<GetPassage xmlns:tei="http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0" xmlns="http://chs.harvard.edu/xmlns/cts">
            <request>
                <requestName>GetPassage</requestName>
                <requestUrn>urn:cts:latinLit:phi0914.phi001.perseus-eng3:9.18-9.21</requestUrn>
            </request>
            <reply>
                <urn>urn:cts:latinLit:phi0914.phi001.perseus-eng3:9.18-9.21</urn>
                <passage>
                    <TEI xmlns="http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0"><text><body><div n="urn:cts:latinLit:phi0914.phi001.perseus-eng3" type="edition" xml:lang="eng"><div n="9" subtype="book" type="textpart"><div n="18" subtype="chapter" type="textpart"><div n="1" subtype="section" type="textpart"><p>I am speaking of Alexander as he was before he was submerged in the flood
							of success, for no man was less capable of bearing prosperity than he
							was. </p></div><div n="2" subtype="section" type="textpart"><p> If we look at him as transformed by his new fortunes and presenting the
							new character, so to </p></div><div n="3" subtype="section" type="textpart"><p> speak, which he had assumed after his victories, it is evident he would
							have come into Italy more like Darius than Alexander, and would have
							brought with him an army which had forgotten its native Macedonia and
							was rapidly becoming Persian in character. </p></div><div n="4" subtype="section" type="textpart"><p> It is a disagreeable task in the case of so great a man to have to
							record his ostentatious love of dress; the prostrations which he
							demanded from all who approached his presence, and which the Macedonians
							must have felt to be humiliating, even had they been vanquished, how
							much more when they were victors; </p></div><div n="5" subtype="section" type="textpart"><p> the terribly cruel punishments he in- flicted; the murder of his friends
							at the banquet-table; the vanity which made him invent a divine pedigree
							for himself. </p></div><div n="6" subtype="section" type="textpart"><p> What, pray, would have happened if his love of wine had become stronger
							and his passionate nature more violent and fiery as he grew older? I am
							only stating facts about which there is no dispute. Are we to regard
							none of these things as serious draw- backs to his merits as a
							commander? </p></div><div n="7" subtype="section" type="textpart"><p> Or was there any danger of that happening which the most frivolous of
							the Greeks, who actually extol the Parthians at the expense of the
							Romans, are so constantly harping upon, namely, that the Roman people
							must have bowed before the greatness of Alexander's name — though I do
							not think they had even beard of him —and </p></div><div n="8" subtype="section" type="textpart"><p> that not one out of all the Roman chiefs would have uttered his true
							sentiments about him, though men dared to attack him in Athens, the very
							city which had been shattered by Macedonian arms and almost well in
							sight of the smoking ruins of `Thebes, and the speeches of his
							assailants are still extant to prove this? However lofty our ideas of
							this man's greatness, still it is the greatness of one individual,
							attained in a successful career of little more than ten years. </p></div><div n="9" subtype="section" type="textpart"><p> Those who extol it on the ground that though Rome has never lost a war
							she has lost many battle, whilst Alexander has never fought a battle
							unsuccess- fully, are not aware that they are comparing the actions of
							one individual, and he a youth, with the achievements of a people who
							have had 8oo years of war. </p></div><div n="10" subtype="section" type="textpart"><p> Where more generations are reckoned on one side than years on the other,
							can we be sur- prised that in such a long space of time there </p></div><div n="11" subtype="section" type="textpart"><p> have been more changes of fortune than in a period of thirteen years?
							Why do you not compare the fortunes of one man with another, of one
							commander with another? </p></div><div n="12" subtype="section" type="textpart"><p> How many Roman generals could I name who have never been unfortunate in
							a single battle! You may run through page after page of the lists of
							magistrates, both consuls and Dictators, and not find one with whose
							valour and fortunes the Roman people have ever for a single day had
							cause to be dissatisfied. </p></div><div n="13" subtype="section" type="textpart"><p> And these men are more worthy of admiration than Alexander or any other
							king. </p></div><div n="14" subtype="section" type="textpart"><p> Some retained the Dictatorship for only ten or twenty days; none held a
							con- sulship for more than a year; the levying of troops was often
							obstructed by the tribunes of the plebs; they were late, in consequence,
							in taking the field, and were often recalled before the time to conduct
							the elections; </p></div><div n="15" subtype="section" type="textpart"><p> frequently, when they were commencing some important operation, their
							year of office expired; their colleagues frustrated or ruined their
							plans, some through recklessness, some through jealousy; they often had
							to succeed to the mistakes or failures of others and take over an army
							of raw recruits or one in a bad state of discipline. </p></div><div n="16" subtype="section" type="textpart"><p> Kings are free from all hindrances; they are lords of time and
							circumstance, and draw all things into the sweep of their own designs.
						</p></div><div n="17" subtype="section" type="textpart"><p>Thus, the invincible Alexander would have crossed swords with invincible
							captains, and would have given the same pledges to Fortune which they
							gave. </p></div><div n="18" subtype="section" type="textpart"><p> Nay, he would have run greater risks than they, for the Macedonians had
							only one Alexander, who was not only liable to all sorts of accidents
							but deliberately exposed himself to them, whilst there were </p></div><div n="19" subtype="section" type="textpart"><p> many Romans equal to Alexander in glory and in the grandeur of their
							deeds, and yet each of them might fulfil his destiny by his life or by
							his death without imperilling the existence of the State. </p></div></div><div n="19" subtype="chapter" type="textpart"><div n="1" subtype="section" type="textpart"><p>It remains for us to compare the one army with the other as regards
							either the numbers or the quality of the troops or the strength of the
							allied forces. </p></div><div n="2" subtype="section" type="textpart"><p> Now the census for that period gives 250,000 persons. In all the revolts
							of the Latin league ten legions were raised, consisting almost entirely
							of city troops. </p></div><div n="3" subtype="section" type="textpart"><p> Often during those years four or five armies were engaged simultaneously
							in Etruria, in Umbria (where they had to meet the Gauls as well), in
							Samnium, and in Lucania. </p></div><div n="4" subtype="section" type="textpart"><p> Then as regards the attitude of the various Italian tribes —the whole of
							Latium with the Sabines, Volscians, and Aequi, the whole of Campania,
							parts of Umbria and Etruria, the Picentines, the Marsi, and Paeligni,
							the Vestinians and Apulians, to which we should add the entire coast of
							the western sea, with its Greek population, stretching from Thurii to
							Neapolis and Cumae, and from there as far as Antium and Ostia —all these
							nationalities he would have found to be either strong allies of Rome or
							reduced to impotence by Roman arms. </p></div><div n="5" subtype="section" type="textpart"><p>He would have crossed the sea with his Macedonian veterans, amounting to
							not more than 30,000 men and 4000 cavalry, mostly Thracian. This formed
							all his real strength. If he had brought over in addition Persian and
							Indians and other Orientals, he would have found them a hindrance rather
							than a help. </p></div><div n="6" subtype="section" type="textpart"><p> We must remember also that the Romans had a reserve to draw upon at
							home, but Alexander, warring on a foreign soil, would have found his
							army diminished by the wastage of war, as happened afterwards to
							Hannibal. </p></div><div n="7" subtype="section" type="textpart"><p> His men were armed with round shields and long spears, the Romans had
							the large shield called the scutum, a better protection for the body,
							and the javelin, a much more effective weapon than the spear whether for
							hurling or thrusting. </p></div><div n="8" subtype="section" type="textpart"><p> In both armies the soldiers fought in line rank by rank, but the
							Macedonian phalanx lacked mobility and formed a single unit; the Roman
							army was more elastic, made up of numerous divisions, which could easily
							act separately or in combination as required. </p></div><div n="9" subtype="section" type="textpart"><p> Then with regard to fatigue duty, what soldier is better able to stand
							hard work than the Roman? If Alexander had been worsted in one battle
							the war would have been over; what army could have broken the strength
							of Rome, when Caudium and Cannae failed to do so? </p></div><div n="10" subtype="section" type="textpart"><p> Even if things had gone well with him at first, he would often have been
							tempted to wish that Persians and Indians and effeminate Asiatics were
							his foes, and would have confessed that </p></div><div n="11" subtype="section" type="textpart"><p> his former wars had been waged against women, as Alexander of Epirus is
							reported to have said when after receiving his moral wound was comparing
							his own fortune with that of this very youth in his Asiatic campaigns.
						</p></div><div n="12" subtype="section" type="textpart"><p> When I remember that in the first Punic war we fought at sea for
							twenty-four years, I think that Alexander would hardly have lived long
							enough to see one war through. </p></div><div n="13" subtype="section" type="textpart"><p> It is quite possible, too, that as Rome and Carthage were at that time
							leagued together by an old-standing treaty, the same apprehensions might
							have led those two powerful states to take up arms against the common
							foe, and Alexander would have been crushed by their combined forces.
						</p></div><div n="14" subtype="section" type="textpart"><p> Rome has had experience of a Macedonian war, not indeed when Alexander
							was commanding nor when the resources of Macedon were still unimpaired,
							but the contests against Antiochus, Philip, and Perses were fought not
							only without loss but even without risk. I trust that I shall not give
							offence when I say that, leaving out of sight the civil wars, we have
							never found an enemy's cavalry or infantry too much </p></div><div n="15" subtype="section" type="textpart"><p> for us, when we have fought in the open field, on ground equally
							favourable for both sides, still less when the ground has given us an
							advantage. </p></div><div n="16" subtype="section" type="textpart"><p> The infantry soldier, with his heavy armour and weapons, may reasonable
							fear the arrows of Parthian cavalry, or passes invested by the enemy, or
							country where supplies cannot be brought up, </p></div><div n="17" subtype="section" type="textpart"><p> but he has repulsed a thousand armies more formidable than those of
							Alexander and his Macedonians, and will repulse them in the future if
							only the domestic peace and concord which we now enjoy remains
							undisturbed for all the years to come. </p></div></div><div n="20" subtype="chapter" type="textpart"><div n="1" subtype="section" type="textpart"><p>M. Foslius Flaccina and L. Plautius Venox were the next consuls. In this
							year several communities amongst the Samnites made overtures for a fresh
							treaty. These deputations, when admitted to an audience, prostrated
							themselves on the ground, and their humble attitude influenced the
							senate in their favour. </p></div><div n="2" subtype="section" type="textpart"><p> Their prayers, however, were by no means so efficacious with the
							Assembly, to which they had been referred by the senate. </p></div><div n="3" subtype="section" type="textpart"><p> Their request for a treaty was refused, but after they had spent several
							days in appealing to individual citizens, they succeeded in obtaining a
							two years' truce. </p></div><div n="4" subtype="section" type="textpart"><p> In Apulia, too, the people of Teanum and Canusium, tired of the constant
							ravages which they had suffered, gave hostages and surrendered to the
							consul, L. Plautius. </p></div><div n="5" subtype="section" type="textpart"><p>It was in this year also that prefects were first appointed for Capua and
							a code of laws given to that city by the praetor, L. Furius. </p></div><div n="6" subtype="section" type="textpart"><p> Both these boons were granted in response to a request from the
							Campanians themselves as a remedy for the deplorable state of things
							brought about by civic discord. </p></div><div n="7" subtype="section" type="textpart"><p>Two new tribes were formed, the Ufentine and the Falernian. As the power
							of Apulia was declining, the people of Teate<note anchored="true" n="7" resp="ed" place="unspecified">this form of the nameLivy probably
								found in the annalist whom he was consulting at the time. It is,
								however, in all probability the Teanum mentioned above which is
								found inscribed on coins as Teate.</note> came to the new consuls,
							C. Junius Bubulcus and Q. Aemilius Barbula, to negotiate for a treaty.
						</p></div><div n="8" subtype="section" type="textpart"><p> They gave a formal undertaking that throughout Apulia peace would be
							maintained towards Rome, and the confident assurances they gave led to a
							treaty being granted, not, however, as between two independent states;
							they were to acknowledge the suzerainty of Rome. </p></div><div n="9" subtype="section" type="textpart"><p> After the subjugation of Apulia —for Forentum, also a place of
							considerable strength, had been captured by Junius —an advance was made
							into Lucania, and the consul, Aemilius, surprised and captured the city
							of Nerulum. </p></div><div n="10" subtype="section" type="textpart"><p>The order introduced into Capua by the adoption of Roman institutions had
							become generally known amongst the states in alliance with Rome, and the
							Antiates asked for the same privilege, as they were without a fixed code
							of laws or any regular magistrates of their own. The patrons of the
								colony<note anchored="true" n="8" resp="ed" place="unspecified">Probably Romans of high standing, who were chosen by individual
								cities or by cantons to act as their agents-general in the City. Or
								possibly the term denotes the three comissioners (triumviri) who had
								supervised the settlement of the colony.</note> were commissioned by
							the senate to draw out a system of jurisprudence. Not only the arms of
							Rome but her laws were spreading far and wide. </p></div></div><div n="21" subtype="chapter" type="textpart"><div n="1" subtype="section" type="textpart"><p>At the termination of their year of office the consuls did not hand the
							legions over to their successors, Sp. Nautius and M. Popilius, but to
							the Dictator, L. Aemilius. </p></div><div n="2" subtype="section" type="textpart"><p> In conjunction with M. Fulvius, the Master of the Horse, he commenced an
							attack on Saticula, and the Samnites at once seized this opportunity to
							renew hostilities. </p></div><div n="3" subtype="section" type="textpart"><p> The Romans were threatened by a double danger; the Samnites, after
							getting a large army together, had entrenched themselves not far from
							the Roman camp in order to relieve their blockaded allies, whilst the
							Saticulans suddenly flung their gates open and made a tumultuous attack
							on the Roman outposts. </p></div><div n="4" subtype="section" type="textpart"><p>The two bodies of combatants, each relying more on the help of the other
							than on its own strength, united in a regular attack on the Roman camp.
							Though both sides of the camp were attacked, the Dictator kept his men
							free from panic, owing to his having selected a position which could not
							easily be turned, and also because his men presented two fronts. </p></div><div n="5" subtype="section" type="textpart"><p> He directed his efforts mainly against those who had made the sortie,
							and drove them back, without much trouble, behind their walls. Then he
							turned his whole strength against the Samnites. </p></div><div n="6" subtype="section" type="textpart"><p> Here the fighting was more sustained and the victory was longer in
							coming, but when it did come it was decisive. The Samnites were driven
							in disorder to their camp, and after extinguishing all the camp fires
							they departed silently in the night, having abandoned all hope of saving
							Saticula. By way of retaliation they invested Plistica, a city in
							alliance with Rome. </p></div></div></div></div></body></text></TEI>
                </passage>
            </reply>
            </GetPassage>