<GetPassage xmlns:tei="http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0" xmlns="http://chs.harvard.edu/xmlns/cts">
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                <requestUrn>urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0062.tlg026.perseus-eng2:21-25</requestUrn>
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                <urn>urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0062.tlg026.perseus-eng2:21-25</urn>
                <passage>
                    <TEI xmlns="http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0"><text><body><div type="translation" n="urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0062.tlg026.perseus-eng2" xml:lang="eng"><div type="textpart" xml:base="urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0062.tlg026.perseus-eng2" subtype="section" n="21"><p><label>EPICURUS</label>
I shall not address you at length, gentlemen of the
jury, for I myself do not need many words.
If Pleasure had used charms or philtres to constrain Dionysius, whom Stoa claims to be her lover,
to desert Stoa and to centre his regard upon her, she
might fairly have been held a sorceress and might
have been found guilty of using undue influence upon
the lovers of others. But suppose a free man in a
free city, unstopped by the laws, hating the tedium
of life with her and thinking that the happiness
which comes, she says, as the consummation of pain
is stuff and nonsense, made his escape from her
thorny, labyrinthine reasonings and ran away to
Pleasure of his own free will, cutting the meshes of


<pb n="v.3.p.127"/>

her logic as if they weré bonds, because he had the
spirit of a human being, not of a clod, and thought
pain painful, as indeed it is, and pleasure pleasant,
in that case would it have been right to bar him out,
plunging him head over ears into a sea of pain when
he was swimming from a wreck to a haven and
yearned for calm water—to put the poor fellow at the
mercy of her dilemmas in spite of the fact that he
was seeking asylum with Pleasure like a suppliant at
the Altar of Mercy—in order that he might climb
“the steep” with copious sweat, cast eyes upon
that famous Virtue,<note xml:lang="eng" n="v.3.p.127.n.1"><p>For the Hill of Virtue, see Hesiod, Works and Days, 289 ff., and Simonides, 41.  </p></note> and then, after toiling painfully
his whole life long, be happy when life is over?</p><p>
Who should be considered a better judge than this
man himself, who knew the teachings of Stoa if ever
a man did, and formerly thought that only what was
right was good, but now has learnt that pain is bad,
and so has chosen what he has determined to be the
better? He saw, no doubt, that her set make a
great deal of talk about fortitude and endurance
of pain, but privately pay court to Pleasure; that
they are bold as brass in the lecture-room, but live
under the laws of Pleasure at home; that they
are ashamed, of course, to let themselves be seen
“lowering their pitch” and playing false to their
tenets, but suffer the tortures of Tantalus, poor
fellows, so that wherever they think they will be unobserved and can transgress their laws with safety,
they eagerly glut themselves with pleasure. In fact,
if they should be given the ring of Gyges, so that
they could put it on and be unseen, or the Cap of
Darkness, without a doubt they would bid good-bye


<pb n="v.3.p.129"/>

to pain for ever and would go crowding after
Pleasure, one and all, imitating Dionysius who, until
he was ill, expected to get some benefit from their
discourses about fortitude, but when he encountered
suffering and illness, and pain came closer home to
him, he perceived that his body was contradicting
Stoa and maintaining the opposite side. So he put
more trust in it than in her set, decided that he was
‘aman, with the body of a man, and thenceforward
treated it otherwise than as if it were a statue, well.
aware that whoever maintains any other view and
accuses Pleasure

<cit><quote><l>Doth like to talk, but thinks as others do!</l></quote><bibl>Euripides, Phoenissae360.</bibl></cit>

I have done. Cast your ballots with this understanding of the case.

</p></div><div type="textpart" xml:base="urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0062.tlg026.perseus-eng2" subtype="section" n="22"><p><label>STOA</label>
No, no! Let me cross-question him a little.
</p><p><label>EPICURUS</label>
Put your questions: I will answer them.
</p><p><label>STOA</label>
Do you consider pain bad?
</p><p><label>EPICURUS</label>
Yes.
</p><p><label>STOA</label>
And pleasure good ?
</p><p><label>EPICURUS</label>
Certainly.
</p><p><label>STOA</label>
Well, do you know the meaning of “material” and
“immaterial,” of ‘approved” and “disapproved” ?<note xml:lang="eng" n="v.3.p.129.n.1"><p>Stoic technical terms: see vol. ii, p. 488. Stoa intends to prove that pleasure and pain are alike “immaterial,” and neither “approved” nor “disapproved,” because they neither help nor hinder the effort to attain Virtue.   </p></note>




<pb n="v.3.p.131"/>

<label>EPICURUS</label>
Certainly.
</p><p><label>HERMES</label>
Stoa, the jurors say they can’t understand these
dissyllabic questions, so be silent ; they are voting.
</p><p><label>STOA</label>
I should have won if I had put him a question in
the form of the “third indemonstrable.”<note xml:lang="eng" n="v.3.p.131.n.1"><p>The five “indemonstrables” of Chrysippus, so called because they are self-evident and require no proof, were all hypothetical or disjunctive syllogisms ; examples are: (1) “if it is day, it is light ; it is light, —&gt; it is day”; (2) “if it is day, it is light ; it is dark, —&gt; it is not day”; (3) “Plato is not both dead and alive; he is dead,  —&gt; he is not alive” ; (4) “it is either day or night; it is day,  —&gt; it is not night”; (5) “it is either day or night; it is not night,  —&gt; it is day.” Cf. Diog. Laert. Vit, Phil. 7, 1, 49; Sext. Emp. adv. Math. 7. </p></note>
<label>JUSTICE</label>
Who won?
</p><p><label>HERMES</label>
Pleasure, unanimously.
</p><p><label>STOA</label>
I appeal to Zeus!
</p><p><label>JUSTICE</label>
Good luck to you! Hermes, call another case.

</p></div><div type="textpart" xml:base="urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0062.tlg026.perseus-eng2" subtype="section" n="23"><p><label>HERMES</label>
Virtue v. High-living, im re Aristippus. Let Aristippus appear in person.
</p><p><label>VIRTUE</label>
I ought to speak first ; I am Virtue, and Aristippus
belongs to me, as his words and his deeds indicate.
HIGH-LIVING
No, indeed ; I ought to speak first; I am High-living, and the man is mine, as you can see from his
garlands, his purple cloak and his perfumes.



<pb n="v.3.p.133"/>

<label>JUSTICE</label>
Do not wrangle; this case will stand over until
Zeus decides the case of Dionysius, for this seems to
be similar. Consequently, if Pleasure wins, Highliving shall have Aristippus, but if Stoa prevails, he
shall be adjudged to Virtue. So let others appear.
Look here, though—these jurors are not to get the
fee, for their case has not come to trial.
</p><p><label>HERMES</label>
Then are they to have come up here for nothing,
old as they are, and the hill so high?
</p><p><label>JUSTICE</label>
It will be enough if they get a third. Go your
ways; don’t be angry, you shall serve another day.

</p></div><div type="textpart" xml:base="urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0062.tlg026.perseus-eng2" subtype="section" n="24"><p><label>HERMES</label>
It is time for Diogenes of Sinope to appear. Make
your complaint, Banking.
</p><p><label>DIOGENES</label>
I protest, if she does not stop bothering me,
Justice, it will not be running away that she will
have me up for, but aggravated assault and battery,
for I shall mighty soon.take my staff and. .. .
</p><p><label>JUSTICE</label>
What have we here? Banking has run away, and
he is making after her with his stick raised. The
poor creature is likely to catch it pretty badly! Call
Pyrrho,

<pb n="v.3.p.135"/>

</p></div><div type="textpart" xml:base="urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0062.tlg026.perseus-eng2" subtype="section" n="25"><p><label>HERMES</label>
Painting is here, Justice, but Pyrrho has not come
up at all. It might have been expected that he
would do this.
</p><p><label>JUSTICE</label>
Why, Hermes?
</p><p><label>HERMES</label>
Because he does not believe there is any true
standard of judgment.
</p><p><label>JUSTICE</label>
Then let them bring in a verdict by default
against him. Now call the speech-writer, the Syrian.
After all, it was only recently that the writs were
lodged against him, and there was no pressing need
to have tried the cases now. However, since that
point has been decided, introduce the suit of Oratory
first. Heavens, what a crowd has come together for
the hearing!
</p><p><label>HERMES</label>
Naturally, Justice. The case is not stale, but new
and unfamiliar, having been entered only yesterday,
as you said, and they hope to hear Oratory and
Dialogue bringing charges in turn and the Syrian
defending himself against both; this has brought
crowds to court. But do begin your speech, Oratory.

</p></div></div></body></text></TEI>
                </passage>
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