"I have not failed and I never will fail to fight with you and for you. I give you my services both as soldier and as general. If I have had any experience in war, if it has been my good fortune to remain unvanquished to this day, I pray the gods to continue all these blessings in our present need and that I may become a man of destiny for my country in her perils as I was in extending her dominion. Surely we may trust in the gods and in the righteousness of the war, which has for its noble and just object the defence of our country's constitution. In addition to this we may rely upon the magnitude of the preparations which we behold on land and sea, which are all the time growing and will be augmented still more as soon as we come into action. We may say that all the nations of the East and around the Euxine Sea, both Greek and barbarian, stand with us, and the kings, who are friends of the Roman people or of myself, are supplying us soldiers, arms, provisions, and other implements of war. Come to your task then with a spirit worthy of your country, of yourselves, and of me, mindful of the wrongs you have received from Cæsar, and ready to obey my orders promptly."

When Pompey had thus spoken the whole army, including the senators and a great many of the nobility who were with him, applauded him vociferously and told him to lead them wherever he would. Pompey thought that as the weather was bad and the sea boisterous Cæsar would not attempt to cross till the end of winter, but would be occupied in the meantime with his duties as consul. So he ordered his naval officers to keep watch of the sea, and then divided his army and sent it into winter quarters in Thessaly and Macedonia. So heedlessly did Pompey form his judgment of what was about to take place. Cæsar, as I have already said, hastened to Brundusium about the winter solstice, intending to strike terror into his enemies by taking them by surprise. Although he found neither provisions, nor apparatus, nor his whole army collected at Brundusium, he, nevertheless, called those who were present to an assembly and addressed them as follows:--

"Fellow-soldiers,--you who are joined with me in the greatest of undertakings,--neither the winter weather, nor the delay of our comrades, nor the want of suitable preparation shall check my onset. I consider rapidity of movement the best substitute for all these things. I think that we who are first at the rendezvous should leave behind us here our servants, our pack-animals, and all our apparatus in order that the ships which are here may take us on board and carry us over at once without the enemy's knowledge. Let us oppose our good fortune to the winter weather, our courage to the smallness of our numbers, and to our want of supplies the abundance of the enemy, which will be ours to take as soon as we touch the land, if we realize that nothing is ours unless we conquer. Let us go then and possess ourselves of their servants, their apparatus, their provisions, while they are spending the winter under cover. Let us go while Pompey thinks that I am spending my time in winter quarters also, or in processions and sacrifices appertaining to my consulship. It is needless to tell you that the most potent thing in war is the unexpected. It will be glorious for us to carry off the first honors of the coming conflict and to prepare a safe pathway yonder for those who will immediately follow us. For my part I would rather now be sailing than talking, so that I may come in Pompey's sight while he thinks me engaged in my official duties at Rome. Although I am certain that you agree with me I await your response."Cæsar's account of his own speech is much briefer, viz: "When Cæsar arrived at Brundusium he addressed his soldiers saying that since they were almost at the end of their labors and perils they should be content to leave their slaves and impedimenta in Italy and embark themselves in the ships in light order so that a greater number of troops could be transported, and that they might expect everything from victory and his liberality." (iii. 6.)

The whole army cried out with enthusiasm that he should lead on. Cæsar at once led, from the platform to the seashore, five legions of foot-soldiers and 600 chosen horse, but as a storm came up he was obliged to cast anchor. It was now the winter solstice and the wind kept him back, against his will, and held him in Brundusium, to his great disappointment, until the first day of the new Y.R. 706 year.Cæsar says that he sailed on the fourth day of January. In the meantime two more legions arrived and B.C. 48 Cæsar embarked these also and started in the winter time on merchant ships, for he had only a few war-ships and these were guarding Sardinia and Sicily. The ships were driven by the winds to the Ceraunian Mountains and Cæsar sent them back immediately to bring the rest of the army.Cæsar tells of another effort which he made for peace by sending Vibullius Rufus to Pompey with a proposal that both should disband their armies within three days. Pompey refused to discuss the proposal, saying: " Of what use to me is life or citizenship if I shall seem to owe them to the benefaction of Cæsar, a belief which will never be erased if it is supposed that I am thus brought back to Italy from which I departed." (iii. 10-18.) He then marched by night against the town of Oricum by a rough and narrow path, with his force divided in several parts on account of the difficulties of the road, so that if his army had been anticipated he might have been easily beaten. With much trouble he got his detachments together about daylight and the commander of the garrison of Oricum, having been forbidden by the townsmen to oppose the entrance of a Roman consul, delivered the keys of the place to Cæsar and remained with him in a position of honor. Lucretius and Minucius, who were on the other side of Oricum with eighteen war-ships guarding merchant ships loaded with corn for Pompey, sunk the latter to prevent them from falling into Cæsar's hands, and fled to Dyrrachium. From Oricum Cæsar hastened to Apollonia,The modern Pollina. It was situated on the southern border of Illyria. The Egnatian Way, the Roman military road to Macedonia and the East, ran from Apollonia and Dyrrachium to Thessalonica. (Strabo, vii. 7, 4.) the inhabitants of which received him. Straberius, the commander of the garrison, abandoned the city.

Cæsar assembled his army and congratulated them on the success they had achieved by their rapid movement in mid-winter, on conquering such a sea without war-ships, on taking Oricum and Apollonia without a fight, and on capturing the enemy's supplies, as he had predicted, without Pompey's knowledge. "If we can anticipate him in reaching Dyrrachium, his military arsenal," he added, "we shall be in possession of all the things they have collected by the labors of a whole summer." After speaking thus he led his soldiers directly toward Dyrrachium over a long road, not stopping day or night. Pompey, being advised beforehand, marched toward the same place from MacedoniaCæsar says that Pompey was at Candavia. This was the name of a mountain range also. It was situated on the Egnatian Way in Illyria and was nearer to Dyrrachium than Apollonia was. Cæsar's course took him northwardly to a junction with the main road about midway between Candavia and Dyrrachium. Pompey going westward passed this junction first and had Cæsar in his rear. with extreme haste also, cutting down trees along the road, in order to obstruct Cæsar's passage, destroying bridges, and setting fire to all the supplies he met with, considering it of the greatest importance (as it was) to defend his own arsenal. If either of them saw any dust, or fire, or smoke at a distance they thought it was caused by the other, and they strove like athletes in a race. They did not allow themselves time for food or sleep. All was haste and eagerness mingled with the shouts of guides who carried torches, causing tumult and fear as when hostile armies are ever drawing nearer and nearer to each other. Some of the soldiers from fatigue threw away their loads. Others hid themselves in ravines and were left behind, exchanging their fear of the enemy for a moment's rest.

In the midst of such vicissitudes on either side Pompey arrived first at Dyrrachium and encamped near it. He sent a fleet and retook Oricum and kept the strictest watch on the sea. Cæsar pitched his camp so that the river AlorCæsar and all other authorities say the river Apsus. ran between himself and Pompey. By crossing the stream they had occasional cavalry skirmishes with each other. The armies did not come to a general engagement, however, for Pompey was still exercising his new levies and Cæsar waited for the forces left at Brundusium. The latter apprehended that if these should sail in merchant ships in the spring they would not escape Pompey's triremes, which would be patrolling the sea, as guard ships, in great numbers, but if they should cross in winter while the enemy were lying inside among the islands they might perhaps be unnoticed, or might force their way by the strength of the wind and the size of their ships. So he sent orders to them to hasten. As they did not come he decided to cross over secretly to that army, because no one else could bring them so easily. He concealed his intention and sent three servants to the river, a distance of twelve stades, to procure a fast-sailing vessel and a first rate pilot as for a messenger sent by Cæsar.

Then he rose from supper pretending to be fatigued and told his friends to remain at the table. He put on the clothing of a private person, stepped into a chariot, and drove away to the ship, pretending to be the one sent by Cæsar. He gave the rest of his orders through his servants and remained concealed by the darkness of the night and unrecognized. As there was a severe wind blowing the servants told the pilot to be of good courage and seize this opportunity to avoid the enemy who were in the neighborhood. The pilot made his way down the river by rowing. When they came toward the mouth they found it broken into surf by the wind and the sea. The pilot at the instigation of the servants put forth all his efforts, but as he could make no progress he became fatigued and gave it up. Then Cæsar threw off his disguise and called out to him, " Brave the tempest with a stout heart, you carry Cæsar and Cæsar's fortunes." Both the rowers and the pilot were astounded and all took fresh courage and gained the mouth of the river, but the wind and waves cast the ship high on the bank. As the dawn was near and they feared lest the enemy should discover them in the daylight, Cæsar, after accusing his evil genius for its invidiousness, allowed the ship to return, and it sailed up the river with a strong wind.This incident is related by Plutarch, Florus, Valerius Maximus, and Suetonius, but not by Cæsar himself.

Some of Cæsar's friends were astonished at this act of bravery; others blamed him, saying that it was a deed becoming a soldier but not a general. As Cæsar saw that he could not conceal a second attempt he ordered Postumius to sail to Brundusium in his place and tell Gabinius to cross over with the army immediately, and if he did not obey, to give the same order to Antony, and if he failed then to give it to Calenus. Another letter was written to the whole army in case all three should hesitate, saying, "that every one who was willing to do so should follow Postumius on shipboard and sail to any place where the wind might carry them, and not to mind what happened to the ships, because Cæsar did not want ships but men." Thus did Cæsar put his trust in fortune rather than in prudence.Cæsar's account of this matter is as follows: "As these things made Cæsar anxious he wrote more imperatively to his forces at Brundusium that they should not omit the opportunity of the first favorable wind for sailing, and that they should direct their course either to the shore of Apollonia, or to that of the Labeates, because there they might beach their ships. These places were not frequented by the enemy's blockading fleet because they dared not venture very far from their harbors." (iii. 25.) Pompey, in order to anticipate Cæsar's reënforcements, made haste and led his army forward prepared for battle. While two of his soldiers were searching in midstream for the best place to cross the river, one of Cæsar's men attacked and killed them both, whereupon Pompey drew back, as he considered this event inauspicious. All of his friends blamed him for missing this capital opportunity.

When Postumius arrived at Brundusium Gabinius did not obey the order, but led those who were willing to go with him by way of Illyria by forced marches. Almost all of them were destroyed by the Illyrians and Cæsar was obliged to endure the outrage on account of his preoccupation. Antony embarked the remainder of the army and sailed for Apollonia with a favorable wind. About noon the wind failed and twenty of Pompey's ships, that had put out to search the sea, discovered and pursued them. There was great fear on Cæsar's vessels lest in this calm the warships of the enemy should ram them with their prows and sink them. They prepared themselves for battle and began to discharge stones and darts, when suddenly the wind sprang up stronger than before, filled their great sails unexpectedly, and enabled them to complete their voyage without fear. The pursuers were left behind and they suffered severely from the wind and waves in the narrow sea and were scattered along a harborless and rocky coast. With difficulty they captured two of Cæsar's ships that ran on a shoal. Antony brought the remainder to the port of Nymphæum.This adventure is described in similar terms but at greater length by Cæsar, who says that the pursuing ships, sixteen in number, were driven upon the shore and wrecked, without a single exception, and that their crews were either killed by being dashed on the rocks or captured by his own men. The survivors, who were Rhodians, were all sent home unharmed. The loss of two of Antony's fleet is described differently. These two became separated from the main body, lost their way and came to anchor in front of Lissus three miles south of Nymphæum. Here they were attacked by another detachment of Pompey's naval force. One of them, containing 220 new recruits, surrendered on the promise of safety, but they were all put to the sword as soon as they reached land. The other containing 200 veterans was beached and the occupants reached the shore where they defeated a detachment of Pompey's horse and made their way to Cæsar. (iii. 26-28.)

Now Cæsar had his whole army together and so had Pompey his. They encamped opposite each other on hills in numerous redoubts. There were frequent collisions around each of these redoubts while they were making lines of circumvallation and trying to cut off each other's supplies. In one of these fights in front of a redoubt Cæsar's men were worsted, and a centurion, of the name of Scæva, while performing many deeds of valor, was wounded in the eye with a dart. He advanced in front of his men beckoning with his hand as though he wished to say something. When silence was obtained he called out to one of Pompey's centurions, who was likewise distinguished for bravery, "Save one of your equals, save your friend, send somebody to lead me by the hand, for I am wounded." Two soldiers advanced to him thinking that he was a deserter. One of these he killed before the stratagem was discovered and he cut off the shoulder of the other. This he did because he despaired of saving himself and his redoubt. His men, moved by shame at this act of self-devotion, rushed forward and saved the redoubt. Minucius, the commander of the post, also suffered severely. It is said that he received 120 missiles on his shield, was wounded six times, and, like Scæva, lost an eye.Cæsar says that it was the shield of Scæva that was pierced in 120 places and that Cæsar rewarded him with a large sum of money and promoted him to be the first centurion instead of the eighth. Cæsar honored them both with many military gifts. A certain man of Dyrrachium having offered to betray the town to him, Cæsar went by agreement with a small force by night to the gates at the temple of Artemis.There is a lacuna in the text at this place but it is filled by Dio Cassius (xli. 50), who relates the same event thus: "Cæsar, having attempted to corrupt the defenders, advanced by night to Dyrrachium itself by a narrow passage between a marsh and the sea, expecting that it would be betrayed. There he was attacked by a large force in front and by another in the rear. The latter were conveyed in ships and fell upon him unexpectedly. He lost many of his men and narrowly escaped himself." . . . The same winter Pompey's father-in-law (Scipio) advanced with another army from Syria. Cæsar's general, Gaius Calvisius, had an engagement with him in Macedonia, was beaten, and lost a whole legion except 800 men.

As Cæsar could obtain no supplies by sea, on account of Pompey's naval superiority, his army began to suffer from hunger and was compelled to make bread from herbs.Both Plutarch and Cæsar say roots. "Those who were away from the fortifications," says the latter, " found a kind of root which is called 'chara,' which, mixed with milk, greatly relieved their want of food. They fashioned it into the similitude of bread, and they had abundance of it." (iii. 48.) When deserters brought loaves of this kind to Pompey, thinking that he would be gladdened by the spectacle, he was not at all pleased, but said, "What kind of wild beasts are we fighting with ?" Then Cæsar, compelled by necessity, drew his whole army together in order to force Pompey to fight even against his will. The latter occupied a number of the redoubts that Cæsar had vacated and remained quiet. Cæsar was greatly vexed at this and ventured upon an extremely difficult and chimerical task; that is, to carry a line of circumvallation around the whole of Pompey's positions from sea to sea, thinking that even if he should fail he would acquire great renown from the boldness of the enterprise.Cæsar says that his reasons for this were threefold: to prevent Pompey from interfering with his foragers, to prevent Pompey himself from foraging, and to destroy his prestige by showing him to the world besieged, and as one who dared not fight in the open. (iii. 43.) The circuit was 1200 stades.The text here is probably corrupt. The distance mentioned is equal to 133 miles. Cæsar (iii. 63) says that it was 17 miles; Florus (iv. 2) says 16 miles. So, great was the work that Cæsar undertook. Pompey built a line of countervallation. Thus they parried each other's efforts. Nevertheless, they fought one great battle in which Pompey defeated Cæsar in the most brilliant manner and pursued his men in headlong flight to his camp and took many of his standards. The eagle (the standard held in highest honor by the Romans) was saved with difficulty, the bearer having just time to throw it over the palisade to those within.

While this remarkable defeat was in progress Cæsar brought up other troops from another quarter, but these also fell into a panic even when they beheld Pompey still far distant. Although they were already close to the gates they would neither make a stand, nor enter in good order, nor obey the commands given to them, but all fled pell-mell without shame, without orders, without reason. Cæsar ran among them and with reproaches showed them that Pompey was still far distant, yet under his very eye some threw down their standards and fled, while others bent their gaze upon the ground in shame and did nothing; so great consternation had befallen them. One of the standard bearers, with his standard reversed, dared to thrust the end of it at Cæsar himself, but the attendants of the latter cut him down. When the soldiers entered the camp they did not station any guards. All precautions were neglected and the fortification was left unprotected, so that it is probable that Pompey might then have captured it and brought the war to an end by that one engagement had not Labienus, misled by a god, persuaded him to pursue the fugitives instead. Moreover Pompey himself hesitated, either because he suspected a stratagem when he saw the gates unguarded or because he considered the war already decided by this battle. So he turned against those outside of the camp and made a heavy slaughter and took twenty-eight standards in the two engagements of this day, but he here missed his second opportunity to give the finishing stroke to the war. It is reported that Cæsar said, "The war would have been ended to-day in the enemy's favor if they had had a commander who knew how to make use of a victory."Cæsar's account of the battle of Dyrrachium and of the causes of his defeat is embodied in Sections 59-71, Book iii. Two Allobrogian cavalry officers deserted to Pompey because they had been detected embezzling the pay of their own troops. They informed Pompey that a section of Cæsar's line of circumvallation was still unfinished. It was through this gap that Pompey made his sally at daybreak, taking Cæsar's forces by surprise and throwing them into a panic. The two engagements in one day, to which Appian refers, were the fight which took place at this gap, and the subsequent one when Cæsar brought up reinforcements and made a counter attack which ended disastrously by reason of one of those accidents common in war. The ruin of Cæsar's army would have been complete, he says, had not Pompey suspected an ambuscade and therefore desisted from an attack on Cæsar's fortified camp. Cæsar acknowledges the loss of 32 military tribunes and centurions and 969 soldiers besides several Roman knights whom he names. Excellent diagrams of these operations and of the fighting around Dyrrachium, as well as of the battle of Pharsalus, are given in the military history of Cæsar by Col. Theodore Ayrault Dodge.

Pompey sent letters to all the kings and cities magnifying his victory, and he expected that Cæsar's army would come over to him directly, conceiving that it was oppressed by hunger and cast down by defeat, and especially the officers because apprehensive of punishment for their bad conduct in the battle. But the latter, as though some god had brought them to repentance, were ashamed of their fault, and as Cæsar chided them gently and granted them pardon, they became still more angry with themselves and by a surprising change demanded that they should be decimated according to the law of their country. When Cæsar did not agree to this they were still more mortified, and acknowledged that he had been shamefully treated by them. They cried out that he should at least put the standard bearers to death because they themselves would never have run away unless the standards had turned in flight first. Cæsar would not consent to this, but he reluctantly punished a few. So great was the zeal excited among all by his moderation that they demanded to be led against the enemy immediately. They urged him vehemently, beseeching and promising to wipe out their disgrace by a splendid victory. Of their own accord they visited each other in military order and took an oath by companies, under the eye of Cæsar himself, that they would not leave the field of battle except as victors.This agrees with the account given by Cæsar himself of what took place in his camp after his defeat at Dyrrachium. He made a speech to his soldiers in which he dwelt on the great success they had achieved prior to the last battle, and said that if all their efforts had not been equally successful they must repair the defects of Fortune with greater industry. "But whether their own panic," he continued, "or some mistake, or Fortune itself had snatched from them a victory already gained and assured, the utmost effort should be made so that the disaster incurred might be repaired by their bravery. If this were done the loss they had suffered would redound to their advantage, as had been the case at Gergovia (in Gaul), and those who had been timid in fighting before would now go into battle fearlessly." (iii. 73.)

Wherefore Cæsar's friends urged him to avail himself of the army's repentance and eagerness promptly, but he said in the hearing of the host, that he would take a better opportunity to lead them against the enemy, and he exhorted them to be mindful of their present zeal. He privately admonished his friends that it was necessary first for the soldiers to recover from the very great alarm of their recent defeat, and for the enemy to lose something of their present high confidence. He confessed also that he had made a mistake in encamping before Dyrrachium where Pompey had abundance of supplies, whereas he ought to have drawn him to some place where he would be subject to the same scarcity as themselves. After saying this he marched directly to Apollonia and from there to Thessaly, advancing by night in order to conceal his movements. The small town of GomphiThis could not have been a small town if it furnished the amount of food and wine which the text implies. Cæsar speaks of it as " oppido pleno atque opulento." to which he came refused to open its gates to him, and he took it by storm and allowed his army to plunder it. The soldiers, who had suffered much from hunger, stuffed themselves immoderately and drank wine to excess. The Germans among them were especially ridiculous under the influence of drink. It seems probable that Pompey might have attacked them then and gained another victory had he not disdainfully neglected a close pursuit. After seven days of rapid marching Cæsar encamped near Pharsalus. It is said that among the notable calamities of Gomphi the bodies of twenty venerable men of the first rank were found lying on the floor in an apothecary's shop, not wounded, and with goblets near them, as though they were drunk, and that one of them, like a physician, was seated in a chair and had dealt out poison to them.This incident contains a whole volume of the horrors of war to non-combatants in the ancient world. Here was a prosperous town of Thessaly blotted out of existence in a few hours' time. Cæsar says that the Thessalians at first espoused his cause but that they turned against him when they heard of his defeat at Dyrrachium. Naturally so. As they had no interest in the quarrel they were bound to be on the stronger side if they knew which it was. Their principal citizens guessed wrong, their town was destroyed, and they committed suicide in consequence. This was only one case among thousands.

After Cæsar had withdrawn Pompey called a council of war, at which Afranius advised that they should make use of their naval force in which they were much superior, and being masters of the sea should harass Cæsar, who was now wandering and destitute, and that Pompey himself should conduct his infantry with all haste to Italy, which was well disposed toward him and was now free from a hostile army. Having mastered it, together with Gaul and Spain, they could attack Cæsar again from their own home, the seat of imperial power. Although this was the best possible advice Pompey disregarded it and allowed himself to be persuaded by those who said that Cæsar's army would presently desert to him on account of hunger, and that there was not much left of it anyway after the victory of Dyrrachium. They said it would be disgraceful to abandon the pursuit of Cæsar when he was in flight, and for the victor to flee as though vanquished.Both Plutarch and Cæsar give entertaining accounts of what took place in Pompey's camp after Cæsar's retreat. "They cried out," says the former, " that Cæsar had fled. Some wanted to pursue him, others to cross over to Italy. Others despatched their friends and servants to Rome to hire houses in advance near the forum, as though they were about to run for office." ( 66.) Cæsar's narrative says: "They contended with each other openly about rewards and priesthoods and disposed of the consulship for years to come. Some demanded the houses and goods of men in Cæsar's camp, and there was a great controversy over the question whether Lucius Hirrus, who had been sent by Pompey on a mission to the Parthians, should have the right to stand for the next prætorship while absent. . . . Domitius, Scipio, and Lentulus Spinther had daily disputes over the succession to Cæsar's priesthood and descended to the vilest language, Lentulus claiming it on the score of age, Domitius boasting of his influence in the city and his dignity, while Scipio trusted to his relationship with Pompey. Acutius Rufus even accused Afranius, in Pompey's presence, of betrayal of his army, which he said had been done in Spain." (iii. 82-83.) Pompey sided with these advisers partly out of regard for the opinions of the eastern nations that were looking on, partly to prevent any harm befalling Lucius Scipio, who was still in Macedonia, but most of all because he thought that he ought to fight while his army was in high spirits. Accordingly he advanced and pitched his camp opposite to Cæsar's near Pharsalus, so that they were separated from each other by a distance of thirty stades.

Pompey's supplies came from every quarter, for the roads, harbors, and strongholds had been so provided beforehand that food was brought to him at all times from the land, and every wind blew it to him from the sea. Cæsar, on the other hand, had only what he could find with difficulty and seize by hard labor. Yet even so nobody deserted him, but all, by a kind of divine fury, longed to come to close quarters with the enemy. They considered that they, who had been trained in arms for ten years, were much superior to the new levies of Pompey in fighting, but that for digging ditches and building fortifications and for laborious foraging they were weaker by reason of their age. Tired as they were they altogether preferred to perform some deed of valor rather than perish with hunger in inaction. Pompey perceived this and he considered it dangerous to risk everything on a single battle with disciplined and desperate men, and against the amazing luck of Cæsar. It would be easier and safer to reduce them by want as they controlled no fertile territory, and could get nothing by sea, and had no ships for rapid flight. So he decided on the most prudent calculation to protract the war and wear out the enemy by hunger from day to day.Literally, " to lead the enemy around from hunger to hunger," e)s limo\n e)k limou=. Mendelssohn prefers to read e)s loimo\n e)k limou=, "from famine to plague," and he refers to Plutarch ( 40), who says that it was reported in Pompey's camp that a pestilence had broken out in Cæsar's army in consequence of their unaccustomed diet. There is no authority for this change nor does it improve the text in any way. As Cæsar was living off the country he would be obliged to move frequently "from hunger to hunger."

Pompey was surrounded by a great number of senators, of equal rank with himself, by very distinguished knights, and by many kings and princes. Some of these, by reason of their inexperience in war, others because they were too much elated by the victory at Dyrrachium, others because they outnumbered the enemy, and others because they were quite tired of the war and preferred a quick decision rather than a sound one -- all urged him to fight, pointing out to him that Cæsar was always drawn up for battle and challenging him. Pompey answered along this very line of argument by saying that Cæsar was compelled to do so by his want of supplies, and that they had the more reason to remain quiet because Cæsar was pushed by necessity. Yet, harassed by the whole army, which was unduly puffed up by the victories at Dyrrachium, and by men of rank who accused him of being fond of power and of delaying purposely in order to prolong his authority over so many men of his own rank -- and for this reason called him derisively king of kings and Agamemnon,Plutarch says that this nickname was bestowed upon Pompey by Domitius Ahenobarbus, the same who was sent to supersede Cæsar in Gaul and who fell into the latter's hands at Corfinium, and was dismissed with contempt. He was an intense aristocrat, enormously rich, and he hated Cæsar with fury. He was killed in the pursuit after Pharsalus. During the exchange of pleasantries at Pompey's head -- quarters "Afranius, who had been accused of betraying his army in Spain, when he saw Pompey trying to avoid a battle said he wondered why his accusers did not move forward and fight this huckster of provinces." Favonius, who had suggested before they left Italy that Pompey should stamp armies out of the ground, now said: " Gentlemen, we shall not partake of the figs at Tusculum this year." ( 67.) because that general also ruled over kings while war lasted -- he allowed himself to be moved from his own purpose and gave in to them, being deceived now by the god that had misled him on other occasions during the whole of this war. He had now become, contrary to his nature, sluggish and dilatory in all things,The text, or at all events the punctuation, is here doubtful. I have followed that of Schweighäuser but his Latin version does not accord with it: Tandem a proposito se moveri passus, deo jam exitium ejus properante, concessit illorum voluntati. Quemadmodum et alias per totum illud bellum contra naturam suam, tardus fuerat et veluti torpidus, sic nunc, etc., i.e.: "Finally allowing himself to be moved from his purpose he yielded to their wish, a god now hurrying him to his doom. As in other matters he had been, contrary to his nature, sluggish and as it were stupefied through this whole war, so now," etc. and he prepared for battle against his will, to his own hurt and that of the men who had persuaded him to it.

That same night three of Cæsar's legions started out to forage; for Cæsar himself approved Pompey's dilatory proceedings and had no idea that he would change, and accordingly sent them out to procure food. When he perceived that the enemy was preparing to fight he was delighted at the pressure which he conjectured had been put upon Pompey by his army, and he recalled all of his forces at once and made preparations on his own side. He offered sacrifice at midnight and invoked Mars and his own ancestress, Venus (for it was believed that from Æneas and his son, Ilus, was descended the Julian race, with a slight change of name), and he vowed that he would build a temple in Rome as a thank-offering to her as the Bringer of Victory if everything went well. Thereupon a flame from heaven flew through the air from Cæsar's camp to Pompey's, where it was extinguished. Pompey's men said that it signified a brilliant victory for them over their enemies, but Cæsar interpreted it as meaning that he should fall upon and extinguish the fame and power of Pompey. When Pompey was sacrificing the same night some of the victims escaped and could not be caught, and a swarm of bees settled on the altar, the type of weakness.These prodigies, with some slight variations, are related by Plutarch, by Lucan, and by Florus. "Never," says Florus, "were there more manifest signs of impending ruin." Shortly before daylight a panic occurred in his army. He himself went around and quieted it and then fell into a deep sleep.