Ceph.Certainly, said Socrates. Well then, does each participant object partake of the whole idea, or of a part of it? Or could there be some other third kind of participation? How could there be? said he. Do you think the whole idea, being one, is in each of the many participants, or what? Yes, for what prevents it from being in them, Parmenides? said Socrates. Then while it is one and the same, the whole of it would be in many separate individuals at once, and thus it would itself be separate from itself. No, he replied, for it might be like day, which is one and the same, is in many places at once, and yet is not separated from itself; so each idea, though one and the same, might be in all its participants at once. That, said he, is very neat, Socrates you make one to be in many places at once, just as if you should spread a sail over many persons and then should say it was one and all of it was over many. Is not that about what you mean? Perhaps it is, said Socrates. Would the whole sail be over each person, or a particular part over each? A part over each. Then, said he, the ideas themselves, Socrates, are divisible into parts, and the objects which partake of them would partake of a part, and in each of them there would be not the whole, but only a part of each idea. So it appears. Are you, then, Socrates, willing to assert that the one idea is really divided and will still be one? By no means, he replied. No, said Parmenides, for if you divide absolute greatness, and each of the many great things is great by a part of greatness smaller than absolute greatness, is not that unreasonable? Certainly, he said. Or again, will anything by taking away a particular small part of equality possess something by means of which, when it is less than absolute equality, its possessor will be equal to anything else? That is impossible. Or let one of us have a part of the small; the small will be greater than this, since this is a part of it, and therefore the absolute small will be greater; but that to which the part of the small is added will be smaller, not greater, than before. That, said he, is impossible. How, then, Socrates, will other things partake of those ideas of yours, if they cannot partake of them either as parts or as wholes? By Zeus, he replied, I think that is a very hard question to determine. Well, what do you think of this? Of what?