A Dictionary of Greek and Roman biography and mythology

Smith, William

A Dictionary of Greek and Roman biography and mythology. William Smith, LLD, ed. 1890

Κατιλίνας, the descendant of an ancient patrician family which had sunk into poverty, first appears in history as a zealous partizan of Sulla. During the horrors of the great proscription, among many other victims, he killed, with his own hand, his brother-in-law, Q. Caecilius, described as a quiet inoffensive man, and having seized and tortured the well-known and popular M. Marius Gratidianus, the kinsman and fellow-townsman of Cicero, cut off his head, and bore it in triumph through the city. Plutarch accuses him in two places (Sull. 32, Cic. 10) of having murdered his own brother at the same period, under circumstances of peculiar atrocity, but there is probably some confusion here between the brother and the brother-in-law, for Sallust, when enumerating the crimes of Catiline, would scarcely have failed to add such a monstrous deed as this to the black catalogue. Although his youth was spent in the most reckless extravagance, and in the open indulgence of every vice; although he was known to have been guilty of various acts of the foulest and most revolting debauchery; although he had incurred the suspicion of an intrigue with the Vestal Fabia, sister of Terentia; and although it was said and believed that he had made away with his first wife and afterwards with his son, in order that he might wed the fair and rich but worthless Aurelia Orestilla, who objected to the presence of a grown-up step-child, yet this complicated infamy appears to have forced no bar to his regular political advancement,--for he attained to the dignity of praetor in B. C. 68, was governor of Africa during the following year, and returned to Rome in 66, in order to press his suit for the consulship. The election for 65 was carried by P. Autronius Paetus and P. Cornelius Sulla, both of whom were soon after convicted of bribery, and their places supplied by their competitors and accusers, L. Aurelius Cotta and L. Manlius Torquatus, Catiline, who was desirous of becoming a candidate, having been disqualified in consequence of an impeachment for oppression in his province, preferred by P. Clodius Pulcher, afterwards so celebrated as the implacable enemy of Cicero. Exasperated by their disappointment, Autronius and Catiline forthwith formed a project along with a certain Cn. Calpurnius Piso, a young man of high family, but turbulent, needy, and profligate, to murder the new consuls upon the first of January, when offering up their vows in the Capitol, after which Autronius and Catiline were to seize the fasces, and Piso was to be despatched with an army to occupy the Spains. Some rumours of what was in contemplation having been spread abroad, such precautions were taken that the conspirators were induced to delay the execution of their plan until the 5th of February, resolving at the same time to include many of the leading men of the state in the proposed massacre. This extraordinary design is said to have been frustrated solely by the impatience of Catiline, who, upon the appointed day, gave the signal prematurely, before the whole of the armed agents had assembled, and thus confounded the preconcerted combinations. The danger being past, certain resolutions were proposed in the senate with regard to the authors of this abortive attempt; but the proceedings were quashed by the intercession of a tribune. The plot was, however, a matter of common discussion, and no one seems to have entertained any doubt of its reality, while many did not scruple to assert that M. Crassus, and Julius Caesar, who was then aedile, were deeply involved. (Q. Cic. de pet. Cons. 2, &c.; Asconius in Tog. cand. and in Cornel ; Sall. Catil. 15-18; Liv. Epit. 10]; D. C. 36.27; Sueton. Jul. 9 ; Cic. pro Sulla, 1-24, pro Muren. 38, pro Cael. 4, in Catil. 1.6.) [Comp. p. 540b.]

Encouraged rather than disheartened by a failure which had so nearly proved a triumph, and which had so distinctly demonstrated the practicability of such a project, if conducted with common prudence and caution, Catiline was soon after (B. C. 65), left completely unfettered by his acquittal upon trial for extortion, a result secured, it was alleged, by the liberal bribes administered to the accuser as well as to the jury. From this time he seems to have determined to proceed more systematically; to enlist a more numerous body of supporters; to extend

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the sphere of operations, and to organize a more comprehensive and sweeping scheme of destruction. Accordingly, about the beginning of June, B. C. 64, probably soon after the successful termination of his second trial, when called to account for the blood which he had shed during the proscription of Sulla (D. C. 37.10), he began, while canvassing vigorously for the consulship, to sound the dispositions of various persons, by pointing out the probable success of a great revolutionary movement, and the bright prospect of power and profit opened up to its promoters. After having thus ascertained the temper of different individuals, he called together those who from their necessities, their characters, and their sentiments, were likely to be most eager and most resolute In the undertaking. The meeting, according to Sallust, was attended by eleven senators, by four members of the equestrian order, and by several men of rank and influence from the provincial towns. The most conspicuous were P. Cornelius Lentulus Sura, who had been consul in B. C. 71, but having been passed over by the censors had lost his seat in the senate, which he was now seeking to recover by standing a second time for the praetorship (D. C. 37.30); C. Cornelius Cethegus, distinguished throughout by his impatience, headstrong impetuosity, and sanguinary violence (Sal. Cat. 43; Cic. pro Sull. 19); P. Autronius spoken of above; L. Cassius Longinus, at this time a competitor for the consulship, dull and heavy, but bloodthirsty withal (Cic. in Cat. 3.4-6; Pro Sulla, 13); L. Vargunteius, who had been one of the colleagues of Cicero in the quaestorship, and had subsequently been condemned for bribery (Pro Sull. 5, 6, 18); L. Calpurnius Bestia, tribune elect; Publius and Servius Sulla, nephews of the dictator; M. Porcius Lacca (Cic. in Cat. 1.4, 2.6, Pro Sll. 2, 18); Q. Annius; Q. Curins; M. Fulvius Nobilior; L. Statilius; P. Gabinius Capito; C. Cornelius. In addition to these, a great body of the younger nobility were known to be favourably inclined although they had not openly committed themselves, and now, as on the former occasion, rumour included Crassus and Caesar, although the report does not appear to have gained general belief. [Comp. p. 541b.]

At this assembly Catiline, after expatiating upon a number of topics calculated to rouse the indignation and stimulate the cupidity of his audience, proceeded to develop his objects and resources. He proposed that all debts should be cancelled, that the most wealthy citizens should be proscribed, and that all offices of honour and emolument should be divided among the associates, while for support he counted upon Piso in Hither Spain, P. Sittius Nucerinus with the army in Mauritania, and at home confidently anticipated the co-operation of C. Antonius, whom he expected to be chosen consul along with himself for the following year, having formed a coalition with him for the purpose of excluding Cicero. The votes of the people, however, in some measure deranged these calculations. Cicero and C. Antonius were returned, the former nearly unanimously, the latter by a small majority over Catiline. This disappointment, while it increased if possible the bitterness of his animosity towards the dominant party among the aristocracy and the independent portion of the middle ranks, rendered him more vigorous in the prosecution of his designs. Large sums of money were raised upon his own security, or on the credit of his friends; magazines of arms and other warlike stores were secretly formed; troops were levied in various parts of Italy, especially in the neighbourhood of Faesulae, under the superintendence of C. Manlius, an experienced commander, one of the veteran centurions of Sulla (D. C. 37.30), and numerous adherents were enrolled from the most desperate classes, including not a few women of ruined reputation; attempts also were made in various quarters to gain over the slaves; and it was determined, when the critical moment should arrive for an open demonstration, to set fire to the city in many different places at the same instant, and to slaughter the well-disposed portion of the population in the tumult. Meanwhile, in the midst of these extensive preparations, Catiline again (63) stood candidate for the consulship, and used every effort to get rid of Cicero, who met him at every turn and thwarted all his best-contrived machinations. Nor was this wonderful, for he was countermined from a quarter whence he apprehended no danger. One of the most high-born, abandoned, but at the same time, weak and vacillating, among the conspirators, was a certain Q. Curius, who had been expelled from the senate by the censors on account of the infamy of his life. This man had long consorted with a noble mistress named Fulvia, who appears to have acquired complete controul over his mind, and to have been made the depositary of all his secrets. Fulvia, alarmed by the intelligence obtained from her lover, divulged what she had learned to several of her acquaintances and, through them, opened a correspondence with Cicero, to whom she regularly communicated all the particulars she could collect, and at length persuaded Curius himself to turn traitor and betray his comrades. Thus the consul was at once put in possession of every circumstance as soon as it occurred, and was enabled to keep vigilant watch over the conduct of every individual from whom danger was to be apprehended. By imparting to a certain extent his fears and suspicions to the senators and monied men, he excited a general feeling of distrust and suspicion towards Catiline, and bound firmly together, by the the of common interest, all who having property to lose looked forward with dread to confusion and anarchy; Antonius, whose good faith was more than doubtful, he gained over by at once resigning to him the province of Macedonia, while he protected his own person by a numerous body of friends and dependants who surrounded him whenever he appeared in public. These preliminary measures being completed, he now ventured to speak more openly; prevailed upon the senate to defer the consular elections in order that the state of public affairs might be fully investigated; and at length, on the 21st of October, openly denounced Catiline, charged him broadly with treason, predicted that in six days from that time Manlius would take the field in open war, and that the 28th was the period fixed for the murder of the leading men in the commonwealth. Such was the consternation produced by these disclosures that many of those who considered themselves peculiarly obnoxious instantly fled from Rome, and the senate being now thoroughly roused, passed the decretum ultimum, in virtue of which the consuls were invested for the tune being with absolute power, both civil and military. Thus supported, Cicero took such precautions that the Comitia passed off without any outbreak or even attempt at violence, although an

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attack upon the magistrates had been meditated. Catiline was again rejected; was forthwith impeached of sedition, under the Plautian law, by L. Aemilius Paullus; was forced to abandon the expectation he had entertained of surprising the strong fortress of Praeneste, which would have formed an admirable base for his warlike operations; and found himself every hour more and more closely confined and pressed by the net in which he was entangled through the activity of Cicero. Driven to despair by this accumulation of disappointments and dangers he resolved at once to bring matters to a crisis, and no longer to waste time by persevering in a course of policy in which he had been so repeatedly foiled. Accordingly, while he still endeavoured to keep up appearances by loud protestations of innocence, and by offering to place himself under the control and surveillance of M. Lepidus, of Q. Metellus, the praetor, or of M. Marcellus, in whose house he actually took up his abode, or even of Cicero himself; on the night of the 6th of November he met the ringleaders at the dwelling of M. Porcius Lacca, and after complaining of their backwardness and inactivity, informed them that he had despatched Manlius to Etruria, Septimius of Camers, to Picenum, C. Julius, to Apulia, and others of less note to different parts of Italy to raise open war, and to organize a general revolt of the slave population. He added that he was desirous to place himself at the head of his troops, but that it was absolutely necessary in the first place to remove Cicero, whose vigilance was most injurious to their cause. Upon this L. Vargunteius, a senator, and C. Cornelius, a knight, undertook to repair at an early hour the following morning to the house of the consul, to make their way into his chamber as if for the purpose of paying their respects, and then to stab him on the spot. The whole of these proceedings were instantly reported to their intended victim; the assassins, when they presented themselves, were refused admission, and certain intelligence having been now received that the rebellion had actually broken out on the 27th of October in Etruria, Cicero, on the 8th of November, went down to the senate which, for greater security, had been summoned to meet in the temple of Jupiter Stator, and there delivered his celebrated oration, the first of four orations against Catiline,
Quousque tandem abutêre, Catilina, patientia nostra?
which paralysed the traitor, not so much by the vehemence of the invective, as by the intimate acquaintance which it displayed with all his most hidden contrivances. Catiline, who upon his entrance had been avoided by all, and was sitting alone upon a bench from which every one had shrunk, rose to reply with downcast countenance, and in humble accents implored the fathers not to listen to the malignant calumnies of an upstart foreigner against the noblest blood in Rome; but scarcely had he commenced when his words were drowned by the shouts of " enemy" and " parricide" which burst from the whole assembly, and he rushed forth with threats and curses on his lips. On his return home perceiving that there was now no hope of destroying his hated foe, and that the strict watch kept throughout the city rendered tumult and fire-raising difficult if not impossible for the present; he resolved to strike some decisive blow before troops could be levied to oppose him, and accordingly leaving the chief controul of affairs at Rome in the hands of Lentulus and Cethegus, with the promise at the same time to march with all speed to their support at the head of a powerful army, set forth in the dead of night (8th-9th November), and after remaining for a few days with his adherents in the neighbourhood of Arretium, where he assumed the fasces and other ensigns of lawful military command, proceeded to the camp of Manlius, having previously addressed letters to the most distinguished consulars and others, solemnly protesting his innocence, and declaring that unable to resist the cabal formed among his enemies he had determined to retire to Marseilles that he might preserve his country from agitation and disturbance.

On the 9th, when the flight of Catiline was known, Cicero delivered his second speech, which was addressed to the people in the forum, the senate proceeded to declare Catiline and Manlius public enemies, despatched officers of high standing to Etruria, Picenum, Campania, Apulia, and the different districts from which danger was apprehended, directed the consuls to hold a levy with all speed, decreed that Antonius should go forth to the war, and that Cicero should remain to guard the city; offering at the same time an amnesty to all who should quit the rebels, and free pardon and great rewards to any who should give such information as might lead to the discovery and conviction of the conspirators within the walls. It is a remarkable fact, and one which indicates most strongly the disaffection of the lower classes to the existing order of things, that not one man could be found to take advantage of this proclamation, and that not a single soldier deserted from the rebel standard. This circumstance threatened to prove a source of most serious embarrassment. Although the existence of the conspiracy and the names of the leading conspirators were known, not only to the magistrates, but to the public at large, yet there was no legal evidence against any individual, for Curius, while he faithfully supplied secret intelligence, could not come forward openly without blasting himself for ever, and at the same time depriving the government of its most powerful auxiliary. But such steadfastness of purpose did not extend to certain foreigners belonging to a race proverbial in ancient times for the lightness of their faith. There was at Rome at this period a party of Allobroges, deputies despatched by their nation to seek relief from certain real or alleged grievances. Their suit, however, had not prospered, and their complaints of the cupidity of the magistrates and of the indifference of the senate were open and loud. Lentulus, conceiving that their discontent might be made available for his own purposes, opened a negotiation through the medium of P. Umbrenus, a freedman, who, in the course of mercantile transactions, had become acquainted with most of the Gaulish chiefs, and who now assuming a tone of warm sympathy with their wrongs, undertook to point out an easy method by which they might obtain ample redress. Finding that these mysterious hints were greedily caught up, he gradually disclosed the nature of the plot, and invited them to co-operate by stimulating their countrymen to insurrection. The men for a long while hesitated, but prudence prevailed. After calculating and balancing the chances, they resolved to secure a certain and immediate recompense, rather than to speculate upon doubtful and distant advantages. Accordingly, they revealed all to Q. Fabius Sanga, the patron of their

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state, who in his turn acquainted Cicero, and by the instructions of the latter enjoined the ambassadors to affect great zeal in the undertaking, and if possible to gain possession of some tangible documentary proof. The Gauls played well the part assigned to them. A written agreement, signed by Lentulus, Cethegus, and Statilius, was placed in their hands, and they quitted Rome soon after midnight on the 3rd of December, accompanied by T. Volturcius, of Crotona, who was charged with despatches for Catiline, it being arranged that the Allobroges were to visit his camp on their way homewards for the double purpose of receiving his orders and obtaining a ratification of the pledges given by his agents. The whole cavalcade was surrounded and seized as it was crossing the Milvian bridge, by two of the praetors who had been stationed in ambush to intercept them. The Gauls quietly surrendered; Volturcius, after having vainly endeavoured to resist, was overpowered and forced to yield.

Cicero, when informed of the complete success of his plan instantly summoned Lentulus, Cethegus, Statilius, and Gabinius to his presence. Lentulus being praetor, the consul led him by the hand to the fane of Concord where the senate was already met; the rest of the accused followed closely guarded. The praetor Flaccus was also in attendance, bearing the portfolio with the papers still sealed. Volturcius finding escape impossible, agreed, upon his own personal safety being insured, to make a full confession. His statements were confirmed by the Allobroges, and the chain of testimony was rendered complete and conclusive, by the signatures in the handwriting of the ringleaders, which they were unable to deny. The guilt of Lentulus, Cethegus, and seven others being thus established beyond a doubt, Lentulus was forced to abdicate his office, and then along with the rest was consigned to the charge of certain individuals of high station who became responsible for their appearance.

These circumstances as they had occurred having been fully detailed by Cicero in his third oration delivered in the forum, a strong reaction took place among the populace, who all now joined in execrating Catiline and demanding vengeance, from the well-founded conviction, that although they might have derived profit from riot or even from civil war, yet the general conflagration, which had always forced a leading feature in the schemes of the conspirators, must have brought ruin upon the humblest mechanics as well as upon the wealthiest of the aristocracy. On the other hand, a vigorous effort was made by the clients of Lentulus to excite the dregs of the multitude to attempt his rescue. The danger appearing imminent, the senate was called together on the nones (5) of December, the day so frequently referred to by Cicero in after times with triumphant pride, and the question was put, what was their pleasure with regard to those who were now in custody. After an animated debate, to which Cicero's fourth Catilinarian belongs and of which the leading arguments are strongly and pointedly expressed in the two celebrated orations assigned by Sallust to Caesar and to Cato, a decree was passed, that the last punishment should be inflicted according to ancient usage upon the convicted traitors. Thereupon the consul led away Lentulus to the subterranean prison on the slope of the capitol, and the others were conducted thither by the praetors. On the selfsame night the high-born patrician Lentulus, a member of the noble Cornelia gens, was strangled in that loathsome dungeon by the common executioner, and the rest of his associates shared his fate. The legality of this proceeding, which was afterwards so fiercely impugned, is discussed in the life of CICERO.

While these things were going on at Rome, Catiline had gradually collected a force amounting to two legions, although not above one-fourth part of the whole, or about 5000 men, were fully equipped, the rest being armed with pikes, clubs, and other rude weapons which chance presented. On the approach of Antonius, Catiline fearing to encounter regular troops with this motley crowd, threw himself into the mountains and by constantly shifting his ground and moving rapidly in different directions, contrived to avoid a collision, while at the same time he exercised and disciplined his followers, whose numbers daily increased, although he now refused to enrol slaves, multitudes of whom flocked to his banner, deeming that it might prove injurious to his prospects were he to identify their interests with what he termed the cause of Roman freedom. But when the news arrived of the disclosures that had taken place in the city, of the complete suppression of the plot, and of the execution of the leading conspirators, many who had joined his standard, from the love of excitement and the hope of plunder, gradually slunk away. Those who remained firm he led into the territory of Pistoria with the design of crossing the Apennines and taking refuge in Gaul. But this movement was anticipated by the vigilance of Metellus Celer, who guarded Picenum with three legions, and had marched straight to the foot of the hills that he might intercept the insurgents on their descent.

Catiline, therefore, at the beginning of the year 62, finding that escape was cut off in front, while Antonius was pressing on his rear, turned fiercely on his pursuers and determined as a last resource to hazard an engagement, trusting that, if successfill, all Etruria would be thrown open for the maintenance of his soldiers, and that he would be able to keep his ground in the disaffected districts until some diversion in his favour should be made in the metropolis. The battle, in which the legions of the republic were commanded by M. Petreius, in consequence of the real or pretended illness of the proconsul Antonius, was obstinate and bloody. The rebels fought with the fury of despair, and long kept at bay the veterans by whom they were assailed. Catiline, in this his last field, nobly discharged the duties of a skilful general and a gallant soldier; his eye and his hand were everywhere ; he brought up columns to support those who were most hotly pressed; withdrew the wounded and the weary, and supplied their place with the sound and fresh; flew from rank to rank encouraging the combatants, and strove by repeated feats of daring valour to turn the fortune of the day. But at length, perceiving that all was lost, he charged headlong where the foes were thickest, and fell sword in hand fighting with resolute courage, worthy of a better cause and a better man. His body was found after the struggle was over far in advance of his own ranks in the midst of a heap of his enemies; he was yet breathing, and his features in the agonies of death

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still wore their habitual expression of reckless daring. His adherents, to the number of 3000, imitated the example of their leader. Each perished at his post, and not one freeborn citizen was taken alive either in the fight or in the pursuit. The victory cost the consular army dear, for all the bravest were slain or grievously wounded.

Although we possess only a one-sided history of this famous conspiracy; although much that has been recorded seems so marvellous and incredible, that many have regarded the whole narrative as little better than a fabric of misrepresentation and falsehood, built up by violent political animosity, and resting on a very slender basis of truth ; although it cannot be denied that some of the particulars, set down by Dio Cassius (37.30) and alluded to by others (e. g. Sail. Cat. 32) of the revolting rites by which the compact between the associates was ratified, are evidently vulgar exaggerations; although little reliance can be placed on the self-panegyrics of Cicero, who would studiously seek to magnify the danger in order to enhance the merits of his own exertions; yet upon a careful and dispassionate investigation, we shall discover no reasonable ground for entertaining any doubts with regard to the general accuracy of the facts as presented to us by Sallust, whose account is throughout clear and consistent, and is corroborated in all the most important details by the information transmitted from other sources. Nor, upon a close examination into the circumstances of the individuals concerned, of the times, and of the state of public feeling and public morals, shall we have much difficulty in forming a distinct idea of the character of Catiline himself, of the motives by which he was stimulated, and of the calculations by which he was encouraged to anticipate success.

Trained in the wars of Sulla, he was made familiar from his earliest youth with civil strife, acquired an indifference to human suffering, and imbibed an utter contempt for the constitutional forms and government of his country, which had been so freely neglected or violated by his patron. The wealth quickly acquired was recklessly squandered in the indulgence of coarse sensuality; and, although his shattered fortunes may have been to a certain extent repaired by a wealthy marriage, and by the plunder of a province, yet the relief was but temporary; his pleasures were too costly ; a considerable portion of his ill-gotten gains would be expended in bribing the different juries who pronounced his innocence, and his necessities soon became pressing. The remorse too produced by his frightful vices and crimes--remorse which was betrayed by the haggard cheek, the bloodshot eye, the wild glance, and the unsteady step, so graphically depicted by the historian--must have given rise to a frame of mind which would eagerly desire to escape from reflection, and seek relief in fierce excitement. On the other hand, the consciousness of those great mental and physical powers, from which even his most bitter enemies could not with-hold a tribute of admiration, combined with the extensive popularity which he had acquired among the young by his agreeable address, varied accomplishments, and unwearied zeal in ministering to their pleasures, must have tended to augment his natural self-confidence, to foster his pride, and to stimulate his ambition. How soon the idea of destroying the liberties of his country may have entered his thoughts it is impossible to discover, but we can readily believe that the career of Sulla was ever present to his imagination, that his grand aim was to become what the dictator had been, and that, provided this end was accomplished, he felt little scrupulous about the means employed. And, in truth, when he looked abroad, the moment seemed most propitious for the advancement of a man of daring and powerful intellect uncontrolled by principle. The leading statesmen were divided into factions which eyed each other with the bitter jealousy engendered during the convulsions in which they had played an active part some twenty years before. The younger nobility, as a class, were thoroughly demoralized, for the most part bankrupts in fortune as well as in fame, eager for any change which might relieve them from their embarrassments, while it held out the promise of unrestrained licence. The rabble were restless and discontented, filled with envy and hatred against the rich and powerful, ever ready to follow at the bidding of any seditious demagogue. Thus, at home, the dominant party in the senate and the equites or capitalists alone felt a deep interest in the stability of the government. Moreover, a wide-spread feeling of disaffection extended over the whole of Italy. Many of the veterans of Sulla, accustomed to riotous living and profuse expenditure, had already squandered their hoards, and looked forward with anxiety to the renewal of these scenes of blood which they had found by experience so profitable; while the multitudes whose estates had been confiscated, whose relations had been proscribed, and who themselves were suffering under civil disabilities in consequence of their connexion with those who had thus perished, were eagerly watching for any movement which might give them a chance of becoming oppressors, robbers, and murderers in their turn.

Never was the executive weaker. The senate and magistrates were wasting their energies in petty disputes, indifferent to the great interests of the commonwealth; Pompey, at the head of all the best troops of the republic, was prosecuting a long-protracted and doubtful war in the East; there was no army in Italy, where all was hushed in a treacherous calm. If then, Catiline, surrounded as he was by a large body of retainers all devotedly attached to his person, and detached from society at large by the crimes which he had suggested or promoted, had succeeded in striking his first great blow, had he assassinated the consuls and the most able of the senators, the chances were, that the waverers among the higher ranks would have at once espoused his cause, that the populace would have been intimidated or gained over, and that thousands of ruined and desperate men would have rushed from all quarters to his support, enabling him to bid defiance to any force which could have been brought to bear upon the city until the return of Pompey from the East. But Pompey might never return, or might not return victorious, or, at all events, a long period must elapse, and ample time would be given for negotiations or resistance. Such were the probabilities which led on Catiline to hazard all upon one great throw ;--but the Fortune of Rome prevailed, the gambler was ruined, and the state saved.

(Sall. Catilin.; D. C. 36.27, 37.10, 29_42; Liv. Epit. 101, 102; Cic. in Catilin.

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i. ii. iii. iv., pro Sulla, pro Murena, 25, 26, in Pison. 2, pro Flacc. 40, pro Planc. 37, ad Att. 1.19, 2.1, 12.21, 16.14, ad Fam. 1.9; Sueton. Jul. 14 ; Plut. Cic. 10-22, Cat. Min. 23. Muretus, ad Cic. Cat. 1.1, has collected from ancient authorities the names of forty persons connected with the conspiracy. Dio Cassius is very confused in his chronology. His account would lead us to suppose, that the first efforts of Catiline were confined in a great measure to the destruction of Cicero and those senators who supported the Tullian law against bribery, which he believed to be levelled against himself individually, and that he did not form the project of a general revolution until after his second defeat, at the election in 63. But this is manifestly impossible; for in that case the whole of the extensive preparations for the plot must have been devised and completed within the space of a few days.)

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