It is clear to everyone that we are in accord about some matters of this kind and at variance about others, is it not?
I think I understand your meaning, but express it still more clearly.
When one says iron or silver, we all understand the same thing, do we not?
Surely.
What if he says justice or goodness? Do we not part company, and disagree with each other and with ourselves?
Certainly.
Then in some things we agree and in others we do not.
True.
Then in which of the two are we more easy to deceive, and in which has rhetoric the greater power?
Evidently in the class of doubtful things.
Then he who is to develop an art of rhetoric must first make a methodical division and acquire a clear impression of each class, that in which people must be in doubt and that in which they are not.
He who has acquired that would have conceived an excellent principle.
Then I think when he has to do with a particular case, he will not be ignorant, but will know clearly to which of the two classes the thing belongs about which he is to speak.
Of course.
Well then, to which does Love belong? To the doubtful things or the others?
To the doubtful, surely; if he did not, do you think he would have let you say what you said just now about him, that he is an injury to the beloved and to the lover,
and again that he is the greatest of blessings?
Excellent. But tell me this—for I was in such an ecstasy that I have quite forgotten—whether I defined love in the beginning of my discourse.
Yes, by Zeus, and wonderfully well.
Oh, how much more versed the nymphs, daughters of Achelous, and Pan, son of Hermes, are in the art of speech than Lysias, son of Cephalus! Or am I wrong, and did Lysias also, in the beginning of his discourse on Love, compel us to suppose Love to be some one thing
which he chose to consider it, and did he then compose and finish his discourse with that in view? Shall we read the beginning of it again?