And therefore a statement will likewise be considered false,
if it declares that things which are, are not, or that things which are not, are.
In what other way could a statement be made false?
Virtually in no other way; but the sophist will not assent to this. Or how can any reasonable man assent to it, when the expressions we just agreed upon were previously agreed to be inexpressible, unspeakable, irrational, and inconceivable? Do we understand his meaning, Theaetetus?
Of course we understand that he will say we are contradicting our recent statements, since we dare to say that falsehood exists in opinions and words;
for he will say that we are thus forced repeatedly to attribute being to not-being, although we agreed a while ago that nothing could be more impossible than that.
You are quite right to remind me. But I think it is high time to consider what ought to be done about the sophist; for you see how easily and repeatedly he can raise objections and difficulties, if we conduct our search by putting him in the guild of false-workers and jugglers.
Very true.
Yes, we have gone through only a small part of them,
and they are, if I may say so, infinite.
It would, apparently, be impossible to catch the sophist, if that is the case.
Well, then, shall we weaken and give up the struggle now?
No, I say; we must not do that, if we can in any way get the slightest hold of the fellow.
Will you then pardon me, and, as your words imply, be content if I somehow withdraw just for a short distance from this strong argument of his?
Of course I will.
I have another still more urgent request to make of you.
What is it?
Do not assume that I am becoming a sort of parricide.
What do you mean?
In defending myself I shall have to test the theory of my father Parmenides, and contend forcibly that after a fashion not-being is and on the other hand in a sense being is not.
It is plain that some such contention is necessary.
Yes, plain even to a blind man, as they say; for unless these statements
are either disproved or accepted, no one who speaks about false words, or false opinion—whether images or likenesses or imitations or appearances—about the arts which have to do with them, can ever help being forced to contradict himself and make himself ridiculous.