And so, if fair, good? For that is either pleasant or beneficial.
It must be so.
So he who pays the penalty suffers what is good?
It seems so.
Then he is benefited?
Yes.
Is it the benefit I imagine—that he becomes better in soul if he is justly punished?
Quite likely.
Then is he who pays the penalty relieved from badness of soul?
Yes.
And so relieved from the greatest evil?
No, only poverty.
And what in his bodily resources? You would say that badness there is weakness or disease or ugliness or the like?
I would.
And in soul too you believe there is a certain wickedness?
Of course.
And do you not call this injustice, ignorance, cowardice, and so forth?
Certainly I do.
So now in property, body, and soul, these three, you have mentioned three vices—poverty, disease, and injustice?
Yes.
Then which of these vices is the foulest? Is it not injustice—in short, the vice of the soul?
Far the foulest.
And if foulest, then also most evil?
How do you mean, Socrates?
Just this: the foulest is foulest in each case because it produces the greatest pain or harm or both; this follows from our previous admissions.
Quite so.
And foulest of all, we have just agreed, is injustice and,
Yes, we have.
So then either it is most painful, that is, foulest of these vices by an excess of painfulness, or else of harmfulness, or in both ways?
Necessarily.
Then do you think that being unjust, licentious, cowardly, and ignorant is more painful than being poor and sick?
No, I do not, Socrates, from what we have said.
Portentous then must be the extent of harm, and astonishing the evil, by which the soul’s vice exceeds all the others
Apparently.
But further, I suppose, whatever has an excess of harm in the greatest measure, must be the greatest evil in the world.
Yes.
So injustice, licentiousness, and in general, vice of soul, are the greatest evils in the world?
Apparently.
Now what is the art that relieves from poverty? Is it not money-making?
Yes.
And what from disease? Is it not medicine?