We shall soon know more about this, my friend.
Just consider this question:—Is that which is holy loved by the gods because it is holy, or is it holy because it is loved by the gods?
I don’t know what you mean, Socrates.
Then I will try to speak more clearly. We speak of being carried and of carrying, of being led and of leading, of being seen and of seeing; and you understand—do you not?—that in all such expressions the two parts differ one from the other in meaning, and how they differ.
I think I understand.
Then, too, we conceive of a thing being loved and of a thing loving, and the two are different?
Of course.
Now tell me, is a thing which is carried a carried thing because one carries it, or for some other reason?
No, for that reason.
And a thing which is led is led because one leads it, and a thing which is seen is so because one sees it?
Certainly.
Then one does not see it because its a seen thing, but, on the contrary, it is a seen thing because one sees it; and one does not lead it because it is a led thing, but it is a led thing because one leads it; and one does not carry it because it is a carried thing, but it is a carried thing because one carries it. Is it clear, Euthyphro,
what I am trying to say? I am trying to say this, that if anything becomes or undergoes, it does not become because it is in a state of becoming, but it is in a state of becoming because it becomes, and it does not undergo because it is a thing which undergoes, but because it undergoes it is a thing which undergoes; or do you not agree to this?
I agree.
Is not that which is beloved a thing which is either becoming or undergoing something?
Certainly.
And is this case like the former ones: those who love it do not love it because it is a bad thing, but it is a beloved thing because they love it?
Obviously.
Now what do you say about that which is holy, Euthyphro. It is loved by all the gods, is it not, according to what you said?
Yes.
For this reason, because it is holy, or for some other reason?
No, for this reason.
It is loved because it is holy, not holy because it is loved?
I think so.
But that which is dear to the gods is dear to them and beloved by them because they love it.
Of course.
Then that which is dear to the gods and that which is holy are not identical, but differ one from the other.
How so, Socrates?
Because we are agreed that the holy is loved because it is holy and that it is not holy because it is loved; are we not?
Yes.
But we are agreed that what is dear to the gods is dear to them because they love it, that is, by reason of this love, not that they love it because it is dear.