Then actions also are performed according to their own nature, not according to our opinion. For instance, if we undertake to cut anything, ought we to cut it as we wish, and with whatever instrument we wish, or shall we, if we are willing to cut each thing in accordance with the nature of cutting and being cut, and with the natural instrument, succeed in cutting it, and do it rightly, whereas if we try to do it contrary to nature we shall fail and accomplish nothing?
I think the way is as you suggest.
Then, too, if we undertake to burn anything, we must burn not according to every opinion, but according to the right one? And that is as each thing naturally burns or is burned and with the natural instrument?
True.
And all other actions are to be performed In like manner?
Certainly.
And speaking is an action, is it not?
Yes.
Then if a man speaks as he fancies he ought to speak,
will he speak rightly, or will he succeed in speaking if he speaks in the way and with the instrument in which and with which it is natural for us to speak and for things to be spoken, whereas otherwise he will fail and accomplish nothing?
I think the way you suggest is the right one.
Now naming is a part of speaking, for in naming I suppose people utter speech.
Certainly.
Then is not naming also a kind of action, if speaking is a kind of action concerned with things?
Yes.
But we saw that actions are not merely relative to us, but possess a separate nature of their own?
True.
Then in naming also, if we are to be consistent with our previous conclusions, we cannot follow our own will, but the way and the instrument which the nature of things prescribes must be employed, must they not? And if we pursue this course we shall be successful in our naming, but otherwise we shall fail.
I think you are right.
And again, what has to be cut, we said, has to be cut with something.
Certainly.
And what has to be woven, has to be woven with something, and what has to be bored, has to be bored with something?
Certainly.
And then what has to be named, has to be named with something?
True.
And what is that with which we have to bore?
A borer.
And that with which we weave?
A shuttle.
And that with which we must name?
A name.
Right. A name also, then, is a kind of instrument.
Certainly.
Then if I were to ask What instrument is the shuttle? Is it not that with which we weave?
Yes.
And what do we do when we weave? Do we not separate the mingled threads of warp and woof?
Yes.
And you could give a similar answer about the borer and the rest, could you not?
Certainly.
And can you say something of the same kind about a name? The name being an instrument, what do we do with it when we name?
I cannot tell.
Do we not teach one another something, and separate things according to their natures?
Certainly.
A name is, then, an instrument of teaching and of separating reality,
as a shuttle is an instrument of separating the web?
Yes.
But the shuttle is an instrument of weaving?
Of course.
The weaver, then, will use the shuttle well, and well means like a weaver; and a teacher will use a name well, and well means like a teacher.
Yes.
Whose work will the weaver use well when he uses the shuttle?
The carpenter’s.
Is every one a carpenter, or he who has the skill?
He who has the skill.
And whose work will the hole-maker use when he uses the borer?
The smith’s.
And is every one a smith, or he who has the skill?
He who has the skill.
And whose work will the teacher use when he uses the name?
I cannot tell that, either.
And can you not tell this, either, who gives us the names we use?
No.
Do you not think it is the law that gives them to us?
Very likely.
Then the teacher, when he uses a name, will be using the work of a lawgiver?
I think so.
Do you think every man is a lawgiver, or only he who has the skill?