Then it is not for every man, Hermogenes,
to give names, but for him who may be called the name-maker; and he, it appears, is the lawgiver, who is of all the artisans among men the rarest.
So it appears.
See now what the lawgiver has in view in giving names. Look at it in the light of what has gone before. What has the carpenter in view when he makes a shuttle? Is it not something the nature of which is to weave?
Certainly.
Well, then, if the shuttle breaks while he making it,
will he make another with his mind fixed on that which is broken, or on that form with reference to which he was making the one which he broke?
On that form, in my opinion.
Then we should very properly call that the absolute or real shuttle?
Yes, I think so.
Then whenever he has to make a shuttle for a light or a thick garment, or for one of linen or of wool or of any kind whatsoever, all of them must contain the form or ideal of shuttle,
and in each of his products he must embody the nature which is naturally best for each?
Yes.
And the same applies to all other instruments. The artisan must discover the instrument naturally fitted for each purpose and must embody that in the material of which he makes the instrument, not in accordance with his own will, but in accordance with its nature. He must, it appears, know how to embody in the iron the borer fitted by nature for each special use.
Certainly.
And he must embody in the wood the shuttle fitted by nature for each kind of weaving.
True.
For each kind of shuttle is, it appears, fitted by nature for its particular kind of weaving, and the like is true of other instruments.
Yes.
Then, my dear friend, must not the law-giver also know how to embody in the sounds and syllables that name which is fitted by nature for each object? Must he not make and give all his names with his eye fixed upon the absolute or ideal name, if he is to be an authoritative giver of names? And if different lawgivers do not embody it in the same syllables, we must not forget this ideal name on that account; for different smiths do not embody the form in the same iron,
though making the same instrument for the same purpose, but so long as they reproduce the same ideal,
though it be in different iron, still the instrument is as it should be, whether it be made here or in foreign lands, is it not?
Certainly.
On this basis, then, you will judge the law-giver, whether he be here or in a foreign land, so long as he gives to each thing the proper form of the name, in whatsoever syllables, to be no worse lawgiver, whether here or anywhere else, will you not?
Certainly.
Now who is likely to know whether the proper form of shuttle is embodied in any piece of wood? The carpenter who made it, or the weaver who is to use it ?
Probably the one who is to use it, Socrates.
Then who is to use the work of the lyre-maker? Is not he the man who would know best how to superintend the making of the lyre and would also know whether it is well made or not when it is finished?
Certainly.
Who is he?
The lyre-player.
And who would know best about the work of the ship-builder?
The navigator.
And who can best superintend the work of the lawgiver and judge of it when it is finished, both here and in foreign countries? The user, is it not?
Yes.
And is not this he who knows how to ask questions?
Certainly.
And the same one knows also how to make replies?
Yes.
And the man who knows how to ask and answer questions you call a dialectician?
Yes, that is what I call him.
The work of the carpenter, then, is to make a rudder under the supervision of the steersman, if he rudder is to be a good one.
Evidently.
And the work of the lawgiver, as it seems, is to make a name, with the dialectician as his supervisor, if names are to be well given.
True.
Then, Hermogenes, the giving of names can hardly be, as you imagine, a trifling matter, or a task for trifling or casual persons: and Cratylus is right in saying that names belong to things by nature
and that not every one is an artisan of names, but only he who keeps in view the name which belongs by nature to each particular thing and is able to embody its form in the letters and syllables.