It may be that you are right, Hermogenes; but let us see. Whatever name we decide to give each particular thing is its name?
Yes.
Whether the giver be a private person or a state?
Yes.
Well, then, suppose I give a name to some thing or other, designating, for instance, that which we now call man as horse and that which we now call horse as man, will the real name of the same thing be man for the public and horse for me individually, and in the other case horse for the public and man for me individually? Is that your meaning?
Yes, that is my opinion.
Now answer this question. Is there anything which you call speaking the truth and speaking falsehood?
Yes.
Then there would be true speech and false speech?
Certainly.
Then that speech which says things as they are is true, and that which says them as they are not is false?
Yes.
It is possible, then, to say in speech that which is and that which is not?
Certainly.
But is true speech true only as a whole,
and are its parts untrue?
No, its parts also are true.
Are the large parts true, but not the small ones, or are all true?
All, in my opinion.
Is there, then, anything which you say is a smaller part of speech than a name?
No, that is the smallest.
And the name is spoken as a part of the true speech?
Yes.
Then it is, according to you, true.
Yes.
And a part of false speech is false, is it not?
It is.
Then it is possible to utter either a false or a true name, since one may utter speech that is either true or false?
Yes, of course.
Then whatever each particular person says is the name of anything, that is its name for that person?
Yes.
And whatever the number of names anyone says a thing has, it will really have that number at the time when he says it?
Yes, Socrates, for I cannot conceive of any other kind of correctness in names than this; I may call a thing by one name, which I gave, and you by another, which you gave. And in the same way, I see that states have their own different names for the same things,
and Greeks differ from other Greeks and from barbarians in their use of names.
Now, Hermogenes, let us see. Do you think this is true of the real things, that their reality is a separate one for each person, as Protagoras said with his doctrine
that man is the measure of all things—that things are to me such as they seem to me, and to you such as they seem to you—or do you think things have some fixed reality of their own?
It has sometimes happened to me, Socrates, to be so perplexed that I have been carried away even into this doctrine of Protagoras; but I do not at all believe he is right.
Well, have you ever been carried away so far
as not to believe at all that any man is bad?
Lord, no; but I have often been carried away into the belief that certain men, and a good many of them, are very bad.
Well, did you never think any were very good?
Very few.
But you did think them so?
Yes.
And what is your idea about that? Are the very good very wise and the very bad very foolish?
Yes, that is my opinion.
Now if Protagoras is right and the truth is as he says, that all things are to each person as they seem to him, is it possible for some of us to be wise and some foolish?
No, it is not.
And you are, I imagine, strongly of the opinion that if wisdom and folly exist, it is quite impossible that Protagoras is right, for one man would not in reality be at all wiser than another
if whatever seems to each person is really true to him.
Quite right.
But neither do you believe with Euthydemus that all things belong equally to all men at the same time and perpetually,The doctrine here attributed to Euthydemus is not expressly enunciated by him in the dialogue which bears his name, but it is little more than a comprehensive statement of the several doctrines there proclaimed by him and his brother Dionysodorus. for on this assumption also some could not be good and others bad, if virtue and its opposite were always equally possessed by all.
True.
Then if neither all things belong equally to all men at the same time and perpetually nor each thing to each man individually, it is clear that things have some fixed reality of their own,
not in relation to us nor caused by us; they do not vary, swaying one way and another in accordance with our fancy, but exist of themselves in relation to their own reality imposed by nature.
I think, Socrates, that is the case.
Can things themselves, then, possess such a nature as this, and that of their actions be different? Or are not actions also a class of realities?