The six books of a common-weale

ALl Commonweales take their beginning either from a Familie,[*](The beginning of Commonweals.) by little and little encreasing; or els arise at once, as when a multitude of people as a Colony drawne out of another Citie or Commonweale, doe as a young swarme of bees fly abroad unto another place: or as a slip or science pluckt off from a tree, and planted in a straunge soyle, which taking root, bringeth forth much more plentifull and pleasant fruit, than doe those trees which grow up of small kernels, or of their owne accord, Yet both the one and the other of these Commonweales, are established either by the strength of some stronger than themselves, or by the power of some others, who voluntarily had subiected themselves together with their libertie, unto the power and pleasure of others, to be by them disposed of, as by a soueraigne power without any law at all, or else upon certaine laws and conditions betwixt them agreed upon. So the Commonweale hauing taken beginning if it be well rooted and grounded, first assureth it selfe against al externall force, and then against the inward diseases of it self, and so by little & little gathering strength, groweth up vntill it be come to the full perfection of it selfe: which wee may call the Flourishing estate thereof; which cannot be of any long continuance, by reason of the[*](The florishing estate of commonweales endure not long.) chaunges of worldly things, which are so mutable and vncertaine, as that the greatest Commonweales oftentimes fall euen all at once with the weight of themselves, some others by civill warres, some by popular diseases, but most by the enemies violence, being as then ruinated, when as they thought themselves most assured: other some by the wrath of God, being upon the sudden, and in a moment ouerthrowne: some few by age growing old, and by their inward sicknesse taking end. But yet no Commonweales, finding or feeling greater chaunges or falles than the fairest of them: which for all that, are not in that to be blamed, especially if the change or alteration come by any externall force, as most commonly it chaunceth, the fairest things being still the most enuied at. And as Demetrius (he which was called the Besieger) deemed no man more happy, than him who had longest quietly lived in the greatest aboundance of al things,

neuer hauing tasted of aduersitie, as a man by fortune deemed most abiect and vnworthie, with whom shee should contend or striue: so we see some Commonweales so shamefully buried in pleasures and idlenes, or else so to be corrupted, as that they might well moue any man rather to pitie then to enuie at their state. Wherefore the risings and ruines of the Commonweales are well of vs to be considered, and what the causes be of every such their conuersion and change before that we giue iudgement of them, or propound them as examples to be imitated and followed. Now I call that a Conuersion[*](What the conuersion and change of a Commonweale is.) of a Commonweale, when as the state thereof is altogether chaunged: as when a Popular estate is changed into a Monarchie; or an Aristocratie into a Democratie; or contrarywise: For as for the change of customes, lawes, religion, or place, it is but a certaine kind of alteration, the state and soueraigntie continuing still: which may also to the contrarie it selfe be changed, without any change of religion, or lawes, or any other things else, besides them which belong unto soueraigntie. As when in our time the Florentine popular estate was changed into a Monarchie. Neither is the age or continuance of a Commonweale to be measured by the long standing of a citie, or of the walles thereof, as Paulus Manutius seemeth to have done: who writeth[*](The age of a Commonweale how it is to be measured.) the Venetian Commonweale that now is, to have stood twelue hundred yeares; which hath yet suffered three changes, as we shall forthwith declare. Sometime it hapneth also no change either of the citie, or of the citisens, of the customes, or religion to be made, or any other force offered, or wrong done to any man; and yet that the state may perish: as when any soueraigne prince willingly subiecteth himselfe, his kingdome, and people unto the power and obeysance of some other Prince, or else by his testament appointeth some popular Commonweale inheritour of his State and kingdome: As is reported of Attalus king of Asia; of Coctius king of Alpes; of Ptolaemee [*](Kings which made the Romans their heires.) king of Cyrenae; of Eumenes king of Pergamus; of Nicomedes king of Bithynia; of Polemon king of Pontus, who left the people of Rome heires of those so many their kingdomes: for then those kingdomes were quite taken away, and those Commonweales brought into the forme of Prouinces, and no change made of their Monarchies into a popular Estate. And so contrariwise, if of one or many cities or prouinces[*](Diuers changes of commonweales.) be made one or manie Monarchies or popular estates divided in soueraigntie, that is not to be accounted any conuersion or change, but euen a verie beginning of diuers new Commonweales: As when the countrie of the Swissers and the Grisons reuolted from the Germaine Empire, they became eighteene Commonweals, every one of them holding their estates (divided from the other) in soueraigntie. Sometime also of two is made one and the same Commonweale: as were the Romans and the Sabines, their two kings and people being in the same power and league ioyned and combyned together, neither of them subiect unto the Lawes or commaund of the other; but with equall power both of them growing together into the same citie. And lest the Sabines so ioyned unto the Romans should have seemed to have accrewed unto another mans kingdome, it pleased them that the names of both the people being taken away or suppressed, they should be called Quirites, which name the Magistrates in their orations unto the people euer after vsed: Albeit that Romulus (who because he would not seeme to endure a fellow in the kingdome with him, had not spared his owne brother) caused Tatius king of the Sabines not long after to bee also slaine: wherefore the Sabines Commonweale so perished not, either accrewed unto the Romaines (as some have beene of opinion) albeit that other people called them neither Sabines, nor Quirites, but Romans: For that that name once giuen unto the Citie and the people, could neuer more be changed; or for that the name of the Romans was more stately; or else for that those two people so grew together within the wals of Rome, yet so as that the one became not subiect unto the other: as it chanceth when the one being vanquished, yeeldeth it selfe unto the other, and so suffereth the lawes of the vanquisher. Which may serue for the disciding of the question of Cune---u the lawier, who doubteth, Whither the subiects of the one Commonweale, if they be ioyned into one and the selfe same bodie with the subiects of another Commonwealth, be thereby the subiects of them with whom they are so ioyned: which thing Bartholus denieth; and for example thereof alleageth Raimond Countie of Toulouse, not erring indeed in his resolution of the question, but in the example by him produced, not hauing good regard unto the treatie made betwixt the Countie and the estates of Languedoc of the one part, and Lewes the ix the French king on the other part, wherin it was comprised, That the only daughter of the countie Raymond should be espoused to Alphonsus countie of Poitiers, the kings brother, with condition, that if they died without heires of their bodies lawfully begotten, the countrey of Languedoc should in full right returne unto the crowne; yet for all that so, as that the customes of the countrey should not be chaunged, neither any taxe▪imposed without the consent of the estates of the countrey▪ which hath alwaies beene obserued, the soueraigntie over the country and the inhabitants of Languedoc remaining unto the kings, as it had before that the countie was therefrom exempted. But most certaine it is, that an estate subiect vnto another, maketh not another Commonweale, but onely a part of the subiects.

But that these things may the better be perceiued, it is to be vnderstood, that al conuersions and chaunges of Commonweales, are either voluntarie or necessarie, or else mingled of both: and as for necessitie, it is also either naturall or violent: For albeit that the birth of things be more faire and pleasing than their death, yet for all that so it is, that the source and course of flowing nature rauishing all things, giueth vs also to vnderstand, that the one cannot be without the other: so that all things which had beginning, although they have stood many hundred yeares, yet must at length in time take end and perish also. But, as we deeme that death more tollerable which by little and little creepeth on through the weakenesse of age, or the course of some long lingering disease, and that almost without any sensible feeling thereof: so also may wee say the chaunge or fall of a Commonweale, which proceeding as it were of age, and after hauing endured a long tract of worlds, to be necessarie, and yet not violent: for that nothing can well be called violent, which is agreeing unto nature: seeing also that the course of euerie things age is certaine, and a certaine ripenesse unto euerie age appointed:[*](The naturall change or fall of a Commonweale.) so that in due time to take end seemeth to bee a thing of euerie thing to bee wished for.

Now Commonweales be also chaunged some times to the better, and sometimes to the worse, whether such chaunge bee naturall or violent: yet the violent change still hauing violent motions, and so quickely done; and the naturall chaunging still be little and little, and so the lesse felt. But of all chaunges of Commonweales, no voluntarie[*](The most pleasing and easie change of a Commonweale.) chaunges is more pleasing or easie than that which is made by the consent and good will of him which hath the soueraigntie, and of his subiects: when as hee which hath the soueraigntie, chooseth rather to yeelde the same unto the nobility, or the people, than to hold it himselfe: as we have heard Sylla, with incredible violence to have taken upon him the Dictatorship, and that not without the most cruell slaughter of the people, and so to have turned the soueraignty of the Commonweale from a popular estate, into a Monarchie; and yet him the same man within foure yeares after, voluntarily and of his owne accord, dispoiling himselfe of the Monarchy, which he had couered under the colour of his Dictatorship, to have againe restored the soueraignty unto

the people, to the great contentment of them all in generall, and the good liking of every one of them in particular. So also the nobilite of the state of Sienna, by their common consent, yeelded the soueraignty of that state unto the people, and abandoned the city themselves, which Pandulphus the tyrant, violently afterwards inuaded. And as in mens bodies diuers changes happen from the qualities of the elements, the disposition of the body or the minde, the temperature of the humours, as also from the manner of the education thereof, and diuersity of diet: so also the Commonweale may suffer an vniuersall change or ruine, from friends or enemies externall or internall, or from both, whether it be from good to euill, or euill to good, and that oft times contrary to the good liking of the subiects, who must sometimes as children and mad folkes, be cured euen against their wills, as Lycurgus, who changed the lawes and royall state of his country, into a popular government, contrary to the good liking of the subiects, or of the greater part of them; howbeit that in so doing, hee was well beaten of them, and lost one of his eyes (the reward of his vertue) although hee had before renounced the claime and right that he and his successours had unto the kingdome, as princes of the blood, and nearest unto the crowne.

But forasmuch as there are but three sorts of Commonweales, as wee have before [*](Six perfect conuersions or changes of Commonweales.) declared: there are also but six perfect conuersions or chaunges thereof, viz. of a Monarchie into a Popular estate, or of a Popular estate into a Monarchie: and so likewise of a Monarchie into an Aristocratie, and of an Aristocraty into a Monarchie: and of an Aristocratie into a Popular estate, and of a Popular estate into an Aristocratie. So also of euerie estate there be six other imperfect chaunges, or rather alterations; that is to wit, from the Royall estate unto the Lordlike: from the Lordlike estate unto the Tyrannicall: from the Tyrannycall unto the Royall, or from the Royall into the Tyrannicall: from the Tyrannicall into the Lordlike, and from the Lordlike into the[*](Vnperfect changes of Commonweale.) Royall. So might one also say of an Aristocratie, lawfull, lordlike or factious: And of a Popular estate, lawfull, lordlike, and turbulent. I call it an vnperfect chaunge, as the change of a lawfull Aristocratie into a faction; or of a Royall estate into a tyranny: for that therein is nothing but the chaunging of the qualities of good gouernors into euil, the Monarchie yet still remaining in the one, and the Aristocratie in the other. I speake not here of the chaunging of a Monarchie into a Duarchie (or soueraigne government of two) for that we have before declared such a Duarchie to bee comprehended under an Oligarchie (or government of few) otherwise a man might make also a Truarchie of three princes, ruling together in one Commonweale (as it chaunced in the Triumuirat of Marcus Antonius, Augustus, and Lepidus) as also a Tetrarchie (or government of foure) and so other chaunges of Commonweals in number infinit: whereof there is not onely no rule or precept to be giuen, but are also of themselves most absurd: For when wee once passe the soueraigne government of one, wee forthwith enter into the popularitie of moe: which as the lawyers say, is still contained in the number of two.

But besides these conuersions and chaunges of estates, which wee haue alreadie[*](A Commonweale sometime holden in suspence.) spoke of, it happeneth some time that the estate of a Commonweale is holden in suspence and sufferance: as after the death of Romulus, the people of Rome was a yeare without a Monarchie, a Popular estate, or Aristocratie: For the hundred Senatours which commaunded one of them after another, had no soueraigne power, neither commaunded but onely by commission: true it is, that one might say, That the soueraigntie was againe returned vnto the people, and the charge of commaund unto the Senators, vntill that by common consent they had chosen them a king.

And some times againe it chaunceth, that the Royall, Aristocratike, or Popular[*](An Anarchie.)

Commonweale being quite extinguished, there ensueth a meere Anarchie: when as there is neither soueraigntie, nor magistrats, nor commissioners, which have power to commaund; as it chaunced the people of Israel after the death of Iephte, when as their[*](. 27.) estate was brought to a meere Anarchie, and upholden onely by the prouidence and power of God alone, the best and greatest king: for so it is in holy writ reported. So likewise at Syracusa, after the death of Dion, and in Florence after that the nobilitie was thence driuen out by the people: which so continued a certaine time without government, as a ship without a pilot or gouernour. And so after the death of Abusahit king of Fez, that kingdome was in most miserable case eight yeares without a king. As also after diuers murthers of many the Aegyptian Sultans, the Mammalukes made choyce of Campson Gaurus, hauing lived a certaine time in a pure Anarchie. And in like manner the Russians, being wearie and spent with civill warres, for lacke of a soueraigne, of themselves made choice of three of the German princes to rule over them.

Wherefore when an estate is come unto a meere Anarchie, that is to say, when no[*](A meere Anarchie the verie ruine of a Commonweale.) man either commaundeth or obeyeth, it is to bee accounted the verie ruine and destruction, and not the chaunging of a Commonweale: although that the families and colledges therein continue friends together. But if the nobilitie or people have power to create the prince, and he being dead the magistrats shall themselves retaine the soueraigne power and commaund: yet is it not therefore to bee deemed an Anarchyie, for that the soueraigntie is still like againe to fall either unto the nobilitie, or to the people.

The last point is, when as an Estate or Commonweale is together with all the peopled[*](Commonweales sometime together with the people vtterly extinguished.) quite extinguished: as it hapned unto the people and seigneurie of Thebes, which Alexander the Great vtterly rooted out, together with their city, sauing only the house of Pindarus the Poet: upon the entrance whereof was written▪ ---, Burne you not Pindarus his house. So also the Madianites, the Amorites, the Iebusites, and Phaerezites, were by the people of Israel vtterly destroyed: which was not the chaunging of one estate into another, but a meere ruine of the estate with the people together. But yet it may well be, that some one member of a Commonweale, or that some one prouince thereof may be destroyed, or a towne rased, and all the people therein slaine, and yet the Commonweale stand: as it chaunced to the towne of Arzille, in the kingdome of Fez, which the Englishmen rased, and put all the people therein to the sword: and to Sebastia, in the kingdome of Amasia, which Tamarlan the Tattar king used in like sort: and to the towne of Bizance, a member of the Roman empire, which after it had bene three yeares besieged by the emperour Seuerus, was in the end taken, sacked, rased, and all the people slaine, and the scite thereof giuen to the Perinthians, who reedified it, being afterwards called Constantinople, and now corruptly Stamboll, the choyce seat of the Turkish emperours.

But this is in Monarchies speciall and proper, that the Monarches one of them oftentimes[*](A thing unto Monarchies speciall.) by force driuen out by another, do not yet therefore chaunge their estate: as in a few moneths in our remembrance it happened in the kingdome of Telesin, where the king Abuchemo was by the people driuen out of his kingdome, and Abyamein chosen king in his stead: who forthwith after was also cast out by Hariadenus Barbarussa, who long time raigned not there, but that Abuchemo returning with the forces of the emperour Charles the fift chased away Barbarussa, and tooke sharpe revenge upon his dissoiall subiects, making himselfe the emperours tributarie and vassall: but was againe not long after driuen out againe by Barbarussa: the state of a Monarchie yet neuer chaunging, no more than did the Roman empire, for hauing had foure emperours in one yeare; one of them slaine by another: the estate of the Monarchie neuerthelesse still remaining

as the prise and reward of the victor.

Sometime also rule and soueraigntie is euen thrust upon men by force and against their will: as first Claudius, and then Gordianus the elder were euen drawne and enforced to take upon them the Roman empire. And in our remembrance the inhabitants of Tripolis in Barbarie, after they were reuolted from Iachia king of Tunes, chose Mucamen [*](An Heremite against his will chosen and crowned king of Tripolis.) for their king: who being shortly after poysoned, they upon the sudden enforced a religious Hermit to take upon him the crowne and the kingdome; wherein he raigned against his will, vntil that Peter of Nauarre, by force tooke the citie of Tripolis, together with the king, whome he sent prisoner into Sicilie: but was afterwards by the emperour Charles the fift (to his great contentment) sent backe againe to live in his solitarie cell in Affricke. [*](Some commonweales euen in their beginning destroyed.)

But as of men some perish and die in the most flourishing time of their age, some others in their youth, some in their childhood, and some before they could bee well borne; so wee also see some kingdomes and cities to bee cut up and destroyed before they could strengthen themselves with lawes and armes, othersome as abortiues to be dead and extinguished before they were borne: as in our time the kingdome of the Anabaptists at Munster (the metropoliticall citie of Westphalia) was taken away and subuerted before it was well thought to have bene borne. Iohn of Leiden, a Sadler, and their ringleader, who had there by the space of three yeares borne himselfe for a king, and taken upon him the soueraigntie (though still by the imperiall hoast besieged) being at last together with the citie taken and publikely executed.

Now when I speake of the flourishing estate of a Commonweale, my meaning is[*](When the flourishing estate of a commonweale is.) not, that it should be come to the height of most absolute perfection: for that in these transitorie things there is nothing so perfect, and in mans actions lesse than in any thing in the world: but I call that the flourishing estate of a Commonweale, when it hath attained unto the highest degree of the perfection and beautie thereof; or to say better, then when it is least imperfect, and farthest from all kind of vice: which cannot be wel knowne, but after the declination, chaunge, or ruine of euerie Commonweale: As the Romans hauing made proofe of the Royall, Tyrannicall, Aristocratike, and Popular estates and Commonweales, yet neuer flourished more than in the Popular estate: neither did that their Popular estate euer flourish more in armes and lawes, than in the time of Papirius Cursor: Illa aetate, qua nulla virtutum feracior fuit, nemo erat, quo magis innixares Romana, quàm in Papirio Cursore staret, In that time (saith Liuie) than which[*](The florishing estate of the Romaine commonweale to have bene in the time of Papirius Cursor) none was more plentifull of vertues, there was no man on whome the Roman Commonweale resting staied, than upon Papirius Cursor. This was the iudgement of the Romans, of the most flourishing time of their Commonweale▪ for neuer after was the militarie and domesticall discipline, the lawes and ordinances better executed, faith better kept, religion more sincerely embraced, nor vices more seuerely punished▪ So that it ought not to seeme straunge, if there was neuer than then greater store of most valiant and worthy men.

Now if any man shal obiect and say, That the Romans were then but poore, as not yet got out of Italie, neither hauing as yet extended their armes into Grecia, Asia, and Afrike, no not hauing as then so much as subdued Italie, neither that the Capitoll did as then glister with guilded vaults, but was couered with shards: I say againe▪ That ver¦tue[*](The excellencie and perfection of a commonweale how it is to be deemed.) is not to be measured by the foot of wealth and riches; neither the excellencie and perfection of a Commonweale, by the largenesse of the bounds thereof, but by the bounds of vertue it selfe. So that I deeme those their vntrimmed and rough shades and groues, to have had in them more maiestie and honor, than had afterwards their pleasant

greene woods, with the trees most artificially planted in order of the cu---ious Quincunx, and reckon Rome homely and vntrimmed, more stately and replenished with maiestie, than when it was neuer so well deckt, and with precious ointments perfumed. For neuer was the power of the Romans greater than in the time of Traian the emperour, who ioyned unto the Roman empire, not onely Arabia Felix, but many other great prouinces also beyond the riuer Euphrates, and with incredible workmanship[*](The Romain commonweale at the highest in the time of Traian the emperor, and yet not then in the greatest perfection.) hauing built a bridge over the Danubie, (the remainders whereof are yet to bee seene) subdued Decebald, with the kingdom of Dacia, & with the Roman legions danted the most cruell and barbarous nations that then lived; when as the citie of Rome it selfe, being head of the whole empire, did so abound and flow with ambition, couetousnesse, pleasures and delights, as that it seemed to retaine no more but the shadow of the auntient vertue thereof. Neither was the Lacedemonian Commonweale then most flourishing, when as it had by force of armes subdued all Grecia, with some parts of Asia also: for now they contrarie unto the lawes, had giuen way for gold and siluer to enter into the citie, now the discipline of Lycurgus seemed to have beene almost extinct, and so indeed not long after that same Commonweale came headlong tumbling downe. And thus much concerning the differences of the changes of Commonweales, which it is needfull for vs to note, the better to conceiue such conuersions and changes of estates, which none have touched heretofore.

Now as for the causes of the chaunges of Commonweales, although they bee[*](The causes of the changes of commonweales.) right many, and hard to be all reckoned, yet so it is that they may bee brought into some certaine number, which may suffice for▪ our instruction. The most common cause of the chaunge of Commonweales is, that when the posteritie of princes failing, the great men fall out among themselves, and so take up armes for the government of the state: or for the too great pouertie of the greater part of the subiects, and the excessiue riches of some few: or for the vnequall diuision of estates and honours, or for ambition and the great desire some have to commaund, or for the revenge of iniuries, or for the crueltie and oppression of Tyrants, or for the feare that some have to bee punished for their deserts, or for the chaunging of lawes or of religion, or for the desire of some at full to enioy their pleasures, or for the casting out of them which with their excessiue and beastly pleasures pollute and defile the place of maiestie and honour. All which causes wee will particularly entreate of, and as need shall bee, manifest the same with examples.

Wee have now here before declared, That Commonweales had their beginning[*](The first monarchies to have taken their beginnings from opression and tyrannie.) by violent tyrannies: whereof some haue afterwards continued in the state of Lordlike Monarchies, and othersome in Royall Monarchies by right of succession: unto whome diuers chaunges have also happened for the causes by vs before touched. And that it is so, all the Histories, both sacred and prophane agree, That the first soueraigntie and forme of a Commonweale had beginning by the Monarchie of the Assyrians, and that the first prince called Nimroth (which is to say a Bitter Ruler) whome the Histories for the most part call Ninus, by force and tyranny made himselfe a soueraigne prince; and that after him his successours continued that Lordlike Monarchie, taking unto themselves the whole and entire disposition of their subiects and their goods, vntill that Arbaces gouernour of the Medes, draue out Sardanapalus, which was the last king of the Assyrians, and made himselfe king, without any forme of fashion of election at all. The cause why, being for that Sardanapalus drowned in vaine pleasures and delights, was more amongst women than hee was amongst men: a thing which men of courage and valour take most impatiently, to see

themselves subiect to such an one, as hath nothing of a man more than the figure onely. We see also, that the princes of the Medes descended from Artabazus, the kings of Persia, of Aegypt, of the Hebrews, the Macedonians, the Corinthians, the Sicionians, the Athenians, the Celtes, and Lacedemonians, are all come by right of succession unto their kingdomes and principalities, for most part founded by force and violence; but afterward by iustice and good lawes polished, vntill that their posteritie[*](The beginning of Aristocraties.) failed (which oftentimes drew after it the chaunging of the estate) or that the princes abusing their power, and euill entreating their subiects, were themselves driuen out or slaine: and the subiects fearing againe to fall into a Tyrannicall government, if they should giue the soueraigntie to one alone, or not willing to endure the commaund of one of their owne companions, founded amongst them the Aristocraticall estates, little regarding the common people: at which time if there were any of the poorer or popular sort, which would also have had part in the seigneurie or government, they sung unto them the fables of the Hares, which would commaund together with the[*](The greatest honors and offices euen in Popular estates still bestowed upon the nobilitie and richer sort of the people.) Lions: Or if it were that the Monarchie chaunged into a Popular estate, yet so it was neuerthelesse, that the nobilitie or richer sort still carried away all the great offices and places of state: as for example, Solon hauing founded the Popular estate in Athens, yet would not that the poore and common sort of the people should have part in the estates. Neither the Romans hauing chased out their kings (albeit that they had established a Popular estate) yet so it was, that the honorable offices and preferments were still reserued unto the nobilitie onely. Wee also read, that the first tyrants beeing driuen out, the men at armes and gentlemen were indeed alwaies chosen unto the honourable places of estate, and the vulgar people still excluded: vntill that Aristides and Pericles in Athens, and Canuleius and the other Tribunes in Rome, first opened the gate of honourable offices and preferments unto all the people in generall. But afterwards[*](A monarchie of all estates most sure and durable.) when as it was by long experience found out, That Monarchies were more sure, more profitable, and more durable also, than were the Popular estates, or Aristocraties; and amongst the Monarchies, them also which were founded in the succession of the next heires male: these successiue Monarchies were generally receiued almost throughout all the world, and the Popular and Aristocratike estates driuen out. Yea the people sometime fearing the death of their princes, without heires male, persuaded them whilest they yet live, to make choice of their successours: as diuers of the emperours of Rome did, and as they yet at this present time doe in many places of Affrike: or else the right of the election of the prince remaineth in the people, the prince beeing dead without heires: yea and in some places the people hauing power for the election of their prince, albeit that their princes have heires male also: as in the kingdomes of Polonia, Bohemia, Hungarie, Denmarke, Sweden, and Norway, where they have oft times thrust their kings out of their kingdomes▪ for staining the maiestie of their government with tyrannie, licentious liuing, or cowardise. So sometimes also the people hauing had a cruell tyrant, chose for him a iust and courteous prince: or hauing had an idle, an effeminat, or contemplatiue prince, make choyce of some valiant captaine: as did the Romans, who after the death of Numa Pompilius (to rule their religion together with their policie) made choice of Tullus Hostilius, a good captaine. Yea most[*](unto most cruell tirants oftentimes succede most iust and upright princes.) commonly it chaunceth, that unto the greatest and most cruell tyrants succeeded the most iust and upright princes, as men ashamed to follow or imitat the doings of them whose ends they abhorre; or els upon certaine conditions, hauing taken the soueraigntie uppon them, and so hauing their lesson by writing, have also their power therein somewhat diminished. So after the vnfortunat end of Marcus Antonius, a man altogether giuen to riot and voluptuous pleasure, succeeded the great Augustus, a most wise & sober prince. So after the miserable death of Nero a most cruell tyrant, succeeded Galba, an emperor most gratious: So after the strange euent of the most drunken and licencious Vitellus, succeeded Vespatian the most continent: And unto the monster of nature[*](Princes natures much altered by soueraigntie.) Heliogabalus slaine and drawne in the same faction that was Vitellus, succeeded Alexander Seuerus the most vertuous: a thing most strange, considering that he was his cosin germaine, and together with him nourished and brought up: and that the power to commaund in soueraigntie hath this mischiefe in it, that often times it maketh of a good man, an euill; of an humble man a proud; of a mercifull man a tyrant; of a wise man a foole; and of a valiant man a coward. For what could be more notable then the first five yeares of Nero his raigne? what more excellent then his youth? or who for modestie was to be compared in the beginning to Tiberius? who so behaued himselfe (as saith Suetonius) as if he had almost beene a priuat man: and being of one called Lord, commaunded him, that he should no more by way of reproach so call him: and against slaunderous and infamous libels made of him, oft times said no more, but that in a free citie, men ought also to have their tongues free: but speaking unto the Senat: I have had this good fortune (said he) to have you for my gratious Masters, and so long as I live I will acknowledge you for my good Lords: for a good prince (said he) must be the slaue not onely of the Senat, but also of all the citisens in generall, and often times of every one of them in particular. Neither did he any thing in the beginning of his raigne, no not euen in the least things, without the aduise of the Senat; and yet afterwards hauing well tasted of the power of soueraigntie, hee became the most detestable tyrant that euer was for crueltie and voluptuous pleasures. So we read also that Herod the elder raigned six yeares as a good and iust king (as saith Philo) and one and thirtie yeares as a most cruell tyrant, who caused seauentie Senators of the the house of Dauid to be all slaine, which was indeed the whole bodie of the Senate except Semneas, and afterward put to death his wife a most noble gentlewoman, with three of his owne children: and now lying at the point of death, gaue commaundement to kill all the best and chiefe of the Nobilitie of the whole land, to the intent that[*](The fairest beginnings of princes raignes proue not alwaies the best.) great mourning might thereby be after his death. Which examples I have amongst many other marked, whose beginnings were too faire to continue long: the reason whereof may well be, for that he which at the first seemeth to be so notable wise and worthie, must needs dissemble much: wherein Tiberius the emperour is said to have excelled all others. Whereas of them which have so curiously learned the art of false semblant and dissimulation, and have their countenances at commaund, nothing that good is, true, or honest, is to be expected; but all things vaine, salse, and fained, ful of hipocrisie and craft: Whereas he which at the first discouereth his imperfections (albeit that he be not therein wise) yet can he not possibly be a man exceedingly mischieuous or naught: yea of such an one it is to be hoped, that he may at length proue an upright and iust man: such an one as Iohn the French king is reputed to have bene, who was of such a stomacke, as that he could by no meanes endure to looke ar--- ---t uppon him [*](Why there be so fewe vertuous princes?) whome he hated or liked not of: And yet for all that we read not of --- thing by him either dishonourable or wickedly done. Neither ought it unto any man to seeme straunge, if there have bene but few princes for their vertues famous: for if every where there be such a scarcitie of good and valiant men, and that kings are not chosen out of the number of such: and that they to whome their kingdomes come by succession, commonly have their education polluted with so many vices, as that hard it is to say which of them is the greatest: it is almost a myracle if one of them shall bee able to get out of such a gulfe of all maner of vices. Yet if any such there shall be, as shall for his vertues become famous, he as a toarch upon an high place or watch tower, filleth al things with the light and brightnesse of himselfe: neither is onely whilest he yet liveth [*](Euil princes euen for their fathers vertues oftentimes of their subiects beloued.) highly commended: but being dead, leaueth unto his children and posteritie also, the most fragrant and sweet smelles of his vertue and worth, who though they shall right wickedly live, yet are they the rather borne with, for their fathers vertues sake. Cambyses did many most cruell and shamefull things, yet was hee alwaies both loued and honoured of his subiects, and redoubted of his enemies, and all for the great loue they bore unto his father Cyrus, which was so well grauen in the harts of the people (as saith Plutarch) that they loued euen all such as had a great and rising nose, such an one as Cyrus had. And the emperour Commodus, albeit that he were a most cruell tyrant, and had in one day commaunded the great Prouost of Rome to kill all the beholders of the playes in the Theatre (which were not fewer than threescore thousand persons) for that they could not forbeare laughing, to see him in stead of an emperour, so cunningly to play the Fencer, as if he had bene one inded; yet was hee neuerthelesse of the people alwaies beloued, for the loue they bare unto the remembrance of Marcus Aurelius his father.[*](A new prince without great vertues hardly to maintaine his estate.)

Wherefore we see kingdomes which come by succession, seldome times to suffer chaunge or innouation, albeit that a wicked sonne succeed a good father: for that his kingdome is like unto a great tree which hath taken as deepe root as it spreadeth branches: whereas he which commeth but newly unto a kingdome commended nor strengthened with no vertue or power of his auncestours, is indeed like unto an high tree: which for that it is not well rooted, is with the wind and tempest easily ouerthrowne. For which cause a tyrant the sonne of a tyrant, must needs raigne in great daunger, except he be with great wealth and the power of his neighbor princes strengthened, or by long discent of his auncestours have obtained his kingdome. Neither can the verues of a new prince deliver his vngracious sonne from the conspiracies of his subiects: as it happened unto Hierome a tyrant of Sicilie, who succeeded to Hiero his grandfather, a new prince in his kingdome, which he had by no right or claime gained, but was yet for his manifold and great vertues, of a priuat man, thought right worthy of that so great a kingdome, which hee so held almost sixtie yeares, without force or garrison, to the great contentment of all men; beloued not of his owne subiects onely, but of all his neighbour princes also, and especially of the people of Rome, to whome he was most deere: whose nephew, that he might seeme to excell his grandfather in magnificence and state, thought it better for the assurance of his estate, to strengthen himselfe with strong garrisons of men, and so afterwards wholly giuing himselfe over unto riot and excesse, bare himselfe proudly towards all men, and so drew all mens hatred upon him: and as for the counsel, the most assured foundation of his grandfathers kingdome, he altogether set it at naught: & to heape up his mishaps, without any cause why, renounced the amitie and alliance of the Romans. And so hauing lost both all the ornaments of his honour, and the stayes of his assurance, was by the conspiracie of his subiects himselfe with all his friends and kinsfolkes most miserably slaine, and his Monarchie forthwith chaunged into a Popular estate. The like end almost had Dionysius the younger, another king of the same countrey also, and sonne to Dionysius the elder, who by fraud inuaded the estate, which he of long time held with strong garrisons and fortresses, without the stay or alliance of any other forren prince: but he once dead, and this his sonne a man vnskilfull of the government, and altogether giuen to riot, succeeding in his place, and banishing his vncle Dion, and confiscating his goods, he was by the same Dion, returning out of exile againe into his owne countrey, with an armie thrust out of his kingdome, and all the fortresses of his tyrannie ouerthrowne: which Dion not long after being also slaine, the Monarchie was againe chaunged into a

Popular estate. Whereby it is to be vnderstood, new princes without great vertues hardly to maintaine their estate: which although it be a thing right, manifest, yet appeareth it more plainely by the example of Herod the elder, upon whome Caesar for the valour of Antipater his father, by a decree of the Senat bestowed the kingdome of the Iewes: who although he were in great favour with Marcus Antonius, and Octauianus Augustus, yet for the better assurance of his kingdome, built most strong castles, and to gaine the good will of his subiects, bestowed great masses of money for reliefe of the poorer sort, and eased the people of a third part of their woonted tributes: but knowing how little he had for all that gained, he tooke also an oath of alleagiance of his subiects, seeking to gaine them of the better sort with extraordinarie favours and good turnes: and yet for all that he could do, he was so hated of his subiects, that beeing become sickly, the people much reioyced thereat: which he perceiuing, it had almost driuen him into a phrensie. But he being dead, the Iewes sent fiftie ambassadors to Rome, that so eased of that regall government, they might become subiects unto the Romans, and so happily had obtained to haue bene, had not Herod his sonne bene then in great favour with Augustus the emperour, unto whome the elder Herod had before by his[*](That is nine hundred Thousand crownes.) will left fifteene hundred talents of gold. Howbeit yet, that all the successours and posteritie of Herod, which were in number many, in lesse than threescore yeares, all in poore estate perished, as well for that he being but a new man, was not descended of royall race: as for that his prowesse and valour fayled in his successours.

But these conuersions and chaungings of kingdomes and Commonweales chance [*](Couetousnesse, crueltie, and the voluptuous lives of princes, oftentimes the causes of the change or ruine of their estates.) so much the rather, if the tyrant be too great an exactor, too cruell, or too much giuen to his voluptuous and vnlawfull pleasures, or be delighted in all these together: as was Nero, Tiberius, and Caligula: and yet of these, wantonnesse and whoredome hath ruinated moe princes than all the other causes: and so is it also much more daungerous unto a prince for his estate than crueltie: for crueltie keepeth men in feare and awe, & bringeth a terrour upon the subiects; whereas wantonnesse bringeth after it an hate and contempt also of the tyrant; forasmuch as euerie man deemeth the effeminat man to be also faint hearted, and farre vnworthie to commaund a whole people, which hath[*](Voluptuousnesse more daungerous unto a prince than crueltie.) not power over himselfe. So we see that Sardanapalus king of Assyria, Canades king of Persia, Dionysius the younger, and Hierosme, kings of Sicilie, Heliogabalus, Amyntas, Chideric, Periander, Pisistratus, Tarquin, Aristocrates king of the Messenians, Timocrates king of Cyrene, Andronicus emperour of Constantinoble, Rhoderike king of Spaine, Appius Claudius, Galeace Sfortia, Alexander Medices, the Cardinall Petruce Tyrant of Sienne, Lugrac and Megal, kings of Scots, all for wantonnesse to have lost their estates, and most of them slaine upon the fact doing. Neither is it long since Delmendin and Delmedin, two of the greatest cities of Affrike, were by rebellion dismembred from the kingdome of Fez, and brought under the obeysance of the Portugals, for a maiden by force taken from her husband to whome she was betrothed, by the gouernour, who was therefore afterwards slaine: as was also Ahusahid king of Fez himselfe with his six children all massacred by a secretarie of his, for hauing abused his wife. Neither for any other cause did the people of Constantine (a sea towne in Affrike) chose rather to suffer the commaund of Delcaid a Christian renegat, than to obey the king of Tunes his sonne. And why in our time was Muleasses thrust out of his kingdome, and so lost his estate, but for intemperance? and yet neuerthelesse was so drowned in delights, as that returning out of Germanie, without hope that the emperour Charles the fift (in whom his greatest trust was) would afford him any aid, and banished as he was out of his kingdom, yet spent he an hundred crowns upon the dressing of one peacock, as Paulus Iouius reporteth: and to the end he might better conceiue the pleasure of musick, stil couered

his eyes, as hauing learned a double pleasure, not to bee so well perceiued by two sences at once: yet such was the iudgement of God uppon him, as that by the commaundement of his sonnes he had his eyes put out with an hot barre of Iron, by little and little drying up the humors of them, and depriued of his kingdome also.[*](Extreme crueltie oftentimes cause of the change of the princes estate)

But for the crueltie of a prince, the estate easily chaungeth not, if he be not more cruell than the wild beasts themselves, such as were Phaleris, Alexander Phereus, Nero, Vitellius, Dometian, Commodus, Caracalla, Maximinus, Ecelinus of Padua, and Iohn Maria of Millan, who were all slaine, or driuen out of their dominions, and their Tyrannical estates for the most part chaunged into estates Popular. Which befell them not so much for the crueltie by them used against the common sort of people (wherof no reckoning nor account is made in a Tyrannicall estate) as for crueltie committed in the person of the great and best friended, who are alwayes of tyrants to bee feared: unto whome euen contumely and disgrace is oftentimes more grieuous than crueltie it self: wherof we have a domesticall example of that Bodile, who for that he was by the commaundement of Childeric king of Fraunce whipped, slew not onely the king, but the queene also, being then great with child. So was also the emperour Iustinus the third slaine by Atelia generall of his armie, whose sonne he had slaine, and in despight prostituted his wife unto his seruants. And Archetaus king of Macedon, was likewise slaine by him whome he had put into the hands of Euripides the poet, to be whipt: as was his nephew also king of Macedon, slaine by him whome hee had without punishment suffered to be abused against nature by Antipater, and scorned him crauing of him revenge.

The Aristocratike estate also of them of Mitylen, was chaunged into a Popular, for that it chaunced certaine gentlemen as they went along the streets with their bastanadoes, in sport to strike all such of the common people as they met: Whereupon one Megacles tooke occasion to stirre up the comminaltie to fall upon the nobilitie, and so to kill them. And not to seeke for examples farther, Henry, of late king of Sweden (but now a prisoner) was also thrust out of his kingdome, for that he not onely disdainfully reiected the request of a certaine gentleman his subiect, but also with his owne hand most cruelly stabbed him with his dagger: wherwith the nobilitie and people moued, tooke him prisoner, and enforcing him to resigne his kingdome, gaue it to his younger brother, who now raigneth. And almost alwaies the tyrants-quellers haue receiued[*](Rewards still giuen unto the killers of tyrants▪) either the estate or goods of the tyrants by them slaine, or the greatest honours and preferments in the state, as rewards due to their deserts. So both the one and the other Brutus, obtained the greatest estates in Rome; the one of them for hauing driuen out the proud king Tarquin, and the other for hauing slayne Caesar. And Arbaces gouernour of the Medes hauing brought Sardanapalus king of Assyria to such extremitie, as that he was glad to burne himselfe alive together with his concubines and treasures, for reward enioyed his kingdome. So Lewes of Gonzaga hauing slaine Bonacolse, tyrant of Mantua, was by the subiects chosen their prince, his posteritie euer since by the space of about two hundred and fiftie yeares hauing enioyed that estate. And the Venetians hauing slaine the tyrant Eceline, obtained the seigneurie of Padua.

Some others there be, which seeke the tyrants death, and so the chaunge of the[*](Some for desire of revenge▪ and some for the desire of honor and the deliverance of their countrie, to have procured the tyrants deat and so the changing of the estate▪) estate; hauing nothing before their eyes but the desire of revenge, and that without either the feare of God, the regard of their countrey, or loue of their neerest and deerest friends: as he which to be revenged of king Roderike, who had rauished his wife, drew the Mahometan Moores into Spaine, who draue out the king, and there vsing an hundred thousand cruelties, possessed the kingdome of Spayne, which they held by the space of seuen hundred yeares after. And some others there bee also, who neither for

hope of bearing of rule, of preferment; or of wealth: neither for revenge of wrongs, nor for any other priuat iniuries receiued, are yet induced to the killing of a tyrant, without hope to be able by any means to escape therefore a most sharpe and cruell death, respecting onely the deliverance of their countrey, and the honour of the fact: such as were Harmodius; and Aristogiton in Athens, and those which slew Domitian and Caligula the cruell emperours. A thing which most commonly happeneth in the Popular estates, wherein the new tyrants by force or fraud hauing oppressed the libertie of the people, are neuer assured of themselves, or of their estate, without great and strong garrisons about them. So we see Alexander Medices, nephew to pope Clement the seuenth, & sonne in law to the emperour Charles the fift, by whose forces and power hee obtained the soueraigntie of Florence, and draue out them also that were of greatest power and courage in the state, to have compassed himselfe with great and strong garrisons, and alwaies to have gone armed, in such sort as that it seemed almost impossible to find the meanes to come neere him, and yet for all that to have bene slaine by the conspiracie of Laurence Medices, not onely his neere kinsman, but his most familiar and domesticall friend also▪ when as the said Laurence had promised to prostitute unto him his owne sister; that so he might the better deliver the man disarmed (euen as he was kissing and embrasing his sister, who me he thought to haue rauished) to the murtherer to be slaine▪ which was so couertly done, as that the souldiours of his guard, whome he kept for the saftie of his person, making merrie in a dining chamber fast by, perceiued nothing of the murther of their prince. And yet in so doing, the said Laurence neither delivered his countrey from tyrannny (whereinto it by and by after againe fell) neither himselfe from daunger, being at length by a murtherous fellow himselfe also slaine at Venice. And Cosmu--- Medices, who after the death of Alexander, by the helpe of the garrison souldiours, the supportation of his friends, and fauor of the pope, obtained the same government▪ albeit that he was reported to have bene one of the wisest princes of his age, or of long time before him, and a right great justicier, euen by the report of his enemies themselves, and had diuers strong castles euen in the citie it selfe: yet neuerthelesse was he an hundred times in daunger of his person, by the conspiracies of his subiects against him, being not able to endure a maister over them, albeit that hee were both iust and vertuous. And he which now raigneth, not long since missed not much to have bene ---laine by the conspiracie of Puccinus, neither can bee safe without a strong garrison, so long as the citisens his subiects shall either remember or hope for the rewards of their valour and libertie. And for this cause Dionysius the elder of Syracusa, being chosen generall, and hauing made himselfe maister of all, and chaunged the Popular estate into a Monarchie, had alwaies forty thousand souldiors in readinesse at his call to set forward, beside a great garrison still attendant about his person, and diuers strong holds, onely to keepe the people of Syracusa with a part of Sicilia in subiection. And yet neuerthelesse was he no tyrant, as we call a tyrant, that is to say, a cruell, vitious, and naughtie man: neither was he euer amorous of other mens wiues, but to the contrarie sharply reproued his sonne (as saith Plutarch) for hauing taken away one of his subiects daughters, saying, That he should neuer have one to succeed him in his estate, if he used such fashions: as indeed it fell out with him, being shortly after his death chased out of his kingdome.

Now if any man shall obiect and say unto mee, That force and feare are two euill[*](Force and feare, things necessarie for a new prince, for the maintenance of his state.) masters for the maintaining of an estate: true it is, and yet needfull for a new prince to vse, who by force changeth a Popular estate into a Monarchie, a thing altogether contrarie unto a Monarchy Royall; which the lesse guard it hath, the surer it is: & therefore the wise king Numa put from him the three hundred archers which Romulus his

predecessour had taken unto him for his guard, saying, That hee would not distrust a people which had willingly and of themselves put their trust in him: neither yet commaund ouer them which should distrust him. But Seruius hauing of a slaue made himselfe a king, beset himselfe with strong guards, and that wisely, as beeing forsaken of the Senators, who tooke his seruile government in great euill part: For as iust, pleasing, & gracious, as he was, yet had it bene a thing impossible for him without guards, garrisons, and fortresses, long to have maintained himselfe and his so new an estate, but that he should haue fallen into the hands of his enemies. There was neuer a more gratious, magnificent, noble, couragious, or courteous prince then Caesar; and yet notwithstanding, all these his great vertues were not able to preserue him, but that he was by his sonne Brutus and other the conspirators with incredible consent and fidelitie combyned against him, in the middest of the Senat most cruelly slaine: who being before warned to take unto him a guard for the safetie of his person, frankly answered▪ that he had rather to die once for all, than still to languish in feare: wherein he did not wisely so to refuse a guard, hauing pardoned his greatest enemies (whom he suffered still to live) and desiring to chaunge into a Monarchie the free estate of the most warlike people that euer was in the world. Which his course Augustus his successour followed not, but first caused to be put to death all the conspiratours against Caesar, (not so much in revenge of the death of his vncle Caesar, as he pretended, as so to prouide[*](The notable wisdome of Augustus in his government, for the establishing of his estate.) for his owne safetie) after that hee still guarded with a strong guard about him, easely kept himselfe from the violence of his enemies: And albeit that hauing quite discomfited and ouerthrowne Sextus Pompeius, and Lepidus, and ouercome Marcus Anthonius in battell at Actium, (who afterwards also slew himselfe) and the other citisens of greatest force and courage, either in battell slaine or otherwise taken out of the way; he might have seemed to have beene able to have raigned in great securitie: yet neuerthelesse hee dispersed fortie legions into the prouinces, placed three legions in Italie, and that not farre from the citie, kept a strong guard about him for the safetie of his person: forbid the Senators without leaue to depart out of Italie, and committed the government of his legions not unto any the great Lords, but to gentlemen onely, or some of the meanest of the nobilitie. As for the creating of the officers of the citie, he divided it betwixt himselfe and the people; yet so as that of such as stood for them, he would bring some of them by the hand unto the people, and so recommending unto their choice them whom he wished to have preferred unto the offices and honors: he tooke from the people their free choice, and had the magistrats still beholden and bound unto him. Iustice he daily administred, without intermission, receiuing and answering every mans request, hauing alwaies before him the records of the publike reuenues of his forces, and of the prouinces, so that he alone seemed to discharge all the dueties of all the officers. Whereby it euidently appeareth him to have beene a sole Monarque, and soueraigne Prince, whatsoeuer faire title of a Tribune of the people, or of a Prince, was by one or other giuen unto him. That is also reported to have beene of him verie popularly done, in that he commaunded debts due to the Commonweale, which were growne by the civill warres, and the records of the debters to be torne and burnt. And yet this so mightie a Prince, endued with so great vertue & wisedome hardly escaped the hands of the wicked conspirators against him, albeit that the most desperat and daungerous sort of them were now long before dead. But after that the subiects hauing by little and little made proofe of his justice and wisedome, tasted of the sweetnes of long peace and assured tranquillitie, in steed of cruell and bloodie civill warres,, and that they had to doe, rather with a father than with a lord (as saith Seneca) and so began to loue and reuerence him: he againe on his part discharged his guard, going as a priuat man sometimes with one man, and sometimes with an other without any other companie; and so laide the foundation of that great Monarchie, with the most happie successe that euer Prince did.

Now all Monarchies newly established by the change of an Aristocratie, or Popular[*](How Aristocraties or Popular estates are changed into Monarchies.) estate, have as it were taken their beginning, after that some one of the magistrats, captaines, or gouernours, hauing the power of the state in his hand, hath of a companion made himselfe Lord and soueraigne, or else that some straunger hath subdued them, or that those states haue willingly submitted themselves unto the lawes & commandements of some other man. As for the first point, and the most ordinarie change of these estates we have examples enowe. For so Pisistratus, when he had got the chiefe office in the commonweale, inuaded the libertie of the people: as did also Cypselus at Corinth, Thrasybulus, Gelo, Dionysius, Hiero, Agathocles at Syracusa, Panaetius, and Icetes at Leonce, Phalaris at Agrigentum, Phidon at Argos, Periander at Ambrace, Archelaus in Ca---die, Euagoras in Cyprus, Polycrates in Samos, Anaxilaus at Rhegium, Nicocles at Sicyon, Alexander at Pheree, Mamercus at Catana, the Decemuiri at Rome, and there after them Sylla and Caesar: the Scaligers at Verona, the Bentinoli at Bolonia, the Manfreds at Fauentia, the Malatestes at Atiminum, the Baleones at Perusium, the Vitelles at Tifernas, the Sforces at Millan, and diuers others of like sort, who of gouernors of cities and armies have taken upon them the soueraigntie. For in matters of estate it may be holden for an vndoubted maxime, that he is[*](Master of the forces, Master of the Estate.) master of the estate, which is master of the forces. Wherefore in well ordered Aristocratique and popular Commonweales, the greatest honours are graunted without power of commaund, and the greatest powers to commaund are not graunted without a companion therein: or if it be dangerous to diuide the power of commaund to[*](Orders necessary for the maintenance of Aristocratique and popular commonweale.) many, as in matters of warre it is; then the power so graunted unto the magistrat or Generall ought to be but short. And therefore the Romans made chiefe commaunders their two Consuls: and the Carthaginensians their two Suffets, who every other day commaunded by turnes: For albeit that the dissention which is commonly betwixt them which are in power equall, is sometimes an hinderance for the execution of good and profitable things: yet so it is that such a commonweale so gouerned is not so subiect to be turned into a Monarchie, as it were if it had but one chiefe and soueraigne magistrat: as the great Archon at Athens, the Prytani with the Rhodians, the yearely Generall with the Achaeans and the Aetolians, and the Duke at Genes. And for the same cause the Dictatorship in Rome continued no longer then the charge required, which neuer passed six monethes at the longest; yea and sometime lasted but one day; which time expired, the power to commaund ceased: and if so be that the Dictator did for any longer time retaine his forces, he might therefore be accused of treason. And in Thebes, so long as it was a Popular estate, the law was that the Generall of the armie should be put to death, if he retained the forces aboue a day after the appointed time: which was the cause that the great capitaines Epaminondas and Pelopidas were condemned to death, for hauing retained their forces foure monethes after the time, howbeit that they were by necessitie constrayned so to doe, neither could without the great danger of the State have otherwise done. And so for the same reason almost all the Magistracies are annuall, in Aristocratique and Popular Commonweales. Howbeit that in Venice the six Councelours for the estate which are assistant unto the Duke, continue but two monethes in their charge: and he that had the keeping of the principall fortresse of Athens, had the keyes thereof but for one day onely: no more then hath the captaine of the castle of Rhaguse, who chosen by lot, hath the charge but for a day, and is led into the castle hoodwinkt. It behoueth also in popular

& Aristocraticall Commonweales so much as possible is, to beware that the lawes [*](To chaunge the lawes and ordinances concerning the magistrats time, or to prorogue his charge, a thing most dangerous in an Aristocratique or Popular Commonweale.) and ordinances concerning the Magistrats time be not changed, neither their charge prorogued, if the necessity be not verie great: as the Romans did to Camillus, to whom the Dictatorship was prorogued for six monthes, which had neuer to any other person beene graunted. And namely by the law Sempronia it was straitly forbidden that the governments of Prouinces should be graunted unto any for longer time than five yeares: which law had it beene kept, Caesar had neuer inuaded the estate as he did, hauing the government of the Gaules by the consent of Pompeius and Crassus graunted for five yeares more than the law allowed of; whereunto in that point was derogated in favour of him. Which was a notable ouersight, considering that they had to doe with the most ambitious man that euer was; who so well grounded his power to continue, that he gaue at one time unto Paulus the Consull nine hundred thousand[*](Wonderfull bribes giuen by Caesar in aspiring to the estate.) crownes, to the intent that he should not oppose himselfe against his enterpises; and unto the Tribune Curio, fifteene hundred thousand crownes to take his part. The people of Rome moreover allowing him pay for ten legions of souldiers so long as the warres in Fraunce should last. Which so great a power was ioyned with the hardiest hart that then lived, and the most valiant that euer was, and discended of so noble an house, as that in an oration unto the people he doubted not to say, That by the fathers side he was discended from the gods, and by the mothers side from kings; and yet withall so modest, as that his great enemie Cato said, That there was neuer so modest a tyrant as he, and withall so vigilant: as that Cicero an other great enemie of his, (who conspired his death) calleth him in one of his Epistles, The monster of wisdome & incredible diligence: and moreover so magnificall and popular as euer any was▪ sparing for no cost for the setting forth of playes, iusts, tournies, feastes, largesses, & other publike delights: In which doing he upon the publike charge woon the harts of the common people, and gained the honour of a most gratious and charitable man towards the poore. And yet for all that hauing by this meanes gained the soueraigntie, he sought for nothing more than by all meanes to clip and cut off the wealth & power of the people, and to take from them their priuileges: for of three hundred and twentie thousand citisens which still lived of the publique corne which they receiued, he retained but an hundred and fiftie thousand, and sent fourescore thousand over the sea into diuers Colonies a farre off: and beside that tooke away most part of their fraternities, corporations, and colleges. In briefe it hath alwaies beene seene in all changes[*](Aristocratique and Popular Commonweals still ruinated by the subiects, hauing too much power committed unto them.) of Aristocratique and popular Commonweales, them to have beene still ruinated, which have at any time giuen too much power unto the subiects whereby to exalt themselves: Which thing Iulian the Apostatament by that his embleanie or deuise of an Eagle shot thorow with arrowes fethered with his owne feathers, being before pluckt from her. For so do the soueraigne gouernors and magistrats of those estates, especially when too great power is giuen to him which is of too ambitious and hautie a mind. And thus much concerning the chaunge of a Popular or Aristocraticall estate into a Monarchie, wherein one of the subiects maketh himselfe Lord thereof.

But the chaunge of a Popular estate into an Aristocratie chanceth commonly upon[*](The mutuall chaunge of a popular estate into an Aristocratie, and of an Aristocratie into a Popular estate.) the losse of some great battell, or other notable detriment of the state, receiued from the enemie: as to the contrarie the Popular power then most encreaseth when it returneth from the warres with some great victorie over their enemies. Of which manner of chaunges as there are many examples, so is there none more fit than those of the Athenians and Syracusians, two Commonweales of the selfe same time; when as the Athenians by the default of Niceas their generall, vanquished by the Syracusians and so discomfited, forthwith chaunged their Popular estate into an Aristocratie of foure

hundred men, who yet bare themselves for five thousand by the deceit of Pisander: so that the people complayning themselves to be so spoiled of the soueraigntie, and comming to giue voice in the councell, was thence repulsed & driuen backe by the forces which the foure hundred had in their power, wherwith they slew diuers of the people and discouraged the rest: at which verie time the Syracusians proud of their victorie (to the contrarie) chaunged their Aristocratie into a Popular estate. And within a while after the Athenians hauing heard news of the great victorie of Alcibiades against the Lacedemonians, tooke up armes against the foure hundred of the nobilitie, whom they by the leading of Thrasybulus thrust out or slew, and so againe chaunged the Aristocratie into a Popular estate. And in like manner the Thebans ouercome by the Enophites, chaunged their Popular estate into an Aristocratie. And albeit that the Romans hauing lost two great battels unto Pirrhus changed not their popular estate, yet so it was that indeed it was then a faire Aristocratie of three hundred Senators which gouerned the estate, and but in appearance and show a Democratie, or a Popular estate, the people being neuer than then more calme and tractable. But so soone as the Romans had gained the estate of Tarentum, the people forthwith began to set up their hornes, demaunding to have part in the lands which the nobilitie had of long time possessed. And yet neuerthelesse afterwards, when as Hannibal had brought the Roman estate into great extremitie, the people became as humble as was possible: but after that the Carthaginensians were ouercome, king Perseus ouerthrowne, Antiochus put to flight, the kingdome of Macedonia and Asia subuerted▪ then immediatly againe followed the sturres for the diuision of lands, and the turbulent seditions of the Gracchies, wherewith the Tribunes armed the people in most insolent manner, insulting upon the nobilitie. In like manner the Florentines ouerthrew their Oligarchie, established by Pope Clement the seuenth, restoring the people againe vnto their wonted libertie: for so soone as newes was brought unto Florence, That Rome was by the imperials sackt, and the Pope with the rest of the Cardinals and Bishops besieged▪ it is not to be beleeued, with what pride the headstrong people began to rage against them of the house of Medices; with what ---urie they cast downe their statues, defaced their armes, and reuersed all their decrees and lawes. The Popular estates of the Swissers indeed first tooke their beginning from the pride and insolencie of the gouernours of those places, but yet had their greatest encreasings after the victorie of Sempach, about the yeare 1377, at which time the nobilitie being with a great slaughter ouerthrowne by the rural people, there was no more talking of Aristocraties, nor of acknowledging of the soueraigntie of the empire ouer them, in what sort soeuer. But the chiefe cause of these conuersions and chaunges of these estates, is the rash vnstaidnesse and vnconstancie of the people, without discourse or iudgement moued with euerie wind; which as it is with a little losse discouraged, so is it also after any victorie intollerable; neither hath it any more deadly or dangerous enemie, than too much felicitie and prosperous successe of the affaires thereof; nor a wiser maister than aduersitie and distresse, wherewith it daunted and discouraged, learneth to rest upon the councell of the wiser sort, leauing the helme of the estate for them to gouerne, which they themselves in such tempestuous times know not how to hold. Whereby it is to bee perceiued, nothing[*](Nothing more profitable for the preseruation of a Popular estate than warres.) to be more profitable for the preseruation of a Popular estate, than to have warres, and to make enemies for it if otherwise it have none. Which was the principall reason that moued Scipio the yonger so much as in him lay, to hinder the rasing of the famous citie of Carthage, wisely foreseeing, that the people of Rome being altogether martiall and warlike, if it had no enemies abroad would at length be enforced to make war upon it selfe. For which cause also Onomadesme generall of the Commonweale of Chio, hauing appeased the civill warres, and driuen out the most mutinous, would by no meanes banish the the rest, albeit that he was earnestly persuaded so to doe, saying That so it would be daungerous, least (that hauing cast ōut all the enemies) they should fall together by the eares with their friends. Howbeit that this reason which hath place for the straunge and forren enemies, is not yet to bee receiued for the maintaining of enemies at home amongst the citisens themselves: and yet in this case hee did but that which best beseemed him, and was also most expedient. For he that will have the upper hand in civill warre, if he shall banish all them that take part with the faction contrarie to his owne, he shall then have no hostages at all left, if the banished shall prepare new warres against him: but hauing slaine the most outragious and daungerous, and banished the most mutinous, he ought still to retaine the remnant; for otherwise hee is to feare least all the exiled together, making warre uppon him, without feare of their friends at home, should so by force ouerthrow their enemies, and chaunge the Popular estate into an Aristocratie. As it happened unto the Heracleans, the Cumans, and the Megarenses, who were chaunged from Popular estates into Aristocraties, for that the people had wholly driuen out the nobilitie, who with their friends combining their forces, and possessed of these three commonweales, ouerthrew therein the Popular estates, and againe established Aristocraties.[*](Popular estates most commonly to chaunge into Monarchies.)

Yet amongst other conuersions and chaunges of Commonweales, the chaunge of a Popular estate into a Monarchy oftenest happeneth; and that either by civill warres, or through the ignorance of the people, hauing giuen too much power to some one of the subiects, as we haue before said. For Cicero speaking of the civill warres betwixt Caesar and Pompey, saith, Ex victoria cum multa, tum certe Tyrannis existit, Of victorie ensue many things, but especially a Tyrannicall government. For that almost alwaies in civill warres the people is divided: wherein if it so fall out, that the leaders of the factions bring the matter unto the tryall of a battaile, no man can doubt but that hee who therein shall carrie away the victorie, possessed of the forces and powers, shall either for ambition and the desire of honour, or for the saftie of his person, keepe unto himself the[*](Tyrannicall governments most commonly to chaunge into popular estates.) soueraigntie. Whereas contrariwise Tyrannicall governments (for the most part) chaunge into Popular estates. For that the people which neuer knoweth how to keep a meane, the Tyrannicall government once taken away, desiring to communicat the soueraigntie unto them all, for the hatred that it beareth against Tyrants, and the feare that it hath to fall againe into tyranny, becommeth so furious and passionat, as without reason or discretion to fall upon all the kinsmen and friends of the tyrant, and not to leaue one of them alive: whereof for the most part ensueth the slaughter, exile, & proscription of the nobilitie; in which case euerie man of valour, courage, and worth, chuseth rather to shunne the furie of the most headstrong people, as the raging of a wild beast, rather than to beare rule over it. As it happened at Athens, after that Pisistratus was slaine; at Rome, after Tarquin the proud was driuen out: at Syracusa, after Hiero slaine, and againe after that Dionysius was banished: at Florence, after that the duke of Athens (who afterwards died Generall in the expedition of Poitiers) was driuen out: at Milan, after that Galuagno the tyrant had there lost his estate, where the people of Milan for fiftie yeares after, held a Popular estate, vntill that at last it was againe changed into a Tyrannicall government by the Toresa---s. Neither did the Swissars otherwise establish that thei Popular estate (which by the space of 260 yeares hath continued euen unto this day) but by killing of the tyrannicall deputies of the empire, tyrannizing over them. The like we see to have happened in Thessalie, after that Alexander the tyrant of the Phereans was slaine: and in Sienna, after that Alexander Dichi the new tyrant, was by the conspiracie of Hierome Seuerin slaine, and his partakers of the

nobilitie De Monte Nouo cast out, slaine, and banished, the people forthwith tooke upon it the soueraigntie. Neither is it to be doubted, but that the Florentines, after the death of Alexander Medices the new tyrant, would have taken the government from them of the house of Medices, and reestablished their Popular estate, if they had certainly knowne the tyrant to have beene slaine: but when as almost onely Laurence Medices with Caracciolus the muttherer were priuie to the murther (supposed to bee not onely the tyrants familiar and domesticall acquaintance, but his most inward friend also) no man could by him be persuaded, that he had slaine the tyrant: but so by present flight making shift for himselfe, gaue opportunitie to young Cosmus Medices his cosen (who then had the forces of the estate in his power) to take uppon them the soueraigntie. But this conuersion or chaunge of Tyrannicall governments into Democraties, or of Democraties into Tyrannicall governments, most commonly happeneth, as we haue said, by occasion of civill warres: for if a strange enemie become lord of any Popular estate, he commonly ioyneth it unto his owne: which is not then to be called a change, but a destruction of that Commonweal, so vnited unto the victors; except the victor (which seldome times happeneth) restore unto the vanquished their libertie and government: as the Lacedemonians chose rather that the confederat cities of the Athenians, by them ouerthrowne in the Peloponesian warre, yea and that euen the citie of Athens it selfe also, should enioy their wonted libertie, than to be ioyned unto the Lacedemonian estate: howbeit yet that the Lacedemonians in euerie place established Aristocraties for Popular estates, quite contrarie unto the manner and fashion of the Athenians, who in all places went about to ouerthrow Aristocraties, and to establish Democraties or Popular estates. So that it differeth much, whether the conuersions or chaunges of Commonweales proceed from a forren and straunge enemie, or else from the citisens themselves.

Sometime also the people are so fickle and fantasticall, as that it is almost a thing impossible[*](The ickelnesse of the people oftentimes cause of the change of the estate.) for them to hold any one estate, which it is not by and by againe wearie of: as we may say of the auntient Athenians, Samians, Syracusans, Florentines, and Genowayes; who after they had changed from one estate or forme of government, would by and by have another. Which phantasticall disease most commonly chanceth unto such Popular estates, as wherein the subiects be too wise and of too subtill spirits, as were those whome we have before spoken of: For amongst them euerie man thinketh himselfe worthy to be a commaunder, whereas where the subiects be more grosser witted, they the more easily endure to be by others ruled, and more easily yeeld unto other mens aduises, than doe they whome you must with the multitude of arguments and subtiltie of wit conuince, before you shall persuade them unto any thing: so subtillising their reasons, as that oftentimes they vanish euen into smoke; whereof ariseth an obstinacie of conceit, alwaies enemie unto wise councels, with diuers changes of Commonweales. As a man may easily see in Thucidides, Xenophon, and Plutarch, the Athenians lesse than in an hundred yeares, six times to have chaunged their estate; and since them the Florentines seuen times: which so happened not neither unto the Venetians, nor Swissers, men not of so sharpe a wit. For who knoweth not the Florentines to be most sharpe witted men? but the Swissers to have alwaies bene men of a more dull spirit? And yet when as they both almost at the same time, chaunged their Monarchie into a Popular estate, the Swissers have therein so maintained themselves now almost three hundred yeres: wheras the Florentines not long after changed their estate into an Aristocratie; they which in nobilitie and wealth exceed the rest, altogether disdaining to be made equall with the common sort of the people. But the[*](The fickle and turbulent estate of the Florentines) nobilitie hauing so got the soueraigntie, began also to striue amongst themselves for

the principalitie: and with mutuall hatred and proscriptions so weakned themselves and their estate, as that they were by the people taking up armes against them easily ouercome and put to flight. But the nobilitie (and so the Aristocraticall estate) thus ouerthrowne, the popular sort, and they of them especially which were called the Grandes (or great ones) began to striue and contend among themselves, for the government of the state: and yet these much more cruelly than had before the nobilitie; for that they contended not by forme of iustice, or of law, but by verie force of armes, and dint of sword; who hauing with mutuall slaughters spent themselves, the middle sort of the people (for they were divided into three sorts) began to take upon them the mannaging of the estate: but these also falling together by the eares for places of honour and commaund, the verie basest and refuse of the rascal people, became too strong for them, filling all places with the blood and slaughter of them, vntill they had driuen out and slaine the most part of them. Now these also of the baser sort become masters of the estate, and hauing no moe enemies left with whome to striue, began at length to struggle with it selfe, and made such cruell warre upon it selfe, that the blood ran down the streets, yea & that most part of the houses were with fire quite consumed, vntill that they of Luca moued with their great miseries and distresse, comming in great companies to Florence, exhorted them their neighbours to lay downe armes, and to seeke for peace: by whose good speeches they persuaded at last, ceased from their slaughters & butchering of one another. Whereupon to end the matter, they sent ambassadours unto the pope, to send them some one descended of royall blood, to rule and raigne over them: where by good fortune there was then at Rome Charles of Fraunce brother to king Lewes the ninth, who at the request of the pope, and of the Florentines themselves, came to Florence, and with the good liking of the people in generall, tooke upon him the government, ended their quarrels, and reconciled the citisens among themselves, together with the Commonweale: and so hauing appeased the citisens, and reformed the Commonweale, being inuited to the kingdome of Naples, he left in the citie of Florence his deputies. But he was scarce well gone out of the citie, but that the Florentines wearie of the government of the deputies, came againe unto their popular government, and so with all renewed their civill warres. For redresse whereof they sent for the duke of Athens, who hauing taken upon him the soueraigntie, commaunded the citisens to lay downe armes, and for the safetie of his person, tooke unto him a strong guard, so to keepe under the seditious and rebellious persons. But the citisens now supposing themselves so to be spoyled of their libertie, and brought into bondage by the terrour of his guard, turned their old mutuall hatred all uppon the prince, first secretly, and afterwards three conspiracies breaking forth into open force, one after another in the citie: yea at last the citisens altogether burst out into such hatred against the prince, that they besieged the pallace wherein he lay, together with the souldiours which guarded him: neither could that so strait a siege be broken up, vntill the prince was content himselfe with all his familie to void the city: which for safegard of his life he was glad to do, not hauing yet a whole yeare gouerned the state. So the citie delivered of the feare of a master, appointed a forme of an Aristocratie, not much vnlike unto a Popular estate; deuising new names for their officers and magistrats, still chaunging and rechaunging them with the manner of their state and government, oftentimes no better ordered, than if it had bene committed to mad men, or children without discretion: scarcely twentie yeares together keeping the same forme of state. But as sicke men in the heat of burning feuers, desire to be remoued now hither, and by and by againe thither, or from one bed to another, as if the disease were in the places where they lay, and not in the verie entrals of their bodies: euen so the Florentines were still turning and tumbling of their estate, vntill they light upon Cosmus Medices, of all Physitians the most skilfull, who cured the citie of these popular diseases, by establishing therein a Monarchie, and building therin three strong citadels, furnished with good & sure garrisons; so leauing unto his posteritie a well grounded soueraigne state, by himselfe holden by the space of almost fortie yeares: than which nothing could have bin wished for of almightie God, better or more wholsome for such a most seditious citie. And thus much briefly concerning the Florentine state, which haply might seeme incredible, had they not bene committed to the remembrance of all posteritie, euen by the * writings of the Florentines themselves. The like tragedies we see to haue[*](Antoninus Poggius Mbiauellus.) bene plaid also by the people of Affrike (who in sharpnesse of wit are said to passe the Italians) when they made proofe of Popular estates: whereof I will set downe but one or two examples amongst many: as namely the inhabitants of Segelmessa, a citie upon the sea coast in the kingdome of Bugia, reuolting from their king, established among themselves a Popular estate, but shortly after entred into such factions and civill seditions, as that not able to endure either the government of their king, or yet the government of themselves, they by common consent laid all their houses and the walles of their citie euen with the ground, that so they might euerie one of them as kings and princes rule and raigne in their owne houses abroad in the countrey. The people also of Togoda, a citie in the frontiers of the kingdome of Fez, wearie of their Aristocratie, forsooke their countrey. For which causes the people of Affrike, not able to endure the Aristocratique or Popular estates, have almost euerie where established Royall Monarchies.

Now albeit that Aristocratike estates seeme to many both better and more assured[*](Discord amongst themselves daungerous unto the gouernours of an Aristocratie.) and durable also than the Popular, yet so it is, that the gouernors therof if they bee not of accord among themselves, are still therein in double daunger: the one from the faction among themselves, the other from the insurrection or rebellion of the people, who neuer faile to fall upon them if they once find them at variance among themselves, as we haue before shewed of the Florentines. The like whereof happened at Vienna, at Genes, and diuers other Commonweales in Germanie also. As it also chanced in the Peloponesian warre, unto all the cities of Greece which were then gouerned by the nobilitie or richer sort. Which is also yet more daungerous, when the gouernours giue leaue to all straungers to come and dwell in their cities or countries: who by little and little encreasing, and in wealth and credit growing equall with the naturall subiects or citisens, and hauing no part in the government, if they shall chance to be surcharged, or otherwise euill entreated of the gouernours of the state, will uppon[*](Multitude of straungers in an Aristocratie daungerous.) the least occasion rise up against them, and so haply chase euen the naturall lords out of their own countrey: As it chaunced at Sienna, at Genes, at Zurike, and at Cullen; where the straungers encreasing, and seeing themselves surcharged and euill entreated, without hauing any part or interest in the estate, draue out the gouernours and slew most part of them. And namely they of Lindaw, after they had slaine the gouernors, chaunged their Aristocratie into a Democratie or Popular estate: as also did the inhabitants of Strasburg, who in detestation of the Aristocraticall government, which they had chaunged into a Popular, after they had driuen out, banished, or slaine their lords and gouernours, solemnly by law prouided, That no man should have the great estate, or any other publike charge in the citie, except hee could first well proue his grandfather to have bene some verie base fellow, and so himselfe to be descended from the meanest sort of the rascall people. Which yet is no new matter: For we read, that the straungers in the Commonweale of Corfu encreased so fast, that in the end they seised upon all the nobilitie, whom they cast into prison, and there murthered them;

chaunging afterwards that Aristocraticall estate into a Popular government. The like hapned unto the Aristocratique Commonweales of the Samians, the Sibarites, the Trezenians, the Amphipolits, the Chalcidians, the Thurians, the Cnidians, and them of Chio, who were all by strangers changed into popular estates, hauing with their multitude thrust out the naturall Lords and gouernours. Which is the thing most to be feared in the Venetian estate, which we have before showed to be a meere Aristocratie, and receptacle of all straungers, who have there so well encreased, that for one Venetian gentleman there are an hundred citisens, as well noble as base descended of straungers; which may well be proued by the number of them which was there taken 20 yeares agoe, or thereabouts: wherein were found nine and fiftie thousand three hundred fortie nine citisens, aboue twentie yeares old; and threescore seauen thousand five hundred fiftie seauen women: two thousand one hundred eightie fiue[*](The number of the inhabitants of Venice in the yeare 1555.) Religious men, 1157 Iewes: which are in all, an hundred thirtie and two thousand three hundred and thirtie persons; whereunto putting a third part more for the number of them which are under twentie yeares old, (taking the ordinary age and the lives of men to be 60 yeares, as the law pre---ineth) it amounteth to the number of about an hundred seauentie six thousand foure hundred and fortie citisens, beside straungers. In which number the nobility or gentlemen were not comprehended, who could not be aboue three or foure thousand, accounting as well them that were absent, as them that were present. And truely I cannot but maruell why the Venetians haue published, yea and that more is have suffered to be put in print the number that then was taken. The Athenians long agoe committed the like errour, and when the citie was most populous, found that upon the number taken, there were in the citie twentie thousand citisens, ten thousand straungers, and foure hundred thousand slaues: which open number and account the Romans would not take of their straungers, and so much lesse of their slaues: whom they would not either by their countenance or attire haue knowne from the rest of the citisens: Howbeit that some were of opinion that the slaues ought to be knowne by their apparell; yet their opinion preuayled which thought the same to be daungerous, and a thing to bee feared, lest the slaues entering into the number of themselves, should make their masters their slaues, for so Seneca writeth. We read in the hystorie of Cardinall Bembus, that the greatest assemblie of the gentlemen of Venice in his time (when as that Commonweale was most populous) was but fifteene hundred; which their fewnesse they by most certein tokens, and their attire, make still to appeare. But that which hath most maintained their seignorie against the commotion of the citisens, Is the mutuall amitie and concord of the gouernours and gentlemen among themselves; and the sweetnes of libertie, which is greater in that citie than in any other place of the world: so that beeing drowned in pleasure and delights, and hauing also part in certeine honors and meane offices, whereof the gentlemen are not capable, they have no occasion to stirre for the chaunging of the estate; as had those of whom I have before spoken, who were not onely debarred of all offices, but by the gouernors of the State surcharged and euill entreated also.

Now all these changes of Aristocraties into popular Commonweales haue beene[*](The change of popular estates into Aristocraties of all others most gentle and quiet.) violent and bloodie, as it happeneth almost alwaies: whereas to the contrarie it commeth to passe that Popular estates chaunge into Aristocraties by a more gentle and insensible chaunge. As when entrance is giuen unto straungers, who in tract of time by little and little plant themselves, and multiplie, without hauing any part in the estate and government, it falleth out in the end that the naturall citisen employed in publique charges, or in the warres, or by popular diseases wasted, do so decay; the

straungers still encreasing: whereby it commeth to passe, that the lesser part of the inhabitants hold the soueraigntie, which wee have shewed to bee a right Aristocratie. Such were the changes of those Commonweals which we have before noted, from the people unto the nobilitie, and such as have indeed happened unto the Venetians, the Luques, them of Rhaguse, & of Genes, which being in auntient time Popular estates, have by little and little as it were without feeling, changed into Aristocraties: ioyning hereunto also, that the poorer sort of the citisens hauing much a do to live, & so wholly intentiue vnto their domesticall and priuat affaires, shun all publike charges without profit: and so by succession and prescription of time exclude themselves with their families from entermeddling with the state. And this maner of change in the estate, is of all others most gentle and easie, and least subiect unto tumults and sturres: neither can otherwise be letted, but that it wil in time chaunge, but by keeping of strangers from entring into the citie: or by sending of them out into colonies, or else together with the rest admitting them unto the honors and preferments in the estate: and so much the more if the people be giuen to warre. For otherwise it is to be feared, that the nobilitie not daring to put armes into the subiects hands, but being constrained to go to warres themselves, should be all at once ouerthrowne, and so the people inuade to soueraigntie: as it happened to the seigneurie of Tarentum, which in one battell against the Iapiges lost almost all the nobilitie: after which the people seeing themselves the stronger,[*](Aristocraties by some great our throwe of the nobilitie oftentimes chaunged into popular estates.) changed the Aristocraty into a Popular estate, in the time of Themistocles. And for this cause the nobilitie of the Argiues, being almost all slaine by Cleomenes king of Lacedemonia, they that remained yet alive, fearing the rebellion of the people, of themselves receiued the comminaltie into the fellowship of the government, and so of their owne accord seemed willingly to grant that which the people otherwise have taken from them by force, & whether they would or no: by which means their Aristocratie most quietly and sweetly chaunged into a Popular estate. So one of the things that gaue aduantage unto the people of Rome over the nobilitie, was the victorie of the Vientes, who in one battell slew 300 of the Fabians, all gentlemen of one house, when as not long after twelue families of the Potitij, who ascribed the beginning of their houses unto the gods, were in one and the same yere quite extinguished & brought to naught, as Liuie writeth. And therefore the Venetians, better citisens than warriors, if they bee to make warre (which they neuer doe but upon great necessitie) vse commonly to chuse their generall one of their nobilitie, their souldiors for the most part beeing strangers and mercenarie men. But this inconuenience for the changing of the estate, for the losse of the nobilitie, cannot happen in a Monarchie, if all the princes of the blood bee[*](Monarchies hardly chaunged for the losse of the nobilitie.) not slaine together with the rest of the nobilitie: as the maner of the Turks is to doe in all places where they have any purpose absolutely to command, where they spare not so much as a gentleman: whereof have ensued the destruction of many Commonweals in the East, and great encreasing of the Turkish empire. But this change, or rather vnion or encreasement of one estate by another, proceedeth from externall force. So in France also, when as almost all the nobilitie of France was slaine in the expedition of Fontenay, neere unto Auxerre, by the civill warre betwixt Lothaire the eldest sonne of Lewes the Gentle, on the one part, and Lewes and Charles the Bald on the other: yet for all that all their three Monarchies stood still firme: and namely when the countrey of Champagne had lost so much of the nobilitie in those wars, as that for the restoring therof, the gentlewomen had especial priuilege to ennoble their husbands with whom they should marrie, and yet for all that the Monarchy in the state therof felt no change at all. And thus are the great and notable changes commonly made in Aristocratike and Popular Commonweales.

But nothing is so much in an Aristocratie to be feared, as least some gracious man [*](Ambition and the vnworthie bestowing of the great preferments of the commonweale, thinges most daungerous to an Aristocrati ) of the nobilitie, or of the people, desirous of rule & authoritie, should stirre up the people against the nobilitie, and become leader of them himselfe. For therof ensueth the most certaine destruction of an Aristocratie, together with the nobilitie. In this sort Thr---syllus first, and afterward Thrasybulus at Athens, Marius and Caesar at Rome, Fra. Valori, and P. Sodorin at Florence, armed the people against the nobilitie: which is also so much the more to be feared, if the great honours of the estate bee bestowed uppon most filthy and wicked men, and other vertuous men and such as have well deserued of the Commonweale, kept backe and excluded. Which thing seemeth not grieuous onely to euerie good man, and not to be borne withall, but ministreth occasion also unto the seditious and popular, to enflame the people against the nobilitie. Neither for any other cause did the people of the Orites by force wrest the power and government from the nobilitie, than for that they had preferred unto the chiefe honours one Heracleotes, a man for his euill life infamous. Which thing also was the destruction of Nero and Heliogabalus, for that they had bestowed the greatest honours and preferments of the empire, upon most wicked and corrupt men. Which of all other things is most to be feared and shunned in an Aristocratie Aristocratically gouerned: that is to say, where the people is kept from all honours and places of commaund: which although it be of it selfe an hard thing patiently to endure, yet were it the better to bee borne, if the government were committed to good men: but when it is giuen to wicked and vnworthy men, euerie audacious fellow uppon occasion offered, will easily draw the people from the nobilitie, and so much the rather, by how much the nobilitie shall be at lesse unitie among themselves. Which plague, as it is in all estates and governments,[*](Discord among the nobilitie a thing most daungerous to the sta ) so is it especially in an Aristocratie to be eschewed and fled. Now discord oft times ariseth euen of most small matters, which as sparkes raise the great fiers of civill warres, which at length take hold euen of the whole bodie of the estate of a citie or Commonweale. As it happened at Florence, for the refusall made by a gentleman of the noble house of Bondelmont, to marrie a gentlewoman to whome hee had before giuen his promise, gaue occasion to the raising of a faction amongst the nobilitie, who so wasted and deuoured one another, as that the people to end the quarrel, easily draue[*](Small matters oftentimes the caus of great chaunges in commonweals.) out all the rest, and commaunded the state of the citie. And for like occasion arose great civill warres amongst the Ardeates, for an inheretrix, whome her mother would have married unto a gentleman, and her guardions to a base obscure man: which divided the people from the nobilitie, in such sort, that the nobilitie vanquished and put to flight by the people, tooke their refuge unto the Romans, and the people unto the Volsians, who were afterwards vanquished by the Romans. So also the citie & Commonweale of Delphos, for the same occasion, was chaunged from an Aristocratie unto a Popular estate. The state of Mitelin was also chaunged from an Aristocratie into a Popular estate, upon a suit betwixt the nobilititie and the people, Which of them should have the tuition of two orphans. And the state of the Commonweale of the Hestiens, for a suit in matter of inheritance betwixt two priuat men. And the sacred warre which chaunged not, but euen vtterly ruinated the estate of the Phocenses, was grounded upon the marriage of an inheritrix, whome two of their great lords stroue to haue. And that more is, the Aetolians and Arcadians, for a long time sore weakened one another with mutuall warres, and all but fo--- a boares head: as they of Carthage and of Bizaque did also for a small frigot. So betwixt the Scots and the Picts, was raised a most cruell warre, and all but for certaine dogges, which the Scots had taken from the Picts, and neuer could be againe reconciled, howbeit that they had for six hundred yeares before lived in good peace and amitie together. And the war betwixt the duke of Burgundy and the Swissers, which could no otherwise be ended, but by the death of the duke himself, was all but for a wagon load of sheepe skins which he had taken from the Swissers.[*](Great men hardly to be called in question to giue an account of their doinges, without the daunger of the estate.)

Sometime also the changes and ruines of Commonweales come, when the great ones are to be brought in question, to cause them to giue an account of their actions, whether it be for right or wrong: wherein euen they which are guiltlesse (and especially in Popular estates) not without cause alwaies feare the calumnies and doubtfull issues of iudgements, which most commonly endaunger the lives, the goods, and honour of such as are accused. And to leaue forren examples, wee have store enow of our owne, and that of such as of late have set on fire all the kingdome with civill wars when it was but spoken of, for calling them to account for two and fortie millions. And no maruell if they so feared to be brought in question for embeseling of the common treasure and reuenewes, when as Pericles, a man of greatest integritie, and which had most magnificently spent euen his owne wealth for the Athenian Commonweale, rather than he would hazard the account that they demaunded of him for the treasure of Athens, which he had mannaged, and so generally of his actions, raised the Peloponesian warre, which neuer after tooke end vntill it had ruinated diuers Commonweals, and wholly chaunged the estate of all the cities of Greece. Who alwaies hauing bene a good husband, and had the charge of the common treasure of that Commonweale, by the space of almost fiftie yeares, was therefore yet found neuer the richer, as Thucydides, a most true historiographer, and Pericles his most mortall enemie reporteth of him: who caused him to be banished with the banishment of the Ostracisme. And euen for the selfe same cause the Rhodians and they of Choos had their estates changed from Aristocraties into Popular estates. And albeit that Caesar was of himselfe most ambitious and desirous of soueraigntie: yet was he not so much desirous to beare rule, as affraid to be called to account by priuat men, for such things as he had done, as his enemies had openly boasted that he should, so soone as hee was discharged of his charge: not the least cause that moued him to ceise upon the estate. For what assurance could he have of himselfe, seeing before the two Scipioes (Africanus the honor of his time, and Scipio Asiaticus) Rotulus and Cicero, by the iudgement of the people condemned? Now if good men were to feare, what should the wicked do? who besides that they are in hope the better to escape, the Commonweale beeing all on a broile, are also resolued, that the common treasures can neuer more easily be robbed, or good men spoiled and slaine, than in the time of civill warres: euer taking it for an aduantage to fish in the troubled water. And although it may fortune such wicked men also to perish (as oftentimes it happeneth them which have bene the authors of civill warres, themselves to die a most miserable death) yet have they still in their mouths that desperat saying of Cateline▪ That the fire (forsooth) which had taken hold of his house, which he could not with water quench, hee would yet quench with the vtter ruine of the same. And truly much he missed not, but that hee had vtterly ouerthrowne the Roman Commonweale, or stept into the soueraigntie, had not Cicero the watchful Consul, and Ca. Antonius his companion (although it were with much a do) slaine him so desperat a citisen, with all his fellows. Neither ought Cicero (by his good leaue bee it said) to have driuen Catiline out of the citie, but to have oppressed him euen there, the conspiracie once detected. For it is not to be hoped, but that he which seeth himself banished from his house, & from his country, if he haue power, wil forthwith put himself in arms, as he did. And had he gained the battell against Ca▪ Antonius, hee had put the[*](How daungerous a matter it is in euerie commonweale to bannish a great man.) whole estate in great danger, being one of the most noble gentlemen, and best allied of all them that were in Rome. Certeine it is that by his departure out of the citie, a great

and dangerous sinke of the Commonweale was so well clensed; yet had it beene better for him to have beene there oppressed, than armed against his owne countrie. But of such great and dangerous enemies, the wiser sort aduiseth vs, to make them our[*](This was the Ostracisme banishment.) verie good friends, or else vtterly to destroy them, rather than to driue them out of the citie; except we should for honour banish them: as they did in the cities of Athens, Argos, and Ephesus, where the great Lordes mightie in wealth, favour, or vertue, were for a certeine time (which for all that neuer exceeded ten yeares) constrained to absent themselves, without any losse of goods or reputation; which was an honourable kind of banishment. Of whom so banished, not any one of them is reported to have therefore made warre upon his countrie. But to banish a great Lord with losse of his good--- and contumely, is not to quench but to kindle the fire of warre against the estate: For that oft times such a banished man by the helpe of his friends aspireth unto the soueraigntie; as did Dion banished out of Syracusa by Dionysius the yonger, against whom for all that he yet tooke not up armes vntill he was by him proscribed. And Martius Coriolanus, who cast into exile, brought the Romans to such extremitie, as that had he not suffered himselfe to have beene ouercome with the prayers and teares of his mother, and the other women whom the Romans had sent unto him, the Roman state had there taken end. In like manner the banished men of the house of Medices, and the nobilitie of Zurich in the yeare 133---, thrust out of their cities, by the helpe and power of their friends and allies besieged their owne natiue countries, and for a long time wearied the citisens their countrymen with a most doubtfull and daungerous warre. But yet here some man may say, That it is more safetie to keepe a wicked and a daungerous citisen without the wals, than to bee troubled with such a plague in the verie entrailes of the Commonweale. Whereto I yeeld: but yet how much greater a follie is it to let him whom thou oughtest to kill, to escape out of the citie, who once got out, is both willing and able to stirre up, and maintaine warre? Artaxerxes king of Persia had cast in prison Cyrus the yonger, guiltie of high treason, and had commanded him in princely manner to be bound with chaines of gold; and afterwards ouercome with his mothers requests enlarged him: but he had no sooner got his libertie, but that he made most grieuous warre upon the king, and was like enough by his brothers death to have obtained the kingdome, or else haue vndone his countrie; had he not by the kings armie beene circumuented and slaine. I said we must kill such people,[*](Great men enmies unto the estate, are either to be slaine, or by great kindnes to be made therunto faithfull friends.) or make them our good friends: as did Augustus, hauing discouered the conspiracie of Cinna against him, and hauing him in his power attainted and conuinced by his owne letters, yet neuerthelesse pardoned him; and not so content, tooke him by the hand, and swore a bond of mutuall friendship with him, and afterwards bestowed the greatest honours and preferments of the estate upon him, at the time that Cinna expected nothing but the sentence of condemnation, and so present execution; vsing these words of grace and favour unto him: Vitam tibi Cinna iterum do, priùs hosti, nunc insidiatori ac parricidae; Ex hodierno die amicitia inter nos incipiat, contendamus vtrum ego meliore fide vitam tibi dederim, an tu debeas, Cinna (said he) thy life I giue thee againe, being before mine enemie, and now a traitour and a murtherer; But from this day, let vs begin to be friends, and from henceforth let vs striue, whether I with greater trust have giuen thee thy life, or thou with greater faithfulnesse doest ow it. After which time he neuer had a more faithfull friend; being also afterwards by him appointed heire of all his goods. Augustus had before put to death an infinite number of such as had sworne and conspired his death: but now had a purpose in Cinna to proue if by gentlenesse and mercie he could gaine the hearts of men, wherein he was not deceiued: for from that time there was neuer any found which durst attempt any thing against him. So the Venetians also hauing taken prisoner Gonzaga the duke of Mantua, of all others their most mortall enemie, (who had ioyned all his forces and power with king Lewes of Fraunce for the ouerthrow of the Venetian state) did not onely set him at libertie, but made him Generall also of their forces; by which so honorable a kindnesse he bound, for euer after continued their most fast and loiall friend. And this is it for which Pontius the old capitaine of the Samnites said, That the great armie of the Romans surprised in the straites of the Appenine mountaines was either franke and freely to bee set at libertie, or else all to be put to the sword: for that so it should come to passe, that either the power of the Romans should by so great a slaughter be greatly weakned, or else hauing receiued from the Samnites so great a benefit, as the life and libertie of so many men, they should for euer after keepe good league and friendship with them.

But these conuersions and chaunges of Commonweales do more often happen in[*](Small Commonweales more subiect unto change than great.) little and small cities or estates, than in great kingdomes full of great prouinces, and people. For that a small Commonweale is soone divided into two parts or factions: Whereas a great Commonweale is much more hardly divided; for that betwixt the great Lords and the meanest subiects, betwixt the rich and the poore, betwixt the good and the bad, there are a great number of the middle sort which bind the one with the other, by meanes that they participate both with the one and the other, as hauing some accord and agreement with both the extreames. And that it is for which we see the little Commonweales of Italie, & the auntient Commonweals of Greece, which had but one, two, or three townes or cities belonging to them, in one age to have suffered moe alterations and chaunges than are in many ages reported to have beene in this kingdome of Fraunce, or in the kingdome of Spayne. For it is not to be doubted but that the extreames are alwaies contrarie one of them to the other, and so at discord and variance betwixt themselves, if there be not some meanes which may binde and ioine the one of them with the other; which we see by the eye, not onely betwixt the nobilitie and base common people, betwixt the rich and the poore, betwixt the good and the bad, but euen in the same citie also, where as but the diuersitie of places seperate but by some riuer, or wast vacant peece of ground without building upon it, doth oft times set the citisens at odds, and giue occasion to the chaunging --- [*](Small occasions serue to raise great dissention amongst citisens, and so the change of the estate.) the estate. So the citie of Fez was neuer at quiet, neither could the slaughters & murthers euer be appeased or staied, vntill that Ioseph king of Marocco and of Fez, of two townes standing somewhat distant one of them from the other by continuate building made them both one, and that now the greatest citie of Fez, whereby he gained the praise and commendation of a most wise & discreet prince; for that he so not onely ioyned houses to houses, and wals to wals, but bound also the mindes of the citisens and inhabitants of both places (before burning with an incredible hatred one of them against an other, and alwaies divided in warres) now in perpetuall loue and friendship together. Which hapned also unto the Clazomenians, where one part of the citie standing in the maine, and the other part in an Island, there was alwaies discord and warre betwixt them of the Isle and the other citisens. And so at Athens they which dwelt by the hauens side commonly called Piraeus, were at continuall discord and variance with them of the upper Towne which they called Astu or the Citie, vntill that Pericles with long walles ioyned the Hauen unto the Citie. For which cause also such tumults and quarrels fell betwixt the citisens of Venice, and the mariners and other the seafaring men, as had brought the citie into extreame perill and daunger had not Peter Lauredan with his great authoritie and wisedome appeased the same.

But most often it hapneth the chaunges of Commonweales to follow after civill

discord, especially if some neighbour prince shall upon the suddein oppresse a citie or [*](Commonweales most often changed or ouerthrowme by forrein princes, taking the aduantage of the civill discord of the subiects amongst themselves.) State weakned with the slaughter of the citisens or subiects, or else the citisens or subiects themselves being by the eares together: As the Englishmen have often times vanquished and ouerrunne the French being at variance among themselves: And the king of Fez easely tooke the citie of Tefza, the citisens being almost all consumed and spent with civill warre, And in the memorie of our fathers Philip the second duke of Bourgondie ioyned unto the boundes of his dukedome Dinan and Bo---ines, two cities in the countrie of Liege (parted in sunder but with a riuer) after that they had with long warres weakned themselves, which two cities for all that he could not before by any force subdue; howbeit that in taking of them he did but marrie the one of them unto the other, as saith Philip Commines. So also whilest the kings of Marocco were in armes together for the soueraigntie, the Gouernour of Thunes and of Telesin dismembred those two prouinces to make himselfe a kingdome of. And by the same meanes Lachares seeing the Athenians in combustion, in the time of Demetrius the besieger, stept into the Seignorie. And that more is, we read that foure thousand five hundred slaues and banished men inuaded the Capitoll, and missed but a little to haue made themselves lords of Rome, whilest the Nobilitie and Common people in the meane time were together by the eares in an uproar in the middest of the citie, who thereupon fell to agreement among themselves; not vnlike unto two dogges, who readie to pull one an others throat out, seing a wolfe, fall both upon him. Wherfore such civill discord is most daungerous unto cities or estates, especially if there be no societie or allyance betwixt the State so troubled, and the neighbour Princes: for that the enemie so at hand, may oppresse the state (the citisens or subiects so at variance among themselves) before that any helpe can come. Whereat we are not to matuell, for they to whom neither the huge height of steepe mountaines, neither the vnmeasurable depth of the botomlesse sea, nor the most solitarie desarts, nor the greatest and strongest fortifications, nor the innumerable multitude of enemies can serue for the staying of their ambitious and auaritious couses and desires; how should they content themselves with their owne, without encroaching uppon their neighbours, whose frontiers touch theirs, and that fit occasion presenteth it selfe for them so to do? which is there the more to be feared where the Commonweale is but little: as is that of Rhaguse, of Geneua, and of Luque, which have but one Towne, and the territorie vene strait; so that he which shall gaine the towne, shall withall become master of the Estate also: which so chaunceth not in great and spacious Commonweale, wherein many castles, cities, countries, and prouinces are in mutuall helpe together combyned, so that one citie thereof being taken, or a countrie or prouince thereof spoyled, yet followeth not the ruine of the Estate, one of them still succoring an other, as many members in one bodie, which at need helpe one an other.

Yet for all that a Monarchie hath this aduantage proper unto it selfe, aboue the[*](A Monarchie not so easily changed or ouerthrowne, as is an Aristocratie or Popular Commonweale.) Aristocratique and Popular estates, That in these commonly there is but one towne or citie wherein the Seigneurie lyeth, which is as an house or place of retrait for them which have the mannaging of those estates to retire vnto; which once taken by the enemie, the estate is withall vndone: whereas a Monarke chaungeth himselfe from place to place as occasion requireth: neither doth the taking of him by the enemie bring with it the losse of the Estate. As when the citie of Capua was taken, their estate was also ouerthrowne by the Romans, neither was there so much as one towne or fortresse which made resistance against them; for that the Senat and the people which had the soueraigntie were all together taken prisoners. The citie of Sienna also being taken by the duke of Florence, all the other townes and fortresses of that Seigneurie

at the same time yeelded themselves vnto him also. But the king taken prisoner, is most commonly for his ransome set at libertie; wherewith if the enemie hold not him selfe content, the Estates may proceed to a new election, or take the next of blood if they have other princes: yea sometime the captiue king himselfe had rather to yeeld up his estate, or else to die a prisoner, than to grieue his subiects with his too heauie a ransome. As indeed that which most troubled the Emperour Charles the fift was the resolution of king Francis then his prisoner, who gaue him to vnderstand that he was[*](The resolution of Francis the French king, being prisoner to the Emperour Charles the fift.) upon the point to resigne his kingdome unto his eldest sonne, if he would not accept of the conditions by him offered: For why, the realme and all the Estate stood yet whole without any chaunge taking, or any alteration suffering. And albeit that Spayne, Italie, England, all the Low Countries, the Pope, the Venetians, and all the Potentates of Italie had combyned themselves against the house of Fraunce, ouerthrowne our legions at Pauie, and caried away the king with the flower of the nobilitie into Spayne; yet was there not any which durst enter into Fraunce to conquer it, knowing the lawes and nature of that Monarchie. For as a building grounded upon deepe foundations, & built with durable matter, well vnited and ioyned in every part, feareth neither winde nor tempest, but easily resisteth all force and violence; euen so a Commonweale grounded upon good lawes, well vnited and ioyned in all the members thereofe, asily suffereth not alteration: as also to the contrarie we see some states and Commonweales so euill built and set together, as that they ow their fall and ruine unto the first wind that bloweth, or tempest that ariseth.

And yet is there no kingdome which shall not in continuance of time be chaunged,[*](The insensible change of estates best and most tollerable.) and at length also be ouerthrowne. But they are in better case which least feele such their chaunges by little and little made, whether it be from euill to good, or from good to better; as we have showed by the example of the Venetian Commonweale: which at the beginning was a pure Monarchie, which afterward was sweetly chaunged into a Popular estate, and now by little and little is chaunged into an Aristocratie, and that in such quiet sort, as that it was not well by any man perceiued that the estate was at all chaunged. An other example we have also of the Germaine Empire, which founded[*](The insensible stanging of the Venetian estate, and of the state of the German Empire.) by Charlemaigne and discending to his posteritie, so long continued a true Monarchie under one soueraigne princes government, vntill that the line of Charlemaigne fayling, the Emperours begun to be created by election; at which time it was right easie for the princes which had the choice by little and little to clip the Eagles wings, and to prescribe lawes and conditions unto the Emperour to rule by; and yet right happie was he which could thereunto aspire upon any condition whatsoeuer: whereby the state of the Monarchie began by little and little to decay, and the state of an Aristocratie to encrease in the Princes and Estates of the Empire, in such sort as that at this present the Emperours have nothing more but as it were the bare name and title of an Emperour, the soueraigntie resting in the Estates of the Empire it selfe. So that had not eleuen most noble Princes of the house of Austria for their worthy deeds right famous, as it were in a successiue right (one of them whilest he himselfe yet liveth, still procuring an other of the same house to be designed Emperour) in some sort maintained the maiestie of the Germaine Empire, the Emperours for their estate had now long ago beene like unto the Dukes of Venice, and happely inferiour too. The ---ke chaunge hapned unto the Polonians, the lyne of Iagellon failing: as also the Danes, after that Christierne their king was by them his subiects imprisoned, and his brother to be chosen king in his place, sworne to such conditions as the nobilitie would: and after that Frederike which now raigneth hath beene constrained to confirme the same, (as I have before noted) whereby it manifestly appeareth, that the Nobilitie there

hold as it were the soueraigntie, and that by little and little that kingdome will change into an Aristocratie if Frederike should die without children.

And albeit that the estates of Hungarie, Bohemia, Polonia, and Denmarke, haue alwayes[*](Kingdomes going by election and so indeede but Aistocraties, long continued in one familie, easily chaunge at length into Monarchies as by succession discending.) pretended the right of election of their kings, although they have children, (which prerogative they stil maintaine) yet commonly the kings their parents appointed their children unto the succession of their kingdomes, who so chosen in their fathers places, better maintaine the rights of soueraigntie than do straungers (who have the same oft times cut short, and so their soueraigne power in them restrained) so that the kingdomes so descending, as it were in succession from the great grandfathers unto their nephewes, the soueraigne rights by little and little without violence returne again from the nobilitie unto the kings themselves: which is both an easie chaunge, & most wholsome for the Commonweale. For so Cazimir the Great, king of Polonia, worthily defended the soueraigne rights by him receiued from his great grandfather: but hee dead without issue, the Polonians indeed called Lewes king of Hungarie (and Cazimir his nephew) unto the kingdome of Polonia, but with the soueraigntie therein much diminished; he for the gaining of the kingdome yeelding to whatsoeuer the estates desired. But Lewes dead also without heires male, Iagello duke of Lithuania marrying one of the daughters and heires of Lewes, and so with her obtaining the kingdome of Polonia, yet more impaired the soueraigne rights than they had before bene: the princes of whose posteritie neuerthelesse as it were in successiue right, for the space of aboue two hundred yeares, tooke upon them the government of the kingdome, and notably maintained the rights of their soueraigntie, vntill the death of Sigismundus Augustus, last heire male of that house: unto whome by right of election succeeded Henrie of Fraunce, Charles the ninth the French kings brother: but with oathes and conditions bound unto the estates, so much derogating from the rights of a soueraigne Monarch, as that indeed he might have seemed rather a prince than a king. And to say yet more, I being sent to Mets, to assist them which were thither sent with the duke, to receiue the ambassadours of Polonia, and to parle with them, it was told me by Salomon Sboroschi one of the ambassadours, That the estates of Polonia had yet cut much shorter the power of the new elected king, had it not bene in the regard they had of the honor of the house of Fraunce. Thus we see Monarchies peaceably by little and little to change into Aristocraties, if so it be that the Monarchie be not by auntient lawes and immutable customes, maintained in the maiestie thereof. As we see in the creation of the pope, where the Consistorie (or Colledge of Cardinals) derogat nothing from the soueraigne maiestie that he hath in all the demaine of the church, and the fees depending thereon: no more than do the order of the knights of Malta in any thing diminish the power of the Grand maister, who hath the power of life and death, and to dispose of the reuenewes, estates, and offices of the countrey, yeelding fealtie and homage unto the king of Spaine for the isle of Malta, which Charles the fift the emperour upon this condition gaue them. And albeit that the colledge of cardinals after the death of pope Iulius the second, determined in the conclaue, to moderat the popes power: yet shortly after they flew from that they had before decreed, in such sort that Leo the tenth, then by them chosen, tooke upon him more power than had any pope of long time before him.

But that chaunge is of others most daungerous to a Monarchie, when as the king[*](The most daungerous chaunge of a Monarchie.) dying without issue, there is some one who in wealth and power exceedeth the rest; & so much the more, if he be also ambitious and desirous of rule: For no doubt, but that hauing the power in his hand, hee will, if hee can, take the soueraigntie from the other weake princes. For so Hugh Capet the right line of Charlemaigne ended, being Prouost

of the citie of Paris, and a man of great wealth, and no lesse favoured of the people, excluded from the kingdome Charles duke of Loraine, who with his sonne Otho were the onely men left of all the posteritie of Charlemaigne. Which is also to bee feared of the great Othoman princes, who although they have their families of the Machaloglies, of the Ebranes, and the Turacans, of the princes house and blood, to succeed in the Turkish empire: yet for all that if the Othoman familie should altogether perish, it is to be thought, that some one of the Bassaes or other great men, in greatest favour with the Ianzaries, and the other souldiours of the court will carrie away the estate and soueraigntie from the other princes of the aforesaid families, being but weake, and far off[*](These noble families are nowe also al or most of them extinguished and come to nought.) from the Grand Signior, which might so raise the greatest civill warres in the East, for the great opinion which the people hath of long conceiued of the valour and maiesty of the Othoman familie. A notable example of such change of state wee have in the chaunge of the Lacedemonian kingdome: where Cleomenes the king vanquished and put to flight by Antigonus, the kingdome was chaunged into a Popular estate, which so continued for three yeares: during which time the people made choyce of five Prouosts, or chiefe magistrats, whome they called Ephori, chosen out of the people themselves: but newes being brought of the death of Cleomenes, slaine in Aegypt, two of the five Ephori conspired against the other three their companions and fellowes in office: and so as they were doing sacrifice, caused them to be slaine: which done, they proceed to the election of Agesipolis for their king, a prince of the royall blood. But whereas before Cleomenes they were woont to have two kings: one Lycurgus a man gracious with the people, but otherwise none of the blood royall, by corruption and briberie caused himselfe also by the people to be chosen king, Chilon, a noble gentleman, discended from Hercules, being for his pouerty and want of ability excluded, who not able to endure so great an indignity offered vnto his house and family, procured all the magistrats to be slaine: Lycurgus himselfe onely escaping, who after great effusion of blood, held the soueraignty himselfe alone, hauing before almost quite destroyed the royall race of the Heraclides posterity of Hercules. And thus much concerning the chaunge and ruine of Commonweales, which whether they may by any meanes be forseene and preuented, let vs now also see.