<GetPassage xmlns:tei="http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0" xmlns="http://chs.harvard.edu/xmlns/cts">
            <request>
                <requestName>GetPassage</requestName>
                <requestUrn>urn:cts:latinLit:phi1002.phi001.perseus-eng2:2.17.29-2.17.33</requestUrn>
            </request>
            <reply>
                <urn>urn:cts:latinLit:phi1002.phi001.perseus-eng2:2.17.29-2.17.33</urn>
                <passage>
                    <TEI xmlns="http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0"><text xml:lang="eng"><body><div n="urn:cts:latinLit:phi1002.phi001.perseus-eng2" type="translation" xml:lang="eng"><div n="2" type="textpart" subtype="book"><div n="17" type="textpart" subtype="chapter"><div n="29" type="textpart" subtype="section"><p> But if, as is <pb n="v1-3 p.339"/> the case, our hearers are fickle of
                            mind, and truth is exposed to a host of perils, we must call in art to
                            aid us in the fight and employ such means as will help our case. He who
                            has been driven from the right road cannot be brought back to it save by
                            a fresh detour. </p></div><div n="30" type="textpart" subtype="section"><p> The point, however, that gives rise to the greatest number of these
                            captious accusations against rhetoric, is found in the allegation that
                            orators speak indifferently on either side of a case. From which they
                            draw the following arguments: no art is self-contradictory, but rhetoric
                            does contradict itself; no art tries to demolish what itself has built,
                            but this does happen in the operations of rhetoric; or again:— rhetoric
                            teaches either what ought to be said or what ought not to be said;
                            consequently it is not an art because it teaches what ought not to be
                            said, or because, while it teaches what ought to be said, it also
                            teaches precisely the opposite. </p></div><div n="31" type="textpart" subtype="section"><p> Now it is obvious that all such charges are brought against that type of
                            rhetoric with which neither good men nor virtue herself will have
                            anything to do; since if a case be based on injustice, rhetoric has no
                            place therein and consequently it can scarcely happen even under the
                            most exceptional circumstances that an orator, that is to say, a good
                            man, will speak indifferently on either side. </p></div><div n="32" type="textpart" subtype="section"><p> Still it is in the nature of things conceivable that just causes may
                            lead two wise men to take different sides, since it is held that wise
                            men may fight among themselves, provided that they do so at the bidding
                            of reason. I will therefore reply to their criticisms in such a way that
                            it will be clear that these arguments have no force even against those
                            who concede the name of orator to persons of bad character. For rhetoric
                            is not self-contradictory. </p></div><div n="33" type="textpart" subtype="section"><p> The conflict is <pb n="v1-3 p.341"/> between case and case, not between
                            rhetoric and itself. And even if persons who have learned the same thing
                            fight one another, that does not prove that what they have learned is
                            not an art. Were that so, there could be no art of arms, since
                            gladiators trained under the same master are often matched against each
                            other; </p></div></div></div></div></body></text></TEI>
                </passage>
            </reply>
            </GetPassage>