Soc.

Well then, you speak of a surface, and also of a solid—the terms employed in geometrical problems?

Men.

I do.

Soc.

So now you are able to comprehend from all this what I mean by figure. In every instance of figure I call that figure in which the solid ends; and I may put that more succinctly by saying that figure is limit of solid.

Men.

And what do you say of color, Socrates?

Soc.

How overbearing of you, Meno, to press an old man with demands for answers, when you will not trouble yourself to recollect and tell me what account Gorgias gives of virtue!

Men.

When you have answered my question, Socrates, I will answer yours.

Soc.

One might tell even blindfolded, Meno, by the way you discuss, that you are handsome and still have lovers.

Men.

Why so?

Soc.

Because you invariably speak in a peremptory tone, after the fashion of spoilt beauties, holding as they do a despotic power so long as their bloom is on them. You have also, I daresay, made a note of my weakness for handsome people. So I will indulge you, and answer.

Men.

You must certainly indulge me.

Soc.

Then would you like me to answer you in the manner of Gorgias,There is something of Gorgias’ stately style in the definition that follows; but the implication seems mainly to be that the substance of it will be familiar to Meno because he was a pupil of Gorgias, who had learnt his science from Empedocles. which you would find easiest to follow?

Men.

I should like that, of course.

Soc.

Do not both of you say there are certain effluencesEmpedocles taught that material objects are known to us by means of effluences or films given off by them and suited in various ways to our sense-organs. of existent things, as Empedocles held?

Men.

Certainly.

Soc.

And passages into which and through which the effluences pass?

Men.

To be sure.

Soc.

And some of the effluences fit into various passages, while some are too small or too large?

Men.

That is so.

Soc.

And further, there is what you call sight?

Men.

Yes.

Soc.

So now conceive my meaning, as Pindar Fr. 82 (Bergk); cf. Aristoph. Birds 939. says: color is an effluence of figures, commensurate with sight and sensible.

Men.

Your answer, Socrates, seems to me excellently put.

Soc.

Yes, for I expect you find its terms familiar; and at the same time I fancy you observe that it enables you to tell what sound and smell are, and numerous other things of the kind.

Men.

Certainly.

Soc.

It is an answer in the high poetic style, Meno, and so more agreeable to you than that about figure.

Men.

Yes, it is.

Soc.

But yet, son of Alexidemus, I am inclined to think the other was the better of the two; and I believe you also would prefer it, if you were not compelled, as you were saying yesterday, to go away before the mysteries, and could stay awhile and be initiated.

Men.

But I should stay, Socrates, if you would give me many such answers.

Soc.

Well then, I will spare no endeavor, both for your sake and for my own, to continue in that style; but I fear I may not succeed in keeping for long on that level. But come now, you in your turn must try and fulfil your promise by telling me what virtue is in a general way; and you must stop producing a plural from the singular, as the wags say whenever one breaks something, but leave virtue whole and sound, and tell me what it is. The pattern you have now got from me.

Men.

Well, in my view, Socrates, virtue is, in the poet’s words, to rejoice in things honorable and be able for them Perhaps from Simonides.; and that, I say, is virtue—to desire what is honorable and be able to procure it.

Soc.

Do you say that he who desires the honorable is desirous of the good?

Men.

Certainly.

Soc.

Implying that there are some who desire the evil, and others the good? Do not all men, in your opinion, my dear sir, desire the good?

Men.

I think not.

Soc.

There are some who desire the evil?

Men.

Yes.

Soc.

Thinking the evil to be good, do you mean, or actually recognizing it to be evil, and desiring it nevertheless?

Men.

Both, I believe.

Soc.

Do you really believe, Meno, that a man knows the evil to be evil, and still desires it?

Men.

Certainly.

Soc.

What do you mean by desires? Desires the possession of it?

Men.

Yes; what else could it be?

Soc.

And does he think the evil benefits him who gets it, or does he know that it harms him who has it?

Men.

There are some who think the evil is a benefit, and others who know that it does harm.

Soc.

And, in your opinion, do those who think the evil a benefit know that it is evil?

Men.

I do not think that at all.

Soc.

Obviously those who are ignorant of the evil do not desire it, but only what they supposed to be good, though it is really evil; so that those who are ignorant of it and think it good are really desiring the good. Is not that so?

Men.

It would seem to be so in their case.

Soc.

Well now, I presume those who, as you say, desire the evil, and consider that the evil harms him who gets it, know that they will be harmed by it?

Men.

They needs must.

Soc.

But do they not hold that those who are harmed are miserable in proportion to the harm they suffer?

Men.

That too must be.

Soc.

And are not the miserable ill-starred?

Men.

I think so.

Soc.

Then is there anyone who wishes to be miserable and ill-starred?

Men.

I do not suppose there is, Socrates.

Soc.

No one, then, Meno, desires evil, if no one desires to be such an one: for what is being miserable but desiring evil and obtaining it?

Men.

It seems that what you say is true, Socrates, and that nobody desires evil.

Soc.

Well now, you were saying a moment ago that virtue is the desire and ability for good?

Men.

Yes, I was.

Soc.

One part of the statement—the desire—belongs to our common nature, and in this respect one man is no better than another?

Men.

Apparently.

Soc.

But it is plain that if one man is not better than another in this, he must be superior in the ability.

Men.

Certainly.

Soc.

Then virtue, it seems by your account, is ability to procure goods.

Men.

I entirely agree, Socrates, with the view which you now take of the matter.

Soc.

Then let us see whether your statement is true in another respect; for very likely you may be right. You say virtue is the ability to procure goods?

Men.

I do.

Soc.

And do you not mean by goods such things as health and wealth?

Men.

Yes, and I include the acquisition of gold and silver, and of state honors and offices.

Soc.

Are there any things besides this sort, that you class as goods?

Men.

No, I refer only to everything of that sort.

Soc.

Very well: procuring gold and silver is virtue, according to Meno, the ancestral friend of the Great King. Tell me, do you add to such procuring, Meno, that it is to be done justly and piously, or is this indifferent to you, but even though a man procures these things unjustly, do you call them virtue all the same?

Men.

Surely not, Socrates.

Soc.

Rather, vice.

Men.

Yes, of course.

Soc.

Then it seems that justice or temperance or holiness or some other part of virtue must accompany the procuring of these things; otherwise it will not be virtue, though it provides one with goods.

Men.

Yes, for how, without these, could it be virtue?

Soc.

And not to procure gold and silver, when it would be unjust—what we call the want of such things—is virtue, is it not?

Men.

Apparently.