Then let us try again; let us divide in two
the class we have taken up for discussion, and proceed always by way of the right-hand part of the thing divided, clinging close to the company to which the sophist belongs, until, having stripped him of all common properties and left him only his own peculiar nature, we shall show him plainly first
to ourselves and secondly to those who are most closely akin to the dialectic method.
Right.
We began by making two divisions of art, the productive and the acquisitive, did we not? See Plat. Theaet. 219
Yes.
And the sophist showed himself to us in the arts of hunting, contests, commerce, and the like, which were subdivisions of acquisitive art?
Certainly.
But now, since imitative art has taken him over, it is clear that our first step must be the division of productive art into two parts;
for imitative art is a kind of production—of images, however, we say, not of real things in each case. Do you agree?
By all means.
Then let us first assume two parts of productive art.
What are they?
The divine and the human.
I don’t yet understand.
We said, if we remember the beginning of our conversation, that every power is productive which causes things to come into being which did not exist before.
Yes, we remember.
There are all the animals, and all the plants that grow out of the earth from seeds and roots, and all the lifeless substances, fusible and infusible, that are formed within the earth. Shall we say that they came into being, not having been before, in any other way than through God’s workmanship? Or, accepting the commonly expressed belief—
What belief?
That nature brings them forth from some self-acting cause, without creative intelligence. Or shall we say that they are created by reason and by divine knowledge that comes from God?
I, perhaps because I am young, often change from one opinion to the other; but now, looking at you and considering that you think they are created by God, I also adopt that view.
Well said, Theaetetus; and if I thought you were one of those who would think differently by and by, I should try now, by argument and urgent persuasion, to make you agree with my opinion; but since I understand your nature and see that it of itself inclines,
without any words of mine, towards that to which you say you are at present attracted, I will let that go; for it would be a waste of time. But I will assume that things which people call natural are made by divine art, and things put together by man out of those as materials are made by human art, and that there are accordingly two kinds of art, the one human and the other divine.
Quite right.
Now that there are two, divide each of them again.