But it exists, by reason of its participation in being.
Yes, it exists.
Now motion again is other than the same.
You’re about right.
Therefore it is not the same.
No, it is not.
But yet we found it was the same, because all things partake of the same.
Certainly.
Then we must admit that motion is the same and is not the same, and we must not be disturbed thereby; for when we say it is the same and not the same, we do not use the words alike. When we call it the same, we do so because it partakes
of the same in relation to itself, and when we call it not the same, we do so on account of its participation in the other, by which it is separated from the same and becomes not that but other, so that it is correctly spoken of in turn as not the same.
Yes, certainly.
Then even if absolute motion partook in any way of rest, it would not be absurd to say it was at rest?
It would be perfectly right, if we are to admit that some of the classes will mingle with one another, and others will not.
And surely we demonstrated that before we took up our present points; we proved that it was according to nature. See Plat. Theaet. 251e ff
Yes, of course.
Then let us recapitulate: Motion is other than the other, just as we found it to be other than the same and than rest. Is that true?
Inevitably.
Then it is in a sense not other and also other, according to our present reasoning.
True.
Now how about the next point? Shall we say next that motion is other than the three, but not other than the fourth,—that is, if we have agreed that the classes
about which and within which we undertook to carry on our inquiry are five in number?
How can we say that? For we cannot admit that the number is less than was shown just now.
Then we may fearlessly persist in contending that motion is other than being?
Yes, most fearlessly.
It is clear, then, that motion really is not, and also that it is, since it partakes of being?
That is perfectly clear.
In relation to motion, then, not-being is. That is inevitable. And this extends to all the classes; for in all of them
the nature of other so operates as to make each one other than being, and therefore not-being. So we may, from this point of view, rightly say of all of them alike that they are not; and again, since they partake of being, that they are and have being.
Yes, I suppose so.
And so, in relation to each of the classes, being is many, and not-being is infinite in number. Being is many, for each and every thing in all the classes is; but not-being is infinite, for not only is it true that everything in each of the classes is not, but not-being extends also to all conceptions which do not and cannot have any reality.