When you give this answer, if you speak of something in mirrors or works of art, he will laugh at your words, when you talk to him as if he could see.
He will feign ignorance of mirrors and water and of sight altogether, and will question you only about that which is deduced from your words.
What is that?
That which exists throughout all these things which you say are many but which you saw fit to call by one name, when you said image of them all, as if they were all one thing. So speak and defend yourself. Do not give way to the man at all.
Why, Stranger, what can we say an image is, except another such thing fashioned in the likeness of the true one?
Do you mean another such true one, or
in what sense did you say such?
Not a true one by any means, but only one like the true.
And by the true you mean that which really is?
Exactly.
And the not true is the opposite of the true?
Of course.
That which is like, then, you say does not really exist, if you say it is not true.
But it does exist, in a way.
But not truly, you mean.
No, except that it is really a likeness.
Then what we call a likeness, though not really existing, really does exist?
Not-being does seem to have got into some such entanglement with being, and it is very absurd.
Of course it is absurd. You see, at any rate, how by this interchange of words the many-headed sophist has once more forced us against our will to admit that not-being exists in a way.
Yes, I see that very well.
Well then, how can we define his art without contradicting ourselves?
Why do you say that? What are you afraid of?
When, in talking about appearance, we say that he deceives and that his art is an art of deception, shall we say that our mind is misled by his art to hold a false opinion, or what shall we say?
We shall say that. What else could we say?
But, again, false opinion will be that which thinks the opposite of reality, will it not?
Yes.
You mean, then, that false opinion thinks things which are not?
Necessarily.
Does it think that things which are not, are not, or that things which are not at all, in some sense are?
It must think that things which are not in some sense are—that is, if anyone is ever to think falsely at all, even in a slight degree.
And does it not also think that things which certainly are, are not at all?