And again, a man of sense in a state of pain or enjoyment?
Yes.
And which sort are more apt to feel enjoyment or pain, the wise or the foolish?
I should think there is not much difference.
Well, that will suffice. In war have you ever seen a coward?
Of course I have.
Well now, when the enemy withdrew, which seemed to you to enjoy it more, the cowards or the brave?
Both did, I thought; or if not that, about equally.
No matter. Anyhow, the cowards do enjoy it?
Very much.
And the fools, it would seem.
Yes.
And when the foe advances, do the cowards alone feel pain, or the brave as well?
Both.
Alike?
More, perhaps, the cowards.
And when the foe withdraws, do they not enjoy it more?
Perhaps.
So the foolish and the wise, and the cowardly and the brave,
I agree.
But further, are the wise and brave good, and the cowards and fools bad?
Yes.
Then the good and the bad feel enjoyment and pain about equally?
I agree.
Then are the good and the bad about equally good and bad? Or are the bad in some yet greater measure good and bad?
Why, upon my word, I cannot tell what you mean.
You are aware, are you not, that you hold that the good are good by the presence of good things, and that the bad are so by the presence of bad things? And that the pleasures are the good things, and the pains bad things?
Yes, I am.
Hence in those who have enjoyment the good things—the pleasures—are present, so long as they enjoy?
Of course.
Then, good things being present, those who enjoy are good?
Yes.
Well now, in those who feel pain are not bad things present, namely pains?
They are.
And it is by the presence of bad things, you say, that the bad are bad? Or do you no longer say so?
I do say so.
Then whoever enjoys is good, and whoever is pained, bad?
Certainly.
You mean, those more so who feel these things more, and those less who feel less, and those about equally who feel about equally?
Yes.
Now you say that the wise and the foolish, the cowardly and the brave, feel enjoyment and pain about equally, or the cowards even more?
I do.