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                    <TEI xmlns="http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0"><text><body><div type="translation" xml:lang="eng" n="urn:cts:latinLit:phi0448.phi001.perseus-eng2"><div n="8" type="textpart" subtype="book"><div type="textpart" subtype="chapter" n="0"><p>Prevailed on by your continued solicitations, <name>Balbus</name>, I have engaged in a most difficult task, as my daily refusals appear to plead not my inability, but indolence, as an excuse. I have compiled a continuation of the Commentaries of our <name>Caesar's Wars</name> in <name key="tgn,1000070" type="place" n="France [2,46] (nation), Europe">Gaul</name>, not indeed to be compared to his writings, which either precede or follow them; and recently, I have completed what he left imperfect after the transactions in <name key="perseus,Alexandria" type="place" n=" +Alexandria [29.9,31.2] (Perseus) ">Alexandria </name>, to the end, not indeed of the civil broils, to which we see no issue, but of <name type="pers">Caesar</name>'s life. I wish that those who may read them could know how unwillingly I undertook to write them, as then I might the more readily escape the imputation of folly and arrogance, in presuming to intrude among <name type="pers">Caesar</name>'s writings. For it is agreed on all hands, that no composition was ever executed with so great care, that it is not exceeded in elegance by these Commentaries, which were published for the use of historians, that they might not want memoirs of such achievements; and they stand so high in the esteem of all men, that historians seem rather deprived of, than furnished with material. At which we have more reason to be surprised than other men; for they can only appreciate the elegance and correctness with which he finished them, while we know with what ease and expedition. <name type="pers">Caesar</name> possessed not only an uncommon flow of language and elegance of style, but also a thorough knowledge of the method of conveying his ideas. But I had not even the good fortune to share in the <name>Alexandrian</name> or <name>African</name> war; and though these were partly communicated to me by <name type="pers">Caesar</name> himself, in conversation, yet we listen with a different degree of attention to those things which strike us with admiration by their novelty, and those which we design to attest to posterity. But, in truth, while I urge every apology, that I may not be compared to <name type="pers">Caesar</name>, I incur the charge of vanity, by thinking it possible that I can in the judgment of any one be put in competition with him. Farewell. </p></div><div type="textpart" subtype="chapter" n="1"><p><name key="tgn,1000070" type="place" n="France [2,46] (nation), Europe">Gaul</name> being entirely reduced, when <name type="pers">Caesar</name> having waged war incessantly during the former summer, wished to recruit his soldiers after so much fatigue, by repose in winter quarters, news was brought him that several states were simultaneously renewing their hostile intention, and forming combinations. For which a probable reason was assigned; namely, that the <name type="ethnic">Gauls</name> were convinced that they were not able to resist the <name type="ethnic">Romans</name>, with any force they could collect in one place; and hoped that if several states made war in different places at the same time, the <name type="ethnic">Roman</name> army would neither have aid, nor time, nor forces, to prosecute them all: nor ought any single state to decline any inconveniences that might befall them, provided that by such delay, the rest should be enabled to assert their liberty. </p></div><div type="textpart" subtype="chapter" n="2"><p>That this notion might not be confirmed among the <name type="ethnic">Gauls</name>, <name type="pers">Caesar</name> left <name>Marcus Antonius</name>, his questor, in charge of his quarters, and set out himself with a guard of horse, the day before the kalends of <date>January</date>, from the town <name key="tgn,6000798" type="place" n=" +Mont Beuvray (inhabited place), Saone-et-Loire, Burgundy, France, Europe ">Bibracte </name>, to the thirteenth legion, which he had stationed in the country of the <name>Bituriges</name>, not far from the territories of the <name>Aedui</name>, and joined to it the eleventh legion which was next it. Leaving two cohorts to guard the baggage, he leads the rest of his army into the most plentiful part of the country of the <name>Bituriges</name>; who, possessing an extensive territory and several towns, were not to be deterred, by a single legion quartered among them, from making warlike preparation, and forming combinations. </p></div><div type="textpart" subtype="chapter" n="3"><p>By <name type="pers">Caesar</name>'s sudden arrival, it happened, as it necessarily must, to an unprovided and dispersed people, that they were surprised by our horse, while cultivating the fields without any apprehensions, before they had time to fly to their towns. For the usual sign of an enemy's invasion, which is generally intimated by the burning of their towns, was forbidden by <name type="pers">Caesar</name>'s orders; lest if he advanced far, forage and corn should become scarce, or the enemy be warned by the fires to make their escape. Many thousands being taken, as many of the <name>Bituriges</name> as were able to escape the first coming of the <name type="ethnic">Romans</name>, fled to the neighboring states, relying either on private friendship, or public alliance. In vain; for <name type="pers">Caesar</name>, by hasty marches, anticipated them in every place, nor did he allow any state leisure to consider the safety of others, in preference to their own. By this activity, he both retained his friends in their loyalty, and by fear, obliged the wavering to accept offers of peace. Such offers being made to the <name>Bituriges</name>, when they perceived that through <name type="pers">Caesar</name>'s clemency, an avenue was open to his friendship, and that the neighboring states had given hostages, without incurring any punishment, and had been received under his protection, they did the same. </p></div><div type="textpart" subtype="chapter" n="4"><p><name type="pers">Caesar</name> promises his soldiers, as a reward for their labor and patience, in cheerfully submitting to hardships from the severity of the winter, the difficulty of the roads, and the intolerable cold, two hundred sestertii each, and to every centurian two thousand, to be given instead of plunder: and sending his legions back to quarters, he himself returned on the fortieth day to <name key="tgn,6000798" type="place" n=" +Mont Beuvray (inhabited place), Saone-et-Loire, Burgundy, France, Europe ">Bibracte </name>. While he was dispensing justice there, the <name>Bituriges</name> send embassadors to him, to entreat his aid against the <name>Carnutes</name>, who they complained had made war against them. Upon this intelligence, though he had not remained more than eighteen days in winter quarters, he draws the fourteenth and sixth legion out of quarters on the <name key="tgn,1129316" type="place" n=" +Saone [4.833,45.75] (river), France, Europe ">Saone </name>, where he had posted them as mentioned in a former Commentary, to procure supplies of corn. With these two legions he marches in pursuit of the <name>Carnutes</name>. </p></div><div type="textpart" subtype="chapter" n="5"><p>When the news of the approach of our army reached the enemy, the <name>Carnutes</name>, terrified by the suffering of other states, deserted their villages and towns (which were small buildings, raised in a hurry, to meet the immediate necessity, in which they lived to shelter themselves against the winter, for, being lately conquered, they had lost several towns), and dispersed and fled. <name type="pers">Caesar</name>, unwilling to expose his soldiers to the violent storms that break out, especially at that season, took up his quarters at <name key="tgn,7008337" type="place" n=" +Orleans [1.9,47.9] (inhabited place), Loiret, Centre, France, Europe ">Genabum </name>, a town of the <name>Carnutes</name>; and lodged his men in houses, partly belonging to the <name type="ethnic">Gauls</name>, and partly built to shelter the tents, and hastily covered with thatch. But the horse and auxiliaries he sends to all parts to which he was told the enemy had marched; and not without effect, as our men generally returned loaded with booty. The <name>Carnutes</name>, overpowered by the severity of the winter, and the fear of danger, and not daring to continue long in any place, as they were driven from their houses, and not finding sufficient protection in the woods, from the violence of the storms, after losing a considerable number of their men, disperse, and take refuge among the neighboring states. </p></div><div type="textpart" subtype="chapter" n="6"><p><name type="pers">Caesar</name>, being contented, at so severe a season, to disperse the gathering foes, and prevent any new war from breaking out, and being convinced, as far as reason could foresee, that no war of consequence could be set on foot in the summer campaign, stationed <name>Caius Trebonius</name>, with the two legions which he had with him, in quarters at <name key="tgn,7008337" type="place" n=" +Orleans [1.9,47.9] (inhabited place), Loiret, Centre, France, Europe ">Genabum </name>: and being informed by frequent embassies from the <name type="ethnic">Remi</name>, that the <name>Bellovaci</name> (who exceed all the <name type="ethnic">Gauls</name> and <name>Belgae</name> in military prowess), and the neighboring states, headed by <name>Correus</name>, one of the <name>Bellovaci</name>, and <name>Comius</name>, the <name>Atrebatian</name>, were raising an army, and assembling at a general rendezvous, designing with their united forces to invade the territories of the <name>Suessiones</name>, who were put under the patronage of the <name type="ethnic">Remi</name>: and moreover, considering that not only his honor, but his interest was concerned, that such of his allies, as deserved well of the republic, should suffer no calamity; he again draws the eleventh legion out of quarters, and writes besides to <name>Caius Fabius</name>, to march with his two legions to the country of the <name>Suessiones</name>; and he sends to <name type="pers">Trebonius</name> for one of his two legions. Thus, as far as the convenience of the quarters, and the management of the war admitted, he laid the burden of the expedition on the legions by turns, without any intermission to his own toils. </p></div><div type="textpart" subtype="chapter" n="7"><p>As soon as his troops were collected, he marched against the <name>Bellovaci</name>: and pitching his camp in their territories, detached troops of horse all round the country, to take prisoners, from whom he might learn the enemy's plan. The horse, having executed his orders bring him back word, that but few were found in the houses: and that even these had not stayed at home to cultivate their lands (for the emigration was general from all parts) but had been sent back to watch our motions. Upon <name type="pers">Caesar</name>'s inquiring from them, where the main body of the <name>Bellovaci</name> were posted, and what was their design: they made answer, "that all the <name>Bellovaci</name>, fit for carrying arms, had assembled in one place, and along with them the <name>Ambiani</name>, <name>Aulerci</name>, <name>Caletes</name>, <name>Velocasses</name>, and <name>Atrebates</name>, and that they had chosen for their camp, an elevated position, surrounded by a dangerous morass: that they had conveyed all their baggage into the most remote woods: that several noblemen were united in the management of the war; but that the people were most inclined to be governed by <name>Correus</name>, because they knew that he had the strongest aversion to the name of the <name type="ethnic">Roman</name> people: that a few days before <name>Comius</name> had left the camp to engage the <name type="ethnic">Germans</name> to their aid whose nation bordered on theirs, and whose numbers were countless: that the <name>Bellovaci</name> had come to a resolution, with the consent of all the generals and the earnest desire of the people, if <name type="pers">Caesar</name> should come with only three legions, as was reported, to give him battle, that they might not be obliged to encounter his whole army on a future occasion, when they should be in a more wretched and distressed condition; but if he brought a stronger force, they intended to remain in the position they had chosen, and by ambuscade to prevent the <name type="ethnic">Romans</name> from getting forage (which at that season was both scarce and much scattered), corn, and other necessaries. </p></div><div type="textpart" subtype="chapter" n="8"><p>When <name type="pers">Caesar</name> was convinced of the truth of this account from the concurring testimony of several persons, and perceived that the plans which were proposed were full of prudence, and very unlike the rash resolves of a barbarous people, he considered it incumbent on him to use every exertion, in order that the enemy might despise his small force and come to an action. For he had three veteran legions of distinguished valor, the seventh, eighth and ninth. The eleventh consisted of chosen youth of great hopes, who had served eight campaigns, but who, compared with the others, had not yet acquired any great reputation for experience and valor. Calling therefore a council, and laying before it the intelligence which he had received, he encouraged his soldiers. In order if possible to entice the enemy to an engagement by the appearance of only three legions, he ranged his army in the following manner, that the seventh, eighth, and ninth legions should march before all the baggage; that then the eleventh should bring up the rear of the whole train of baggage (which however was but small, as is usual on such expeditions), so that the enemy could not get a sight of a greater number than they themselves were willing to encounter. By this disposition he formed his army almost into a square, and brought them within sight of the enemy sooner than was anticipated. </p></div><div type="textpart" subtype="chapter" n="9"><p>When the <name type="ethnic">Gauls</name>, whose bold resolutions had been reported to <name type="pers">Caesar</name>, saw the legions advance with a regular motion, drawn up in battle array; either from the danger of an engagement, or our sudden approach, or with the design of watching our movements, they drew up their forces before the camp, and did not quit the rising ground. Though <name type="pers">Caesar</name> wished to bring them to battle, yet being surprised to see so vast a host of the enemy, he encamped opposite to them, with a valley between them, deep rather than extensive. He ordered his camp to be fortified with a rampart twelve feet high, with breastworks built on it proportioned to its height and two trenches, each fifteen feet broad, with perpendicular sides to be sunk: likewise several turrets, three stories high, to be raised, with a communication to each other by galleries laid across and covered over; which should be guarded in front by small parapets of osiers; that the enemy might be repulsed by two rows of soldiers. The one of whom, being more secure from danger by their height might throw their darts with more daring and to a greater distance; the other which was nearer the enemy, being stationed on the rampart, would be protected by their galleries from darts falling on their heads. At the entrance he erected gates and turrets of a considerable height. </p></div></div></div></body></text></TEI>
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