You are quite a prophet! Now tell me, do you consider some just things to be expedient, and others not?
Yes.
And again, some noble, and some not?
What do you mean by that question?
I would ask whether anyone ever seemed to you to be doing what was base and yet just.
Never.
Well, are all just things noble?
Yes.
And what of noble things, in their turn? Are they all good, or some only, while others are not?
In my opinion, Socrates, some noble things are evil.
And some base things are good?
Yes.
Do you mean as in one of the many cases where men have gone to rescue a comrade or kinsman in battle, and have been either wounded or killed, while those who did not go to the rescue, as duty bade, have got off safe and sound?
Precisely.
And such a rescue you call noble, in respect of the endeavor to save those whom it was one’s duty to save; and this is courage, is it not?
Yes.
But you call it evil, in respect of the deaths and wounds?
Yes.
And is not the courage one thing, and the death another?
Certainly.
Then it is not in the same respect that rescuing one’s friends is noble and evil?
Apparently not.
Then see if, inasmuch as it is noble, it is also good; for in the present case you were admitting that the rescue was noble in respect of its courage: now consider this very thing, courage, and say whether it is good or bad. Consider it in this way: which would you choose to have, good things or evil?
Good.
And most of all, the greatest goods, and of such things you would least allow yourself to be deprived?
To be sure.
Then what do you say of courage? At what price would you allow yourself to be deprived of it?
I would give up life itself if I had to be a coward.
Then you regard cowardice as the uttermost evil.
I do.
On a par with death, it seems.
Yes.
And life and courage are the extreme opposites of death and cowardice?
Yes.
And you would most desire to have the former, and least the latter?
Yes.
Is that because you think the former best, and the latter worst?
To be sure.
So you reckon courage among the best things, and death among the worst.
I do.
Then the rescue of one’s friends in battle, inasmuch as it is noble in respect of the working of good by courage, you have termed noble?
Apparently.
But evil, in respect of the working of evil by death?
Yes.
So we may fairly describe each of these workings as follows: as you call either of them evil because of the evil it produces, so you must call it good because of the good it produces.
I believe that is so.
And again, are they noble inasmuch as they are good, and base inasmuch as they are evil?
Yes.
Then in saying that the rescue of one’s friends in battle is noble and yet evil, you mean just the same as if you called the rescue good, but evil.
I believe what you say is true, Socrates.
So nothing noble, in so far as it is noble, is evil, and nothing base, in so far as it is base, is good.
Apparently.
Now then, consider it again in this way: whoever does nobly, does well too, does he not?
Yes.
And are not those who do well happy?
Of course.
And they are happy because of the acquisition of good things?
Certainly.
And they acquire these by doing well and nobly?
Yes.
So doing well is good?
Of course.
And welfare is noble?
Yes.
Hence we have seen again that noble and good are the same thing.
Apparently.
Then whatever we find to be noble we shall find also to be good, by this argument at least.
We must.
Well then, are good things expedient or not?
Expedient.
And do you remember what our admissions were about just things?
I think we said that those who do just things must do noble things.
And that those who do noble things must do good things?
Yes.
And that good things are expedient?
Yes.
Hence just things, Alcibiades, are expedient.
So it seems.
Well now, are not you the speaker of all this, and I the questioner?
I seem to be, apparently.
So if anyone stands up to advise either the Athenians or the Peparethians, Peparethus is a small island off the coast of Thessaly. imagining that he understands what is just and unjust, and says that just things are sometimes evil, could you do other than laugh him to scorn, since you actually say yourself that just and expedient are the same?
But by Heaven, Socrates, I do not even know what I am saying, I feel altogether in such a strange state! For from moment to moment I change my view under your questioning.
And are you unaware, my friend, what this feeling is?
I am, quite.
Well, do you suppose that if someone should ask you whether you have two eyes or three, two hands or four, or anything else of that sort, you would answer differently from moment to moment, or always the same thing?
I begin to have misgivings about myself, but still I think I should make the same answer.
And the reason would be, because you know?
I think so.
Then if you involuntarily give contradictory answers, clearly it must be about things of which you are ignorant.
Very likely.
And you say you are bewildered in answering about just and unjust, noble and base, evil and good, expedient and inexpedient? Now, is it not obvious that your bewilderment is caused by your ignorance of these things?
I agree.
Then is it the case that when a man does not know a thing he must needs be bewildered in spirit regarding that thing?
Yes, of course.
Well now, do you know in what way you can ascend to heaven?
On my word, not I.
Is that too a kind of question about which your judgement is bewildered?
No, indeed.
Do you know the reason, or shall I state it?
State it.
It is, my friend, that while not knowing the matter you do not suppose that you know it.
Here again, how do you mean?
Do your share, in seeing for yourself. Are you bewildered about the kind of thing that you do not know and are aware of not knowing? For instance, you know, I suppose, that you do not know about the preparation of a tasty dish?
Quite so.
Then do you think for yourself how you are to prepare it, and get bewildered, or do you entrust it to the person who knows?
I do the latter.
And what if you should be on a ship at sea? Would you think whether the tiller should be moved inwards or outwards, The tiller was the handle of an oar at the side of the stern, and was moved towards or away from the center of the ship. and in your ignorance bewilder yourself, or would you entrust it to the helmsman, and be quiet?
I would leave it to him.
So you are not bewildered about what you do not know, so long as you know that you do not know?
It seems I am not,
Then do you note that mistakes in action also are due to this ignorance of thinking one knows when one does not?
Here again, how do you mean?
We set about acting, I suppose, when we think we know what we are doing?
Yes.
But when people think they do not know, I suppose they hand it over to others?
To be sure.
And so that kind of ignorant person makes no mistakes in life, because they entrust such matters to others?
Yes.
Who then are those who make mistakes? For, I take it, they cannot be those who know.