But that part of the paid kind which converses to furnish gratification and makes pleasure exclusively its bait and demands as its pay only maintenance, we might all agree, if I am not mistaken,
to call the art of flattery or of making things pleasant.
Certainly.
But the class which proposes to carry on its conversations for the sake of virtue and demands its pay in cash—does not this deserve to be called by another name?
Of course.
And what is that name? Try to tell.
It is obvious; for I think we have discovered the sophist. And therefore by uttering that word I think I should give him the right name.
Then, as it seems, according to our present reasoning, Theaetetus, the part of appropriative, coercive, hunting art which hunts animals, land animals, tame animals, man, privately, for pay, is paid in cash, claims to give education, and is a hunt after rich and promising youths, must—so our present argument concludes—be called sophistry.
Most assuredly.
But let us look at it in still another way; for the class we are now examining
partakes of no mean art, but of a very many-sided one. And we must indeed do so, for in our previous talk it presents an appearance of being, not what we now say it is, but another class.
How so?
The acquisitive art was of two sorts, the one the division of hunting, the other that of exchange.
Yes, it was.
Now shall we say that there are two sorts of exchange, the one by gift, the other by sale?
So be it.
And we shall say further that exchange by sale is divided into two parts.
How so?
We make this distinction—calling the part which sells a man’s own productions the selling of one’s own, and the other, which exchanges the works of others, exchange.
Certainly.
Well, then, that part of exchange which is carried on in the city, amounting to about half of it, is called retailing, is it not?
Yes.
And that which exchanges goods from city to city by purchase and sale is called merchandising?
Certainly.
And have we not observed that one part
of merchandising sells and exchanges for cash whatever serves the body for its support and needs, and the other whatever serves the soul?
What do you mean by that?
Perhaps we do not know about the part that has to do with the soul; though I fancy we do understand the other division.