The matter can be terminated at once, O Caius Aquillius You can at once depart, being delivered from an annoyance, I had almost said, no less than that Quinctius is exposed to. What are we doing, Hortensius? what are we to say of this condition? Can we, some time or other, laying aside our weapons, discuss the money matter without hazard of any one's fortunes? Can we so prosecute our business, as to leave the life of our relation in safety? Can we adopt the character of a plaintiff, and lay aside that of an accuser? Yes, says he, I will take security from you, but I will not give you security. But who is it that lays down for us these very reasonable conditions? who determines this—that what is just towards Quinctius is unjust towards Naevius? The goods of Quinctius, says he, were taken possession of in accordance with the edict of the praetor. You demand then, that I should admit that; that we should establish by our own sentence, as having taken place, that which we go to trial expressly to prove never did take place.

Can no means be found, O Caius Aquillius, for a man's arriving at his rights as expeditiously as maybe without the disgrace and infamy and ruin of any one else? Forsooth, if anything were owed, he would ask for it: he would not prefer that all sorts of trials should take place, rather than that one from which all these arise. He, who for so many years never even asked Quinctius for the money, when he had an opportunity of transacting business with him every day; he who, from the time when he first began to behave ill, has wasted all the time in adjournments and respiting the recognizances; he who, after he had withdrawn his recognizance drove Quinctius by treachery and violence from their joint estate; who, when he had ample opportunity, without any one's making objection, to try a civil action, With respect to its subject matter the actio was divided into two great divisions, the in personam actio and the in rem actio. The former was against a person who was bound to the plaintiff by contract or delict the latter applied to those cases where a man claimed a property or a right. Smith, Dict. Ant. p.7. chose rather a charge that involved infamy; who, when he is brought back to this tribunal, whence all these proceedings arise, repudiates the most reasonable proposals; confesses that he is aiming, not at the money, but at the life and heart's blood of his adversary;—does he not openly say, “if anything were owing to me, I should demand it, and I should long ago have obtained it;

I would not employ so much trouble, so unpopular a course of legal proceeding, and such a band of favourers of my cause, if I had to make a just demand; I have got to extort money from one unwilling, and in spite of him; I have got to tear and squeeze out of a man what he does not owe; Publius Quinctius is to be cast down from all his fortune; every one who is powerful, or eloquent, or noble, must be brought into court with me; a force must be put upon truth, threats must be bandied about, dangers must be threatened; terrors must be brandished before his eyes, that being cowed and overcome by these things, he may at last yield of his own accord.” And, in truth, all these things, when I see who are striving against us, and when I consider the party sitting opposite to me, seem to be impending over, and to be present to us, and to be impossible to be avoided by any means. But when, O Caius Aquillius, I bring my eyes and my mind back to you, the greater the labour and zeal with which all these things are done, the more trifling and powerless do I think them. Quinctius then owed nothing, as you prove yourself.

But what if he had owed you anything? would that have at once been a reason for your requiring leave from the praetor to take possession of his goods? I think that was neither according to law, nor expedient for any one. What then does he prove? He says that he had forfeited his recognizances.