But what do we mean by these words, the same and other, which we have just used? Are they two new classes, different from the other three, but always of necessity mingled with them, and must we conduct our inquiry on the assumption that there are five classes, not three, or are we unconsciously speaking of one of those three
when we say the same or other?
Perhaps.
But certainly motion and rest are neither other nor the same.
How so?
Whatever term we apply to rest and motion in common cannot be either of those two.
Why not?
Because motion would be at rest and rest would be in motion; in respect of both, for whichever of the two became other would force the other to change its nature into that of its opposite, since
it would participate in its opposite.
Exactly so.
Both certainly partake of the same and the other. i.e., sameness and difference can he predicated of both.
Yes.
Then we must not say that motion, or rest either, is the same or other.
No.
But should we conceive of being and the same as one?
Perhaps.
But if being and the same have no difference of meaning, then when we go on and say that both rest and motion are, we shall be saying that they are both the same,
since they are.
But surely that is impossible.
Then it is impossible for being and the same to be one.
Pretty nearly.
So we shall consider the same a fourth class in addition to the other three?
Certainly.
Then shall we call the other a fifth class? Or must we conceive of this and being as two names for one class?
May be.
But I fancy you admit that among the entities some are always conceived as absolute, and some as relative.
Of course.
And other is always relative to other, is it not?
Yes.
It would not be so, if being and the other were not utterly different. If the other, like being, partook of both absolute and relative existence, there would be also among the others that exist another not in relation to any other; but as it is, we find that whatever is other is just what it is through compulsion of some other.
The facts are as you say.
Then we must place the nature of the other as a fifth
among the classes in which we select our examples.
Yes.
And we shall say that it permeates them all; for each of them is other than the rest, not by reason of its own nature, but because it partakes of the idea of the other.
Exactly.
Let us now state our conclusions, taking up the five classes one at a time.
How?
Take motion first; we say that it is entirely other than rest, do we not?