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                <requestUrn>urn:cts:latinLit:phi1002.phi001.perseus-eng2:12.2.10-12.2.20</requestUrn>
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            <reply>
                <urn>urn:cts:latinLit:phi1002.phi001.perseus-eng2:12.2.10-12.2.20</urn>
                <passage>
                    <TEI xmlns="http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0"><text xml:lang="eng"><body><div n="urn:cts:latinLit:phi1002.phi001.perseus-eng2" type="translation" xml:lang="eng"><div n="12" type="textpart" subtype="book"><div n="2" type="textpart" subtype="chapter"><div n="10" type="textpart" subtype="section"><p> And since philosophy falls into three divisions, physics, ethics and
                            dialectic, which, I ask you, of these departments is not closely
                            connected with the task of the orator? Let us reverse the order just
                            given and deal first with the third department which is entirely
                            concerned with words. If it be true that to know the properties of each
                            word, to clear away ambiguities, to unravel perplexities, to distinguish
                            between truth and falsehood, to prove or to refute as may be desired,
                            all form part of the functions of an orator, who is there that can doubt
                            the truth of my contention? </p></div><div n="11" type="textpart" subtype="section"><p> I grant that we shall not have to employ dialectic with such minute
                            attention to detail when we are pleading in the courts as when we are
                                <pb n="v10-12 p.389"/> engaged in philosophical debate, since the
                            orator's duty is not merely to instruct, but also to move and delight
                            his audience; and to succeed in doing this he needs a strength,
                            impetuosity and grace as well. For oratory is like a river: the current
                            is stronger when it flows within deep banks and with a mighty flood,
                            than when the waters are shallow and broken by the pebbles that bar
                            their way. </p></div><div n="12" type="textpart" subtype="section"><p> And just as the trainers of the wrestling school do not impart the
                            various <hi rend="italic">throws</hi> to their pupils that those who
                            have learnt them may make use of all of them in actual wrestling matches
                            (for weight and strength and wind count for more than these), but that
                            they may have a store from which to draw one or two of such tricks, as
                            occasion may offer; </p></div><div n="13" type="textpart" subtype="section"><p> even so the science of dialectic, or if you prefer it of disputation,
                            while it is often useful in definition, inference, differentiation,
                            resolution of ambiguity, distinction and classification, as also in
                            luring on or entangling our opponents, yet if it claim to assume the
                            entire direction of the struggles of the forum, will merely stand in the
                            way of arts superior to itself and by its very subtlety will exhaust the
                            strength that has been pared down to suit its limitations. </p></div><div n="14" type="textpart" subtype="section"><p> As a result you will find that certain persons who show astonishing
                            skill in philosophical debate, as soon as they quit the sphere of their
                            quibbles, are as helpless in any case that demands more serious pleading
                            as those small animals which, though nimble enough in a confined space,
                            are easily captured in an open field. </p></div><div n="15" type="textpart" subtype="section"><p> Proceeding to moral philosophy or ethics, we may note that it at any
                            rate is entirely suited to the orator. For vast as is the variety of
                            cases (since in <pb n="v10-12 p.391"/> them, as I have pointed out in
                            previous books, we seek to discover certain points by conjecture, <note anchored="true" place="unspecified"> See <milestone n="3" unit="chapter"/>
                           <milestone n="1" unit="section"/> vi. 45.
                            </note> reach our conclusions in others by means of definition, <note anchored="true" place="unspecified">See III. vi. 45.</note> dispose
                            of others on legal grounds' or by raising the question of competence,
                                <note anchored="true" place="unspecified">See ill. vi. 23.</note>
                            while other points are established by syllogism <note anchored="true" place="unspecified">See III. vi. 15.</note> and others involve
                            contradictions <note anchored="true" place="unspecified"> Probably an
                                allusion to contradictory laws. See VIII. vii. </note> or are
                            diversely interpreted owing to some ambiguity of language <note anchored="true" place="unspecified">See VII. ix.</note> ), there is
                            scarcely a single one which does not at some point or another involve
                            the discussion of equity and virtue, while there are also, as everyone
                            knows, not a few which turn entirely on questions of quality. </p></div><div n="16" type="textpart" subtype="section"><p> Again in deliberative assemblies how can we advise a policy without
                            raising the question of what is honourable? Nay, even the third
                            department of oratory, which is concerned with the tasks of praise and
                            denunciation, must without a doubt deal with questions of right and
                            wrong. </p></div><div n="17" type="textpart" subtype="section"><p> For the orator will assuredly have much to say on such topics as
                            justice, fortitude, abstinence, self-control and piety. But the good
                            man, who has come to the knowledge of these things not by mere hearsay,
                            as though they were just words and names for his tongue to employ, but
                            has grasped the meaning of virtue and acquired a true feeling for it,
                            will never be perplexed when he has to think out a problem, but will
                            speak out truly what he knows. </p></div><div n="18" type="textpart" subtype="section"><p> Since, however, <hi rend="italic">general</hi> questions are always more
                            important than special (for the particular is contained in the
                            universal, while the universal is never to be regarded as something
                            superimposed on the particular), everyone will readily admit that the
                            studies of which we are speaking are pre-eminently concerned with
                            general questions. </p></div><div n="19" type="textpart" subtype="section"><p> Further, since there are numerous points which require to be <pb n="v10-12 p.393"/> determined by appropriate and concise definitions
                            (hence the <hi rend="italic">definitive basis</hi>
                        <note anchored="true" place="unspecified">See III vi. 31.</note> of cases), it is surely
                            desirable that the orator should be instructed in such things by those
                            who have devoted special attention to the subject. Again, does not every
                            question of law turn either on the precise meaning of words, the
                            discussion of equity, or conjecture as to the intention—subjects which
                            in part encroach on the domain of dialectic and in part on that of
                            ethics? </p></div><div n="20" type="textpart" subtype="section"><p> Consequently all oratory involves a natural admixture of all these
                            philosophic elements—at least, that is to say, all oratory that is
                            worthy of the name. For mere garrulity that is ignorant of all such
                            learning must needs go astray, since its guides are either non-existent
                            or false. Physics <note anchored="true" place="unspecified"><hi rend="italic">i.e.</hi> natural phlilosophy in the widest sense.
                            </note> on the other hand is far richer than the other branches of
                            philosophy, if viewed from the standpoint of providing exercise in
                            speaking, in proportion as a loftier inspiration is required to speak of
                            things divine than of things human; and further it includes within its
                            scope the whole of ethics, which as we have shown <note anchored="true" place="unspecified">§ 15.</note> are essential to the very existence
                            of oratory. </p></div></div></div></div></body></text></TEI>
                </passage>
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