<GetPassage xmlns:tei="http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0" xmlns="http://chs.harvard.edu/xmlns/cts">
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                <requestUrn>urn:cts:latinLit:phi1002.phi001.perseus-eng2:2.21.11-2.21.21</requestUrn>
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            <reply>
                <urn>urn:cts:latinLit:phi1002.phi001.perseus-eng2:2.21.11-2.21.21</urn>
                <passage>
                    <TEI xmlns="http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0"><text xml:lang="eng"><body><div n="urn:cts:latinLit:phi1002.phi001.perseus-eng2" type="translation" xml:lang="eng"><div n="2" type="textpart" subtype="book"><div n="21" type="textpart" subtype="chapter"><div n="11" type="textpart" subtype="section"><p> Similarly medicine will not cease to be an art, because, like the art of
                            the gymnast, it prescribes rubbing with oil and exercise, or because it
                            deals with diet like the art of cookery. </p></div><div n="12" type="textpart" subtype="section"><p> Again, the objection that to discourse of what is good, expedient or
                            just is the duty of philosophy presents no difficulty. For when such
                            critics speak of a philosopher, they mean a good man. Why then should I
                            feel surprised to find that the orator whom I identify with the good man
                            deals with the same material? </p></div><div n="13" type="textpart" subtype="section"><p> There is all the less reason, since I have already shown in the first
                            book <note anchored="true" place="unspecified"> Pref. § 10 <hi rend="italic">sqq.</hi>
                        </note> that philosophers only usurped
                            this department of knowledge after it had been abandoned by the orators:
                            it was always the peculiar property of rhetoric and the philosophers are
                            really trespassers. Finally, since the discussion of whatever is brought
                            before it is the task of dialectic, which is really a concise form of
                            oratory, why should not this task be regarded as also being the
                            appropriate material for continuous oratory? <pb n="v1-3 p.363"/> There
                            is a further objection made by certain critics, who say <quote> Well
                                then, <milestone n="14" unit="section"/> if an orator has to speak
                                on every subject, he must be the master of all the arts. </quote> I
                            might answer this criticism in the words of Cicero, <note anchored="true" place="unspecified"><hi rend="italic">de Or.</hi> I.
                                vi. 20. </note> in whom I find the following passage:— <quote> In my
                                opinion no one can be an absolutely perfect orator unless he has
                                acquired a knowledge of all important subjects and arts. </quote> I
                            however regard it as sufficient that an orator should not be actually
                            ignorant of the subject on which he has to speak. </p></div><div n="15" type="textpart" subtype="section"><p> For he cannot have a knowledge of all causes, and yet he should be able
                            to speak on all. On what then will he speak? On those which he has
                            studied. Similarly as regards the arts, he will study those concerning
                            which he has to speak, as occasion may demand, and will speak on those
                            which he has studied. </p></div><div n="16" type="textpart" subtype="section"><p> What then?—I am asked—will not a builder speak better on the subject of
                            building and a musician on music? Certainly, if the orator does not know
                            what is the question at issue. Even an illiterate peasant who is a party
                            to a suit will speak better on behalf of his case than an orator who
                            does not know what the subject in dispute may be. But on the other hand
                            if the orator receive instruction from the builder or the musician, he
                            will put forward what he has thus learned better than either, just as he
                            will plead a case better than his client, once he has been instructed in
                            it. </p></div><div n="17" type="textpart" subtype="section"><p> The builder and the musician will, however, speak on the subject of
                            their respective arts, if there should be any technical point which
                            requires to be established. Neither will be an orator, but he will
                            perform his task like an orator, just as when an untrained person binds
                            up a <pb n="v1-3 p.365"/> wound, he will not be a physician, but he will
                            be acting as one. </p></div><div n="18" type="textpart" subtype="section"><p> Is it suggested that such topics never crop up in panegyric,
                            deliberative or forensic oratory? When the question of the construction
                            of a port at Ostia came up for discussion, had not the orator to state
                            his views? And yet it was a subject requiring the technical knowledge of
                            the architect. </p></div><div n="19" type="textpart" subtype="section"><p> Does not the orator discuss the question whether livid spots and
                            swellings on the body are symptomatic of ill-health or poison? And yet
                            that is a question for the qualified physician. Will he not deal with
                            measurements and figures? And yet we must admit that they form part of
                            mathematics. For my part I hold that practically all subjects are under
                            certain circumstances liable to come up for treatment by the orator. If
                            the circumstances do not occur, the subjects will not concern him. </p></div><div n="20" type="textpart" subtype="section"><p> We were therefore right in asserting that the material of rhetoric is
                            composed of everything that comes before the orator for treatment, an
                            assertion which is confirmed by the practice of everyday speech. For
                            when we have been given a subject on which to speak, we often preface
                            our remarks by calling attention to the fact that the matter has been
                            laid before us. </p></div><div n="21" type="textpart" subtype="section"><p> Gorgias indeed felt so strongly that it was the orator's duty to speak
                            on every subject, that he used to allow those who attended his lectures
                            to ask him questions on any subject they pleased. Hermagoras also
                            asserted that the material of oratory lay in the cause and the questions
                            it involved, thereby including every subject that can be brought before
                            it. </p></div></div></div></div></body></text></TEI>
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