<GetPassage xmlns:tei="http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0" xmlns="http://chs.harvard.edu/xmlns/cts">
            <request>
                <requestName>GetPassage</requestName>
                <requestUrn>urn:cts:latinLit:phi1002.phi001.perseus-eng2:3.6.71-3.6.73</requestUrn>
            </request>
            <reply>
                <urn>urn:cts:latinLit:phi1002.phi001.perseus-eng2:3.6.71-3.6.73</urn>
                <passage>
                    <TEI xmlns="http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0"><text xml:lang="eng"><body><div n="urn:cts:latinLit:phi1002.phi001.perseus-eng2" type="translation" xml:lang="eng"><div n="3" type="textpart" subtype="book"><div n="6" type="textpart" subtype="section"><div n="71" type="textpart" subtype="section"><p> of fact. <quote> You have no right to bring an action against me, as it
                                is impossible for you to have been appointed to represent the actual
                                plaintiff. </quote> It then has to be decided whether he could have
                            been so appointed. <quote> You ought not to have proceeded by interdict,
                                    <note anchored="true" place="unspecified"><hi rend="italic">sc.</hi> by getting an order for restitution. </note> but
                                to have put in a plea for possession. </quote> The point in doubt is
                            whether the interdict is legal. All these points fall under the head of
                                <hi rend="italic">legal questions.</hi>
                     </p></div><div n="72" type="textpart" subtype="section"><p> not even those special pleas, in which questions of <hi rend="italic">competence</hi> make themselves most evident, give rise to the same
                            species of question as those laws under which the action is brought, so
                            that the enquiry is <pb n="v1-3 p.447"/> really concerned with the name
                            of a given act, <note anchored="true" place="unspecified"><hi rend="italic">e. g.</hi> murder or manslaughter: sacrilege or
                                theft. </note> with the letter of the law and its meaning, or with
                            something that requires to be settled by argument? The <hi rend="italic">basis</hi> originates from the question, and in cases of <hi rend="italic">competence</hi> it is not the question concerning
                            which the advocate argues that is involved, but the question on account
                            of which he argues. <note anchored="true" place="unspecified">See §
                                70.</note>
                     </p></div><div n="73" type="textpart" subtype="section"><p> An example will make this clearer. <quote>You have killed a
                                man.</quote>
                        <quote>I did not kill him.</quote> The <hi rend="italic">question</hi> is whether he has killed him; the <hi rend="italic">basis</hi> is the <hi rend="italic">conjectural.</hi> But the
                            following case is very different. <quote>I have the right to bring this
                                action.</quote>
                        <quote>You have not the right.</quote> The question
                            is whether he has the right, and it is from this that we derive the <hi rend="italic">basis.</hi> For whether he is allowed the right or not
                            depends on the event, not on the cause itself, and on the decision of
                            the judge, not on that on account of which he gives such a decision.
                        </p></div></div></div></div></body></text></TEI>
                </passage>
            </reply>
            </GetPassage>