Well, then, suppose you were on a campaign, with which kind of general would you prefer to share both the peril and the luck—a wise one, or an ignorant? With a wise one. Well then, supposing you were sick, with which kind of doctor would you like to venture yourself a wise one, or an ignorant? With a wise one. And your reason, I said, is this, that you would fare with better fortune in the hands of a wise one than of an ignorant one? He assented. So that wisdom everywhere causes men to be fortunate: since I presume she could never err, but must needs be right in act and result; otherwise she could be no longer wisdom. We came to an agreement somehow or other in the end that the truth in general was this: when wisdom is present, he with whom it is present has no need of good fortune as well; and as we had agreed on this I began to inquire of him over again what we should think, in this case, of our previous agreements. For we agreed, said I, that if many goods were present to us we should be happy and prosper. Yes, he said. Then would we be happy because of our present goods, if they gave us no benefit, or if they gave us some? If they gave us benefit, he said. And would a thing benefit us if we merely had it and did not use it? For instance, if we had a lot of provisions, but did not eat them, or liquor, and did not drink it, could we be said to be benefited? Of course not, he answered. Well then, if every craftsman found the requisites for his particular work all ready prepared for him, and then made no use of them, would he prosper because of these acquisitions, as having acquired all the things necessary for a craftsman to have at hand? For example, if a carpenter were furnished with all his tools and a good supply of wood, but did no carpentry, is it possible he could be benefited by what he had got? By no means, he said. Well now, suppose a man had got wealth and all the goods that we mentioned just now, but made no use of them; would he be happy because of his possessing these goods? Surely not, Socrates. So it seems one must not merely have acquired such goods if one is to be happy, but use them too; else there is no benefit gained from their possession. True. Then have we here enough means, Cleinias, for making a man happy—in the possession of these goods and using them? I think so. Shall we say, I asked, if he uses them rightly, or just as much if he does not? If rightly.