In Hestia’s name, Lycinus, let us leave Plato and Aristotle and Epicurus and the others undisturbed, for I am no match for them. Let us, you and me, enquire into it by ourselves, whether the pursuit of philosophy is as I say it is. As for Ethiopians and Gelo’s wife, why did you have to call her from Syracuse into the discussion?
Why, let them take themselves off, if they seem to you to be superfluous to the discussion. You do the talking now. You look as though you are going to say something wonderful.
It seems to me quite possible, Lycinus, by thorough study of the Stoic doctrines alone, to know the truth from them, even if one does not pursue those of the others and make a thorough study of them in detail. Look at it this way: if someone tells you merely that two twos make the number four, will you have to go about questioning all the other mathematicians to
At once, Hermotimus.
Why then does it seem to you to be impossible for a man when he meets only Stoics who speak the truth to believe them and have no further need of the others in his knowledge that four could never be five, even if thousands of Platos and Pythagorases say so?
That is not to the point at all, Hermotimus. You are comparing what is admitted to what is in dispute, although they differ enormously. Or what would you say? Have you met anyone who says that by putting together two twos he makes the number seven or eleven?
Not
Well then, have you ever met (and by the Graces try to be truthful) any Stoic and Epicurean who did not differ about principles and ends?
In no way.
Make sure then that you are not somehow cheating me, my good sir, and that though I am your friend. For, while we are enquiring who has the truth in philosophy, you have prematurely seized on the answer and taken it and assigned it to the Stoics, when you say that they are the ones who make twice two equal four, although it is not clear that this is so. For the Epicureans and the Platonists would say that they get this result, while you Stoics call it five or seven. Or do you not think that this is what they are doing when you think that only the beautiful is good, while the Epicureans say it is pleasure? And when you say that all things are corporeal, while Plato thinks that there is an incorporeal element in what exists? No, as I said, you very arrogantly lay hold of the bone of contention as being the undisputed property of the Stoics, and give it to them to possess; and yet, when the others are asserting rival claims and saying that it is theirs, then, I think, there is every need for a judgment. If it becomes quite clear then that it is the privilege of the Stoics alone to think that twice two are four, it is time for the rest to be quiet. But as long as they contest this very claim, we must give a hearing to all alike, or realise that we shall be thought to be giving a biased judgment.