and indeed had I felt otherwise in this connexion, I might have defended
my point with greater boldness and freedom.
I say nothing of those critics who will not allow sufficient credit even
for eloquence to Cicero and Demosthenes, although Cicero himself does
not regard Demosthenes as flawless, but asserts that he sometimes nods,
However, let us fly in the face of nature and assume that a bad man has been discovered who is endowed with the highest eloquence. I shall none the less deny that he is an orator. For I should not allow that every man who has shown himself ready with his hands was necessarily a brave man, because true courage cannot be conceived of without the accompaniment of virtue.
Surely the advocate who is called to defend the accused requires to be a man of honour, honour which greed cannot corrupt, influence seduce, or fear dismay. Shall we then dignify the traitor, the deserter, the turncoat with the sacred name of orator? But if the quality which is usually termed goodness is to be found even in quite ordinary advocates, why should not the orator, who has not yet existed, but may still be born, be no less perfect in character than in excellence of speech?
It is no hack-advocate, no hireling pleader, nor yet, to use no harser
term, a serviceable attorney of the class generally known as causidici, that I am seeking to form, but rather
a man who to extraordinary natural gifts has added a thorough mastery of
all the fairest branches of knowledge, a man sent by heaven to be the
blessing of mankind, one to whom all history can find no parallel,
uniquely perfect in every detail and utterly noble alike in thought and
speech.
How small a portion of all these abilities will be required for the
defence of the innocent, the repression of crime or the support of truth
against falsehood in suits involving questions of money? It is true that
our supreme orator will bear his part in such tasks, but his powers will
be displayed with brighter splendour in greater matters than these, when
he is called upon to direct the counsels of the senate and
Was not this the man conceived by Virgil and described as quelling a
riot when torches and stones have begun to fly: Aen. i. 151 sqq.
Here then we have
one who is before all else a good man, and it is only after this that
the poet adds that he is skilled in speaking:
Again, His words their minds control, their
passions soothe.
will not this same man, whom we are striving to form, if in time of war he be called upon to inspire his soldiers with courage for the fray, draw for his eloquence on the innermost precepts of philosophy? For how can men who stand upon the verge of battle banish all the crowding fears of hardship, pain and death from their minds, unless those fears be replaced by the sense of the duty that they owe their country, by courage and the lively image of a soldier's honour?
And assuredly the man who will best inspire such feelings in others is he who has first inspired them in himself. For however we strive to conceal it, insincerity will always betray itself, and there was never in any man so great eloquence as would not begin to stumble and hesitate so soon as his words ran counter to his inmost thoughts.
Now: a bad man cannot help speaking things other than he feels. On the
other land, the good will never be at a loss for honourable words or
fail to find matter full of virtue for utterance, since among his
virtues practical wisdom will be one. And even though his
Therefore, let those that are young, or rather let all of us, whatever our age, since it is never too late to resolve to follow what is right, strive with all our hearts and devote all our efforts to the pursuit of virtue and eloquence; and perchance it may be granted to us to attain to the perfection that we seek. For since nature does not forbid the attainment of either, why should not someone succeed in attaining both together? And why should not each of us hope to be that happy man?
But if our powers are inadequate to such achievement, we shall still be the better for the double effort in proportion to the distance which we have advanced toward either goal. At any rate let us banish from our hearts the delusion that eloquence, the fairest of all things, can be combined with vice. The power of speaking is even to be accounted an evil when it is found in evil men; for it makes its possessors yet worse than they were before.
I think I hear certain persons (for there will always be some who had
rather be eloquent than good) asking, Why then is there so much
art in connexion with eloquence? Why have you talked so much of
'glosses,'
color is a technical term for the
particular aspect given to a case by skilful manipulation of
the facts—the 'gloss' or 'varnish' put on them by the
accused or accuser.
—Peterson on
Quint. X. i. 116.
Now, though my reply to these critics will in the first place be a
defence of my own work, it will also explain what
For the Academicians, although they will argue on either side of a question, do not thereby commit themselves to taking one of these two views as their guide in life to the exclusion of the other, while the famous Carneades, who is said to have spoken at Rome in the presence of Cato the Censor, and to have argued against justice with no less vigour than he had argued for justice on the preceding day, was not himself an unjust man. But the nature of virtue is revealed by vice, its opposite, justice becomes yet more manifest from the contemplation of injustice, and there are many other things that are proved by their contraries. Consequently the schemes of his adversaries should be no less well known to the orator than those of the enemy to a commander in the field.
But it is even true, although at first sight it seems hard to believe,
that there may be sound reason why at times a good man who is appearing
for the defence should attempt to conceal the truth from the judge. If
any of my readers is surprised at my making such a statement (although
this opinion is not of my own invention, but is derived from those whom
antiquity regarded as the greatest teachers of wisdom), I would have him
reflect that
For if to slay a man is often a virtue and to put one's own children to death is at times the noblest of deeds, and if it is permissible in the public interest to do deeds yet more horrible to relate than these, we should assuredly take into consideration not solely and simply what is the nature of the case which the good man undertakes to defend, but what is his reason and what his purpose in so doing.
And first of all everyone must allow, what even the sternest of the Stoics admit, that the good man will sometimes tell a lie, and further that he will sometimes do so for comparatively trivial reasons; for example we tell countless lies to sick children for their good and make many promises to them which we do not intend to perform.
And there is clearly far more justification for lying when it is a question of diverting an assassin from his victim or deceiving an enemy to save our country. Consequently a practice which is at times reprehensible even in slaves, may on other occasions be praiseworthy even in a wise man. If this be granted, I can see that there will be many possible emergencies such as to justify an orator in undertaking cases of a kind which, in the absence of any honourable reason, he would have refused to touch.
In saying this I do not mean that we should be ready under any
circumstances to defend our father, brother or friend when in peril
(since I hold that we should be guided by stricter rules in such
matters), although such contingencies may well cause us no little
perplexity, when we have to decide between the rival claims of justice
and natural