And you can
see these and touch them and perceive them by the other senses, whereas the
things which are always the same can be grasped only by the reason, and are
invisible and not to be seen?
Certainly,
said he, that is true.
Now,
said he, shall we assume two kinds of
existences, one visible, the other invisible?
Let us assume them,
said Cebes.And that the invisible is always the same and the
visible constantly changing?
Let us
assume that also,
said he.
Well
then,
said Socrates, are we not made up of two parts, body and
soul?
Yes,
he
replied.Now to which class should we
say the body is more similar and more closely akin?
To the visible,
said he; that is clear to
everyone.
And the soul? Is it
visible or invisible?
Invisible, to
man, at least, Socrates.
But we call
things visible and invisible with reference to human vision, do we
not?
Yes, we
do.
Then what do we say about
the soul? Can it be seen or not?
It
cannot be seen.
Then it is
invisible?
Yes.
Then the soul is more like the invisible than the
body is,
Necessarily,
Socrates.
Now we have also been
saying for a long time, have we not, that, when the soul makes use of the body
for any inquiry, either through seeing or hearing or any of the other
senses—for inquiry through the body means inquiry through the
senses,—then it is dragged by the body to things which never remain the
same, and it wanders about and is confused and dizzy like a drunken man because
it lays hold upon such things?
Certainly.
But when the
soul
Socrates,
said he, what you say is
perfectly right and true.
And now
again, in view of what we said before and of what has just been said, to which
class do you think
I think,
Socrates,
said he, that anyone, even the dullest, would agree,
after this argument that the soul is infinitely more like that which is always
the same than that which is not.
And
the body?
Is more like the
other.
Consider, then, the
matter in another way.