<GetPassage xmlns:tei="http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0" xmlns="http://chs.harvard.edu/xmlns/cts">
            <request>
                <requestName>GetPassage</requestName>
                <requestUrn>urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg004.perseus-eng2:87-88</requestUrn>
            </request>
            <reply>
                <urn>urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg004.perseus-eng2:87-88</urn>
                <passage>
                    <TEI xmlns="http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0"><text xml:lang="eng"><body><div type="translation" n="urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg004.perseus-eng2" xml:lang="eng"><div type="textpart" subtype="section" resp="perseus" n="87"><milestone unit="page" resp="Stephanus" n="87"/><milestone unit="section" resp="Stephanus" n="87a"/><p><said who="#Phaedo" rend="merge"><label>Phaedo.</label><q type="spoken">The argument seems to me to be just where it  was, and to be still open to the objection I made before.
            For I do not deny that it has
                    been very cleverly, and, if I may say so, conclusively shown that the soul
                    existed before it entered into this bodily form, but it does not seem to me
                    proved that it will still exist when we are dead. I do not agree with Simmias’
                    objection, that the soul is not stronger and more lasting than the body, for I
                    think it is far superior in all such respects. <q type="spoken">Why then,</q> the argument might
                    say, <q type="spoken">do you still disbelieve, when you see that after a man dies 
         
         <milestone unit="section" resp="Stephanus" n="87b"/>
            the weaker part still exists? Do you not think the
                    stronger part must necessarily be preserved during the same length of time?</q> Now
                    see if my reply to this has any sense. I think I may, like Simmias, best express
                    myself in a figure. It seems to me that it is much as if one should say about an
                    old weaver who had died, that the man had not perished but was safe and sound
                    somewhere, and should offer as a proof of this the fact that the cloak which the
                    man had woven and used to wear was still whole and had not perished. Then if
                    anyone did not believe him, he would ask 
         
         <milestone unit="section" resp="Stephanus" n="87c"/>
            which lasts longer, a man or a cloak that is in use and wear, and when the
                    answer was given that a man lasts much longer, he would think it had been proved
                    beyond a doubt that the man was safe, because that which was less lasting had
                    not perished.<milestone ed="P" unit="para"/>But I do not think he is
                    right, Simmias, and I ask you especially to notice what I say. Anyone can
                    understand that a man who says this is talking nonsense. For the weaver in
                    question wove and wore out many such cloaks and 
         
         <milestone unit="section" resp="Stephanus" n="87d"/>
            lasted longer than they, though they were many, but
                    perished, I suppose, before the last one. Yet a man is not feebler or weaker
                    than a cloak on that account at all. And I think the same figure would apply to
                    the soul and the body and it would be quite appropriate to say in like manner
                    about them, that the soul lasts a long time, but the body lasts a shorter time
                    and is weaker. And, one might go on to say that each soul wears out many bodies,
                    especially if the man lives many years. For if the body is constantly changing
                    and being destroyed while the man still lives, 
         
         <milestone unit="section" resp="Stephanus" n="87e"/>
            and the soul is always weaving anew that which wears out, then when the soul
                    perishes it must necessarily have on its last garment, and this only will
                    survive it, and when the soul has perished, then the body will at once show its
                    natural weakness and will quickly disappear in decay.</q></said></p></div><div type="textpart" subtype="section" resp="perseus" n="88"><p><said who="#Phaedo" rend="merge"><label>Phaedo.</label><q type="spoken" rend="merge">And so we are not yet
                    justified in feeling sure, on the strength of this argument, <milestone unit="page" resp="Stephanus" n="88"/>
            
         
         <milestone unit="section" resp="Stephanus" n="88a"/>
            that our souls will
                    still exist somewhere after we are dead. For if one were to grant even more to a
                    man who uses your argument, Socrates, and allow not only that our souls existed
                    before we were born, but also that there is nothing to prevent some of them from
                    continuing to exist and from being born and dying again many times after we are
                    dead, because the soul is naturally so strong that it can endure repeated
                    births,—even allowing this, one might not grant that it does not suffer by
                    its many births and does not finally perish altogether in one of its deaths.
                        
         
         <milestone unit="section" resp="Stephanus" n="88b"/>
            But he might say that no one knows
                    beforehand the particular death and the particular dissolution of the body which
                    brings destruction to the soul, for none of us can perceive that. Now if this is
                    the case, anyone who feels confident about death has a foolish confidence,
                    unless he can show that the soul is altogether immortal and imperishable.
                    Otherwise a man who is about to die must always fear that his soul will perish
                    utterly in the impending dissolution of the body.</q><milestone ed="P" unit="para"/>Now all of us, as we remarked to one another afterwards,
                        
         
         <milestone unit="section" resp="Stephanus" n="88c"/>
            were very uncomfortable when we heard
                    what they said; for we had been thoroughly convinced by the previous argument,
                    and now they seemed to be throwing us again into confusion and distrust, not
                    only in respect to the past discussion but also with regard to any future one.
                    They made us fear that our judgment was worthless or that no certainty could be
                    attained in these matters.</said></p><p><said who="#Echecrates"><label>Echecrates.</label> By the gods, Phaedo, I sympathize with you; for I myself after listening to you am inclined to ask myself:
         
         <milestone unit="section" resp="Stephanus" n="88d"/>
           <q type="spoken">What
                    argument shall we believe henceforth? For the argument of Socrates was perfectly
                    convincing, and now it has fallen into discredit.</q> For the doctrine that
                    the soul is a kind of harmony has always had (and has now) a wonderful hold upon
                    me, and your mention of it reminded me that I had myself believed in it before.
                    Now I must begin over again and find another argument to convince me that when a
                    man dies his soul does not perish with him. So, for heaven’s sake, tell how
                    Socrates 
         
         <milestone unit="section" resp="Stephanus" n="88e"/>
          continued the discourse, and whether
                    he also, as you say the rest of you did, showed any uneasiness, or calmly
                    defended his argument. And did he defend it successfully? Tell us everything as
                    accurately as you can.</said></p></div></div></body></text></TEI>
                </passage>
            </reply>
            </GetPassage>