Str. Can we wonder, then, Socrates, at all the evils that arise and are destined to arise in such kinds of government, when they are based upon such a foundation, and must conduct their affairs in accordance with written laws and with customs, without knowledge? For every one can see that any other art built upon such a foundation would ruin all its works that are so produced. Ought we not rather to wonder at the stability that inheres in the state? For states have labored under such conditions for countless ages, nevertheless some of them are lasting and are not overthrown. Many, to be sure, like ships that founder at sea, are destroyed, have been destroyed, and will be destroyed hereafter, through the worthlessness of their captains and crews who have the greatest ignorance of the greatest things, men who have no knowledge of statesmanship, but think they have in every respect most perfect knowledge of this above all other sciences.

Y. Soc. Very true.

Str. Is it, then, our duty to see which of these not right forms of government is the least difficult to live with, though all are difficult, and which is the most oppressive, although this is somewhat aside from the subject we had proposed for ourselves? On the whole, however, perhaps all of us have some such motive in mind in all that we are doing.

Y. Soc. Yes, it is our duty, of course.

Str. Well then, you may say that of the three forms, the same is both the hardest and the easiest.

Y. Soc. What do you mean?

Str. Just this: I mean that there are three forms of government, as we said at the beginning of the discussion which has now flowed in upon us—monarchy, the rule of the few, and the rule of the many.

Y. Soc. Yes, there were those three.

Str. Let us, then, by dividing each of these into two parts, make six, and by distinguishing the right government from these, a seventh.

Y. Soc. How shall we make the division?

Str. We said that monarchy comprised royalty and tyranny, and the rule of the few comprised aristocracy, which has a name of good omen, and oligarchy; but to the rule of the many we gave then only a single name, democracy; now, however, that also must be divided.

Y. Soc. How? On what principle shall we divide that?

Str. On the same that we used for the others, though the name of this form is already twofold in meaning. The name is said to be twofold in meaning, probably because it was applied in cases in which there was a regularly constituted popular government and also in cases of mob rule. At any rate, the distinction between ruling according to law and without law applies alike to this and the rest.

Y. Soc. Yes, it does.

Str. Before, when we were in search of the right government, this division was of no use, as we showed at the time but now that we have set that apart and have decided that the others are the only available forms of government, the principle of lawfulness and lawlessness bisects each of them.

Y. Soc. So it seems, from what has been said.

Str. Monarchy, then, when bound by good written rules, which we call laws, is the best of all the six; but without law it is hard and most oppressive to live with.

Y. Soc. I fancy it is.

Str. But just as few is intermediate between one and a multitude, so the government of the few must be considered intermediate, both in good and in evil. But the government of the multitude is weak in all respects and able to do nothing great, either good or bad, when compared with the other forms of government, because in this the powers of government are distributed in small shares among many men; therefore of all these governments when they are lawful, this is the worst, and when they are all lawless it is the best; and if they are all without restraint, life is most desirable in a democracy, but if they are orderly, that is the worst to live in; but life in the first kind of state is by far the first and best, with the exception of the seventh, for that must be set apart from all the others, as God is set apart from men. The concentration of power in the hands of one man makes monarchy most efficient, but, since no human monarch is perfect, monarchy must be regulated by laws. Its efficiency makes it under such conditions the best government to live under. But without restraint of law monarchy becomes tyranny—the worst kind of oppression. Oligarchy occupies a position intermediate between monarchy and democracy—less efficient than the one and more efficient than the other, because power is distributed among a small number of persons—and is, therefore, when lawful less good, and when lawless less bad, than monarchy. Democracy, in turn, since power is too greatly subdivided, is inefficient, either for good or evil, and is, therefore, when lawful less good, and when lawless less bad, than either of the others.

Y. Soc. That statement appears to be true to the facts, and we must do as you say.

Str. Then those who participate in all those governments with the exception of the scientific one—are to be eliminated as not being statesmen, but partisans and since they preside over the greatest counterfeits, they are themselves counterfeits, and since they are the greatest of imitators and cheats, they are the greatest of all sophists.

Y. Soc. This term sophist seems to have come round quite rightly to the so-called statesmen.

Str. Well, this part has been exactly like a play. Just as we remarked a moment ago, 291 A. a festive troop of centaurs or satyrs was coming into view, which we had to separate from the art of statesmanship; and now we have succeeded in doing this, though it has been very difficult.

Y. Soc. So it seems.

Str. But another group remains, which is still more difficult to separate, because it is more closely akin to the kingly class and is also harder to recognize. I think we are in somewhat the same position as refiners of gold.

Y. Soc. How so?

Str. Why, the refiners first remove earth and stones and all that sort of thing; and after that there remain the precious substances which are mixed with the gold and akin to it and can be removed only by fire—copper and silver and sometimes adamant. Plat. Tim. 59 B, defines adamant as χρυσοῦ ὄζοςa branch of gold. It was, then, a substance akin to gold. Platinum has been suggested. These are removed by the difficult processes of smelting and tests, leaving before our eyes what is called unalloyed gold in all its purity.

Y. Soc. Yes, that is said, at least, to be the process.

Str. By the same method I think all that is different and alien and incompatible has now been eliminated by us from the science of statesmanship, and what is precious and akin to it is left. Herein are included the arts of the general and of the judge and that kind of oratory which partakes of the kingly art because it persuades men to justice and thereby helps to steer the ship of state. Now in what way shall we most easily eliminate these and show him whom we seek alone by himself and undisguised?

Y. Soc. Clearly we must do this somehow.

Str. Then if it is a question of trying, he will be shown. But I think we had better try to disclose him by means of music. Please answer my question.

Y. Soc. What is it?

Str. Shall we agree that there is such a thing as learning music and the sciences of handicraft in general?

Y. Soc. There is.

Str. And how about this? Shall we say that there is another science connected with those, which tells whether we ought or ought not to learn any one of then?

Y. Soc. Yes, we shall say that there is.

Str. And shall we agree that this is different from those?

Y. Soc. Yes.

Str. And shall we say that none of them ought to have control of any other, or that those sciences should control this one, or that this should control and rule all the others?

Y. Soc. This should control those others.

Str. You mean that the science which decides whether we ought to learn or not should control the science which is learnt or teaches?

Y. Soc. Emphatically.

Str. And the science which decides whether to persuade or not should control that which can persuade?

Y. Soc. Certainly.

Str. Well, then, to what science shall we assign the power of persuading a multitude or a mob by telling edifying stories, not by teaching?

Y. Soc. It is, I think, clear that this must be added to rhetoric.

Str. But the power of deciding whether some action, no matter what, should be taken, either by persuasion or by some exercise of force, in relation to any person, or whether to take no action at all—to what science is that to be assigned?

Y. Soc. To the science which controls the sciences of persuasion and speech.

Str. And that would, I think, be no other than the function of the statesman.

Y. Soc. A most excellent conclusion.

Str. So rhetoric also seems to have been quickly separated from statesmanship Cf. 303 C. as a different species, subservient to the other.

Y. Soc. Yes.

Str. Here is another function or power; what are we to think about it?

Y. Soc. What is it?

Str. The power of determining how war shall be waged against those upon whom we have declared war, whether we are to call this a science or not a science?

Y. Soc. How could we think it is not a science, when generalship and all military activity practise it?

Str. And the power which is able and knows how to deliberate and decide whether to make war or peace, shall we assume that it is the same as this or different?

Y. Soc. If we are consistent, we must assume that it is different.

Str. Shall we, then, assume that it controls the other, if we are to agree with our views in the former examples?

Y. Soc. Yes.

Str. And what other art shall we make bold to declare is mistress of that great and terrible art, the art of war as a whole, except the truly kingly art?

Y. Soc. No other.

Str. We shall, then, not call the art of the generals statesmanship, since it is subservient.

Y. Soc. No; that would not be reasonable.

Str. Now let us examine the function of the righteous judges.

Y. Soc. Certainly.

Str. Has it any power beyond that of judging men’s contracts with one another, pronouncing them right or wrong by the standard of the existing laws which it has received from the king and law-giver; showing its own peculiar virtue in that it is not so perverted by any bribes, or fears, or pity, or enmity, or friendship, as ever to consent to decide the lawsuits of men with each other contrary to the enactments of the lawgiver?

Y. Soc. No; the business of this power is about as you have described it.

Str. Then we find that the strength of judges is not kingly, but is guardian of laws and a servant of the kingly power.

Y. Soc. So it appears.

Str. The consideration of all these arts which have been mentioned leads to the conclusion that none of them is the art of the statesman. For the art that is truly kingly ought not to act itself, but should rule over the arts that have the power of action; it should decide upon the right or wrong time for the initiation of the most important measures in the state, and the other arts should perform its behests.

Y. Soc. Right.

Str. Therefore those arts which we have just described, as they control neither one another nor themselves, but have each its own peculiar sphere of action, are quite properly called by special names corresponding to those special actions.

Y. Soc. That appears, at least, to be the case.

Str. But the art which holds sway over them all and watches over the laws and all things in the state, weaving them all most perfectly together, we may, I think, by giving to its function a designation which indicates its power over the community, with full propriety call statecraft.

Y. Soc. Most assuredly.

Str. Shall we then proceed to discuss it after the model supplied by weaving, See 287-290, 303-305. now that all the classes in the state have been made plain to us?

Y. Soc. By all means.

Str. Then the kingly process of weaving must be described, its nature, the manner in which it combines the threads, and the kind of web it produces.

Y. Soc. Evidently.

Str. It has, apparently, become necessary, after all, to explain a difficult matter.

Y. Soc. But certainly the explanation must be made.

Str. It is difficult, for the assertion that one part of virtue is in a way at variance with another sort of virtue may very easily be assailed by those who appeal to popular opinion in contentious arguments.

Y. Soc. I do not understand.

Str. I will say it again in another way. I suppose you believe that courage The word ἀνδρεία has a much wider meaning than the English courage. Like the Latin virtus, it embraces all qualities which are desirable in a perfect man, especially the more active and positive virtues. When applied to one particular kind of virtue it is applied to courage, but throughout this discussion it is used in the wider sense, for which there is no single English equivalent. is one part of virtue.

Y. Soc. Certainly.

Str. And, of course, that self-restraint is different from courage, but is also a part of virtue of which courage is a part.

Y. Soc. Yes.

Str. Now I must venture to utter a strange doctrine about them.

Y. Soc. What is it?

Str. That, in a way, they are in a condition of great hostility and opposition to each other in many beings.

Y. Soc. What do you mean?

Str. Something quite unusual; for, you know, all the parts of virtue are usually said to be friendly to one another.

Y. Soc. Yes.

Str. Now shall we pay careful attention and see whether this is so simple, or, quite the contrary, there is in some respects a variance between them and their kin?

Y. Soc. Yes; please tell how we shall investigate the question.

Str. Among all the parts we must look for those which we call excellent but place in two opposite classes.

Y. Soc. Say more clearly what you mean.

Str. Acuteness and quickness, whether in body or soul or vocal utterance, whether they are real or exist in such likenesses as music and graphic art produce in imitation of them—have you never yourself praised one of them or heard them praised by others?

Y. Soc. Yes, of course.

Str. And do you remember in what way they praise them as occasion offers?

Y. Soc. Not in the least.

Str. I wonder if I can express to you in words what I have in mind.

Y. Soc. Why not?

Str. You seem to think that is an easy thing to do. However, let us consider the matter as it appears in the opposite classes. For example, when we admire, as we frequently do in many actions, quickness and energy and acuteness of mind or body or even of voice, we express our praise of them by one word, courage.

Y. Soc. How so?

Str. We say acute and courageous in the first instance, also quick and courageous, and energetic and courageous; and when we apply this word as a common term applicable to all persons and actions of this class, we praise them.

Y. Soc. Yes, we do.