Then being itself must also be said to be other than all other things.
Yes, it must.
And we conclude that whatever the number of other things is, just that is the number of the things in relation to which being is not; for not being those things, it is itself one, and again, those other things are not unlimited in number.
That is not far from the truth.
Then we must not be disturbed by this either, since by their nature the classes have participation in one another. But if anyone refuses to accept our present results, let him reckon with our previous arguments and then proceed to reckon with the next step. i.e., if he will not accept our proof that being is not, etc., he must disprove our arguuents respecting the participation of idea in one another, and then proceed to draw his inference.
That is very fair.
Then here is a point to consider.
What is it?
When we say not-being, we speak, I think, not of something that is the opposite of being, but only of something different.
What do you mean?
For instance, when we speak of a thing as not great, do we seem to you to mean by the expression what is small any more than what is of middle size?
No, of course not.
Then when we are told that the negative signifies the opposite, we shall not admit it; we shall admit only that the particle notThe two particles οὐ and μή in Greek. indicates something different
from the words to which it is prefixed, or rather from the things denoted by the words that follow the negative.
Certainly.
Let us consider another point and see if you agree with me.
What is it?
It seems to me that the nature of the other is all cut up into little bits, like knowledge.
What do you mean?
Knowledge, like other, is one, but each separate part of it which applies to some particular subject
has a name of its own; hence there are many arts, as they are called, and kinds of knowledge, or sciences.
Yes, certainly.
And the same is true, by their nature, of the parts of the other, though it also is one concept.
Perhaps; but let us discuss the matter and see how it comes about.
Is there a part of the other which is opposed to the beautiful?
There is.
Shall we say that this is nameless or that it has a name?
That it has one; for that which in each case we call not-beautiful is surely the other of the nature of the beautiful and of nothing else.
Now, then, tell me something more.
What?
Does it not result from this that the not-beautiful is a distinct part of some one class of being and also, again, opposed to some class of being?
Yes.
Then, apparently, it follows that the not-beautiful is a contrast of being with being.
Quite right.
Can we, then, in that case, say that the beautiful is more and the not-beautiful less a part of being?