Soc. Thirst again is a destruction and a pain, but the filling with moisture of that which was dried up is a pleasure. Then, too, the unnatural dissolution and disintegration we experience through heat are a pain, but the natural restoration and cooling are a pleasure.

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. And the unnatural hardening of the moisture in an animal through cold is pain; but the natural course of the elements returning to their place and separating is a pleasure. See, in short, if you think it is a reasonable statement that whenever in the class of living beings, which, as I said before, arises out of the natural union of the infinite and the finite, that union is destroyed, the destruction is pain, and the passage and return of all things to their own nature is pleasure.

Pro. Let us accept that; for it seems to me to be true in its general lines.

Soc. Then we may assume this as one kind of pain and pleasure arising severally under the conditions I have described?

Pro. Let that be assumed.

Soc. Now assume within the soul itself the anticipation of these conditions, the sweet and cheering hope of pleasant things to come, the fearful and woful expectation of painful things to come.

Pro. Yes, indeed, this is another kind of pleasure and pain, which belongs to the soul itself, apart from the body, and arises through expectation.

Soc. You are right. I think that in these two kinds, both of which are, in my opinion, pure, and not formed by mixture of pain and pleasure, the truth about pleasure will be made manifest, whether the entire class is to be desired or such desirability is rather to be attributed to some other class among those we have mentioned, whereas pleasure and pain, like heat, cold, and other such things, are sometimes desirable and sometimes undesirable, because they are not good themselves, though some of them sometimes admit on occasion the nature of the good.

Pro. You are quite right in saying that we must track our quarry on this trail.

Soc. First, then, let us agree on this point: If it is true, as we said, that destruction is pain and restoration is pleasure, let us consider the case of living beings in which neither destruction nor restoration is going on, and what their state is under such conditions. Fix your mind on my question: Must not every living being under those conditions necessarily be devoid of any feeling of pain or pleasure, great or small?

Pro. Yes, necessarily.

Soc. Have we, then, a third condition, besides those of feeling pleasure and pain?

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. Well then, do your best to bear it in mind; for remembering or forgetting it will make a great difference in our judgement of pleasure. And I should like, if you do not object, to speak briefly about it.

Pro. Pray do so.

Soc. You know that there is nothing to hinder a man from living the life of wisdom in this manner.

Pro. You mean without feeling pleasure or pain?

Soc. Yes, for it was said, you know, in our comparison of the lives that he who chose the life of mind and wisdom was to have no feeling of pleasure, great or small.

Pro. Yes, surely, that was said.

Soc. Such a man, then, would have such a life; and perhaps it is not unreasonable, if that is the most divine of lives.

Pro. Certainly it is not likely that gods feel either joy or its opposite.

Soc. No, it is very unlikely; for either is unseemly for them. But let us reserve the discussion of that point for another time, if it is appropriate, and we will give mind credit for it in contending for the second place, if we cannot count it for the first.

Pro. Quite right.

Soc. Now the other class of pleasure, which we said was an affair of the soul alone, originates entirely in memory.

Pro. How is that?

Soc. We must, apparently, first take up memory, and perception even before memory, if these matters are to be made clear to us properly.

Pro. What do you mean?

Soc. Assume that some of the affections of our body are extinguished in the body before they reach the soul, leaving the soul unaffected, and that other affections permeate both body and soul and cause a vibration in both conjointly and in each individually.

Pro. Let us assume that.

Soc. Shall we be right in saying that the soul forgets those which do not permeate both, and does not forget those which do?

Pro. Yes, certainly.

Soc. Do not in the least imagine that when I speak of forgetting I mean that forgetfulness arises in this case; for forgetfulness is the departure of memory, and in the case under consideration memory has not yet come into being; now it is absurd to speak of the loss of that which does not exist and has not yet come into being, is it not?

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. Then just change the terms.

Pro. How?

Soc. Instead of saying that the soul forgets, when it is unaffected by the vibrations of the body, apply the term want of perception to that which you are now calling forgetfulness.

Pro. I understand.

Soc. And the union of soul and body in one common affection and one common motion you may properly call perception.

Pro. Very true.

Soc. Then do we now understand what we mean by perception?

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. I think, then, that memory may rightly be defined as the preservation of perception.

Pro. Quite rightly.

Soc. But do we not say that memory differs from recollection?

Pro. Perhaps.

Soc. And is this the difference?

Pro. What?

Soc. When the soul alone by itself, apart from the body, recalls completely any experience it has had in company with the body, we say that it recollects do we not?

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. And again when the soul has lost the memory of a perception or of something it has learned and then alone by itself regains this, we call everything of that kind recollection.

Pro. You are right.

Soc. Now my reason for saying all this is—

Pro. What?

Soc. That henceforth we may comprehend as completely and clearly as possible the pleasure of the soul, and likewise its desire, apart from the body; for both of these appear to be made plain by what has been said about memory and recollection.

Pro. Let us, then, Socrates, discuss the next point.

Soc. We must, it seems, consider many things in relation to the origin and general aspect of pleasure; but now I think our first task is to take up the nature and origin of desire.

Pro. Then let us examine that; for we shall not lose anything.

Soc. Oh yes, Protarchus, we shall lose a great deal! When we find what we are seeking we shall lose our perplexity about these very questions.

Pro. That is a fair counter; but let us try to take up the next point.

Soc. Did we not say just now that hunger, thirst, and the like were desires?

Pro. They are, decidedly.

Soc. What sort of identity have we in view when we call these, which are so different, by one name?

Pro. By Zeus, Socrates, that question may not be easy to answer, yet it must be answered.

Soc. Let us, then, begin again at that point with the same examples.

Pro. At what point?

Soc. We say of a thing on any particular occasion, it’s thirsty, do we not?

Pro. Of course.

Soc. And that means being empty?

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. And is thirst, then, a desire?

Pro. Yes, of drink.