Ion

Soc. Well then, do you now find that the many agree with themselves or each other about just and unjust men or things?

Alc. Far from it, on my word, Socrates.

Soc. In fact, they differ most especially on these points?

Alc. Very much so.

Soc. And I suppose you never yet saw or heard of people differing so sharply on questions of health or the opposite as to fight and kill one another in battle because of them.

Alc. No, indeed.

Soc. But on questions of justice or injustice I am sure you have; and if you have not seen them, at any rate you have heard of them from many people, especially Homer. For you have heard i.e., at the recitations of rhapsodes; cf. the Ion of Plato. the Odyssey and the Iliad?

Alc. I certainly have, I suppose, Socrates.

Soc. And these poems are about a difference of just and unjust

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And from this difference arose the fights and deaths of the Achaeans, and of the Trojans as well, and of the suitors of Penelope in their strife with Odysseus.

Alc. That is true.

Soc. And I imagine that when the Athenians and Spartans and Boeotians lost their men at Tanagra, 457 B.C. and later at Coronea, 447 B.C. among whom your own father perished, the difference that caused their deaths and fights was solely on a question of just and unjust, was it not?

Alc. That is true.

Soc. Then are we to say that these people understand those questions, on which they differ so sharply that they are led by their mutual disputes to take these extreme measures against each other?

Alc. Apparently not.

Soc. And you refer me to teachers of that sort, whom you admit yourself to be without knowledge?

Alc. It seems I do.

Soc. Then how is it likely that you should know what is just and unjust, when you are so bewildered about these matters and are shown to have neither learnt them from anyone nor discovered them for yourself?.

Alc. By what you say, it is not likely.

Soc. There again, Alcibiades, do you see how unfairly you speak?

Alc. In what ?

Soc. In stating that I say so.

Alc. Why, do you not say that l do not know about the just and unjust?

Soc. Not at all.

Alc. Well, do I say it?

Soc. Yes.

Alc. How, pray ?

Soc. I will show you, in the following way. If I ask you which is the greater number, one or two, you will answer two?

Alc. Yes, I shall.

Soc. How much greater?

Alc. By one.

Soc. Then which of us says that two are one more than one?

Alc. I.

Soc. And I was asking, and you were answering?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. Then is it I, the questioner, or you the answerer, that are found to be speaking about these things?

Alc. I.

Soc. And what if I ask what are the letters in Socrates, and you tell me? Which will be the speaker?

Alc. I.

Soc. Come then, tell me, as a principle, when we have question and answer, which is the speaker—the questioner, or the answerer?

Alc. The answerer, I should say, Socrates.

Soc. And throughout the argument so far, I was the questioner?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And you the answerer?

Alc. Quite so.

Soc. Well then, which of us has spoken what has been said?

Alc. Apparently, Socrates, from what we have admitted, it was I.

Soc. And it was said that Alcibiades, the fair son of Cleinias, did not know about just and unjust, but thought he did, and intended to go to the Assembly as adviser to the Athenians on what he knows nothing about; is not that so?

Alc. Apparently.

Soc. Then, to quote Euripides, Eur. Hipp. 352—σοῦ τάδ’, οὐκ ἐμοῦ κλύεις. the result is, Alcibiades, that you may be said to have heard it from yourself, not me,Eur. Hipp. 352 and it is not I who say it, but you, and you tax me with it in vain. And indeed what you say is quite true. For it is a mad scheme this, that you meditate, my excellent friend—of teaching things that you do not know, since you have taken no care to learn them.

Alc. I think, Socrates, that the Athenians and the rest of the Greeks rarely deliberate as to which is the more just or unjust course: for they regard questions of this sort as obvious; and so they pass them over and consider which course will prove more expedient in the result. For the just and the expedient, I take it, are not the same, but many people have profited by great wrongs that they have committed, whilst others, I imagine, have had no advantage from doing what was right.

Soc. What then? Granting that the just and the expedient are in fact as different as they can be, you surely do not still suppose you know what is expedient for mankind, and why it is so?

Alc. Well, what is the obstacle, Socrates,—unless you are going to ask me again from whom I learnt it, or how I discovered it for myself?

Soc. What a way of going on! If your answer is incorrect, and a previous argument can be used to prove it so, you claim to be told something new, and a different line of proof, as though the previous one were like a poor worn-out coat which you refuse to wear any longer; you must be provided instead with something clean and unsoiled in the way of evidence. But I shall ignore your sallies in debate, and shall none the less ask you once more, where you learnt your knowledge of what is expedient, and who is your teacher, asking in one question all the things I asked before; and now you will clearly find yourself in the same plight, and will be unable to prove that you know the expedient either through discovery or through learning. But as you are dainty, and would dislike a repeated taste of the same argument, I pass over this question of whether you know or do not know what is expedient for the Athenians: but why have you not made it clear whether the just and the expedient are the same or different? If you like, question me as I did you, or if you prefer, argue out the matter in your own way.

Alc. But I am not sure I should be able, Socrates, to set it forth to you.

Soc. Well, my good sir, imagine I am the people in Assembly; even there, you know, you will have to persuade each man singly, will you not?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And the same man may well persuade one person singly, and many together, about things that he knows, just as the schoolmaster, I suppose, persuades either one or many about letters?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And again, will not the same man persuade either one or many about number?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And this will be the man who knows—the arithmetician?

Alc. Quite so.

Soc. And you too can persuade a single man about things of which you can persuade many?

Alc. Presumably.

Soc. And these are clearly things that you know.

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And the only difference between the orator speaking before the people and one who speaks in a conversation like ours is that the former persuades men in a number together of the same things, and the latter persuades them one at a time?

Alc. It looks like it.

Soc. Come now, since we see that the same man may persuade either many or one, try your unpracticed hand on me, and endeavor to show that the just is sometimes not expedient.

Alc. You are insolent, Socrates!

Soc. This time, at any rate, I am going to have the insolence to persuade you of the opposite of that which you decline to prove to me.

Alc. Speak, then.

Soc. Just answer my questions.

Alc. No, you yourself must be the speaker.

Soc. What? Do you not wish above all things to be persuaded?

Alc. By all means, to be sure.

Soc. And you would best be persuaded if you should say the case is so?

Alc. I agree.

Soc. Then answer; and if you do not hear your own self say that the just is expedient, put no trust in the words of anyone again.

Alc. I will not: but I may as well answer; for I do not think I shall come to any harm.