(Ἰάσων), tyrant of Pherae and Tagus of Thessaly (Dict. of Antiq. s. v. Tagus), was probably the son of LYCOPHRON, who established a tyranny on the ruins of aristocracy at Pherae, about the end of the Peloponnesian war, and aimed at dominion overall the Thessalians. (Xen. Hell. 2.3.4; Diod. 14.82.) From this passage of Diodorus we know that Lycophron was still alive in B. C. 395, but we cannot fix the exact time at which Jason succeeded him, nor do we find anything recorded of the latter till towards the close of his life. Wyttenbach, however (ad Plut. Mor. p. 89c.), may possibly be right in his conjecture that the Prometheus who is mentioned by Xenophon as engaged in struggles against the old aristocratic families of Thessaly, with the aid of CRITIAS, was no other than Jason. (Xen. Mem. 1.2.24, Hell. 2.3.36; Schneid. ad loc.) It is at least certain that the surname in question could not have been applied more appropriately. He not only adopted, but expanded the ambitious designs of Lycophron, and he advanced towards the fulfilment of his schemes ably, energetically, and unscrupulously. In B. C. 377 we find him aiding Theogenes to seize the Acropolis of Histiaea in Euboea, from which, however, the latter was afterwards dislodged by the Lacedaemonians under Therippidas or Herippidas. (Diod. 15.30; Palm. and Wess. ad loc. ; Casaub. ad Polyaen. 2.21.) In B. C. 375 all the Thessalian towns had been brought under Jason's dominion, with the exception of Pharsalus, which had been entrusted by the citizens to the direction of POLYDAMAS. Alcetas I., king of Epeirus, was associated with him rather as a dependent than an ally, and Thebes was leagued with him from enmity to Sparta, from which latter state, though it had supported Lycophron (Diod. 14.82), he held aloof, probably because of its connection with Pharsalus (Xen. Hell. vi. L §§ 2, 13), and also from the policy of taking the weaker side. He already kept in his pay 6000 picked mercenaries, with whose training he took personally the greatest pains; and if he could unite Thessaly under himself as Tagus, it would furnish him, in addition, with a force of 6000 cavalry and more than 10,000 foot. The neighbouring tribes would yield him a body of lightarmed troops, with which no others could cope. The Thessalian Penestae would effectually man his ships, and of these he would be able to build a far larger number than the Athenians, as he might calculate on possessing as his own the resources of Macedonia and all its ship-timber. If once therefore the lord of Thessaly, he might fairly hope to become the master of Greece; and when Greece was in his power, the weakness of the Persian empire, as shown especially by the retreat of the Ten Thousand and the campaigns of Agesilaus in Asia, opened to him an unbounded and glorious field of conquest. (Xen. Hell. 6.1. §§ 4-12 ; comp. Isocr. ad Phil. p. 106c. d.; Diod. 15.60 ; V. Max. 9.10, Ext. 2.) But the first step to be taken was to secure the dominion of Pharsalus. This he had the means of effecting by force, but he preferred to carry his point by negotiation, and accordingly, in a personal conference with Polydamas, he candidly set before him the nature and extent of his plans and his resources, represented to him that opposition on the part of Pharsalus would be fruitless, and urged him therefore to use his influence to bring over the town to submission, promising him the highest place, except his own, in power and dignity. Polydamas answered that he could not honourably accept his offer without the consent of Sparta, with which he was in alliance ; and Jason, with equal frankness, told him to lay the state of the case before the Lacedaemonians, and see whether they could adequately support Pharsalus against his power. Polydamas did so, and the Lacedaemonians replied that they were unable to give the required help, and advised him to make the best terms he could for himself and his state. Polydamas then acceded to the proposal of Jason, asking to be allowed to retain the citadel of Pharsalus for those who had entrusted it to him, and promising to use his endeavors to bring the town into alliance with him, and to aid
An insatiable appetite for power--to use his own metaphor--was Jason's ruling passion (Arist. Pol. 3.4, ed. Bekk. ἔφη πεινῇν ὅτε μὴ τυραννοῖ); and to gratify this, he worked perseveringly and without the incumbrance of moral scruples, by any and every means. With the chief men in the several states of Greece, as e. g. with Timotheus and Pelopidas (Plut. Pel. 28), he cultivated friendly relations ; and the story told by Plutarch and Aelian of the rejection of his presents by Epaminondas, shows that he was ready to resort to corruption, if he saw or thought he saw an opportunity. (Plut. de Gen. Soc. 14, Apoph. Reg. et Imp. Epam. 13 ; Ael. VH 11.9.) We find also on record a maxim of his, that a little wrong is justifiable for the sake of a great good. (Arist. Rh/et. 1.12.31 ; Plut. Pol. Praec. 24.) He is represented as having all the qualifications of a great general and diplomatist--as active, temperate, prudent, capable of enduring much fatigue, and no less skilful than Themistocles in concealing his own designs and penetrating those of his enemies. (Xen. Hell. 6.1.6; Diod. 15.60; Cic. de Off. 1.30.) Pausanias tells us that he was an admirer of the rhetoric of Gorgias; and among his friends he reckoned Isocrates, whose cherished vision of Greece united against Persia made him afterwards the dupe of Philip. (Paus. 6.17; Isocr. Ep. ad Jas. Fil. p. 418.)
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