<GetPassage xmlns:tei="http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0" xmlns="http://chs.harvard.edu/xmlns/cts">
            <request>
                <requestName>GetPassage</requestName>
                <requestUrn>urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg023.perseus-eng2:496</requestUrn>
            </request>
            <reply>
                <urn>urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg023.perseus-eng2:496</urn>
                <passage>
                    <TEI xmlns="http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0"><text xml:lang="eng"><body><div type="translation" n="urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg023.perseus-eng2" xml:lang="eng"><div type="textpart" subtype="section" resp="perseus" n="496"><milestone unit="page" resp="Stephanus" n="496"/><milestone unit="section" resp="Stephanus" n="496a"/><said who="#Socrates"><label>Soc.</label><p>Take, for instance, any part of the body you like by itself, and consider it.  A man, I suppose, may have a disease of the eyes, called ophthalmia?</p></said><said who="#Callicles"><label>Call.</label><p>Certainly.</p></said><said who="#Socrates"><label>Soc.</label><p>Then I presume he is not sound also at that time in those same eyes?</p></said><said who="#Callicles"><label>Call.</label><p>By no conceivable means.</p></said><said who="#Socrates"><label>Soc.</label><p>And what say you, when he gets rid of his ophthalmia?  Does he at that time get rid too of the health of his eyes, and so at last is rid of both things together?</p></said><said who="#Callicles"><label>Call.</label><p>Far from it.</p></said><said who="#Socrates"><label>Soc.</label><p>Because, I imagine, this would be an astonishing and irrational result, would it not?</p></said><milestone unit="section" resp="Stephanus" n="496b"/><said who="#Callicles"><label>Call.</label><p>Very much so.</p></said><said who="#Socrates"><label>Soc.</label><p>Whereas, I take it, he gets and loses either turn?</p></said><said who="#Callicles"><label>Call.</label><p>I agree.</p></said><said who="#Socrates"><label>Soc.</label><p>And so with strength and weakness in just the same way?</p></said><said who="#Callicles"><label>Call.</label><p>Yes.</p></said><said who="#Socrates"><label>Soc.</label><p>And speed and slowness?</p></said><said who="#Callicles"><label>Call.</label><p>Certainly.</p></said><said who="#Socrates"><label>Soc.</label><p>And so too with good things and happiness and their opposites—bad things and wretchedness—does one take on each of these in turn, and in turn put it off?</p></said><said who="#Callicles"><label>Call.</label><p>Absolutely, I presume.</p></said><milestone unit="section" resp="Stephanus" n="496c"/><said who="#Socrates"><label>Soc.</label><p>Then if we find any things that a man puts off and retains at one and the same moment, clearly these cannot be the good and the bad.  Do we admit this?  Now consider very carefully before you answer.</p></said><said who="#Callicles"><label>Call.</label><p>Oh, I admit it down to the ground.</p></said><said who="#Socrates"><label>Soc.</label><p>So now for our former admissions:  did you say that being hungry was pleasant or painful?  I mean, hunger itself.</p></said><said who="#Callicles"><label>Call.</label><p>Painful, I said;  though eating when one is hungry I call pleasant.</p></said><milestone unit="section" resp="Stephanus" n="496d"/><said who="#Socrates"><label>Soc.</label><p>I see:  but at all events hunger itself is painful, is it not?</p></said><said who="#Callicles"><label>Call.</label><p>I agree.</p></said><said who="#Socrates"><label>Soc.</label><p>And so too with thirst?</p></said><said who="#Callicles"><label>Call.</label><p>Quite so.</p></said><said who="#Socrates"><label>Soc.</label><p>Then am I to ask you any further questions, or do you admit that all want and desire is painful?</p></said><said who="#Callicles"><label>Call.</label><p>I admit it;  no, do not question me further.</p></said><said who="#Socrates"><label>Soc.</label><p>Very good:  but drinking when one is thirsty you surely say is pleasant?</p></said><said who="#Callicles"><label>Call.</label><p>I do.</p></said><said who="#Socrates"><label>Soc.</label><p>Now, in this phrase of yours the words <q type="mentioned">when one is thirsty,</q> I take it, stand for <q type="emph">when one is in pain</q>?</p></said><milestone unit="section" resp="Stephanus" n="496e"/><said who="#Callicles"><label>Call.</label><p>Yes.</p></said><said who="#Socrates"><label>Soc.</label><p>But drinking is a satisfaction of the want, and a pleasure?</p></said><said who="#Callicles"><label>Call.</label><p>Yes.</p></said><said who="#Socrates"><label>Soc.</label><p>So in the act of drinking, you say, one has enjoyment?</p></said><said who="#Callicles"><label>Call.</label><p>Quite so.</p></said><said who="#Socrates"><label>Soc.</label><p>When one is thirsty?</p></said><said who="#Callicles"><label>Call.</label><p>I agree.</p></said><said who="#Socrates"><label>Soc.</label><p>That is, in pain?</p></said><said who="#Callicles"><label>Call.</label><p>Yes.</p></said><said who="#Socrates"><label>Soc.</label><p>Then do you perceive the conclusion,—that you say one enjoys oneself, though in pain at the same moment, when you say one drinks when one is thirsty?  Or does this not occur at once, at the same place and time—in either soul or body, as you please?  For I fancy it makes no difference.  Is this so or not?</p></said><said who="#Callicles"><label>Call.</label><p>It is.</p></said><said who="#Socrates"><label>Soc.</label><p>But further, you say it is impossible to be badly off, or to fare ill, at the same time as one is faring well.</p></said></div></div></body></text></TEI>
                </passage>
            </reply>
            </GetPassage>