In cases of illness, does not the proper combination of these elements produce health?
Certainly.
And in the acute and the grave, the quick and the slow, which are unlimited, the addition of these same elements creates a limit and establishes the whole art of music in all its perfection, does it not?
Excellent.
And again in the case of cold and hot weather, the introduction of these elements removes the excess and indefiniteness and creates moderation and harmony.
Assuredly.
And thence arise the seasons and all the beauties of our world,
by mixture of the infinite with the finite?
Of course.
There are countless other things which I pass over, such as health, beauty, and strength of the body and the many glorious beauties of the soul. For this goddess, This goddess may be Μουσική (in which case ἐγγενομένη the reading of T and G, would be preferable to ἐγγενόμενα above), not music in the restricted modern sense, but the spirit of numbers and measure which underlies all music, and all the beauties of the world; or the goddess may be mentioned here in reference (and opposition) to the goddess Pleasure (12 B); she is the nameless deity who makes Pleasure and all others conform to her rules. my fair Philebus, beholding the violence and universal wickedness which prevailed, since there was no limit of pleasures or of indulgence in them, established law and order, which contain a limit. You say she did harm;
I say, on the contrary, she brought salvation. What do you think, Protarchus?
What you say, Socrates, pleases me greatly.
I have spoken of these three classes, you observe.
Yes, I believe I understand; I think you mean that the infinite is one class and the finite is another class among existing things; but what you wish to designate as the third class, I do not comprehend very well.
No, because the multitude which springs up in the third class overpowers you and yet the infinite also comprised many classes,
nevertheless, since they were sealed with the seal of the more and less, they were seen to be of one class.
True.
And the finite, again, did not contain many classes, nor were we disturbed about its natural unity.
Of course not.
No, not at all. And as to the third class, understand that I mean every offspring of these two which comes into being as a result of the measures created by the cooperation of the finite.
I understand.
But we said there was, in addition to three classes, a fourth to be investigated. Let us do that together. See whether you think that everything which comes into being must necessarily come into being through a cause.
Yes, I do; for how could it come into being apart from a cause?
Does not the nature of that which makes or creates differ only in name from the cause, and may not the creative agent and the cause be properly considered one?
Yes.
And, again, we shall find that, on the same principle, that which is made or created differs in name only from that which comes into being, shall we not?
We shall.
And the creative agent always naturally leads, and that which is created follows after it as it comes into being?
Certainly.
Then the cause and that which is the servant of the cause for the purpose of generation are not the same.
Of course not.
Did not the things which come into being and the things out of which they come into being furnish us all the three classes?
Certainly.
And that which produces all these, the cause, we call the fourth, as it has been satisfactorily shown to be distinct from the others?
Yes, it is distinct.
It is, then, proper, now that we have distinguished the four, to make sure that we remember them separately by enumerating them in order.
Yes, certainly.
The first, then, I call infinite, the second limit or finite, and the third something generated by a mixture of these two. And should I be making any mistake if I called
the cause of this mixture and creation the fourth?
Certainly not.
Now what is the next step in our argument, and what was our purpose in coming to the point we have reached? Was it not this? We were trying to find out whether the second place belonged to pleasure or to wisdom, were we not?
Yes, we were.
And may we not, perhaps, now that we have finished with these points, be better able to come to a decision about the first and second places, which was the original subject of our discussion?
Perhaps.
Well then; we decided that the mixed life of pleasure and wisdom was the victor, did we not?
Yes.
And do we not see what kind of life this is, and to what class it belongs?
Of course we do.
We shall say that it belongs to the third class; for that class is not formed by mixture of any two things, but of all the things which belong to the infinite, bound by the finite; and therefore this victorious life would rightly be considered a part of this class.
Quite rightly.
Well then, what of your life, Philebus, of unmixed pleasure? In which of the aforesaid classes may it properly be said to belong? But before you tell me, please answer this question.
Ask your question.
Have pleasure and pain a limit, or are they among the things which admit of more and less?
Yes, they are among those which admit of the more, Socrates; for pleasure would not be absolute good if it were not infinite in number and degree.
Nor would pain, Philebus, be absolute evil; so it is not the infinite which supplies any element of good in pleasure; we must look for something else. Well, I grant you that pleasure and pain are in the class of the infinite but to which of the aforesaid classes, Protarchus and Philebus, can we now without irreverence assign wisdom, knowledge, and mind? I think we must find the right answer to this question, for our danger is great if we fail.
Oh Socrates, you exalt your own god.
And you your goddess, my friend. But the question calls for an answer, all the same.
Socrates is right, Philebus; you ought to do as he asks.
Did you not, Protarchus, elect to reply in my place?
Yes; but now I am somewhat at a loss, and I ask you, Socrates, to be our spokesman yourself, that we may not select the wrong representative and so say something improper.
I must do as you ask, Protarchus; and it is not difficult. But did I really, as Philebus said, embarrass you by playfully exalting my god, when I asked to what class mind and knowledge should be assigned?
You certainly did, Socrates.
Yet the answer is easy; for all philosophers agree—whereby they really exalt themselves—that mind is king of heaven and earth. Perhaps they are right. But let us, if you please, investigate the question of its class more at length.
Speak just as you like, Socrates. Do not consider length, so far as we are concerned you cannot bore us.
Good. Then let us begin by asking a question.
What is the question?
Shall we say, Protarchus, that all things and this which is called the universe are governed by an irrational and fortuitous power and mere chance, or, on the contrary, as our forefathers said, are ordered and directed by mind and a marvellous wisdom?
The two points of view have nothing in common, my wonderful Socrates. For what you are now saying seems to me actually impious. But the assertion that mind orders all things is worthy of the aspect of the world, of sun, moon, stars, and the whole revolving universe; I can never say or think anything else about it.