Then if we cannot catch the good with the aid of one idea,
let us run it down with three—beauty, proportion, and truth, and let us say that these, considered as one, may more properly than all other components of the mixture be regarded as the cause, and that through the goodness of these the mixture itself has been made good.
Quite right.
So now, Protarchus, any one would be able to judge about pleasure and wisdom,
and to decide which of them is more akin to the highest good and of greater value among men and gods.
That is clear; but still it is better to carry on the discussion to the end.
Let us, then, judge each of the three separately in its relation to pleasure and mind; for it is our duty to see to which of the two we shall assign each of them as more akin.
You refer to beauty, truth, and measure?
Yes. Take truth first, Protarchus; take it and look at the three—mind, truth,
and pleasure; take plenty of time, and answer to yourself whether pleasure or mind is more akin to truth.
Why take time? For the difference, to my mind, is great. For pleasure is the greatest of impostors, and the story goes that in the pleasures of love, which are said to be the greatest, perjury is even pardoned by the gods, as if the pleasures were like children, utterly devoid of all sense.
But mind is either identical with truth or of all things most like it and truest.
Next, then, consider measure in the same way, and see whether pleasure possesses more of it than wisdom, or wisdom than pleasure.
That also is an easy thing to consider. For I think nothing in the world could be found more immoderate than pleasure and its transports, and nothing more in harmony with measure than mind and knowledge.
However, go on and tell about the third. Has mind or pleasure the greater share in beauty?
But Socrates, no one, either asleep or awake, ever saw or knew wisdom or mind to be or become unseemly at any time or in any way whatsoever.
Right.
But pleasures, and the greatest pleasures at that, when we see any one enjoying them and observe the ridiculous or utterly disgraceful element which accompanies them,
fill us with a sense of shame; we put them out of sight and hide them, so far as possible; we confine everything of that sort to the night time, as unfit for the sight of day.
Then you will proclaim everywhere, Protarchus, by messengers to the absent and by speech to those present, that pleasure is not the first of possessions, nor even the second, but first the eternal nature has chosen measure, moderation, fitness, and all which is to be considered similar to these.
That appears to result from what has now been said.
Second, then, comes proportion, beauty, perfection, sufficiency, and all that belongs to that class.
Yes, so it appears.
And if you count mind and wisdom as the third, you will, I prophesy, not wander far from the truth.
That may be.
And will you not put those properties fourth which we said belonged especially to the soul—sciences, arts, and true opinions they are called—
and say that these come after the first three, and are fourth, since they are more akin than pleasure to the good?
Perhaps.
And fifth, those pleasures which we separated and classed as painless, which we called pure pleasures of the soul itself, those which accompany knowledge and, sometimes, perceptions?
May be.
But with the sixth generation, says Orpheus, cease the rhythmic song. It seems that our discussion, too, is likely to cease with the sixth decision.
So after this nothing remains for us but to give our discussion a sort of head.
Yes, that should be done.
Come then, let us for the third time call the same argument to witness before Zeus the saviour, and proceed.
What argument?
Philebus declared that pleasure was entirely and in all respects the good.
Apparently, Socrates, when you said the third time just now, you meant that we must take up our argument again from the beginning.
Yes; but let us hear what follows. For I, perceiving the truths which I have now been detailing, and annoyed by the theory held not only by Philebus but by many thousands of others, said that mind was a far better and more excellent thing for human life than pleasure.
True.
But suspecting that there were many other things to be considered, I said that if anything should be found better than these two, I should support mind against pleasure in the struggle for the second place, and even the second place would be lost by pleasure.
Yes, that is what you said.
And next it was most sufficiently proved that each of these two was insufficient.
Very true.
In this argument, then, both mind and pleasure were set aside; neither of them is the absolute good, since they are devoid of self-sufficiency, adequacy, and perfection?
Quite right.
And on the appearance of a third competitor, better than either of these, mind is now found to be ten thousand times more akin than pleasure to the victor.
Certainly.
Then, according to the judgement which has now been given by our discussion, the power of pleasure would be fifth.
So it seems.
But not first, even if all the cattle and horses and other beasts in the world, in their pursuit of enjoyment, so assert. Trusting in them, as augurs trust in birds, the many judge that pleasures are the greatest blessings in life, and they imagine that the lusts of beasts are better witnesses than are the aspirations and thoughts inspired by the philosophic muse.
Socrates, we all now declare that what you have said is perfectly true.
Then you will let me go?
There is still a little left, Socrates. I am sure you will not give up before we do, and I will remind you of what remains.