The six books of a common-weale

NOw wee have alreadie declared▪ What a Soueraigne Prince ought to be in the administration of iustice towards his subiects; and if he should take upon him the person of a judge, when, and how, and in what sort of Commonweale he ought to doe it: let vs now also see out of the tearmes of iustice, when the subiects; are divided into factions and part-takings, and that the judges and magistrats are themselves parties also, Whether the Soueraigne Prince ought to ioyne himselfe to one of the parties; & whether the good subiect ought to be constrained to follow the one or the other partie, or not. And first let vs set downe this as a maxime, All factions and part-takings to be daungerous and pernitious in euerie sort of Commonweales, and that they ought, if[*](All factions and part-takings dan gerous unto Commonweales▪) it be possible, by all meanes to be preuented; or if that cannot be before they bee plotted, yet to search the meanes to heale them▪ or at leastwise to imploy all convenient remedies to mittigat the disease. And albeit that of ciuil seditions and part-takings there sometime commeth great good, as some one or other good law, or some other good reformation, which had not beue if the sedition had not happened; yet it is not therefore to be said, that sedition is not daungerous, although that it by chaunce and casually draw after it some good: as in mans bodie a disease chauncing, is the cause that men vse letting of blood, and purgations, and so draw away the euill and corrupt humors: so seditions oftentimes are cause that the euill or wicked men are slaine, or driuen away and banished, to the end that the rest may live in quiet; or that euill lawes and decrees be cancelled and repealed, to giue place unto good, which had otherwise neuer beene receiued. For which if one shall say, That seditions, and civill warres, are good, hee might also say, that murders, parricides, adulteries, theft; and the subuersion of estates & Commonweales are also good. For why, there is no impietie so great, no villanie so detestable, whereof no profit may redound, either to all, or to some men in particular; yea the verie villanies of wicked men almightie God vseth to draw either to the punishment of the reprobat, or to the glorie of his name. Which yet to prayse, were as if we should commend diseases; as Fauorinus the Philosopher highly commended the feuer quartaine: which were but to confound the difference betwixt good and euill, the difference betwixt profit and disprofit, betwixt honour and dishonour, betwixt vice and vertue; and in briefe to confound fire and water, heauen and earth together. Wherefore as vices and diseases are daungerous both unto the bodie and the soule; so seditions and civill warres are hurtfull and pernitious unto all estates and Commonweales.

But it may be some man will say, That seditions and civill warres are good and profitable [*](Seditions and factions dangerous euen for Tyrannicall governments) for Tyrannicall Monarchies, and for the maintaining of Tyrants in their Tyrannicall estates, they being alwayes enemies unto their subiects, and such as cannot long continue, if the subiect be once at accord amongst themselves. But we have before declared, the Tyrannicall Monarchy to be of all others the weakest, as that which is not but by cruelties and villanies nourished and maintained; and yet commonly wee see it to fall and take end by seditions and civill warres: so that if we looke into all tyrannies which haue bene destoyed and ouerthrowne, we shal find it most commonly to have happened of factions and civill tumults. Yea euen the most craftie and subtill tyrants,

who by little and little put to death, now some, and then others, to fat themselves with the blood of their subiects, and to saue their owne vnluckie life, which they lead in continuall paine and languor, neuer escape the murdering hands of conspirators; who so much the more encrease, by how much moe the tyrant putteth of his subiects to death; others which are unto them allied, being alwaies prest and readie to revenge the death of their so nie kinsmen: and albeit that the tirant put to death all their kinsmen, friends, and allies, yet neuerthelesse they shall so stirre up all the good subiects against themselves. And of the goods of the subiects for tyrants to enrich themselves, is to procure their owne ruine and decay: for it is impossible that spleene should fill it selfe, or that the ouergrowing of corrupt proud flesh should fatten it selfe, but that the other members must drie, and so the whole bodie shortly after perish and consume also. And therfore the Florentines in my iudgement had no reasonable cause, why secretly to maintaine the factions of the Pistoians, whome they had before subdued: for that they foresaw not, them whome they thought might so by their mutuall broiles and contentions be weakned, & so the more easily endure the Florentines their lords, by liberty and the vse of armes to grow more fierce and couragious, than if they had lived in peace and quiet, and with aboundance of delights lost their force and strength: besides that, they therewith lost so much of their owne force, by the losse of so many good subiects, one of them by another ruinated and ouerthrowne.

Now if seditio---s and factions be dangerous vnto monarchies, then are they much[*](An especiall benefit a Monarch hath aboue other Commonweales.) more daungerous unto Aristocraties and Popular estates: for that Monarches may maintayne their maiesty, and as neuters decide the quarrels of their subiects; or by ioyning themselves to one of the parties, to bring the other unto reason, or els altogether to oppresse them: whereas the people divided in a popular estate, hath no soueraigne over them; no more than the lords divided in Aristocratie have no man to cōmaund them: if it be not that the greater part of the people, or of the lords, be not of the faction, which so may commaund the rest. Now when I say faction, my meaning is not[*](Priuat factions how they are to be suppressed.) of an handfull of people, or some small number of subiects, but euen of a good part of them banded against an other, able to trouble the whole estate: but if they be but few in number, hee that hath the soueraignty in hand, ought at the first to represse them; which he may doe either by commaunding them to lay downe armes, or by referring the cause of their dissention and variance unto indifferent judges: or if the matter bee such as may require his own declaration and pleasure, then to doe the same with good aduice, and the mature deliberation of his most wise magistrats and councellours, not in any wise suspected to favour the one part more than the other: and this to the intent that the prince, or they which have the soueraignty, should not themselves beare the enuy or discontentment of them which should so bee condemned. But if the faction be grown so farre, as that it cannot by way of justice, or by orderly inducements be appeased, it then be hooueth the soueraigne prince, or them that hold the soueraignety in an Aristocratie or popular estate, to vse their forces for the vtter extinguishing thereof, by the punishing of some few of the ring-leaders and chiefe men in the faction; that so the punishment may touch but some few▪ and yet the feare come unto all of them. Neither ought the soueraigne prince to deferre the matter so long, vntill they bee growne so strong as that they be not any more to be resisted, or that the leaders of them being for feare of punishment become desperat, shall seeke to ouerthrow the whole estate of the commonweale. For there still are, and alwaies have bene good and valiant men, which for the welfare of their countrey doubt not to aduenture their lives; although there be many, who to the contrary had rather their countrey should perish for them. Which kind of men (the very plagues of commonweales) are upon the sudden to bee

oppressed▪ lest happely the whole estate of the commonweale were oft times by some one or other of them to bee indaungered; yea, although such civill discord rise but for some priuate displeasure of theirs.

But all this which we have yet said, is to be vnderstood but of factions which concerne[*](Factions and conspiracies against the prince or estate, how they are to be repressed and the conspirators punished.) not the estate; for if the faction be directly against the state, or the life of the soueraigne prince, there is then no question whether the prince should take a part, or show himselfe an open enemy unto such seditious, which so professe themselves of all others the greatest enemy of their prince & commonweale: for otherwise, if when the state and welfare of the commonweale, or the prince his owne life is attempted, he shall sit still but as an idle beholder, he shall so inuite and annimate not the more desperate sort of men onely, but euen very cowards to seeke after his life also. But yet a great difference there is to bee made in the manner of punishment of the offendors: for if the number of the conspirators against the state or his person be but few, he shall suffer the Magistrats to proceed against them by order of law, and as he seeth cause himselfe to moderate the heauinesse of the punishment; which the fewer the conspirators are, is so much the sooner to be inflicted▪ and before that moe bee discouered, to the end that by the punishment of some few, the good subiects may stil be kept within the compasse of their allegiance and dutie, and those which were euill enclined, so terrified from their euill intended purpose. Neither yet is too strait or strict enquirie to bee made to find[*](That in a conspiracie it is not good to make too strait enquiry to find out all the conspirators.) out all the conspirators, least by force of torture and torment, such things bee haply wrung out, as were indeed better vnknowne than knowne. And yet it is not to bee dissembled or winked at, if the partie guiltie bee once discouered to have conspired against the life of his soueraigne, or yet to have but bene willing so to have done. As it happened unto a gentleman of Normandie, who confessing unto a frier (his ghostly father) of a purpose that he had had to have slaine Francis the first the French king, but yet not daring so to do, to have repented him now of his so wicked and detestable a purpose, was therefore of the frier so much as in him lay pardoned; who yet neuerthelesse forthwith reuealed the same unto the king, who causing the gentleman to bee apprehended, sent him unto the parliament of Paris to be tryed, where he was as a traitor condemned to death. Howbeit, that (in mine opinion) the king in his greater wisedome might have done better to haue pardoned him, for that it had repented him of that his wicked purpose (which the law for the hainousnesse of the fact doe so seuerely punish) & so was become the betraier & accuser of himself before he was by any other accused. And it may be that it had bin better to have executed him without making of the king acquainted therewith, so to have disburdened him of the enuy of such a iudgment. So as did the emperour Augustus with Q. Gallus, who hauing not onely purposed, but euen desperatly also attempted to have slaine him; and being therefore by the Senate condemned of treason, was yet by the same emperour Augustus (dissembling the matter as if he had thereof knowne nothing) pardoned, and so sent away unto his brother then gouernour in one of the prouinces: but was yet neuerthelesse upon the way slaine, not without the secret commaundement of Augustus himselfe, as many men supposed, vsing therein the like subtilty: a craft that had his vncle Caesar before vsed, in giuing pardon to M. Marcellus at the request of the Senate; who yet was immediatly after slaine, as one of Caesar his most mortall enemies. Yet more likely it is, neyther Caesar (who in a certayne naturall clemency exceeded almost all other princes) neyther Augustus (placed in so high a seat of honour and maiestie) to have beene willing to have defiled or stained their so great honour & dignity with the secret murder of them whom they might most iustly have executed. Howbeit that some of the finer sort to the contrary excuse the matter, as by them done for the safty of their owne

lives; and yet so by his meanes still to maintaine the great opinion which they had before [*](Torture for the finding out of conspirators ought to be most warily vsed.) caused men to conceiue of their clemency and mercy. But if the conspirators be in number many, and that they be not all discouered, the wise prince ought to beware how he putteth to torture those that be condemned, albeit that he might euen with a becke without danger kill them all: for that for one that he should put to death, there would arise up an hundred of their allies & friends, who it may be, have power enough, or at least wise neuer fayle of will enough to revenge the death of them which were of their bloud; and in case all this were not so, yet ought the prince alwayes to shunne the note and blame of cruelty, as well of his subiects as of strangers: wherein Nero was greatly deceiued, who hauing discouered the conspiracy against his person and estate, would needs by torture & torment know all them that were partakers therein: wherin he found so great a number of them that were, what by right, and what by wrong accused, as that the cōspirators indeed seeing themselves condemned, discharged their choller upon the tyrants most faithfull and loyall friends: all whom hee caused most cruelly to be slayne; which was afterwards the cause of the open and generall rebellion of the captaynes and gouernours of the prouinces against him. And for this cause Alexander the great hauing put to death Parmenio, Philotas, and the rest which had conspired his death, by a new decree or law abrogated the auncient law of the Macedonians, whereby five of them that were the nearest of kinne unto the conspirators were still to be put to death. But the best and surest way to auoyd the farther daunger of a conspiracy already preuented, is for a prince to dissemble the matter, as if he knew not the conspirators, as Tacitus well sayed, Optimum remedium insidiarum, est si non [*](Conspirators preuented to have oftentimes bene right wisely dissembled, and not farther enquired after.) intelligatur, The best remedie of a conspiracie is, not to seeme to vnderstand thereof. So when Hanno generall of the Carthaginensians, had purposed to have slaine all the Senators, and chiefe men of the citie, under the colour of the marriage of his daughter; the Senat understanding of the matter, but dissembling the same, forthwith caused an edict or law to be published, concerning the charges to be made at feasts: wherein the number of the guests, & the charges of the feast (which was not great) was most straitly appointed. By which decree of the Senat, the conspiracie intended, was without any tumult or bloodshed at all quietly suppressed. So in like manner Eteocles captaine of the Lacedemonians, with a strong garrison of souldiors holding the island of Chio against the Atheniensians, and understanding that the garrison souldiours secretly conspiring together, had determined to kill the inhabitants their friends and allies, in whose aid they were come, and so to take unto themselves the possession of the iland; and that the signall of the conspiratours was, for every one of them to carrie in their hands a cane, or reed: hee (I say) understanding of the matter, and accompanied with certaine of his most assured friends, & so walking about the citie, slew the first that he met withall carrying of a reed, and so suddenly gaue it out, That hee would kill all the rest that so carried reeds in their hands, and yet withall tooke order with the inhabitants of the island, that the souldiers were paid their pay: and so by the death of one onely souldiour the conspiracie was quenched before the fire could bee well kindled: and the occasion of the conspiracie so taken away, and all againe well quieted. Wherefore euerie gouernour and magistrat ought to take care, not so much to take away seditions alreadie growne, as to preuent them: For that a sedition once set on fire, is like a sparke suddenly blowne, which with the rage of the people, which setteth all the citie on a light fire before it can be againe quenched. Wherein the princes commaunds are not to be expected, who commonly know least of such things as touch them neerest. Yea oftentimes it happeneth princes wel to vnderstand the secrets, writings, doings, and sayings of other forren princes, and yet perceiue not the fire kindled at home in their own realmes, in their own pallaces, yea euen in their owne bed chambers. The conspiracy of [*](Princes oftentimes better to vnderstand of the conspiracies against princes, than of such as are against themselves at Rome contriued.) Pelopidas, for the surprising of the castle Cadmea, and the expulsing of the Lacedemonians out of Thebes, was knowne in Athens, before that any thing thereof was disconered in Thebes, as the euent shewed. For why, but euen a little before that Archias the captaine of the castle was together with the garrison souldiors therein slaine, he was by letters from the bishop of Athens warned to looke to himselfe: which letters because he would not at supper read, he used the common prouerb; In crastinum negotia, To morrow will serue for our businesse. Who knoweth not the emperour Charles the fift to have bene either partaker, or priuie almost to all things that were any where done by other princes, yet did he not so much as once suspect the conspiracie which [*](1552.) duke Maurice and Albertus marquesse of Brandeburg his familiar and domesticall friends, had euen fast by him contriued against him: yea and had also effected the same before he could feele or perceiue the smoke thereof. But what need forren examples? the conspiracie of Amboise, which set all Fraunce on fire, was diuulged in Germanie, England, and Italy, before it was once suspected by them against whome it was contriued in Fraunce: unto whom the cardinall Granuellan is reported by his letters to have first discouered the same, and yet there were aboue ten thousand persons which had therein a part. Whereby it is plaine, such conspiracies as wherein the force and power[*](Conspiracies hard to be concesld, being oft times euen by women reuealed.) of many is to be required, to have alwayes had most difficult and daungerous euents: for that they can neither by a few be effected, neither yet by many be concealed. Yea oft times it chaunceth the conspirators most secret designes to bee euen by women first reuealed. As it happened to Philotas, who discouering the conspiracie against Alexander the Great unto a courtisan whom he loued, was together with his complices to his destruction by her bewrayed. So Fuluia understanding of Cateline his conspiracie by one of his souldiors, reuealed the same unto the Consull Cicero. And in our time the secret designes of the Prior of Campania (generall of the French gallies) for the sudden surprising and rifling of the citie of Venice by a souldiour reuealed unto a courtisan,[*](The most dangerous conspiracie that can be against the person of a prince, and the hardest to be auoyded.) was forthwith by her discouered and made knowne unto the Senat. Yet for all that an hard matter it is for a prince, be he neuer so wise or subtill, to preserue himselfe from the daunger of a resolute man that hath sworne his death: for that as the secret, & the exeuction thereof is but against one man onely, so is it but in one man alone enclosed, willing and resolued to sacrifice his life (how deere unto him soeuer) to have another mans, howbeit that he were beset round with an armie. Such an one as Sc---uola is reported to have bene; who of the euent gaue first name unto his house and familie, for that he of his owne accord had thrust his right hand into a burning fire, so to bee burnt of, for that he mistaking the man, had slaine the kings lieutenant in stead of the king himselfe. With no lesse boldnesse (or valour should I say) did a seruant of Lazarus the Despot of Seruia kill Amurath the king of the Turkes, in the middest of his legions of men, so to revenge the death of his lord, and the dishonour done unto the queene his wife. So Pausaenias also in the sight of the whole armie slew Philip king of Macedon, Alexander the Great his father. And Peter Aloisius also duke of Placence, was in his owne castle by two murderers stabbed and slaine euen in the sight of his guard. And he that slew the emperour Domitian went to seeke him out euen into his cabinet with his arme in a scarfe: in such sort as did Aod kill Eglon king of the Moabites. And if Cosmus Medices duke of Florence (hauing ceized upon the estate) had not alwaies gone armed, neither could his great guards, nether yet his strong castles have kept him from the hands of most desperat men, who oftentimes found meanes to enter euen into his most close and secret places, to have slain him an hundred times, what death soeuer they should therefore have died. Yea amongst the rest of many most desperat murtherers, there was one, who euen in the councell chamber strucke him with his dagger, thinking so to have stabbed him (his guard standing round about him) not knowing him as then to have had a priuie coat upon him. And yet well hee knew that his life lay thereon, and so indeed was presently cast headlong out at a window downe to the ground.

But forasmuch as we have before touched certaine meanes which may preserue a prince from falling into these daungers, and whereby to hinder the conspiracies which might be made against his person: Let vs now see how he ought to beare and behave himselfe in conspiracies and factions, which are not directly against himselfe nor his estate, but amongst his great lords among themselves, or among the estates, townes, or prouinces subiect unto him; all which he ought by all meanes to preuent, and not to neglect any thing how little soeuer it be for the meeting therewith. For as the great stormes and tempests are caused of most light and insensible exhalations and vapours:[*](Of small sparkes oft times do arise the great flames and fiers of sedition.) euen so seditions and civill warres the destructions of cities and Commonweales, are most times begun for most smal matters, and such as a man would not thinke that euen they should worke such effect. In the raigne of Iustiman the emperour all the cities of the Greeke empire were divided into factions, for the maintaining of the colours of Greene & Blew, which they according to their fancies tooke unto them in their sports and iusts, one of them brauing and contending with another: which in the end tooke such force and went so farre, as that the judges and magistrats of Constantinople, going about to punish the seditious, were letted so to doe by others of the same faction who tooke part with them, and so tooke out of the hands of the officers and executioners such as were by them led to the place of execution, and not so contented brake open the prisons also, and let loose all the prisoners, and in the same rage burnt the temple of Saint Sophia: and to auoid the punishment which they (hauing laid downe armes) were not to hope for, made choyce of one Hippatius the captaine and ring-leader of their faction, for emperour; Iustinian with his familie in the meane time lurking in a corner. Which tumult proceeded so farre, as that thirtie thousand men were in one day in that quarrel slaine: and had not he the leader of the faction (and he euen the new chosen emperour) there beene killed, the emperour Iustinian had vndoubtedly had much to do to have saued his life; who yet at the beginning together with his other courtiers tooke great sport and pleasure therein. The like whereof happened at Syracusa also, where two of the magistrats become riuals, and so falling out for their loue, at the first gaue occasion for other men to laugh at them, but at length so divided the whole Commonweale into two such factions, which so banded the one the other, as that the most couragious of the nobilitie being slaine, the people taking up armes and driuing out them that were left of the nobilitie or better sort, tooke upon it the soueraigntie, and so changed the Aristocratie into a Democratie or Popular estate. Wherfore it behoueth a prince, before the fire of sedition and civill warres by such sparkes be[*](That the quarrels of great men ought euen in the beginning to be wisely appeased, or by force of the prince suppressed.) enflamed, to cast on cold water, or else quite to quench the same: that is to say, to proceed to the preuenting thereof, either by sweet speeches and persuasions, or elsby open force. So as did Alexander the Great, who seeing Ephestion and Craterus his greatest friends, upon a mutuall emulation to be at discord and varience amongst themselves, and so to draw the rest of his valiant captaines into parts-taking with them: hee at the first with faire words, and gentle persuasions sought to make them friends together, but afterwards taking them apart, sharply rebuked them both, threatning withall to band himselfe against him which soeuer of them should first by word or deed offend the other: by which sharp reprehension putting them both in feare, made them friends together. And so our king Lewes, he who for his deuotion towards God, for his loue

towards his neighbours, for his charitie towards particular men, and upright dealing towards al, is numbred amongst the Saints; unto his great praise used the matter, as that all the time of his raigne there was neuer difference or contentions betwixt any the princes, which he for his integritie and wisedome himselfe in most friendly and peaceable manner quieted not. Yet of all things this is in a prince most to bee taken heed of, That in ending the differences and quarrels of the nobilitie or princes, he seeme not to be led or moued with the loue or hatred of any of them, one more than another. Wherin Archidamus king of the Lacedemonians, wisely prouided for himselfe, who[*](A wise part of Archidamus in making of two great enemies friends.) seeing two great men his most deere friends at oddes betwixt themselves, brought them both into the temple, and there demaunded of them whome they would make choyce of to be arbitrator of the difference betwixt them? who both answering, That they would make choyce of none other but of Archidamus himselfe: Sweare then unto me (said he) that you shall both abide mine award, and doe as I shall enioyne you: which they both doing, he straitly enioyned them both, Neuer to depart out of that same church, vntill they had reconciled themselves one of them unto another, and so became sworne friends. Whereby he wisely without any offence or displeasure unto himselfe (by giuing of iudgement betwixt them) made them friends, and so with thanks enioyed the fruit of their friendship and good agreement, than which nothing ought to be more deerer or more pretious unto a prince: for that no fortresses are unto princes more assured, no castles stronger, than is the loue and fidelitie of their subiects towards them. But here I speake of a good prince, and not of a tyrant which taketh pleasure to see the great men still ruinated one of them by another; neither aimeth at any other marke, but how to flesh the great ones one of them upon another. Howbeit[*](The craft of tyrants in setting other mn together by the eares, sometime daungerous vnto themselves.) that it oftentimes falleth out, that the dogges falling unto agreement among themselves, fall all upon the wolfe: so as did the factions of the Colonnois and the Vrsins, who hauing discouered that pope Alexander the sixt set them still at discord and variance among themselves, so by their calamities and falles to encrease the strength and power of his bastard sonne Borgia; they fell to agreement among themselves, and so made head against him their common enemie.

Sometime also a tyrant seeing the nobilitie in the State to flourish with the strength and alliance of friends, and the favour of the people, and not to seeke one of them anothers ruine, neither to have any equall aduersaries to oppose themselves against them; doth yet secretly affoord favour unto some of the meaner or weaker sort, and so armeth them against the richer and stronger, and by some notable and irremissable villanie by them committed against the other, bindeth them unto him, in such sort, as that they can neuer be reconciled againe unto the parties by them so offended. So as Iohn Bentiuole the tyrant of Bononia is reported to have done: who fearing the good agreement of them of the greater sort, easily suffered the chiefest of the house and familie of the Marischots (then the richest and a man of greatest credit in all that countrey) to bee of his enemies slaine, to the end that hee might so bee dispatched of him, and supported of them of the contrarie faction: all reconciliation being by that so great an outrage broken off, and all hope of mutuall friendship vtterly cut a sunder: all which his tyrannicall slights and deceits, together with the favour of the French king, yet helped him not, but that at length he was thrust out of his estate, and so by violence pluckt headlong[*](The obligation of wicked and desperat men grounded uppon some norable villanie, in all Commonweales most daungerous, and how to be suppressed.) euen out of the chiefest strength of his tyranny. But as the bond and obligation of a notable villanie is of all others the strongest, so is it also in every Commonweale most of all to be feared, for that thereby all the hope of amitie and concord is cut off towards them which have receiued the iniurie. As it happened to the armie of Carthage, which for want of pay reuolting against the seigneurie or state, under the conduct

of two or three of their mutinous captaines, ceized upon diuers strong townes & places which they rifled and ransackt: which captaines and ringleaders fearing to bee by the souldiours at one time or other betrayed and delivered, persuaded the rest of the chiefe principall men amongst them, to kill the ambassadours of the seigneurie, and to hang up Hasdrubal the Generall with the rest of the Carthaginensians which were fallen into their hands, to the end that hauing bound them by such cruelties, they should now have no hope at al to saue their lives by composition. In which case there was no other meane for the Seigneurie to vse, but euen plaine force, so vtterly to root them out which could not otherwise be healed: as was afterwards that armie of the Carthaginensians, being by a long and cruell war at length defeated. For why, they had directly banded themselves against the seigneurie: in which case we have said the prince must of necessitie become a partie, and show himselfe a most sharpe enemie unto the rebellious.

But if discord and contention be amongst the princes and great men themselves, &[*](How a soueraign prince is to end the quarrels and controuersies that are betwixt the nobilitie.) that under the same soueraigne prince, which yet he cannot either by his princely authoritie, neither by faire persuasion, nor hope of rewards, appease; he ought then to giue them arbitrators, men of great integritie and wisdome, and such as they themselves can like of. In which doing the soueraigne prince shall discharge himselfe of the heauinesse of the iudgement to be giuen, and of the hatred and displeasure of him or them that should be condemned. For if this manner of proceeding is and alwayes hath beene commendable for the ending of controuersies euen betwixt kings themselves, by committing their differences unto the arbitrement of princes; and that all nations vse this manner and fashion: with how much more reason ought a wise prince (as of right hee may) cause his owne subiects to condescend thereunto, and especially them which are neere unto him in alliance or blood, to the end that their quarrels and contentions should neuer (if it were possible) so farre passe the bounds of reason, as to come to bee tried by the sword or force of armes.

But in ending such controuersies, the prince aboue all things must beware that hee[*](Dangerous for a prince not to shew himselfe indifferent in the quarrels and controuersies of his great subiects.) show not himselfe more affected unto the one part than to the other: which hath bene the cause of the ruine and ouerthrow of many princes and estates. So Philip the first king of Macedon was not slaine, but for that he openly favoured Antipater against Pausanias a meane gentleman, in denying of him iustice; which was the cause that Pausianas discharged his choler euen upon the person of the king himselfe. Neither for any other cause did Henrie the sixt, king of England, stirre up that long and deadly civill warre, wherewith all England was in combustion eight and twentie yeares, and wherein were lost about fourescore princes of the royall blood (as Philip Comines reporteth) but for that the king tooke upon him to be captaine of them of the faction of the house of Lancaster, against them of the faction and house of Yorke: who at length hauing vanquished and ouercome their enemies, put to death the king himselfe in prison, with all the rest of his neerest kinsmen. The conspiracie also of the marquesse of Pescara, against Charles the emperour, was grounded upon the favour that the emperour bare unto the viceroy of Naples, against the marquesse. It were but lost time to set downe in writing the cruell & bloodie warres which have bene raised in this realme by Robert of Arthois, Lewes of Eureux king of Nauarre, Iohn Montford, Iohn of Burgundie, and diuers others of our time, which it is not needfull to rehearse, and all for the favours of the kings, who forgetting the high degree of maiestie whereunto they were mounted, would basely take upon them the offices of aduocats, of judges, and arbitrators; so descending from the highest unto the lowest places, so to follow the passions of their subiects, making themselves companions unto some of them, and unto other some of them enemies.

But some will haply say, That by this meanes the king shall know newes, and keepe the parties also in awe: whereunto I also well agree, that a young king might so doe amongst his ladies and gentlewomen, to take pleasure & knowledge of news enough, but not amongst his princes and other his great lords. Now if any man shall further obiect and say, Princes to be oftentimes, yea and that against their will enforced so to doe, and to take a part, when as he which thinketh himselfe wronged, upon an obstinat[*](When, and how a soueraigne prince is to vse his force for the appealing of the controuersies and quarrels betwixt his great subiects) mind will not by any reason, persuasion, iudgement, or arbitrement, suffer himselfe to be ouerruled or persuaded. In which case I say, that necessitie hath no law: and yet that the prince before hee may come to that point of extremitie, as to vse his force, ought to proue all the meanes that he possibly may, for the composing of the matter in controuersie, and making of those his great subiects friends: which if it may not be, then by force and strong hand to ouerrule that which he could not otherwise doe: For that it cannot be, that he which shall be so froward or presumptuous as not to hearken unto reason, nor his friends persuasion, can have many to take his part, or to stand fast by him in that his so great and obstinat wilfulnesse.

Yet might some man say, That the occasion of the quarrell may be so secret, as that no proofe can thereof be made, neither any iudgement giuen, and yet that hee which hath so receiued the iniurie, demaundeth thereof an amends: in which case the princes find themselves oftentimes much troubled, as when an iniurie or offence is unto any man secretly offered or done, which he which did it denieth, and that the trueth cannot therein be tried but onely by bare surmises & coniectures; in this case what is amongst the common and vulgar sort to bee done? it is an easie thing to say, as that no man ought without most manifest witnesses to be condemned: but souldiours, and such as[*](The beginning of combats.) stand upon their nobilitie, deeme their honour to be stained, and their reputation greatly impaired, except he have satisfaction, who upon his oath affirmeth himselfe to have so bene by any man secretly wronged. For why, such men say, the subiects lives and goods to be all in the princes hand and power to be disposed of▪ but not their honour and reputation. In which case the people of the North have for the tryall of the matter appointed combats; as is to be seene in the auntient lawes of the Lombards, of the Saliens, the Ripuaries, the English, the Burgundions, the Danes, the Almaines, and the Normans; who in their customes call the Combat, The law of appearance: which many for all that have as a most beastly thing reiected, as neuer receiued or practised by the Assyrians, the Aegyptians, the Persians, the Greekes, or Latines, except in lawfull warre, one man against his enemie, and that by the good leaue of the Generall of the armie; or else sometime one Generall encountering hand to hand with another, for the sparing of their subiects blood: so Cossus and Marcellus in battell hand to hand ouercame their enemies kings? Or els one king against another king, as did Romulus with the king of the Latines, and Hundig king of the Saxons, with Roe king of Denmarke. So also Charles king of Naples chalenged Peter king of Arragon unto the combat, for the triall of their right unto that kingdome, which they yet performed not. Neither is this any meane matter, when as Corbis and Orsua contending for the principalitie before Scipio Affricanus the Romane Generall, said, That they would have none other judge, either of God or man, to decide their quarrell, but Mars onely. And yet[*](Combats when to be admitted.) for all that it is better to appoint combats amongst subiects, according to the auntient and lawfull manner of our auncestors, when the persons are of like qualitie which so stand upon their honour, and that there is some apparant coniecture of the wrong receiued (for why, the auntient lawes neuer admitted combat in a plaine and euident matter, or wherein good proofe was to be had) for that to deny combat vnro noble personages standing upon their honour, and at so great oddes as that they can by no

other means be appeased, were but to nourish the fire of civill war euen in the entrails of the Commonweale, which after it is once kindled, enflameth the whole body thereof. For that two inconueniences propounded, wise men haue well taught vs, the greater ought stil to be of vs declined. Ioine hereunto also, that to change a custom which hath for many worlds of yeares bene found necessarie, is not onely an hard matter, but withall[*](Combats by diuers great princes forbidden, & for the auoiding of greater inconueniences by them again allowed.) daungerous also. Rotaris king of the Lombards, had taken the law of Combats from amongst his subiects, but yet at their instant requests was enforced to restore the same againe into the former force; protesting withall, That it was but inhumane and naught, (as is in the lawes of the Lombards to be seene) but yet for all that necessarie to auoid greater inconueniences: For that the law of Combat being so taken away, moe good and innocent men were most cruelly and secretly slain and made away, than haply had bene, the daunger and eternall infamie of such hidden treacherie beeing still propounded to the offendors, to be tried by combat. So king Lewes the ninth, hauing the honour of God, and the welfare of his subiects before his eyes, was the first that forbad combats in this realme; which edect was thus, NOVS DEFENDONS BATAILLES PAR TOVT EN NOSTRE DOMAINE EN TOVTES QVERELLES, We forbid Combats in all quarrels throughout our dominions. And for that this edict was euill kept, Philip the Faire, king Lewes his nephew, caused the like also to bee published, whereby he vtterly forbad combats: who yet within two yeres after was at the instant request of his subiects constrayned to restore them againe, by reason of the secret murders and stabbings, yea euen of the most valiant men, who then were in every place so slaine. Philip of France, surnamed the Hardie, duke of Burgundie, did not altogether forbid combats in Holland, but yet commanded them not to bee at all suffered, without the lawfull appointment of the magistrats: whereas before they were there open and common without iust cause euen to all sorts of men. But it was a thing most barbarous, that Fronto king of Denmarke in auntient time appointed all causes and quarrels to bee decided by combat, as the Saxon historiographer saith. Howbeit that the Russians and Hungarians otherwise vse it not, but when there is no euident proofe of the matter brought in question. But in our remembrance the prince of Melphe, the king his lieutenant in Piemont, found no remedie or meanes better, for the restrayning of the secret murders and mutinies which were ordinarie amongst his souldiors, than combat to be for them appointed, by the leaue and authoritie of the Generall; with condition, That the vanquished should not be spared, but still bee slaine by the victor, and his bodie throwne into the riuer: For which such combats hee appointed a publike place betwixt two bridges, compassed round about with the riuer: so that the hope of flight or of aid taken away, and that they must either ouercome their enemie, or there shamefully die; the souldiors afterwards began to behave themselves more modestly, and so live the more quietly together.[*](Of the lie giuen, what is to be thought.)

But now, when as to have the lie giuen one, was neither by the Romans thought to be a thing iniurious, neither that our auncestors had allowed the combat for the lie giuen to another man; it began in our age to be a thing not only contumelious, but euen capitall also; and that especially in the time of Francis the first the French king, who in a great assembly of his greatest peers one day said, that he was not an honest man which could endure the lie giuen him. Which he said, hauing by his heraults at armes giuen the lie to Charles the fift, for some dishonorable speeches he had giuen of him. Which yet since with vs is growne as it were into a law, so that none of the nobilitie or martiall men, which will put up the lie, is accounted of, as of a man of any worth or valour, but as of a base or vile fellow. Whereof have risen great quarrels, brawles, and murders, amongst all sorts of subiects. Which to meet withall, Henry the second, who not without

much griefe with a great number of his nobilitie, had seene a matter ended by combat, by a perpetuall law forbad controuersies or quarrels to be afterwards so tried. And to the intent that no man, who had rashly receiued the lie, should incurre the note of infamie: Charles the ninth reuiuing the edict made by his father, for the forbidding of combats, ioyned thereunto moreouer, That he would take unto himselfe the honour and reputation of such as found themselves grieued, for that they might not have the combat for the lie offered them: and yet there was neuer in Fraunce so many murders seene, as when combats were so forbidden. For who should not bee well laughed at, which for the lie giuen him should appeale unto the judges? And yet in the opinion of the nobilitie and martiall men, he shall seeme to incurre the most heauie note of infamie, which shall not by force of armes repell such a reproach or disgrace offered him. Neither can the frowardnesse (should I say) or vanitie of so foolish an opinion easily be out of mens minds remoued.

But whereas we before said, that the combat is for the auoiding of greater inconueniences[*](How, and for what cause combats are to be granted.) to be borne withall, my meaning is not, that it should be by law allowed, but onely in case of necessitie graunted, and that by the princes expresse letters, after the hearing of the parties, and for the auoyding of murders and seditions, which might otherwise ensue. Whereby that inconuenience shall be auoyded, which otherwise without combat could not be prouided for, that kinsmen, neighbours, and friends, should for one mans wrong in a sort be enforced to take up armes, and so to entertaine another mans quarrell: as oftentimes it chaunceth the force and furie of wicked men, to fall upon the heads of good and worthy subiects. But that is in the hearing of the matter especially to be respected, that combat be not graunted for the triall of any but of capitall causes, and those also whereof no manifest proofe is to be had or found out: following therein also the auntient lawes, which will, That the vanquished should bee declared infamous, and so disgraded of all his estates and honours, condemned to some shamefull death, if he will not better die of the hand of the victor. Which seueritie of punishment, and feare of infamie, might stay many as well from entring into combats, as also from leading of a quarrellous and wicked life. For Philip the Faire hauing forbidden combats, thought it not good otherwise to restore them againe unto the nobilitie, but upon the cause before knowne unto the magistrats, as it was by the old decree of the Senat prouided. As by another decree of the same Senat giuen in the controuersie betwixt the counties of Foix and Armagnac, it was said, That combats might not take place, when question was of civill right and law, which is yet the custome of them of Berne. And by the lawes of Naples also, it was ordained, That combats should not take place but in cases of treason, and of casuall murder: whereas before it was lawfull in any offence whatsoeuer to chalenge the combat of the aduersarie, theft onely except: which yet I see by the custome of them of latter time, not to have beene without good cause lawfull. Howbeit that by the lawes of Spaine no iust cause of combat is allowed. And thus much concerning priuat and particular quarrels▪ with the meanes to appease the same.

But if quarrels and contentions arise betwixt whole families, or betwixt whole corporations[*](Combats nor to be admitted for the quarrels and contentions betwixt families.) and colledges of the same citie or Commonweale, and upon such like causes as doe betwixt priuat men: combats in that case are not to have place▪ but the parties so at oddes are by way of iustice to be kept in good peace; or otherwise by force & sharpe punishment to be inflicted upon the offendors to be kept in awe; yet for all that in such sort, as that iustice should still have place euen in armes in the execution doing: as it was in Rome, at such time as by a decree of the Senat it was appointed and set downe, That foure hundred innocent slaues should be all put to death; with which vnusuall

manner of execution the common people all inraged was about to have taken [*](Seditions arising for the execution of iustice, how they are to be preuented.) up armes, if the emperor Nero had not for the keeping of them in, dispersed the souldiours of his guard into every quarter of the citie, so to keepe all quiet, vntill that the execution was done. Whereof Iustinian the emperour hauing euen in like case failed, fell into the great and daungerous sedition (whereof we before spake) which upon the sudden set all Constantinople almost upon a light fire. As not long ago the two most famous cities of Paris and Antwerpe, were in great tumults and uproares, at such time as the people saued from execution certaine persons for their religion condemned to die: whereof the reuolt of the Low countries against the king begun. Neither is this any new matter, but knowne to have happened in the glory of the Roman Commonweale: when as at such time as the Consull had commanded one Volero a factious fellow to have the bastenado giuen him, (as the manner of punishing of such offendors was) the people by force tooke him out of the hands of iustice, euen as hee was to have bene stripped, and made him Tribune to defend the popular libertie against the Senat and the Nobilitie, with whome the people were still at warre, if they had no enemies abroad. For which cause the Senat and Magistrats chiefe care, was to find out forren enemies to oppose against the people: or if they wanted such, by all meanes to forge new enemies and warres, as knowing them otherwise neuer to cease from seditions & civill broyles. For so soone as that the Carthaginensians had made peace with the Romans, after the first Punique warres, they forthwith entred into a great daungerous civill warre at home among themselves: which still happened unto them at Rome, if they were neuer so little a while without warres. We see also, that they neuer shut up the temple of Ianus, which was the signe of an vniuersall peace, but twice in seuen hundred yeares space. And if we marke the histories well, wee shall find nothing to haue[*](Nothing more hurtfull unto a warlike people than peace.) bene more daungerons and hurtfull unto a valiant and warlike people, than peace: For that men accustomed to warres, and still trayned up in armes, seeke for nothing els but dissentions and broyles, neither hate any thing more than to be at rest and quiet. And that is it for which the histories report Ca. Marius to haue bene the best generall of his time in the warres abroad, but the worst and most troublesome man alive at home and in time of peace: for that he well knew not what peace & quietnesse meant. Yet whether it be better in a Commonweale to traine the people up in peace or warre wee will hereafter declare.

Now we have in some sort touched certaine meanes for the preuenting of seditions and part-takings: but as it is much more easie to stay the enemie from entring, than to driue him out after he is once entred; so is it more easie also to preuent seditions and tumults, than to appease the same: and yet that more hardly also in a Popular estate or[*](Seditions in a Popular Commonweale of all others most dangerous, and how to be appeased.) Commonweale, than in any other. For why, the prince in a Monarchy, and the lords in an Aristocratie still are, and ought to be, as soueraigne judges and arbitrators of the subiects: and so oft times of their absolute power and authoritie appease and quiet all their differences: wheras in the Popular government the soueraigntie lieth in the people themselves, which are so divided into factions, who in no other acknowledge the magistrats, but as men subiect unto their commaund and power. Wherefore in such Commonweales such seditions and factions are with the greatest care and diligence that possible is, to be at the first preuented: but if they bee once risen before they were well foreseene, then it behoueth the most wise and vertuous men in the estate to take the matter in hand: who by their great wisedome and kind speeches may againe appease the turbulent motions of headstrong and giddie common people. For as they which are sicke of a phrensie, which causeth them to skip and daunce without ceasing, cannot be cured, except the cunning musitian tune his instrument unto their mad manner

and fashion, to draw them unto his owne, and so to fall by little and little▪ vntill that they be so againe made more quiet and tractable: euen so ought also the wise magistrate seeing the people in a rage, at the first to accommodate and frame himselfe unto their disordered appetite, that so he may afterwards by little and little induce them to hearken unto reason: and so by yeelding at first unto the tempest, at length put into the desired hauen. For to seeke by force to stay the rage of an angry and incensed multitude, is no other thing than as if a man should by maine strength seeke to stay the force and course of an headie streame, most violently falling from the high and steepe rockes.

And as for them which goe about by force of armes and strong hand to stay the[*](That the people up in tumult or sedition, is not by strong hand or open force to be staid or appeased) angrie peoples rage and furie, if they bee not verie strong and well assured of the victorie, they put the estate into great perill and danger: for if the subiect become victor, no doubt but that hee will at his pleasure prescribe lawes unto the vanquished. And admit that the prince himselfe be not vanquished, yet so it is, that if he attaine not unto the full of his designes, he shall in so doing make himselfe contemptible, giue occasion unto his other subiects to rebell, for strangers to inuade him, and for all men to contemne him. Which is yet more to bee feared in popular estates, and was most manifestly knowne in the seditions which happened in Rome, wherein they which would needs proceed by force, and openly resist the desires of the people (up in furie) matred all: whereas to the contrarie, they which sought by faire meanes to win them, still brought them to reason, and so upheld the state of the citie, otherwise readie to have fallen. Appius Claudius seeing the people of Rome to demaund to have had the obligations and bands for money lent, canceled, (wherein the richer sort and vsurers had a notable interest) was of opinion, not to have any thing of the due debt remitted. And at another time the people being reuolted from the nobilitie, hee the same man would have had them most rigorously entreated, without any regard to have been had of them at all; for that the people otherwise would swell with pride, and become insupportable: howbeit, Seruilius at the first time, and Menenius Agrippa at the second, withstood him, and so carried away the matter from him. Which Agrippa shewed in deed, and by a most excellent fable of mans bodie and the parts thereof (which hee so lively set before every mans eyes) that he caused the armes to fall out of the hands of both parties, and so sweetly againe reconciled the people unto the nobilitie: wherby he together with the welfare of the Commonweale, and all mens loue, gained also vnto himselfe immortall fame and glorie. And if so be that wild beasts will neuer by strokes be tamed, but by the kind handling of him that ---ameth them: euen so the people once moued or enraged, as a beast with many heads, and of all others the wildest and fiercest, is neuer by force, but by good and kind vsage and entreatie to be gained. Wherefore in such time of common uprore and tumult, something is to be graunted unto the people: and if the sedition be raised for famine or for dearth of victuals, some present distribution is to be made, and reliefe giuen unto the poorer sort, who are not with words to bee appeased. For that as Cato the Censor, speaking of the people of Rome, sayd, The hungrie bellie hath no eares. Neither in that case must the magistrats[*](The hungry belly hath no eares.) spare faire words or promises, yea more than is euer to be performed. For that the matter so standing, both Plato and Xenophon giue leaue unto the magistrates to lie, as physitions to children and their sicke patients. So the wise Pericles, to draw the people[*](The wisedome of Pericles to draw the common peo ple of Athens to vnderstand reason.) of Athens unto reason, fed them with feasts, with plaies, with comedies, with songs and daunces; and in time of dearth caused some distribution of corne or money to be made amongst them: and hauing by these meanes tamed this beast with many heads, one while by the eyes, another while by the eares, and sometimes by the bellie, hee

then caused wholesome edicts and lawes to bee published, declaring unto them the graue and wise reasons thereof: which the people in mutinie, or an hungred, would neuer have hearkened vnto.

Yet whereas we have said, that the people is to be flattered, and to haue something[*](How, and when the people is to be flattered.) graunted unto it: yea sometimes euen things vnreasonable; especially in popular and Aristocraticke estates, that is to be vnderstood in time of extremitie, when as it is alreadie up in sedition: and not for that one ought still to follow the appetite and passion of the insatiable people, and without reason: But euen to the contrarie, it is so to bee gouerned, as that it be not too hard curbed, neither yet left with the reines at too much libertie. For as it is a right slipperie high standing place to serue the appetite and pleasure of the vnsteady people, so is it yet much more daungerous also, openly to oppose a mans selfe against it: so as did Appius, Coriolanus, Metellus, C---to the younger, Phocion, and Hermiodorus, who whilest they would have all things of the people by strong hand, and rather breake than bow, they did either vtterly vndoo themselves together with the Commonweale, or at leastwise brought it into most great perill and danger. True it is, that for the prince or magistrats thus to temper maiestie with clemency towards an vnruly and headstrong people, without iudgement and reason, is a most hard and difficult matter: yet is there nothing more necessarie, especially in Popular governments, than not too much to flatter, neither yet to deale too roughly with the people. But as the Sunne goeth, rising and setting with the other starres and planets, dayly carried about with the most swift motion of the superiour celestiall spheres, and yet for all that faileth not to performe his owne naturall course by retiring backe by little and little; and that by how much the higher he is mounted up from the Horison, the lesser hee seemeth for to be: Euen so ought the wise gouernour to doe, following in part the affections and desires of the troubled people, so much the more easily afterwards[*](Force neuer to be used against the people, where faire meanes may preuaile.) to attaine unto the full of his designes. And albeit that a prince had the power by force to represse and reforme a mutinous and rebellious people, yet ought he not so to doe, if otherwise he may appease them. For what Physitian is there so inconsiderat, as to vse sections, and cauterisings, or burnings, if the disease might otherwise be cured? And so what prince is there so euill aduised, as by way of force and fact to proceed against his people, if with a kind word speaking hee may appease all? But especially in a Popular estate, wherein it beseemeth the wise magistrat, by all faire means to appease and quiet the passions of a troubled people, in laying plaine before their eyes the euill successe which may ensue of their so euill and disordered proceedings. We read therof many examples, but yet none more famous than that of Pacuuius Caluinus of Capua, who being accounted a great favourer of the comminaltie, and an vtter enemie unto the nobilitie of that citie, yet understanding of a purpose that the people had uppon the sudden to kill all the Senators of the citie, which so cruell a murder hee greatly detested, but yet seeing the common people so resolutely set downe upon the matter, as that they were not to be remoued, he himselfe made show also, as if he had as well as any of the rest liked of that the peoples will and purpose, yet withall gaue the Senators to vnderstand of the great daunger they were in, and of the purpose he had for the safegard of their lives, willing them to bee of good cheere, and to feare nothing. And[*](The commendable deceit of Pauius, to deceiue the angry people.) so afterwards the Tribune or chiefe leader of the mutinous people, hauing shut up all the Senators into a strong place, as men appointed for the slaughter: but indeed so to preserue them from the present furie, hee then with a merrie and chearefull countenance comming forth unto the angrie people, spake unto them thus, That which you men of Capua have oftentimes wished for, That it might once be in your power to be revenged

of the most wicked and abhominable Senat; you now have the same put into your hands, not by uprore and tumult, by assaulting and breaking open their houses one by one, which they keepe and defend with strong companies and guards of their seruants and friends, but euen at your pleasure, and without daunger. Receiue them all shut up in the court, where I will giue you power to pronounce sentence of every one of their lives. But before all things it behoueth you so to satisfie your anger, as yet to deeme your owne health and welfare better than the satisfying of your rage and wrath. For a Senat you will not altogether bee without: for that you must needs either have a king, which is a thing to be abhorred; or els a Senat, the onely Councell of a free citie. Wherefore two things rest for you to doe, the one that you take out of the way the old Senat: and the other, that you chuse a new. And this said, hee sat downe; and so the Senatours names beeing all put into a pot, hee commaunded the first name that was drawne out to bee read, and him so named, to bee brought out of the court. Is it your pleasure then (said hee) that this man shall first die? Whereunto all the people cried alowd, That it was well said of him, and well done. Well, I see then (said Pacuuius) what his doome is: let him bee cast out; and now for him an euill and wicked man, make you choyce of a good and upright Senator to bee put into his place. Whereupon they all at the first were silent▪ for lacke of a better to make choyce of: but as soone as one more impudent than the rest had named one, presently a greater crie was heard than before; some crying out, That they knew him not; othersome exclaiming as fast against him as a naughtie base fellow, of some beggerly trade or other, and so vnworthy of the place: The like sturre there was▪ when choyce was to bee made of the second, and third Senator, the base artificers and trades-men still nominating some one, and some another: in such sort, as that they now began to fall out among themselves, about the choyce, none of them beeing willing to yeeld or giue place to other, which whilest they did in euerie Senator which was named, there was no lesse trouble and sturre among themselves, than was before betwixt them and the Senatours. Whereuppon they were better contented that the old Senatours should now still hold their places, than to suffer one of them to bee preferred before another. Wherein the councell of the Tribune was right wise, and cunningly by him put in execution: who after hee had by his wise dissimulation somewhat appeased the mad peoples rage, hee as it were with his finger poynted out, and layed open euen unto euerie mans eye, the great hurt and inconuenience that was to ensue, by putting the Senators to death: as that not onely such a shamefull murder should for euer bee accounted most cruell and inhumane; but that also by the dooing thereof the Commonweale should bee without councell, as a bodie without a soule; and the fire of sedition raised also amongst the people, about the preferment, and them that were to bee preferred.

But if the people once enraged be alreadie up in armes, it is a most hard and daungerous[*](The mutinous people best appeased by the good persuasion of some good old vertuous personage.) matter to appease them: in so much as that not long agoe there was one that set fire on his owne house (least the Commonweale should with the flames of sedition euen then have perished) so to turne the citisens then together by the eares to leaue the fray, and to come to helpe to quench the fire, for feare least all should have beene burnt. Then if any man there bee in vertue and valour exceeding the rest, who will with good speech take uppon him to persuade the people unto peace and concord, hee onely, or else none, is the man that may appease the peoples frantike furie and rage. Which thing Virgil most excellently expressed in these few verses following▪

Ac veluti magno in populo cum saepe coorta

Seditio est, saeuit{que} an---mis ignobile vulgus;

Iam{que} faces & saxa volant, furor arma ministrat:

Tum pietate grauem ac meritis si fortè virum quem

Conspexere, silent, arrectis{que} auribus astant:

Ille regit dictis animos, & pectora mulcet.

And as a sudden tumult rais'd amidst a people great,

When as the base and rascall sort are in the greatest heat,

And firebrands now and stones do flie, such weapons as there lye,

Then if some good graue worthy sire they fortune to espie,

They silent with attentiue eare stand listning to his lore:

He with good words their minds doth rule, and calmes the whole uprore.

Such we said Pericles to have bene in Athens, Menenius Agrippa in Rome, and not long agoe Peter Loredan in Venice, who at such time as the marriners and sea-faring men banded themselves against the rest of the citisens, and in such sort massacred one another, as that neither duke, neither the Senat, nor other magistrat could come nie, but that they were by force and violence of the furious people reiected; this plaine gentleman Peter Loredan (I say) a priuat citisen, and bearing no office at all, showing[*](Peter Lored an a most notable citisen.) but himselfe in the middest of these combats, and holding but up his hand on hie, caused the weapons to fall out of every mans hand, for the reuerence they all bare unto the vertue of so graue a personage; and so as it were in a moment appeased all that civill discord. Whereby it was to be seene, vertue to be of greater power and maiestie than armes, than lawes, yea than all the magistrats together.

There is also in the reuerend feare of religion a great power for the staying of the[*](The reuerend feare of religion a good meane for the appeasing of the seditious people.) tumultuous people. For at such time as the Florentines were fallen out into such a furie among themselves, as that the citie swome with the blood and slaughter of the citisens: and that they could by no meanes be parted, Francis Soderin the bishop attired in his bishoplike attire, and attended upon with a company of priests, and a crosse carried before him, came into the middest of the furious citisens, so bandying it one against another; at the sight and presence of whome, they all for the reuerend feare of religion upon the sudden laid downe their weapons, and so without more adoo, got themselves home every man unto his owne house. So also Iadus the Iewes high Priest, in his Pontifici---libus met Alexander the Great comming towards Hierusalem with his victorious armie, with whose port and maiestie Alexander terrified, worshipped the High Priest, and was so farre from ransacking either of the countrey or holy citie, as that he gaue it great priuileges, with whatsoeuer the High priest els requested. With like wisedome pope Vrban is reported to have turned Attila king of the Hungarians from the siege of Aquilia.

But sometime such is the deadly hatred of citisens amongst themselves, as that they [*](Seditions sometimes appeased by the interposition and mediation of friends.) need of the helpe of their friends and allies, yea and sometimes euen of meere strangers to set them agreed. In which case an other good old man of Florence seeing the citisens without pity to kill and massacre one another, and on all sides to burne one anothers houses, went to request the Luquois their neighbours and friends, to interpose themselves for the appeasing of these so deadly broyles, as had well neere ruinated the whole estate: Wherewith the Luquois mooued, came in great numbers, by whose good trauell and mediation all those slaughters and broyles were well stayed and quited: a thing both commendable and profitable, not to them onely which are so set agreed,

but euen to them also which were the workers therein, as reaping therby great honour, together with the loue of them whom they so made friends. Yea oftentimes it happeneth, that the citisens deuided into factions, weary at length of their murders and tumults, seeke but to find an occasion for them to fall to agreement; yet being of opinion it to touch them in honour, that should first seeke for peace, therefore continue their bloody quarrels vntill that they have vtterly ruinated one another, if some third man interpose not himself betwixt them for the making of them friends: which thing oftner happeneth in popular or Aristocratike commonweales, than in a monarchie: wherein the subiects are by the power and authority of one onely prince still to bee set at one, & reconciled amongst themselves, together with the commonweale. Howbe[*](Nothing more daungerous unto a prince, than in seditions to make himselfe a partie.) it, that sometime it happeneth the soueraigne prince to make himselfe a party, in stead of holding the place of a soueraigne Iudge: in which doing for all that he shall be no more but the head of one party, and so vndoubtedly put himselfe in daunger of his life, and that especially when such daungerous seditions and factions be not grounded upon matters directly touching his estate, but otherwise, as it hath happened almost in all Europe within this fifty yeares, in the warres made for matters of religion: for we have seene the kingdome of Sweden, of Scotland, of Denmarke, of England, the Cantons of the Swissers, yea and the Germaine empire also, to have changed their religion, the estate of every of these monarchies and commonweales yet standing entire and whole: howbeit that the truth is, that it was not done, but with great violence, and much bloudshed in many places.

But religion by common consent once receiued and setled, is not againe to be called[*](It is daungerous to call that into question which ought to be holden as resolued upon.) into question and dispute, that so all the wayes and entrances unto sedition and faction may be stopped, and the assurances of vnity and peace strengthened; for that all things called into disputation, are so also but as things probable called in doubt: and what can come neerer to impiety then by probable arguments to call in doubt the lawes of God, which are by their nature immutable and eternall; and such as of the truth whereof every man ought to be most certainly resolued and assured Besides that, nothing is so firme and stable, nothing so manifest and cleare (except it rest upon most[*](Religion once receiued and setled, to be no more called into question or doubt.) playne and vndoubtfull demonstrations) which may not by disputation and force of arguments be obscured or made doubtfull; and especially where that which is called into question, or dispute, resteth not so much upon demonstration or reason, as uppon the assurance of fayth and beleefe onely: which they which seeke by demonstrations and publishing of bookes to performe, they are not onely mad with reason, but weaken also the foundations and grounds of all sorts of religions.

There is a most antient law of Licurgus extant, which the Florentines (of all others the sharpest disputors) established in their popular estate, viz. Ne de legibus semel reepctis ac probatis disserere liceret, That it might not be lawfull to dispute or make question lawes once receiued and allowed. For why he of others the wisest▪ well vnderstood, lawes disputed and reasoned upon to bee still doubted of; which doubting brought with it an opinion of the iniquity thereof; whereof must needs follow the contempt both of the lawes and magistrats, and so consequently the ruine and destruction of the whole commonweale. But if Philosophers and Mathematicians cannot abide to have the principles of their sciences reasoned of, what great folly, or rather madnesse is it to dispute not onely priuatly, but euen openly also of religion alreadie approued. Howbeit that Anaxagoras maintained the snow to be blacke, and Fauorinus the Quartaine feuer to bee a very good and wholesome thing; and Carneades hauing one day highly commended iustice, the very next day preferred iniustice before it, and that it was (without all comparison) better to be a verie knaue than a vertuous honest man:

which they all so perfuasiuely did, as that they drew a great number of men to bee indeed of their opinions. Although Aristotle said them which made question, whether snow were white or not, to want sence: but them which doubted whether there were a God or not▪ not to be with arguments refuted, but by the lawes punished: howbeit that he himselfe by necessarie demonstration proued there to be one euerlasting God, and that there could be no moe gods but he. Wherfore, all the kings and princes both of Affricke and of the East, doe most straitly forbid all men to dispute of their religion. Which like strict prohibition is also set downe by the lawes and decrees of Spaine. So also the king of Moscouie seeing his people, who had receiued the rites and ceremonies of the Greekes, divided into diuers sects and factions, by reason of the diuers preachings and disputations of the ministers: hee thereupon forbad them uppon paine of death any more to preach or dispute of religion; and withall gaue a booke unto the bishop and parish priests, wherein was contained what hee would have every man persuaded of, and to beleeue, concerning matters of faith and religion, which he commaunded them upon all feastiuall dayes to reade and publish unto the people: with a capitall paine thereunto annexed, if by any mans exposition any thing were at all thereunto either added or diminished. And Moyses, when hee had most curiously written all those things which he had learned and receiued from Almightie God, and declared the same unto the people: yet in one chapter of the law (the people yet wandering up and downe in the desart) he commaunded the priests and Leuits aloud and distinctly to reade the law, yea, and that dayly also, that so it might bee vnderstood and knowne unto the people of every age and sexe: and so in another chapter forbad any thing to be unto the lawes of God either added or detracted. Yet sayth hee not, that they should dispute thereof: but euen to the contrarie, the Hebrewes instructed by the prophets from the father to the sonne: they teaching the law of God in seuen Colledges, which then were in mount Syon, neuer yet suffered men to enter into disputation thereof, as we read in Optatus Mileuit---nus. For why, disputation was[*](* Lib. 3.) inuented▪ but for things probable and doubtfull; and not for things religious and necessarie, and such as every man is bound to beleeue: which by disputation are alwaies made doubtfull. Wherefore seeing that disputations of religion bring not only the doubt and ouerthrow of religions, but euen the ruine and destruction of Commonweales [*](Disputations of religion dangerous.) also; it behooueth them to be by most strait lawes forbidden: which after long civill war was by the estates and princes of the Germane empire prouided for, and a decree made, that the princes should with mutuall consent defend both the Romane and Saxon religion: whereunto that was also ioyned, That no man should upon paine of death dispute of the religions. Which seuere punishments, after that the Germane magistrates had inflicted upon diuers, all Germany was afterwards at good quiet & rest: no man daring more to dispute of matters of religion. Moreouer, seeing that not onely all wise law-giuers and Philosophers, but euen the very Atheists themselves also (as namely [*](Lib. 6. De militari ac domestica Romanorum disiplina. ) Polybius himselfe an Atheist) are of accord, That there is nothing which doth more uphold and maintaine the estates and Commonweals than religion: and that it is the principall foundation of the power and strength of monarchies and Seignories: as also for the execution of justice, for the obedience of the subiects, the reuerence of the[*](The power of religion.) magistrats, for the feare of doing euill, and for the mutuall loue and amitie of every one towards other, it is by most strait and seuere lawes to be prouided; that so sacred a thing as is religion be not by childish and sophisticall disputations, (and especially by such as are publickely had) made contemptible, or by probable arguments made doubtful, and so at length quite taken out of the minds, both of the hearers & of the disputors together. Neither are they to be heard which thinke themselves to be able with more subtill reasons to persuade all things: for that as Papinian most wisely said, Summa ratio est quae pro religione facit, It is of all the greatest reason, which tendeth to the maintainance of Religion.

I will not here in so great varietie of people so much differing among themselves in[*](Religion not to be enforced.) religion, take upon me to determine which of them is the best (howbeit that there can be but one such, one truth, and one diuine law, by the mouth of God published) but if[*](How a prince wel assured of the truth of his religion is to draw his subiects therunto, being therfoe divided into sects and factions) the prince well assured of the truth of his religion, would draw his subiects thereunto, divided into sects and factions, hee must not therein (in mine opinion) vse force: (For that the minds of men the more they are forced, the more froward and stubborne they are; and the greater punishment that shall be inflicted uppon them, the lesse good is to be done; the nature of man being commonly such as may of it selfe bee led to like of anything, but neuer enforced so to doe) but rather it he houeth the prince so persuaded of the truth of his religion, without fainting or dissembling to professe and follow the same, still deuoutly seruing the almightie God: by which meanes he shall both turne the will and minds of his subiects unto the admiration and imitation of himselfe, and at length also plucke up euen the verie rootes of all sects and opinions: In which doing he shall not onely auoid commotions, troubles, and civill warres, but lead also his straying subiects unto the port of health. Whereof as there are many examples, so is there none more fit for this our purpose, than that of Theodosius the elder, who at the beginning of his raigne found all the prouinces of the empire full of Arrians, whose strength and power was so growne and encreased under three or foure Arrian emperous their favourors, as that their doctrine was not onely by eight councels confirmed, which were at diuers times assembled at Tyre, at Sardis, at Sirme, at Milan, Seleucia, Nice, Tarsis, and especially at Ariminum (where six hundred bishops were of their opinion: and but three of name which held the contrarie) but that they also punished other their aduersaries of opinion contrarie unto themselves, with confiscations, proscriptions, and other most grieuous punishments. Yet would not this good emperour now come unto the empire, either force or punish the Arrians, although that hee deadly hated them, but graunted unto them both the Arrians (I say) and the Catholikes, their churches, and suffered them in euerie towne to have two bishops, of either religion one: and albeit that hee at the importunat suit and instance of the Catholike bishops, commaunded certaine edicts to bee published against the Arrians, yet was hee well contented to have the same holden in suspence, and not put into execution; as his letters unto Ambrose in these words declare, Trade Arrianis Basilicam, mei namque sunt omnia iuris, Giue (saith hee) unto the Arrians a church: for that all are in my power. Which thing Rotaris also king of the Lombards by his law permitted. And yet neuerthelesse this emperor liuing according to his religion, and instructing his children & kinsmen in the same, wonderfully diminished the Arian sect in Europe: howbeit that they have euer since continued, and so yet do, both in Asia and Affrike, under the law of Mahomet, grounded upon the same foundation. The great emperour of the Turkes doth with as great deuotion as any prince in the world honour and obserue the religion by him receiued from his auncestours, and yet detesteth hee not the straunge religions of others; but to the contrarie permitteth every man to live according to his conscience: yea and that more is, neere unto his pallace at Pera, suffereth foure diuers religions, viz. That of the Iewes, that of the Christians, that of the Grecians, and that of the Mahometanes: and besides that, sendeth almes unto the Calogers or religious Monkes, dwelling uppon the mountaine Athos (being Christians) to pray for him: as did Augustus to the Iews, to whom he ordinarily

sent his almes and perpetuall sacrifices to Hierusalem, which hee commaunded to bee there dayly made for the health of himselfe, and of the Commonweale. For why the people of auntient time were persuaded, as were the Turks, All sorts of religions which proceed from a pure mind, to be acceptable unto the gods. And albeit that the Romans easily admitted not straunge religions into their Commonwealeas (as in the warres against them of Veios the Aediles had in charge, Ne qui nisi Romani dij, neu quo alio more quam patrio Colerentur, That no gods should be worshipped but the Roman gods, neither after any other manner than after the manner of the countrey) yet for all that did they easily suffer every man priuatly within the citie to vse his owne manner and fashion, and his owne religion: yea the Romans themselves receiued into the citie the sacrifices of Isis and of Esculapius, and suffered the Pantheon to be dedicated to all the gods. Only the Iewes of all people detested straunge ceremonies: whereby they prouoked the hatred of all people against them. For at such time as Antiochus the Noble besieged Hierusalem, the Iewes tooke truce with him for eight dayes, wherein they might keepe holy the Feast of their deliverance out of Aegypt, dedicated unto the honour of the immortall God: Whereunto Antiochus (as Plutarch writeth) willingly condescended; and yet not so contented, with great reioicing brought also bulles and rammes for the furnishing of the sacrifice euen unto the gates of the citie. Howbeit that afterwards the time of the truce expired, he tooke the citie and sacked it. But as he was about therein to have sacrificed after the manner of the Greekes, the Priests & Leuites cursing and banning, forsooke the Temple. For which cause Antiochus enforced them, as contemners of the gods, to receiue the Greeke ceremonies and sacrifices, yea and caused hogges also to be killed in the temple, and the Iewes to bee enforced to eat of them, tormenting such as refused so to do with all kind of torments and tortures, which in that citie wrought the change both of the religion and state. But Ptolomeus Lagus (as Agatharchides writeth) and after him Pompeius, after long siege hauing taken Hierusalem (the same day that the Iewes had before taken truce with Antiochus) yet both of them kept their hands from sacrilege: which Crassus did not, neither Flaccus: whome yet Cicero denieth to have taken any gold belonging unto the temple; in which oration, as serued for his purpose, hee said, The gods of the Iewes to have delivered their seruants from the bondage of the Romans. So that the Iewes detesting the gods of other nations, caused all other people and nations most grieuously to hate and contemne them: For at such time as Quadratus being President of Iudea, a common souldiour had in contempt showed his tayle unto the Iewes, as they were sacrifising in the temple, such an upro---e and tumult ensued thereof, as that twentie thousand of the Iewes were there slaine. At which time the Iewes by a decree of the Senat, were driuen also out of Rome: where Tiberius caused such as would not remoue thence, either to chaunge their religion, or to become slaues; but this was done in Rome onely. For the same Tiberius forbad Pilat, who had determined to have placed certain shields and escutchions in the temple of the Iewes, to place the same, or to alter any thing of their religion. But Alexander Seuerus the emperor in his priuat sacrifices worshipped Abraham, Orpheus, Hercules, and Christ. But when the Christians as well as the Iewes, had begun to detest those thirtie thousand gods which Pindarus now in his time worshipped, and so began to breed a contempt of the gods in the minds of men, the princes and magistrats began likewise with most grieuous punishments to persecute them, except they would forsweare Christ and the Christian religion, the Iewes (bearing themselves upon the antiquitie of their religion) being become their accusers and enformers against them, least they should seeme partakers of the same impietie with them. And thus as the multitude of religion and sects was innumerable, some detesting the rites and ceremonies of others: so thereof proceeded also the diuers and manifold chaunges of Commonweales. And albeit that tyrants had before exercised incredible cruelties upon their subiects, yet neuer thought they it lawfull for them to rule ouer mens minds before the time of this Antiochus, whome wee but euen now spoke of. Which was the cause that Theodoricus king of the Gothes (though favouring the Arrians) would not yet enforce the conscience of his subiects, nor have them tormented for their religion; least under the pretence of impietie hee should have seemed to have taken the spoyle of their goods, or bind their minds, which could by no threats or commaunds be constrained or bound. For so he wri---ing unto the Senat[*](No man to b compelled against his will to beleeue.) at Rome, vseth these words, Religionem imperare non possumus, quia nemo cogitur vt credat inuitus, Religion (saith he) we cannot commaund, for that no man is compelled against his will to beleeue: as we read in Cassiodore: Which reason of all others seemeth unto me most effectuall, for the taking away of such punishments, as are under the colour of religion to be inflicted upon the subiects. Wicked and straunge rites & ceremonies, and such other as the greater part of the subiects of greatest power detest, I thinke it good and profitable to have them kept out of the Commonweale. For the preseruation of the subiects loue amongst themselves, which is especially nouished & maintained by their consent and agreement in matters of religion: yet if the same religion be liked of by the opinion of neighbour nations, and of many of the subiects, then ought it not onely with punishments not to be restrained, but also so much as may be prouided, that if it may not without sedition bee publikely profes---ed, yet that no man be forbidden the priuat exercise of such his religion. For otherwise it shall come[*](To forbid men the priuat exercise of their religion, is to make them oftentime to become Atheists.) to passe, that they which are destitute of the exercise of their religion, and withall distasted of the religion of the others, shall become altogether Atheists (as wee daily see) and so after that they have once lost the feare of God, tread also under foot both the lawes and magistrats, and so inure themselves to all kinds of impieties and villanies, such as is impossible by mans lawes to be redressed. Howbeit what lettteth vs to follow the councell of the most holy prophets, of whom [*](Baruc.) the one persuaded his countrimen l---d away into captiuitie into Chaldea, That at such time as they should bee enforced to fall downe before the idols, yet that they should with a pure mind alwayes worship the euer liuing God: & the [*](.) other admitted the request or excuse of Naaman the king of Syria his seruant, but newly instructed in the true religion and seruice of God, if he were present with the king his maister sacrificing unto a straunge god, so that hee kept his mind pure and cleane from idolatrie. For they are much deceiued, which think Commonweales to be better kept in order by mens commands and lawes, than by the feare of God his iudgements. For as the greatest tyranny is nothing so miserable as an[*](Atheisme worse than the greatest Superstition.) Anatchie, when as there is neither prince nor magistrat, none that obeieth, neither yet any that commaundeth, but that all men live as they list at libertie in all loosenesse of life, without feare of punishment. So the greatest superstition that is, is not by much any thing so detestable as Atheisme. And truely they (in mine opinion) offend much, which thinke that the same punishment is to bee appointed for them that make many gods, and them that would have none at all: or that the infinitie of gods admitted, the almightie and euerliuing God is thereby taken away. For that superstition how great soeuer it be, doth yet hold men in feare and awe, both of the laws and of the magistrats, as also in mutuall duties and offices one of them towards another: whereas meere Atheisme doth vtterly root out of mens minds all the feare of doing euill. Wherfore two inconueniences propounded▪ Superstition (I say) and Atheisme, we must still decline the greater: yet when we may not publikely vse the true religion, which still consisteth in the worshipping of one almightie and euerlasting God: least by contemning of the religion which is publikely receiued, we should seeme to allure or stirre the subiects unto impietie or sedition, it is better to come unto the publike seruice, so that the mind still rest in the honour and reuerence of one almightie and euer liuing God.

But now, whereas some men maruell how it came to passe, that in the time of Theodosius, [*](Why many sects better agree in a Commonweale than two onely.) considering the diuersitie of sects and of religions that then were, they could so stand without civill warres, being then at the least an hundred diuers sorts of them according to the account of Tertullian and Epiphanius: whereof the cause was, the multitude and varietie of such different opinions, which so still held one of them in counterpoise with another. Now in matters of sedition and tumult, nothing is more dangerous, than to have the subiects divided into two opinions or factions onely, whether it be before matters of estate, or of religion, or for the lawes and customes, or other matters whatsoeuer that the subiects are so divided. For that but one thing can by nature be contrary unto another thing: and moe things than one to be contrarie unto one, is a thing not to be imagined. So that where there be moe than two sects or sorts, there must needs be some in the meane betwixt the two contrarie extreames, which may set them agreed, which otherwise of themselves would neuer fall to agreement. And therfore Solon by law prouided, That in civill seditions and troubles, every man should of[*](Whether Solons law for part-taking▪ as that every man should be of necessitie bound to take either the one o the other part in time of sedition, be good and profitable unto Commonweals or not) necessitie take either the one or other part, and that it should not bee lawfull for any man to stand as neu---er: which unto many seemed a thing vnreasonable, considering that the greatest prayse and commendation of a good subiect is; to bee a quiet civill man, desirous and doing the best that he can to live in peace. Besides that, by this means the conscience of an honest man is forced, to take either the one or other part, when as haply he thinketh both naught, and that they are both in the wrong. And that more is, it may so happen, that if in such seditions he will follow that part which hee iudgeth the better, he must beare armes euen against his father, against his brethren, and friends, which are in armes in the other side: which were the way so to compell men to commit vnnaturall murders, and to kil euen them whom we ought to defend, & to depriue them of life, by whom we our selues live. In briefe the law of God forbiddeth him that knoweth the truth, to follow the common opinion of them which are out of the way: whereunto Solons law seemeth to repugne, in forcing a man to take either the one part or the other, although that they be both naught. Howbeit that a man might say unto the contrarie, this Solons law to be most profitable and necessarie also unto Popular and Aristocratike estates, wherein is no soueraigne, which standing as neu---er, may determine and decide the differences of them which shall so bee at discord and variance. For men well know, that the most craftie men in time of civill warres, withdraw themselves so much as possibly they can out of the preasse, if they be not well assured of the victorie of the part that they themselves take (if it bee not so, that they see the daunger such, as that the publike fire is like to take hold and burne euen their own priuat houses) yea oftentimes the more subtill and deceitfull sort set the rest at dissention and debate, that so they may themselves the better fish in troubled water, and make a bridge for themselves to passe ouer, to ceize upon other mens goods and honors: imitating therin the priests of Mars, whome the auntients called ---, or Fire-bearers, who hauing orderly performed their solemne execrations, cast fire brands betwixt both armies standing readie ranged, and so stirred them up to battell: but yet retired themselves in safetie out of the medley and daunger. Now if the law of Solon might take place, these fire makers durst not sow debate and discord among the citisens, seeing that they must themselves then run into the same danger with others. And as for other honest men which loue peace, and like neither of the one nor other faction, if they must needs be constrained to take a part, they will then enforce themselves by all means to preuent

seditions, and in what they may to withstand them: or if they cannot be foreseene, yet to do what they may to appease them. For why, the great vertue and authoritie of good subiects is of great force to keepe the rash and mad vulgar people in some order: and to persuade them being disquieted againe unto reason, who would euer be at ods and variance, if they were not by the good councell of the wiser sort better persuaded. By which reasons Solons law seemeth to be unto cities and Commonweales profitable. Besides that, if in the leagues and societies of princes among themselves, it be good and profitable for them all, some one of them to be of greater power than the rest, or at leastwise to ioyne himselfe with them that bee of greatest power: how much more true and profitable is it in civill warres still to take the one or the other part: where hee which standeth as neuter, as he is of no man protected, so lieth he open to the common [*](The daungerous estate of them that stand as neuters in time of sedition.) spoyle of all men. For so Theramenes, who all the time of the Peloponesian war, and the troubles of the Athenians, had kept himselfe quiet, and stood still looking on, but as an idle beholder, without taking part either with the one or with the other, was himselfe at the last forsaken of all, and so left unto the mercie of the tyrants, who made him a miserable spectacle unto all men, and in the end most cruelly put him to death. Hee therefore which will stand as neuter, whether it be in civill warre, or in warres amongst straungers, ought at the least to doe his endeuour to set the rest agreed: or if hee shall see the quarrels, warres, and ruines of others, to tend to the profit of the better sort, or the assurance of his estate, his wealth or person (as it sometimes happeneth that tyrants and wicked subiects or citisens agree not but for to ---uinat the good) yet ought he which so standeth as neuter, to show himselfe in appearance desirous and forward to set them agreed: which many men have done euen then when they most nourished and maintained such quarrels in the most secret manner they could: A thing which God (as Salomon [*](Prouerb. 4.) saith) abhorreth: if it be not in case (as I have said) that the concord and agreement of the euill, tend to the ineuitable ruine and decay of the good. For as for one good vertue, there are many vices one of them quite contrarie vnto another; and that for one good man, there be ten which are nothing worth: so God hath also appointed, That the euill and wicked men should euen one of them by another be brought to ruine and destruction: I will revenge me (saith God, speaking by the mouth of the prophet Ieremie) of mine enemies, by mine enemies. I have said, that good princes and good subiects ought to dissemble the good and pleasure they take in the discord and contention of other the wicked princes or citisens; for that there is nothing which grieueth a man more, than to see others in all securitie, to take pleasure and reioyce in his ruine and decay.

Thus have we seene certaine meanes for the appeasing of tumults and seditions[*](The vse of belles, why in many countries forbidden.) amongst many. For which there might yet some more particulars bee also rehearsed; as to take away the vse of belles from rebellious or seditious citisens: so as wee read to have bene done in the rebellions at Montpelier, and at Bourdeaux, which were yet afterward unto them againe not without a great fine restored: howbeit that the greater part of the inhabitants of Bourdeaux most instantly requested, That they might not be so restored, hauing felt the commoditie that came thereby. But whether well or euill, I leaue it to the resolution of every man of sound iudgement. The great emperour of the Turkes, with the other princes of the East, have taken strait order, That this inuention of belles, first deuised in Italie, should not into any of their dominions or territories be receiued: whereby they have well auoided one of the greatest occasions of civill tumults and broyles. The noyse and backward ringing of the belles (as when houses be on fire) being not onely proper unto straunge accidents, and to put the mutinous people into armes, but also to trouble euen the quiet spirits of peaceable men,

and to thrust fooles headlong into fury: as did he, who the more to sturre up the people rung the Tocsaine, together with the great bell at Bourdeaux, and was therefore himselfe hanged in the belrope, as he had well deserued.

Another and the most vsuall way to preuent sedition, is to take away the subiects[*](The best and surest way to preuent sedition.) armes: howbeit that the princes of Italy, & of the East cannot endure that they should at all have armes; as doe the people of the North and of the West: no more then they did in auncient time in Greece and in Asia. For so Aristotle speaking of the Barbarians, accounteth it for a strange thing, that a man should in a quiet and peaceable citie[*](The common wearing of weapons in a peaceable Commonweale, the occasion of many euils.) weare a sword or a dagger in time of peace: which by our lawes, as also by the manners and customes of the Germaines and Englishmen is not onely lawfull; but by the lawes and decrees of the Swissers euen necessarily commaunded: the cause of an infinit number of murders, hee which weareth a sword, a dagger, or a pistoll, being more fierce and insolent to offer unto others iniury, as also to commit murder if any iniurie be offered him: whereas if he were disarmed, he should doe neither the one nor the other; neither should yet incurre the infamy and disgrace which followeth them, who when they are wronged, dare not to draw their weapons. The Turkes herein go yet farther, not onely in punishing with all seuerity the seditious and --- people, but also by forbidding them to beare armes, yea euen in time of warre, except it bee when they are to giue battell: wheras otherwise if the enemie be not nie, they lay their armes up in their tents, or in their carriages: and yet they are accounted the best soldiours of the world: which if they doe in the field, and in time of warre, what is it to be thought them to doe in their townes, and in time of peace?

Amongst many the lawdable manners and customes of the policy of Paris, there is one a very good one, and well put in execution, which is, That no car-man or porter shall weare sword, dagger, knife, or any other offensiue weapon, and that for the murders by them committed in their ordina---ie quarrels which they still had one of them against another▪ which if it might take place upon all persons: also a thousand murders and stabbings are committed, which should neuer have happened, neither the seditions and broyles raysed, which have upon this occasion bene in many places kindled. For it is not the part of a wise polititian, neither of a good gouernour, to expect vntill the murder be committed, or that the sedition be raysed, before he forbid the bearing of armes, but as a good phisition preuenteth diseases: and if chaunce be that the partie be sodainly attainted with any violent griefe, he first asswageth the present paine, and that done applyeth convenient remedies unto the causes of the disease: euen so the wise prince ought (so much as in him lyeth) to preuent sedition, as also when they are happened to appease them at what charge soeuer: and then afterward to looke into the cause of the diseases farthest off from the effects, and so thereunto to apply remedies convenient.

Now we have before spoken of the causes which worke the chaunge of estates and[*](Impunitie of offendors to draw after it ruine of estates.) commonweales, of which selfe same causes proceed also seditions and civill warres, as of the denyall of iustice, of the oppression of the common people, of the inequall distribution of punishments, and of rewards; of the excessiue riches of some few in number, and extreame pouertie of the greater sort; of the too great idlenesse of the subiects, or of the impunitie of offendors: and it may be that this last point is therein of greatest consequence or importance, and yet the least of all regarded. Which as I have before touched, so must I also oftentimes repeat the same, for that the princes and magistrats which desire to be accounted mercifull, do oftentimes turne upon their owne heads the same punishment that the offendors deserued. And that is it for which the wise Hebrew hath so oftentimes aduised vs, Not to become suretie for another man: not for that he

forbiddeth a charitable dealing one of vs towards another (as many have thought) but rather to giue all men to vnderstand, That they which become sureties for wicked men, and so find meanes to deliver them from deserued punishment, shall beare the pain of the offendors guilt therefore. As was said to king Achab, who had saued the life of Benadab the king of Syria, whom hee should have put to death, God caused it to bee told unto him by his prophet, That he was become suretie for another man, and that it should surely cost him his life therefore. Which being but spoken in particular unto this one king, extendeth yet in general unto all princes and Commonweals, who have no more certaine cause of their ruine and decay, than the want of the due execution of iustice. To punish the rebellious, is also one of the meanes to preuent and meet with rebellions yet to come, which how it is to be done we have before said, when as wee reasoned of punishments to be upon corporations and colledges inflicted; which is to take place when some one corporation, or the least part of the subiects have erred or offended; but not if all the people in generall, or the greatest part of them be in fault: For albeit that the physitian or surgeon sometimes for the preseruation of the whole bodie, cuts off a mans leg or arme, yet must he not therfore cut off the head, or any other of the principall members, if they shall chance to be infected: but therin follow the wise councell of the great Physitian Hippocratts, who unto desperat diseases forbiddeth vs to apply any remedy at all. But beside the causes of seditions & rebellions, which wee haue[*](The immoderat libertie of speech giuen unto Orators a great cause of seditions and rebellions.) before spoke of, there is yet another, which dependeth of the immoderat libertie of speech giuen to orators, who direct & guide the peoples hearts & minds according to their owne pleasure. For there is nothing that hath more force over the minds of men, than hath eloquence: So that our ancestors have not without cause pu---traied Hercules Celtique not as a yong & strong man with a great club in his hand, but as a reuerend bauld old man, drawing after him a great number of people enchained, & hanging by the eares with chaines, which all issued out of his mouth; to shew, that the armies and power of kings and monarchs are not so strong as the vehemencie and force of an eloquent man, who encourageth & enflameth the most cowardly & faint hearted to vanquish euen the most valiant, who striketh armes out of the hands of the most couragious, who turneth rage into mildnesse, & barbarisme into ciuility, who changeth whole Commonweals, and sporteth with the people at his pleasure. Which I say not for the prayse of eloquence, but to shew the force & power therof, which is oftner emploied to[*](The force and power of eloquence.) euill, than to good. For seeing that this is nothing els but a disguising of the truth, and an art to make that seeme good, which is indeed naught, & that right which is wrong, and to make a great matter of nothing, as of an Emot an Elephant (that is to say, an art to lie cunnungly) wee need not doubt, but that for one which vseth this art well, fiftie vse the same euill, & that amongst 50 Orators it is hard to find an honest man. For that to seeke after the plaine & bare truth, were a thing altogether contrarie unto their profession, seeing that the best rule that Cicero giueth under the person of Marcus Antonius the Orator, is to say nothing against himself: or rather as Aristotle saith, So well to disguise matters, as that the deceit thereof cannot not be discouered: or to speake more plainly, to cover all things with lies and dissimulation. So that if we will but wel looke into al them which had the name to have beene the most noble and famous Orators, we shall find them to haue beene still the stirrers up of the people to sedition, to have oftentimes changed the laws, the customs, the religions, and Commonweals, yea & some others of them to have vtterly ruinated the same; in which doing they have also almost all of them ended their dayes by violent death. Which it is not needfull here to proue by the Orators of Athens, or of Rome, but euen by those of our age, who have so well besturred themselves, as that under the colour of religion they have troubled all the empires both of Affrike & of the West: yea and many of them so wrested the scepters euen out of the kings hands. As it happened unto the king of Marocco, descended (as is supposed) from the house of Ioseph, from whom a preacher under the vaile of religion tooke both the crowne and scepter: & albeit that he was commonly called the Asse Knight, yet preached he so well, as that he assembled an armie of sixscore thousand men to take his part. In like sort he which was first called the Sophi, inuaded the kingdome of Persia, and in short time draue out the children of Vsun Cassan the lawfull king, under the same coulour of religion. As also not long agoe Iohn of Leiden (who of a botcher became a preacher) ceised upon Munster the Metropoliticall citie of Westphalia, and there taking upon him the state of a king, was hardly after three yeares siege by the imperiall armie thence remoued. And by the selfe same meanes Hierome Sauanarola a preacher, incited by Anthonie Soderin, uppon the contention which happened among the inhabitants at Florence, about the estate, so much preuailed with his persuasions unto the people, as that hee translated the soueraigntie from the nobilitie unto the people, and chaunged the Aristocratie into a Democratie or Popular estate. No otherwise than had before Ephialtes, by the setting on of Pericles by his seditious orations, drawne unto the people the soueraigntie of that state, taken from the Senat of the Areopagi; and so made the Athenian estate of all others the most Popular. And to be briefe, we have seene all Germany in armes, and an hundred thousand men slaine in lesse than in a yeare space, after that the mutinous preachers had stirred up the people against the nobilitie. How often hath the speeches of preachers bene heard, tending by all meanes to have incited the princes and people to kill, massacre, & burne their subiects: as did in auntient time Nestorius, preaching before the emperor at Constantinople in this sort, Giue me emperour, the earth void of heretikes, and I will giue thee heauen: destroy with me the heretikes, and I with thee wil ruinat the power of the Persians: for which he was called the Fire maker: For had the emperour giuen credence unto him, he had so put to death the greatest part, and almost all his subiects, and Nestorius himselfe first of all. Wherefore a knife is not more daungerous in the hand of a[*](Eloquence in an euill man as dangerous, as a sword in a mad mans hand.) mad man, than eloquence in the mouth of a mutinous Orator. And yet neuerthelesse it is a meane for them which will well vse it, to reduce the people from barbarisme to humanitie, to reforme disordered maners, to correct the lawes, to chastice tyrants, to cast out vices, to maintaine vertue. And as men charme the Aspis, Vipers, and Serpents, by certaine words; euen so the Orators (as Plato saith) by the sweetnesse of their eloquent persuations, charme euen the most sauage and cruell people. Neither is there any other[*](A wise, vertuous, and eloquent preacher, of all others the fittest man to appease rebellions, and to keepe the people in obedience to their prince.) greater or better means for the appeasing of seditions & tumults, and to keepe the subiects in the obedience of their princes, than to have a wise and vertuous preacher, by whom they may bend and bow the hearts of the most stubborne rebels, especially in a Popular estate, wherein the ignorant people beareth the sway, and cannot possibly bee kept in order but by the eloquent Orators: which for this cause have alwayes holden the chiefe degree of honour & power in such Popular estates, causing the honourable charges & commissions, gifts and rewards, to be still giuen to whom they saw good: so that in briefe both peace & war, arms and laws, wholy depended on the pleasure of the Orators. And so to the contrarie, there is nothing more to be dreaded in a tyrant, than the Orator which hath the bent of the peoples bow, and is in credit & estimation with them, especially if he hate the tyrant, or his Tyrannicall government. But forasmuch as the rules by vs alreadie set downe, ought to bee applied unto the nature of Commonweals, and that the Commonweals, laws & customs, are likewise to bee fitted unto the nature & disposition of every nation. Let vs now also speake of the nature of al people, as of a thing most necessary for the good government of Estates and Commonweales.