Not those who produce some large work of sculpture or painting. For if they reproduced the true proportions of beautiful forms, the upper parts, you know, would seem smaller
and the lower parts larger than they ought, because we see the former from a distance, the latter from near at hand.
Certainly.
So the artists abandon the truth and give their figures not the actual proportions but those which seem to be beautiful, do they not?
Certainly.
That, then, which is other, but like, we may fairly call a likeness, may we not?
Yes.
And the part of imitation which is concerned with such things, is to be called, as we called it before, likeness-making?
It is to be so called.
Now then, what shall we call that which appears, because it is seen from an unfavorable position, to be like the beautiful, but which would not even be likely to resemble that which it claims to be like, if a person were able to see such large works adequately? Shall we not call it, since it appears, but is not like, an appearance?
Certainly.
And this is very common in painting
and in all imitation?
Of course.
And to the art which produces appearance, but not likeness, the most correct name we could give would be fantastic art, would it not?
By all means.
These, then, are the two forms of the image-making art that I meant, the likeness-making and the fantastic.
You are right.
But I was uncertain before in which of the two the sophist should be placed, and even now I cannot see clearly.
The fellow is really wonderful and very difficult to keep in sight, for once more, in the very cleverest manner he has withdrawn into a baffling classification where it is hard to track him.
So it seems.
Do you assent because you recognize the fact, or did the force of habit hurry you along to a speedy assent?
What do you mean, and why did you say that?
We are really, my dear friend, engaged in
a very difficult investigation; for the matter of appearing and seeming, but not being, and of saying things, but not true ones—all this is now and always has been very perplexing. You see, Theaetetus, it is extremely difficult to understand how a man is to say or think that falsehood really exists and in saying this not be involved
in contradiction.