Further, it is not merely true that the variety required in impersonation will be in proportion to the variety presented by the case, for impersonation demands even greater variety, since it involves the portrayal of the emotions of children, women, nations, and even of voiceless things, all of which require to be represented in character.

The same points have to be observed with respect to those for whom we plead: for our tone will vary with the character of our client, according as he is distinguished, or of humble position, popular or the reverse, while we must also take into account the differences in their principles and their past life. As regards the orator himself, the qualities which will most commend him are courtesy, kindliness, moderation and benevolence. But, on the other hand, the opposite of these qualities will sometimes be becoming to a good man. He may hate the bad, be moved to passion in the public interest, seek to avenge crime and wrong, and, in fine, as I said at the beginning, See § 14. may follow the promptings of every honourable emotion.

The character of the speaker and of the person on whose behalf he speaks are, however, not the only points which it is important to take into account: the character of those before whom we have to speak calls for serious consideration. Their power and rank will make no small difference; we shall employ different methods according as we are speaking before the emperor, a magistrate, a senator, a private citizen, or merely a free man, while a different tone is demanded by trials in the public courts, and in cases submitted to arbitration.

For while a display of care and anxiety, and the employment of every device available for the amplification of our style are becoming when we are pleading for a client accused on a capital charge, it would be useless to employ the same methods in cases and trials of minor importance, and the speaker who, when speaking from his chair before an arbitrator on some trivial question, should make an admission like that made by Cicero, to the effect that it was not merely his soul that was in a state of commotion, but that his whole body was convulsed with shuddering, Div. in Caec. xiii. 41 would meet with well-deserved ridicule.

Again, who does not know what different styles of eloquence are required when speaking before the grave assembly of the senate and before the fickle populace, since even when we are pleading before single judges the same style will not be suitable for use before one of weighty character and another of a more frivolous disposition, while a learned judge must not be addressed in the same tone that we should employ before a soldier or a rustic, and our style must at times be lowered and simplified, for fear that he may be unable to take it in or to understand it.

Again, circumstances of time and place demand special consideration. The occasion may be one for sorrow or for rejoicing, the time at our disposal may be ample or restricted, and the orator must adapt himself to all these circumstances.

It, likewise, makes no small difference whether we are speaking in public or in private, before a crowded audience or in comparative seclusion, in another city or our own, in the camp or in the forum: each of these places will require its own style and peculiar form of oratory, since even in other spheres of life the same actions are not equally suited to the forum, the senate-house, the Campus Martius, the theatre or one's own house, and there is much that is not in itself reprehensible, and may at times be absolutely necessary, which will be regarded as unseemly if done in some place where it is not sanctioned by custom.

I have already pointed out VIII. iii. 11 sqq. how much more elegance and ornament is allowed by the topics of demonstrative oratory, whose main object is the delectation of the audience, than is permitted by deliberative or forensic themes which are concerned with action and argument. To this must be added the fact that certain qualities, which are in themselves merits of a high order, may be rendered unbecoming by the special circumstances of the case.

For example, when a man is accused on a capital charge, and, above all, if he is defending himself before his conqueror or his sovereign, it would be quite intolerable for him to indulge in frequent metaphors, antique or newlycoined words, rhythms as far removed as possible from the practice of every-day speech, rounded periods, florid commonplaces and ornate reflexions. Would not all these devices destroy the impression of anxiety which should be created by a man in such peril, and rob him of the succour of pity, on which even the innocent are forced to rely?

Would any man be moved by the sad plight of one who revealed himself as a vainglorious boaster, and ostentatiously flaunted the airs and graces of his eloquence at a moment when his fate hung in suspense? Would he not rather hate the man who, despite his position as accused, hunted for fine words, showed himself concerned for his reputation as a clever speaker, and found time at such a moment to display his eloquence?

I consider that Marcus Caelius, in the speech in which he defended himself against a charge of breach of the peace, showed a wonderful grasp of these facts, when he said: I trust that none of you gentlemen, or of all those who have come to plead against me, will find offence in my mien or insolence in my voice, or, though that is a comparative trifle, any trace of arrogance in my gesture.

But there are some cases where the success of the pleader depends on apology, entreaties for mercy, or confession of error. Can sorrow be expressed in epigram? Or will enthymemes A form of syllogism. See V xiv. 1. or epiphonemata See VIII. v. 11. An exclamation attached to the close of a statement or a proof by way of climax. avail to win the judge's mercy? Will not all embellishment of pure emotion merely impair its force and dispel compassion by such a display of apparent unconcern?

Or, suppose that a father has to speak of his son's death, or of some wrong that is worse than death, will he, in making his statement of facts, seek to achieve that grace in exposition which is secured by purity and lucidity of language, and content himself with setting forth his case in due order with brevity and meaning? Or will he count over the heads of his argument upon his fingers, aim at niceties of division and proposition, and speak without the least energy of feeling as is usual in such portions of a speech?

Whither will his grief have fled while he is thus engaged? Where has the fountain of his tears been stayed? How came this callous attention to the rules of text-books to obtrude itself? Will he not rather, from his opening words to the very last he utters, maintain a continuous voice of lamentation and a mien of unvaried woe, if he desires to transplant his grief to the hearts of his audience? For if he once remits aught of his passion of grief, he will never be able to recall it to the hearts of them that hear him.

This is a point which declaimers, above all, must be careful to bear in mind: I mention this because I have no compunction in referring to a branch of the art which was once also my own, or in reverting to the consideration of the youthful students such as once were in my charge: the declaimer, I repeat, must bear this in mind, since in the schools we often feign emotions that affect us not as advocates, but as the actual sufferers.

For example, we even imagine cases where persons, either because of some overwhelming misfortune or repentance for some sin, demand from the senate the right to make an end of their lives; VII. iv. 39. It is said that poison was provided by the state of Massilia to serve the turn of such unhappy persons, so soon as they could convince the local senate that their proposed suicide was justifiable. and in these cases it is obviously unbecoming not merely to adopt a chanting intonation, Cp. I. viii. 2. a fault which has also become almost universal, or to use extravagant language, but even to argue without an admixture of emotional appeal, so managed as to be even more prominent than the proof which is advanced. For the man who can lay aside his grief for a moment while he is pleading, seems capable even of laying it aside altogether

I am not sure, however, that it is not in our attitude towards our opponents that this care for decorum, which we are now discussing, should be most rigorously maintained. For there can be no doubt, that in all accusations our first aim should be to give the impression that it is only with the greatest reluctance that we have consented to undertake the role of accuser. Consequently, I strongly disapprove of such remarks as the following which was made by Cassius Severus: Cp. x. i. 22. In 9 B.C. he accused Nonius Asprenas, a friend of Augustus, of the crime of poisoning. Asprenas was defended by Pollio, and supported by Augustus during his trial. Thank Heaven, I am still alive; and that I may find some savour in life, I see Asprenas arraigned for his crimes. For, after this, it is impossible to suppose that he had just or necessary reasons for accusing Asprenas, and we cannot help suspecting that his motive was sheer delight in accusation.

But, beside this consideration, which applies to all cases, there is the further point that certain cases demand special moderation. Therefore, a man who demands the appointment of a curator for his father's property, should express his grief at his father's affliction; and, however grave be the charges that a father may be going to bring against his son, he should emphasize the painful nature of the necessity that is imposed upon him. The imagined case would be as follows. The father disinherits the son for an alleged offence. The son accuses the father of madness and demands a curator, etc. And this he should do not merely in a few brief words, but his emotion should colour his whole speech, so that it may be felt not merely that he is speaking, but that he is speaking the truth.

Again, if a ward make allegations against his guardian, the latter must never give way to such anger that no trace is left of his former love or of a certain reverent regard for the memory of his opponent's father. I have already spoken, in the seventh book, I think, VII. iv. 24. of the way in which a case should be pleaded against a father who disinherits his son, or a wife who brings a charge of illtreatment against her husband, while the fourth book, IV. i. 46. in which I prescribed certain rules for the exordium, contains my instructions as to when it is becoming that the parties should speak themselves, and when they should employ an advocate to speak for them.

It will be readily admitted by everyone that words may be becoming or offensive in themselves. There is therefore a further point, which presents the most serious difficulty, that requires notice in this connexion: we must consider by what means things which are naturally unseemly and which, had we been given the choice, we should have preferred not to say, may be uttered without indecorum.