The six books of a common-weale

NOw after that we have spoken of a Familie, and of the parts thereof, of Soueraigntie, and of Magistrats; we must speake of Corporations and Colledges also: wherefore let vs then first speake of the cause of Corporations and Colledges, and after of their power and priuileges in generall, and of the maner of punishing of them, if they offend: and last of all whether the Commonweale can be without them. The difference of a Familie, from Corporations and Colledges, and so of them from a Commonweale, is such as is the difference of the parts from the whole: for the communitie of many heads of a familie, or of a village, or of a towne, or of a countrie, may be without a Commonweale, aswell as a familie without a colledge. And, as many families[*](The difference betwixt familie, a colledge, and a Commonweale.) by amitie alyed, are members of one corporation and communitie; so many corporations and communities allyed by a soueraigne power, make one Commonweale. Now a familie is a communitie naturall; a colledge is a communitie civill; and a Commonweale hath that moreouer, That it is a communitie gouerned by a soueraigne power, and may be so strait, as that it may have neither corporation nor colledges, but onely many families in it. And so the word Communitie is common unto a familie, a colledge, and a commonweale. And properly a Corporation is vnderstood to consist of diuers families, or colledges, or of many families and colledges together. But the beginnings of all civill societies are deriued from a familie, which is[*](A Familie the beginning of all civill societies.) (as we say) it selfe a naturall societie, and by the father of nature it selfe first founded in the beginning together with mankind. But when reason, by God himselfe ingrafted in vs, had made man desirous of the companie and societie of man, and to participate together both in speech and conuersation; the same so wrought, as that proceeding farther from the loue of them that were domesticall & their owne, it extended farther, to take pleasure in the propagation and encrease of families. So also families by little and little departing from their first beginning, learned by civill societie to imitate the naturall societie of a familie. For why, a Commonweale is a civill societie, which can of it selfe stand without corporations or colleges; but not without a familie: besides that, Commonweales may be dissolued, for that they are deriued from the Lawes and institutions of men: whereas families cannot altogether perish, but that all mankind must before perish also. Whereby it is to be vnderstood, From the roote of one familie, by the euerliuing God himselfe planted, at the first to have sprung up as it were certeine plants, who by necessitie constrained, built for themselves houses and dwelling places, so to be the safer from the iniurie of the weather, and the rage of wilde beasts: and after that Hamlets and villages, which in processe of time became Boroughes and

Townes. But being growne to such a multitude, as that they could not longer be contained within the compasse and precinct of the same countrie, they were driuen to depart thence also, and to seeke out new dwelling places. So that now thus divided in places, in regions, and kinred, being bound unto no law or commaund, as every one of them exceeded the other in strength and power, so he forced himself to thrust them that were neere unto him, and weaker than himselfe, out of their houses and dwelling[*](The beginning of strong townes and cities.) places; or to take from them their springs, their fountaines, or pleasant places; or to driue them from their pastures or feedings: which violence so offered by the stronger, enforced the weaker either to seeke out places by nature defencible and strong, or else by art or wisedome to fortifie themselves, their children, wiues, and families, with ditches, trenches, and walles, whereof strong townes and cities arise. For so Dionysius long since writeth king Seruius to have placed certeine places of refuge in the mountaines & strongest hilles, whether the poore countrie men might retire themselves out of the fields, so to saue themselves from the incursions of their enemies. And yet could not the enemies force be so kept off with walles and other fortifications, but that they which had so shut up themselves therein, were yet neuerthelesse besieged by the stronger. For why, the first sort of men was most giuen to rapine, murther, and theft, delighting[*](The first sort of man, most delighted in theft and murther, and oppressing of others weaker than themselves.) in nothing more, nor accounting any honour greater than to robbe and kill, and to oppresse the weaker sort as slaues: as Plutarch well agreeing with the sacred historie most truely writeth. And long before Plutarch, Thucidides the most famous historiographer of them that florished among the Greekes reporteth, all Greece but a little before his time to have beene troubled with the robberies and outrages committed[*](Theft and robberie in auntient time no disgrace nor shame.) by the mightier sort; and then robberie & theft to have bene no disgrace or shame. Yea such as traueiled by Sea or land (as the same authour reporteth) when they met, before they came neere together, used commonly (and that without any reproach or imputation) to aske whether they were Robbers or Pyrates or not. And not onely Plato, and his disciple Aristotle, have put robberie among the kinds of hunting, but the Hebrewes also▪ who call theeves and Robbers, mightie hunters, as they did Nimroth. And by the lawes of Solon it is plaine, that men might lawfully ioine in fellowship[*](Theft in auntient time lawfull both amongst the Greekes and Latins.) to robbe and steale, (prouided alwaies that it were not from the subiects of their owne estate) as appeareth by these words, ---, which the Latin interpretour thinking to be absurd and false, hath wrested them another way: For what other thing is ---, than to robbe? And what other thing is ---, but ---? Neither were robberies lesse allowed of the auntient Latines than they were of the Greeks and Hebrewes, as it is to be perceiued by the first league made betwixt the Romans and the Carthaginensians: wherein it was thus expresly set downe: * Vltra Promontorium pulchri praedae aut mercaturae gratia Romani ne nauiganto, [*](Polyb. Lib. 3.) Beyond the faire Promontorie, the Romans shall not saile either for bootie, or in trade of marchandize. From which kind of robberies long it was before other people also abstained: for so Caesar speaking of the Germaines in his time saith, Latrocinia nullam habent infamiam, quae extra fines cuiuscunque ciuitatis fiunt, atque ea iuuentutis exercendae, ac desidiae minuendae causa fieri praedicant, Robberies done without the boundes of every citie, have with them no infamie; and those they say to be done for the exercise of the youth, and auoiding of slouth. This licence and impunitie of robbing and reauing, constrained men which as yet had no Princes nor Magistrats, to ioyne themselves in societie and amitie for the defence of one an other, and to make Communities and Fraternities, which the Greekes called ---, and ---, as brethren which drew water of the same well, which they called ---, as also ---, which are rurall and countrie people vsing the faire fountaine, which the Dorians called ---, and whereof such countrie villages were called Pagi, as the Latines also said them Commessari, who in the same countrey villages, which the Greekes called ---▪ did ordinarily eate and drinke together: as [*](Festus in verbo pagi. The societies of men, why they were first sought out.) Festus writeth. Whereby it is plainely to be seene, the societies of men among themselves, to have bene at the first sought out for the leading of their lives in more safetie and quiet: and them first of all to haue sprung from the loue which was betwixt man and wife: From them to have flowed the mutuall loue betwixt parents and their children: then the loue of brethren and sisters one towards another: and after them the friendship betwixt cosens and other nie kinsmen: and last of all, the loue and good will which is betwixt men ioyned in alliance: which had all at length growne cold, and bene vtterly exstinguished, had it not bene nourished, maintained, and kept, by societies, communities, corporations, and colledges: the vnion of whome hath for long time in safetie maintained many people, without any forme of a Commonweale, or soueraigne power[*](The happy estate of the people of Israel before they had any king, or other forme of Aristocratique or popular commonweale.) over them. So the people of Israel for a long time florished in great tranquilitie without kings, and without any Popular or Aristocraticall estate, euerie man liuing at his pleasure in all libertie, euerie Tribe being in it selfe vnited by the bond of bloud and kindred, and all of them together by the communitie of their law and sacrifices. Who when they were by any enemie to be assailed or inuaded, the estates of their Tribes and communities assembling together, made choyce of a chieftaine, unto whom they gaue soueraigne power; and namely of such an one as God had with his spirit enspired and stirred up amongst them. So of many Tribes and families together vnited, was made --- Commonweale, by meane of a soueraigne power set ouer them. And for this cause the princes and lawgiuers which first founded Commonweals, who had not yet discouered the difficulties they were to proue, to keep & maintaine their subiects by way of iustice, ordained and maintained fraternities, communities, and colledges; to the end, that the parts and members of the self same body of a Commonweale, being at accord among themselves, it might be for them the more easie to rule the whole Commonweale[*](Fraternities, communities, and colleges, why they were first instituted and ordained▪) together. So we see that Numa Pompilius, king and lawgiuer unto the Romans (after he had abolished the name of the Sabines, which some thing divided the Roman state) established certaine fraternities, and colledges, or companies of men, of all maner of occupations; appointing unto euerie fraternitie certaine patrons, priests, and solemne sacrifices, which were kept on certaine appointed dayes of the yeare. And afterwards also ordained a fraternitie of marchants, to whome he gaue Mercurie for their patron: which he seemed to have done to the imitation of Solon, who by a positiue law permitted all manner of fraternities and communities whatsoeuer, with power for them to make such lawes and statutes among themselves as they should see good, so that they were not contrarie unto the publike positiue lawes of the state. Lycurgus also did not onely permit, but straitly commaund also to maintaine and cherish such societies and communities, as well generall as particular; and that all his subiects should take their refection and diet in companies of fifteene and fifteene together: which for that they were kept for friendship sake, were called ---, of the friendship that they had one of them with another. As also in almost all the other townes of Greece, there were the like fraternities and companies, whome they called ---, as in Italie the same colledges and companies were called Sodalitia; for the unitie, companie, and[*](Amitie and friendship the foundation of l humane and ciuil societies and more requisite for the keeping and maintaining thereof than iustice is selfe.) friendship they had among themselves, eating and drinking together for the most part: and hauing no judges but themselves, if any difference or strife chaunced to fall out amongst them, being such companions and fellowes; as knowing that amitie and friendship was the onely foundation of all humane and civill societie, and much more requisit for the keeping and maintaining thereof, than iustice it selfe: For that iustice neuer flexible, but alwayes keeping the uprightnesse of it selfe, by iust iudgement well endeth suits; but not hatred, making oft times of friends foes: whereas amitie and friendship, which is by company nourished, yeelding of the right of it selfe, best establisheth the true naturall iustice, and plucketh up all controuersies by the root, with great quietnesse and loue reconciling subiects among themselves, together with the Commonweale. Now the principall end & scope of all laws, both diuine and humane, is to keep and maintaine the loue of men one towards another amongst themselves, and them altogether in their dutie towards God; which cannot better be done, than by ordinarie and orderly conuersing and combining of men themselves together.

Wherefore the Cretentians in auntient time did all eat and drinke together, young and old, men and women; for to maintaine the loue and amitie which we have before spoke of amongst them: Howbeit that afterwards to auoid confusion, the ages and sexes were into certaine orders divided. So we see in the law of God, the feasts of Passeouer, to haue bene commaunded to be holden by companies of ten and ten persons together: beside the feasts of Tabernacles, and the ordinarie banquets of sacrifice, which God commaunded to be solemnised with all ioy and gladnesse: and that for no other cause, but that so men might be together vnited in religion towards God, and mutuall loue and friendship one to another among themselves. The same was also well obserued[*](Orderly feasts and meetings of old time instituted to maintaine loue and amitie amongst men.) & kept in the Christian primitiue church, who oftentimes made such feasts, which they called ---, for the deuout kissings, and charitable embracements one of them (in the feruensie of their zeale) gaue to another, in the ending of them, besides their ordinarie behauiour and communication. And albeit that many things are long since by tract of time growne out of vse, yet neuerthelesse a resemblance of those old feastes is yet shadowed in our holy feasts and banquets: which not faigned but true feasts the Venetians do with most great care and solemnitie keepe: but the Swissers better than in any place of the world, where the fraternities and companies in euerie towne have their common houses or halles▪ wherein they oftentimes make their feasts and bankets, neither is there any village so little, which hath not a common house in it for that purpose. Where if any strife or contention shall arise amongst them that be of the fellowship or companie, it is by the common consent there ended, and the definitiue sentence there written, not in paper, but upon the verie table whereon they have banqueted, and that not with inke, but with chalke. And as in auntient time artisans, marchants, priests, bishops, and all sorts of men had their fraternities, and companies: so had also the philosophers, and especially the Pythagorians, who ordinarily met together, and lived for most part of their time in common. And thus much concerning the cause, the beginning, and progresse of corporations, and colledges, communities, and companies: which afterwards by succession of time have in all Commonweales beene better ruled by lawes, statutes, and customes.

But that all things which are to be said of corporations and colledges, may in order be declared: Let vs first orderly set downe and show, what power every corporation or colledge is of, and what priuilege is to euerie one of them giuen; then how they are to be gouerned, and kept within the bounds of their dutie; and last of all, whether a[*](The diuisiion of colleges and companions.) Commonweale can be without colledges or companies, and what colledges are most necessarie and best fitting a Commonweale. Which the better to vnderstand, we may say, that all colledges and companies are ordained either for religion, or for policie, and so concerne but worldly things. If they be instituted but for policie, either they have iurisdiction, or are without all iurisdiction. Colledges without iurisdiction, are such as are ordained for the bringing up of youth, or for fellowship of physitians, or of other schollers, or of marchants, or of handie craft and trades men, or of companies of husbandmen:

but such as have iurisdiction, are colledges of magistrats, and judges, such as of whome we have before spoken. Colledges ordained and made for religion, or for publike deuotion, are growne into number almost infinit; differing as wee see, in lawes, manners, life, attire, orders, fashions, and apparell. And it may be, that a colledge may be particular to one occupation, or to one science, or to one companie of marchants, or to one iurisdiction: and it may also be, that two or moe colledges, may bee vnited into one bodie, as all manner of occupations together, all sorts of marchants, or all maisters of sciences, or all the magistrats; which ought not of right to bee called a colledge, but a bodie politique, or corporation: albeit that by the ambiguitie of words they be oftentimes together confounded. For there was one colledge of the Tribunes, another of the Pretors, and another of the Questors: but when these three colledges meet together into one and the selfe same bodie, it is foolishly called a colledge: and yet can it not rightly be tearmed an Vniuersitie, which consisteth of the companie and assemblie of all the citisens, colledges, and corporations, yea and sometimes also of the villages of the same countrey. Wherefore we shall rather call it a bodie politique than a colledge: which so together groweth of many colledges, or persons of vnlike condition. And it may be also, that all the particular colledges may have the right of a generall communitie, or of an vniuersitie. And that not onely all the colledges and communities, but that also all the inhabitants ioyned together with the corporation & colledges of a towne, or of a countrey, or of a prouince, may have the right of a communitie for to hold their estates. Moreover the right of a colledge or companie may be giuen to euerie mysterie or occupation in particular, and yet forbidden them in generall.[*](What a corporation or college is.) And euerie one of them may have diuers rules, statutes, and particular priuileges. So that we may say, that euerie corporation or colledge, is a lawfull communitie or consociation under a soueraigne power. Where the word Lawfull importeth the authoritie[*](No corporation or college to be suffered without the leaue of the soueraige.) of the soueraigne, without whose permission there can be no colledge: and is referred not onely unto the power of meeting together: but unto the place also where it ought to meet, unto the time and manner of meeting, and to what things ought to bee entreated of, in their assembly. And the word communitie, or consociation, signifieth that there ought some thing to be common to all that be fellowes of the colledge or[*](every college of societie must have somthing common to al the fellowes thereof, being otherwise no college.) societie: For where there is nothing common, there is no colledge: sufficient it is for them to have their meeting common, their attourney or agent common, and the priuileges giuen unto the colledge common unto all the fellowes thereof: albeit that they have neither common treasure, neither ordinarily live or conuerse together. So that they have not well defined a colledge, which haue said it to bee a fellowship of three persons dwelling together, hauing their goods and substances in common. Wherein they are two wayes deceiued, for it may be, that three persons or moe may have their goods in common, and live together, and yet be all no colledge, but a societie of themselves, contracted for the getting of goods, and liuing together: as also to the contrarie, fellowes of the same colledge may dwell separat in houses, not hauing their goods in common, nor any common treasure; neither yet commonly liuing together: and yet enioy indeed the right of a colledge or companie, as hauing by law and the princes graunt, power to assemble themselves and meet together at certaine places, and times: and to intreat of certaine their affaires, such as are the fraternities or companies of artificers and trades men, whome the law calleth Collegia, or colledges. Yet some colledges there be, which have almost all those things among themselves common, as wee[*](What number of fellowes ought to be in college or societie.) see those to haue, which are together ioyned for studie, religion or deuotion sake.

As for the number of fellowes in a colledge or societie, it is no matter what it bee, so that they be not fewer than three: for that otherwise it cannot be a colledge. Wherefore

the Romans called it not a colledge of their Censors, or Consuls, as they did of [*](What number of fellowes ought to be in a college or societie.) their Pretors, Tribunes, and Questors. And as for the fellowes themselves, my meaning is, that they should be equall of power, in respect of their communitie or fellowship, hauing euerie one of them a deliberatiue voice in their affayres: howbeit that it may be, that the colledge, or prince, may make choyce of one of the fellowes to commaund, reforme, and chastice euerie one of the fellows in particular, but not all of them in generall: such as are our bishops and abbats, hauing power to chastice their religious and chanons But if this head or chiefe have power over the whole body of the societie or colledge in grosse, it is not then rightly a colledge, but rather a forme of familie, such as are colledges or schooles ordained for the bringing up of youth: wherein there bee no bursors or fellowes, which have therein any deliberatiue voice: For if it have in it any such bursors or fellowes, hauing the right of the societie or colledge, and deliberatiue voice in their assemblies, it is then a colledge, albeit that the rest of the yonger sort be under the power and correction of the principall.

And hereof ariseth a question, Whether a bishop in the companie of his priests, or an abbat amongst his religious, be to be accounted fellowes, hauing the verie title and[*](Whether the head or principal of a college be to be also accounted a fellowe thereof) right of a fellow, and himselfe making a part of the colledge, without the qualitie or title of a bishop or abbat? Which question being by the learned on both parts disputed, yet remaineth vndecided. But to leaue the disputation apart, it seemeth, that he which is chosen by the colledge or prince to commaund all the fellowes in particular, hath a double qualitie; one in respect of euerie one of the fellowes, and another in respect of the whole colledge or societie: where in regard of the fellowes he is called Principall, Bishop, Abbat, Prior, President, or such like, hauing power and authoritie to command euerie one of them in particular: howbeit that in the bodie of the colledge or corporation, he is no more than a fellow, although he have the place of precedence: and that is it for which they put their titles divided, as, the Bishop, Chanons, and Chpite---; the Abbat, Religious, & Couent; the Principall, Bursors, & Colledge. Wherein one of the chiefest lawyers hath bene deceiued, saying, That the Philosophers haue called the persons of a colledge, the colledge: showing indeed no Philosophie in so saying, considering[*](That a college is a name of right: and consisteth not in the persons of the fellows, but may stil remaine, all the fellowes thereof being dead.) that a colledge is a name of right, and that all the reuenew and right of a colledge may remaine in one person, the rest of the fellowes being all dead. And in case that all the fellowes of a colledge were dead, yet doth the right of a colledge remaine: neither can the lands or goods thereof be confiscated, except the right of a colledge be before by the supreme authoritie suppressed. For one of the principall priuileges of corporations and colleges is, that legacies may be unto them giuen by testament: wheras societie by the law forbidden, are not colleges, but vnlawfull assemblies, unto whom it is not by the law permitted, to leaue any thing by testament, albeit that legacies may be giuen unto euerie one of the colledges. But to the intent such vnlawfull companies and assemblies might be repressed, I thinke it needfull, that it should by law bee forbidden, any lands or legacies to be vnto al or any of them left by testament, as unto fellows of such corporations or colledges.

And whereas we have said, that a colledge or societie may be without any common[*](Antoninus first that gaue leaue for legacies to be giuen to colleges) stocke or treasure: that it also to be vnderstood, that a colledge or societie may bee ordained with such prouiso, that nothing shall be left unto it by gift or legacie. Antoninus the emperour was the first which gaue leaue for legacies & donations to be giuen to al colledges, except to the colledges of the Iewes, unto whome it was yet lawfull to meet together for religion sake, and to have their Synagogues: as is to be seene in the oration of the ambassadour Philo, unto the emperour Caligula. And Augustus himselfe by letters pattens directed unto the gouernours of the prouinces of the empire, commanded,

That they should permit and suffer the Iewes to enioy their colledges. Whereupon [*](Augustus a great fauorour of th Iewes.) Narbanus Proconsull of Asia, forbad the magistrats of Ephesus in any sort to let of disturbe them. Yea that more is, Augustus himselfe commaunded a dailie and perpetuall sacrifice of a calfe, a goat, and a ram, to be made at Hierusalem for the welfare of himselfe, and of the Commonweale: and willed an ordinarie almes or doale to bee giuen unto the Iewes, of his owne proper costs and charges, for the reliefe of their necessitie. There be also corporations and colledges of judges and magistrats, which yet are not capable of testamentarie legacies, if they have not expresse leaue by their erection and institution so to doe. As was iudged against the Senat of Rome: whereunto Russius Caepio one of the Senators, had giuen by legacie a certaine summe of money, which he willed to be still distributed to them onely which came vnto the councell: which legacie the Senat demaunding, Caepio his heires denied it to bee unto the Senat due: in which controuersie Domitian the emperour gaue sentence for the heire, and excluded the Senat, although it were the most auntient, and most necessarie corporation of all the Roman Commonweale.

And thus hauing set downe and declared the beginning and definition of colledges, and communities: let vs now also speake of their power in generall; which is not determined by their particular foundations, statutes, and priuileges, which are diuers and[*](The colleges of iudges and the chief colleges in a Commonweal.) almost infinit, according to the diuersitie of the particular colledges and communities themselves. Now the chiefe corporations or colledges, and which have most power in a Commonweale, are the colledges of judges and magistrats: who not onely have power over euerie one of their fellowes, and the lesser part of their owne colledge, but over other particular colledges also; and so ouer others subiect to their iurisdiction, and yet without their colledge. And in this the colledges of judges and magistrats notably differ from other colledges: for that other colledges are established euerie one of them for the good government of that onely which is unto themselves common; whereas the colledges of judges and magistrats, are principally erected for the good of other subiects, and to rule the other colledges, as also to chastice them if they shall transgresse their lawes and statutes. But as a wise man ought first to be wise for himselfe, and then for others; as also to looke first into himselfe, before he can rightly iudge of others; or as the Hebrewes in their prouerbes say, That charitie ought first to begin of it selfe, if it be well ruled: So ought the colledges of judges and magistrats, first to establish iustice amongst themselves, euerie one of them in particular, and to themselves all in generall, the better to distribute the same to the other subiects.

But question might be made, Whether it were more expedient that the colledges[*](Whether it w more expedient the colledges of magistrats and judges to be iudged and reformed by their fellowes of the same societie, or by others.) of magistrats and judges, should be iudged by their fellowes, or by others? for some particular reasons, which in due place we shall hereafter set downe. But here to make the matter short, If the colledge for the most part be composed of euill and naughtie men, it is not to be left unto themselves, to iudge of their owne misdemainers; but they are to be iudged by the superiour magistrats, if they have power over them; or by the prince, in case they be not by any other superiour magistrat to be reformed. But if the greater part of them be good and honest men, there is then no doubt but that it is better and more expedient both for the colledge and the Commonweale, that the fellows should be iudged by their fellowes, rather than by other iudges: For that euerie colledge I know not how hath in it some particularitie which cannot so well bee vnderstood or iudged, as by the fellowes of the same corporation themselves. Ioyning hereunto also, that by this meane the loue and unitie of the fellowes among themselves, is in their colledge and societie the better maintained. And for this cause chiefly the emperour Adrian decreed, That the Roman Senators should be iudged by the Senat onely.

And for the selfe same reason the civill iurisdiction of marchants, and for the trade of marchandise hath bene wisely in all Italie, and since that in Fraunce committed and giuen to certaine magistrats and Consuls of the corporation and companie of marchants, summarily to decide the differences arising about the contracts of marchandise, which have in them I know not how certaine secrets, not to others well knowne.

As for other corporations and colledges, as of physitians, and tradesmen, albeit that[*](Colleges not hauing any iurisdiction but only a restraining power, how they are to vse the same.) by their foundation they have not any iurisdiction or commaunding power; yet neuerthelesse so it is, that they alwayes have a certaine restrayning authoritie and power by their statutes and priuileges, limited and allowed them; and sometime without any limitation at all left unto the wisdome and discretion of the corporation or colledge, or of the head thereof: which ought to be used with such moderation, as the father is to vse towards his children: which ought not to be with crueltie or rigour. For if the law condemne him to pay the price of the slaue, slaine by him that hath taken uppon him to teach him, albeit that it were in correcting of him: of much greater reason were he to be condemned, which hauing but the moderat correction of men of free condition, should vse such rigour as that death should thereof ensue? As it sometimes happened in Lacedemonia, where yong children were by the Great Maister of the youth so rigorously whipt, a--- that sometimes they gaue up the ghost upon the altar of Diana whilest they were yet in whipping; most part of them not daring so much as to sigh or grone, for feare they had to be accounted faint harted cowards. And albeit that the emperour Frederike the second gaue power and authoritie unto the rectours of Vniuersities, and that the principals of schooles and colledges have alwayes had the correction of their disciples and schollers: yet that is to bee vnderstood but of light matters, and not of such chastisement and correction as the magistrat hath by the princes graunt over priuat offendors; as many haue beene of opinion. For why, neither the German emperour, no--- the pope can giue any such power unto the principalles of colledges, or to the colledges themselves: but in such countries as are vnto themselves subiect. For albeit that pope Gregorie the eleuenth in a Bull graunted for the confirmation of the priuileges of the Vniuer---itie of Paris, before graunted by the popes Vrban the fift, and Innocent the sixt, in one article prouided, That if a scholler committed any thing deseruing punishment, the hearing thereof should belong unto the bishop of Paris onely: and in another article also, That no scholler should from thenceforth bee imprisoned for whatsoeuer debt. Yet the French kings and magistrats have o---eentimes well declared themselves not to bee bound to any such the popes Bulles. Yet true it is, that colledges instituted for religion, have ordinarily the correcting of them that are therein professed; and that so much the more, as their rule and order is the straiter: For which cause such as have therein taken uppon them such profession, are exempted from the power and correction of their owne fathers: albeit that many hold the contrarie: whose opinion for all that is not in that point followed. And yet neuerthelesse certaine it is, that the naturall dutie and reuerence[*](Whether children hauing taken upon them any vowe of religion, be yet neuerthelesse bound to honor and obey their parents.) of children towards their parents, remaineth alwaies in force and power, notwithstanding whatsoeuer bond and vow they have made to any corporation or colledge. For why, neither mans lawes, nor the statutes or priuileges of princes can derogat from the lawes of God and nature, which hath expresly bound children unto the obedience of their fathers and mothers; from which they can by no otherwise free, or yet deliver tthemselves, than by lawfull emancipation: or their fathers silence, who in saying nothing, seeme to have consented vnto their childrens vowes, which by speaking they might have letted: which cōsent for all that excuseth not children from doing

the honour and reuerence due unto their parents, although that they being so professed, be from thenceforth accounted children of the colledge; unto whome also their colledges in right of inheritance succeed, they themselves beeing accounted of seruile estate & condition. For which cause the canonists giue unto the abbies power and authoritie over their owne religious, exempt from the bishops, which hath oftentimes by the decrees of the parliament of Paris bene confirmed. In such sort, as that they which are once entred into such religious orders, may not from that time be called to account or into questiō for any thing by them committed before they entred into the monastery: which yet is to be vnderstood but of light & youthful faults; which otherwise were but to open a way to theeves and murtherers, to retire themselves into such colledges, as into forrests, for the auoiding of due punishment; as indeed it ofttimes happeneth: wherewith the wise magistrats ought to meet, & according to the law of God to draw the murtherers from the altar to doe upon them iustice. As the court of parliament of Thoulouse (not long agoe) condemned two religious monks of the order D'aurade, to be in their habits shamefully drawne upon a hurdle to the place of execution, and there to be quartered, without disgrading of them, for hauing most cruelly murthered[*](That Monks may conuent their Abbot before the ordinarie iudge: and also appeale from the inust sentence of their Abbot.) the head of their monasterie, whose seueritie they could by no meanes endure. Yea the abbat himselfe may by his monkes be conuented before the ordinarie judge, and that as well in criminall as civill matters: who may also freely appeale from the sentence of their abbat unto his superiour, as it hath oftentimes beene iudged by the decrees of the parliament of Paris; & that without leaue, as witnesseth [*](Panormitan the Abbot.) the abbat of Palermo; and hath also bene iudged by the parliament of Bourdeaux. And for the same reason if the colledge would without cause thrust out or depriue one of the fellowes of his right, priuilege, and libertie in the colledge, the hearing of the cause belongeth to the ordinarie judge of the colledge. Howbeit that in auntient time the corporations and colledges of Artisans, Marchants, and other such like, had this power (for the remouing of their fellowes) as we read in Cicero of the Roman marchants, Mercuriales & Capitolini, M. Furium hominem nequam, equitem Romanum de collegio deiecerunt, The Mereuriales and Capitolini (saith he) thrust M. Furius a naughtie man, and yet a gentleman of Rome, out of their colledge or companie. And in Lacedemonia (as Plutarch writeth) it was lawfull for to thrust out of their colledges or companies, him that had discouered or reuealed the sec---ets of their companie. As in like case Panormitan the abbat writeth, That in abbies or colledges erected for deuotion, the chapiters have power to thrust out any of the fellowes, or to depriue him of his ordinarie diuidents, but not to beat him, or to vse sen---re correction upon him, or yet to imprison him; as hath bene iudeged by a decree of the parliament of Paris.

But yet here a man might aske, Whether a colledge may make a decree, That none of the fellowes shal conuent or sue another of his fellowes, before any other judges but the colledge? And in case it be so decreed, whether hee that shall breake the decree so made and sue his fellow before another judge, shall be bound unto the civill penaltie in the decree set downe? Wherein Sceuola the lawyer is of opinion, the decree to bee good; and that the fellow of a colledge or societie cannot have recourse unto other magistrats, contrarie unto the decree of the colledge, but in paying the penaltie in the decree of the colledge expressed. Howbeit (in mine opinion) this decree is not general, neither can take place in causes criminall, no more than the conditionall penalties set downe in arbitrements, which have no place if they concerne matters of crime. Secondarily mine opinion is, That the decree of a colledge or companie, euen in civill causes hath no place, if all the fellowes of the colledge or societie giue not thereunto their consents, as they do in arbitrements, whereunto no man is bound that

would not. For in all communities, corporations and colledges, and so generally in [*](How decrees are in colleges and societies to be made, to bind every one of them to that is common to every one of them in particular, as also to that which is common to them all iointly and indiuisibly together.) euerie societie and companie, if question be of any thing which is common to them al in particular & apart from the community, the expresse consent of every one of them is therin requisit, if any thing be therin to be done. But if question be of that which is commō to them all iointly & indiuisibly, it sufficeth that the greater part be of one opinion, for the binding of the rest: Prouided alwaies, that nothing be ordained or decreed, contrarie to the statutes of the colledge, established by the soueraigne prince, or by the founder of such corporation or colledge, authorised by the prince. Wherfore the laws of the Commonweale, and the statutes of the colledge standing whole and entire, the colledge may make decrees which may bind the lesser part all together, and all the fellowes in particular: yet still prouided, that two third parts of the fellowes consent unto the making of the decree: albeit that they be not all of one aduise or opinion, in matters concerning their common society, although that such decrees so made cannot bind the greater part of the fellows collectiuely, and much lesse the whole corporation and college: no more than the prince is bound to his owne law, or the testator to his owne will, or particular men unto their owne agreements, from which they may by their common consent reuolt, nothing beeing more agreeing with reason and nature, than euerie thing to be dissolued, by the same meanes that it was made.

But yet it might be doubted, Whether decrees made by the consent and good liking[*](Whether decres made by the consent of an whole college or societie: may by the greater part thereof againe be abrogated or repealed.) of an whole colledge or societie, might bee againe repealed and abrogated by the greater part, or two third parts of the same societie or colledge? Which I doubt not but that they may in al common estates, corporations, and colledges, if question be but of things common to them al in generall (as they are one vnited body:) but if question be of euerie mans right by himselfe particular and apart from others, then euerie man is to giue his consent thereunto. Wherefore if the assemblies of the estates in a Commonweale consist and be of diuers bodies, as in the diets of the empire, and in all other Commonweales are composed of three orders and degrees of men, viz. of the Clergie, the Nobilitie, and Comminaltie, nothing can be done or decreed by any two of the orders, to the hurt or preiudice of the third, especially if the matter concerne every one of the orders by themselves apart. By which reason I caused two of the orders of Fraunce, to chaunge their opinions in matter concerning the third. For at such time as I was sent deputie for the prouince of Vermandois to Blois (whither king Henry the iij had called an assemblie or parliament of al the kingdome of France) a great and weightie question was moued amongst the three estates, Whether it were more indifferent, and better also, the requests of the people to bee before the prince iudged and determined by 36, men which euerie one of the three orders should by voice chuse, than by the prince himselfe with his councel? And now the Clergie and Nobilitie had not onely so decreed, but had drawne a great part of our sort unto their side also, hauing with hope of great rewards gained their voices. At which time I perceiuing the drift and purpose of certaine ambitious persons that were dealers in the matter, aunswered, That the matter was further to bee considered of. For why, it was laboured, that such things as could not bee obtained of the people in generall, might so be from a few in the name of the whole extorted. Wherefore the question being more throughly debated, I denied that the matter could so by vs bee passed, without a more speciall commission from the people. Neither that if wee had any such speciall commission from the people, could it yet by vs bee done, without the great daunger of the whole Commonweale; and that for many reasons, by me then discouered: whereby I drew the rest of my fellowes backe againe to mine opinion, who laied this charge uppon mee to remoue also the other two orders of estate

from their former receiued and setled opinion. But when the Archbishop of Lyons (President of the Ecclesiasticall estate) earnestly withstood me, seriously alleaging that the Clergie and Nobilitie had before so resolued; I showed him, that such a prerogative had from all antiquitie beene kept to every of the three Estates, as that no two of them could decree any thing to the preiudice of the third: as it had before without any difficultie passed in the parliament at Orleance; and as it is also used in the diets of the Empire, and the Parliaments of England, and of Spayne. For which cause, and other reasons then alleaged, I requested the other two orders of Estate, to take it in good part, in that they were by me hindered, as hauing the charge of the third estate. Which was the cause, that the thing beeing againe called into consultation, both the estates chaunged their opinions. Which the king hearing, and dissembling his griefe, said in the presence of Ruze Bishop of Angiers, and other Lords, That Bodin at his pleasure had over ruled the Estates.

But if question be of a thing common to all a corporation or colledge, and which[*](The greater part of a Colledge or Communitie alwaies reputed for the whole, and therefore may as it seemeth good, determine of any thing which concerneth the whole corporation or colledge.) concerneth not any the particular members apart from the whole bodie, but the whole and entire bodie onely; the greater part of the societie, may at their discretion thereof determine: albeit that the whole communitie have determined that their Statutes and orders should not be infringed, but by the consent of all the fellowes. For why, The greater part of a Communitie is alwaies reputed for the whole. Yea the law willeth, that he which is chosen of a communitie or colledge to entreat and discide of their common affaires, may bind every one of the colledge. Wherefore they are deceiued which write the greater par---, or two third parts of a Colledge, to be able to do nothing, if the colledge have made a statute, That they must all thereto consent: for if that might take place, then any one of the fellowes himselfe alone might empeach and stay the aduise, decrees, and resolutions of the whole societie; which is contrarie to the formall disposition of the law, which willeth, That in all acts concerning a communie or corporation, the greater part should be the stronger; and that the more part of two third parts, may giue lawe to all the fellowes in particular, whether the rest of the fellowes be there present or absent. For why, it is not needfull that they should all be present, that the decrees should stand good, and that especially in light matters; prouided yet that they be all thereunto summoned or called. Howbeit that in matters of waight & consequence, it is needfull that two third parts be there present, albeit that they all giue not their consents, except it be by a speciall law prouided that the two third parts must of necessitie agree in one. As by the iudiciall lawes of Lewes the xij the French king, it is ordained, That two parts of the Iudges, and no fewer, may in the higher Courts end any civill cause: whereas in criminall causes, equall voices acquite the partie accused; who yet otherwise is to be condemned, if the greater part do but by one voice exceed the lesser. So also by a decree of Gregorte the x, concerning the election of the Pope, he must have two third parts of the colledge of Cardinals that is to be chosen Pope. As also in many elections of the heads of Colledges, it is necessarie that two third parts of the colledge should agree in one. Yea sometime it is necessarie that all the fellowes should be of one and the selfe same accord. As in Rome it was by the Tribunitiall law requisite that all the ten Tribunes should be of one opinion and mind, or at least wise not openly to discent, for that otherwise one Tribune alone might empeach and stay the proceedings of the whole Colledge. Now if they all agreed in one, then unto the decree were ioyned these words, Pro Collegio, for the Colledge: otherwise if there be no speciall statutes or law to the contrarie, the greater part of two third parts sufficieth in all acts concerning the communitie of corporations and colledges.

It is also necessarie, that the consent whereof we speake, bee giuen in the common

assembly of the corporation or colledge: for albeit that all the fellowes had seperately [*](For the making of a decree in a colledge, or corporation, the consent is to be giuen in the cōon assembly of the same, & that in time & plac by the statutes theeof appointed.) and apart consented unto any thing concerning that which is common to all the Colledge, yet so it is that such act is not to any effect or purpose, neither for nor against them which have so giuen their consents, although it were done euen before publique notaries: for that it is not done by the Colledge, which is done by all the fellowes apart. Neither sufficeth it that all they of the Corporation or Colledge were called together, if it were not in time and place, by the Statutes appointed. Wherefore two parts of the fellowes gathered together, can do more, than all the fellowes consenting apart.

But here some man may aske, who shall call the fellowes together? Wherein many are of opinion, that the most auntient fellow of the Colledge or Societie, hath power [*](To whom it belongeth to call the fellowes together in a colledge or societie.) to call the rest together; as also to condemne them of contumacie for not comming▪ and yet for all that not to have power to fine them, which is but a ridiculous thing, if such contumacie cannot be punished, neither by him, nor yet by the colledge; as certein it is that it cannot: wherfore such calling of the fellows together, by the most auntient fellow, is but vaine, except that the fellowes of their owne accord be content to obey the same. And therefore the Senat during the Consulship of Caesar could not be assembled or called together, Caesar the greatest magistrat forbidding the same, as is afore said. Othersome are of an other opinion, and hold, That two third parts of a Colledge may of right call together the rest: but yet who shall then call together those two third parts they say not. Howbeit is two third parts suffice to do and determine the affaires of a corporation or communitie, we need not to trouble our selues with the rest, all the fellowes being called. Howbeit the custome kept almost in all corporations and colledges is, for the elders by their seruants or other ministers to call together the rest; or else for them of them selues to come together at the tolling of a bell, or the sound of a Trumpet; as in auntient time they did in Graece and Rome, when as the magistrats which had power to assemble the people, or the Senat, caused their commaunds by the sound of a Trumpet to be published to the people in particular, but not to all in generall, for that they could not be so in that sort commaunded. And who so obeyed not but refused to come, him the magistrat had power to fine, or seize upon his goods. As we see how that Marcus Antonius being Consull, threatned Cicero to pull downe his house, if he came not to the Senat being called. So that there is no question where he that calleth together the fellowes, hath power to commaund. But if the Colledge or societie be destitute of an head or magistrat which hath power to commaund, or hauing power, yet is not willing to constraine them which will not obey him; then he whom it concerneth to have the societie assembled, is to obtaine commission from the magistrat to constraine them to come together, and so we vse to doe. Yet may the greater part of the fellowes together, depriue every particular fellow of part of the profit and commoditie he is to have of his Colledge, if being orderly called he shall refuse to come, it being so decreed; yet so that it be moderately [*](That it is lawful for all colleges & corporations to make such orders as they shal thinke best for themselves, not derogating from such orders as were giuen them from their soueraigne prince, or from the lawes and ordinances of the commonweale.) done. Wherefore to conclude this question of the power of Communities, Corporations, and Colledges, we may say Solons law to have generally place in every Commonweale, and to be approued by the Interpretors of both the lawes: that is to say, that it is free for all lawfull communities, corporations, and colledges, to make such orders as they shall think for themselves best, so that therby they do not derogate from the statutes of the Colledge, made or established by the Soueraigne Prince, or that they be not repugnant or contrarie to the lawes and ordinances of the Commonweale. And in auntient time it was not forbidden corporations and colledges to make decrees and ordinances within themselves, without derogating from the publique

lawes; as also to put therunto such and so great a penaltie and punishment, as pleased the Colledge. But since that time by the statutes and ordinances of every Colledge & Commonweale, that power hath beene ordinarily cut short, and brought unto some small fi---e. Neither am I of their opinion, which hold that a Colledge may make ordinances and decrees without any penaltie annexed vnto them; for that such an ordinance, degree, or statute, should be but vnprofitable and ridiculous, if no punishment were thereunto apposed against them that should disobey the same, especially if he that maketh the orders or decrees have not power by arbitrarie punishment to cause them to be obserued and kept. We see also in many places the Corporations of artificers and such like, which have the right of a communitie, to have also a certeine forme of restraining, and visiting of the workes and wares of their occupations or trades, with power to seise upon them, or to breake or confiscate them, if any thing be done contrarie to their decrees and orders: sauing yet alwaies the Magistrats authoritie[*](What things Corporations and colleges are in their assemblies & meeting to entreat and consult of?) for the hearing of the matter, if it be so reserued unto him. But whereas we said that a lawfull Corporation or colledge may make ordinances and decrees, not derogating from the lawes of the Commonweale: that is so yet to be vnderstood, as that they in their assemblies and meetings entreat onely of that which is vnto themselves common, and not of such things as whereof they are by the law prohibited not onely to determine, but euen to consult also: lest in so doing they incurre the penaltie appointed against vnlawfull Colledges and Companies.

And thus much concerning the power, rights, and priuileges of Corporations and [*](How Corporations & colleges are to be corrected and punished when they shall offend.) Colledges in generall. Let vs now see also how and in what sort they are to be corrected and punished when they shall offend. Howbeit that one might say that where no offence is committed, there no punishment is to be inflicted. Now so it is that a colledge or corporation cannot offend, nor so much as consent, or doe any thing by fraud or deceit (as the law saith;) and therefore there lyeth no action of fraud or deceit against a colledge or corporation, although all the fellowes of the same colledge, or all the inhabitants of a citie, or all the estates of a countrie, had particularly and every one of them apart consented thereunto: a thing yet altogether impossible in corporations and communities of Townes, Countries, Prouinces, & Commonweales, considering that the children and furious persons which therein are, cannot yeeld their consent thereto. But forasmuch as things done by the greater part of the fellowes of a colledge[*](How Corporations and Colleges are said to offend.) collegiatly assembled, or by the greater part of the inhabitants of a towne or citie in a lawfull assemblie, are supposed to be done by them all, therefore the whole colledge or corporation is punished: as in rebellions of Townes, and seditions of communities, which are punished in their Corporations by losse of their priuileges, or of the right of their communitie, by fines, charges, seruices, and other punishments, according to the qualitie of the offence: which punishment yet ought not to take place, if the rebellion or other crime be not committed by the consent of the communitie or corporation, and decree for the doing thereof made in their common assemblie: as it was iudged by a decree of the parliament of Paris, for the communitie of the citie of Corbeil. And yet neuerthelesse, if the corporall punishment be for the offence committed, to be inflicted, as whipping, torture, or death, none of the societie or corporation are so to be punished, but they which were therein partakers, or at least thereunto priuie, although the whole bodie of the communitie or colledge be therefore condemned. As in priuat offences done by many being of no colledge or communitie, there lyeth not an action but against every one of the offendours in particular, and for the whole, in such sort, as that one of them hauing made satisfaction, the others are thereby acquired. But if such fact or offence be done by any one, following therein the aduise, counsell, and

deliberation of all, they may be all therefore conuented, and every one of them apart for the whole, neither one of them making satisfaction, are the others thereby discharged. But happely it may seeme a thing verie vnreasonable and absurd, that many, yea the greater part of the same colledge or corporation, should be found innocent, and yet to be altogether punished in the whole bodie, as in the cases by vs before rehearsed. Whereunto I answere, That it is yet more straunge, that the innocents should by lot be drawne together with the offendours, and that these should be punished, upon whom the lot should fall; as the maner was in the Decimation (or as it were tything) of the armie, for hauing borne it selfe cowardly against the enemie, where the most hardie & valiant, were oftentimes by lot drawne out, and for cowards executed. Which example the Senator Cassius vsed, at such time as he in full Senat, persuaded the Senators to put foure hundred Slaues to death, although that there was one (and he vnknowne) amongst them guiltie of the murther committed in the person of their master, ioyning thereunto these wordes: Omne magnum exemplum habet aliquid [*](A notable saying.) ex iniquo, quod publica vtilitate compensatur, every great example sauoreth something of iniustice, which (yet for all that) is with the common profit againe recompensed or requited. But this is not (may some say) to pay the debt, to alleage one inconuenience in defence of an other, and of one absurditie to conclude an other. Whereunto I say, that the best iustice that a man can doe is, of diuers inconueniences at once[*](Of diuers inconueniences at once propounded, it is alwaies best to shunne the greatest.) propounded, to shunne the greatest, especially when question is of such offences as may in no wise be left vnpunished. For we see that the wisest, & most aduised Lawiers have descided, That if there be any one slaine, or beaten, or robbed by many, they are all bound for the whole, albeit that happely it was but one of them which gaue to him the mortall wound: but if it shall appeare, which of them killed him, and that it was done without the conspiracie of the rest, onely he is bound that so slew him: But if it appeare not at all by whom he was slaine, neither that they had conspired against him, they are all acquited from corporall punishment; but yet are to be therefore fined: For nothing is more effectuall for the finding out of that which is true and iust, then that in doubtfull things it is admitted, still to shunne those things which are more absurd and vniust. As if a felonie bee done which cannot by one man be performed; as if many have caried away an other mans timber log, and amongst those many it appeareth not who it was that did it, none of them is guiltie of the theft, if we will sticke unto the subtillitie of the words of the law; and yet are they all indeed guiltie: whereof the Lawiers have no other reason, but that the inconuenience falleth greater on the one side, when they would shunne it on the other, which is (as we said) the greatest reason that a man can haue, to find out the truth of all things, when all other reasons faile. We speake not here of that which enemies do to townes besieged, and by force taken, pilling, killing, sacking aswell the good as the bad; and where the better that a man is, the worse commonly he fareth: but what a prince ought to do against his rebellious subiects. Howbeit that the Romans, although accounted the most iust people of the world, have not alwaies followed that rule of equitie and iustice which we before spoke of, but sometimes punished not onely in generall, but euen in particular,[*](The seueritie of the Romans against their rebellious conspitors.) all the inhabitants of their rebellious Townes after that they had taken them: and yet alwayes obserued this point, to punish the heads more seuerely than the rest, and to preserue them that had resisted the seditious; hauing still aspeciall regard whether the rebellion were consulted of and decreed in the Corporation and communitie or not. So Liuie saith: Valerius Leuinus Agrigento capto qui capita rerum erant, virgit caesos securi percussit, caeteros proedamque vendidit, Valerius Leuinus hauing taken Agrigentum beheaded them that were the chiefe authours (of the rebellion) being before whipped, the rest and the prey he sold. And in an other place: Quoniam defectionis authores merit as poenas a dijs immortalibus, & a vobis habent P. C. quid placet innoxia multitudine fieri? tandem ignotum est illis, & ciuitas data, For that the authours of the rebellion (saith he) have from the immortall Gods, and you the appointed fathers, receiued their deserued punishment, what is it your pleasure to be done with the rest of the guiltlesse multitude? at length they were pardoned, and the freedome of the citie giuen them. The Consull Fuluius, hauing after a long siege taken the citie of Capua, beeing renolted from the Romans, beheaded fourescore of the Senatours, beside xxvij others which had before poysoned themselves, and caused three hundred moe of their chiefe gentlemen to be in prison starued, the rest of the inhabitants he sold for slaues. As for the other Townes which were under the obedience of them of Capua, there were none but the chiefe men punished. Atella, Calatia{que} in deditionem acceptae, ibi quoque in eos qui capita rerum erant animaduersum, Atella and Calatia (saith Liuie) were taken in by composition, and there also execution was done upon such as were chiefe doers in the rebellion. The other Consull Appius more seuere than his fellow Fuluius, would have enquirie made also of their allyes, who had had secret part in the same conspiracie: Whereunto Fuluius would not agree, saying, That so to do, were but to prouoke their faithfull and loyall allyes to rebell, in giuing credit unto the traiterous Campanians▪ Whereby it is manifest with[*](The notable clemencie of the emperour Aurelianus.) what seueritie the Romans thought it good to punish their rebellious conspirators, during the time of their popular government. And as for the Roman Emperours, some of them used towards such offendours gratious favour, and othersome extreame ctueltie. The emperour Aurelianus for his clemencie deserueth to be for euer commended, who laying siege unto the citie Thyane, swore that there should not a dog escape alive, if he should take the citie: but hauing by force wonne it, chaunging his mind, as with compassion moued, he straitly forbid any man to be therein slaine; and when some to prouoke him unto wrath, put him in remembrance of the oath he had made: he said it concerned but dogs, which hee commaunded to be all forthwith killed. The like clemencie Henry the fift the Germaine Emperour, hauing condemned the citie of Brixia to bee vtterly rased, and laid euen with the earth; yet when he had wonne the same, pardoned the citisens neuerthelesse, least the innocent people should so haue perished together with the offendors; following therein the mercie of God, who would not onely the good not to perish together with the euill and wicked, but promised to be mercifull unto certeine cities, and a multitude of wicked persons, for some few good men to bee found amongst them. Some others of the Emperours have contrariwise used most barbarous cruelties, without discretion killing the good and bad together, and that for the fault of some few. As the emperour Antonius Caracalla, who in revenge of certeine rymes and songes made and sung against him[*](The great crueltie of Antonius Caracalla, Theodosius the great, Xerxes, and Sylla.) at Alexandria, caused certeine of his garrison souldiours and Praetorian bandes to bee entermingled with the people as they were there beholding playes: who upon a signall giuen, slewe an infinite number of the poore Citisens one with an other without respect, as they came to hand. The like whereof hee had also before commaunded to bee put in execution at Hierusalem. And afterward at Thessalonica, where the Emperour Theodosius the great caused seauen thousand of the inhabitants to bee slaine one with another pell mell in revenge of certaine of his Receiours and other his magistrates and officers there slaine, without any deliberation or decree for the doing thereof, before made in their Communitie or Corporation. Xerxes king of Persia used an other manner of revenge, not in deede so cruell as the other, but yet farre more ignominious and despirefull, causing the noses of all the people of a citie in Syria to bee cut off (which citie after that was of that euent called Rhinocura) for the like fault done by some few of them. But of all cruelties that of Syllaes passed, who beside three score thousand citisens of Rome by him slaine, caused also all the inhabitants of Preneste to bee put to death, pardoning none but his hoast, who would also needs die with the rest, saying, That he would not be beholden for his life, unto the murtherer of his countrey. Which cruelty may yet be borne with, when the vanquished shal chuse rather to die than to become subiects; as in all ages there have bene such: but not if they shall bee content to serue and obey them, by whome they are ouercome and vanquished. So the Pisans (in the memorie of our fathers) not able to endure the iust government of the Florentines their lords, by the favour of Charles the eight the French king, yeelded themselves to Countie Valentine Borgia, who beeing not able to protect them, they in vaine offered themselves first to the Genowayes, and then to the Venetians: By both which states they being reiected, after that they had for a long time beene most straitly besieged, they yeelded themselves subiects unto the Florentines their old lords, of whome they easily obtained pardon, and so afterwards continued their good and faithfull subiects. But Lewes eare of Flaunders, and the last of his house (for after his death that earledom[*](The great mischeite which befel earle of Flaunders, in seeking to ke too sha reueng uppon the Gantoies his rebellious subiects.) fell into the house of Burgundie) hauing brought the Gantois rebelling against him to such extremitie, as that they were glad to craue of him grace and pardon, would not so receiue them, but propounded vnto them most hard conditions, and not beseeming a free people to accept of: as that they should all come unto him out of the citie to craue pardon with halters about their neckes; and that then he would consider what he were to do with them. Which put the poore distressed people into such a desperat feare, as that they went out being in number but five thousand (but all armed with dispaire) against the earle, who then was fortie thousand strong, whome they in a great battell ouerthrew; and so brought under their obeysance all the townes of Flaunders, except Audenard. The earle flying out of the ouerthow hid himselfe under a poore womans bed; who afterwards found meanes for his escape, by couering him in an heape of apples: but being so escaped▪ for euer lost his power, together with his honour. With which so great an ouerthrow giuen, the Gantois became much more arrogant than before, [*](No more cruel enemie against the prince, than are his desperate Some princes unto crueltie to hae also added contumelie, in revenge of their rebellious subiects.) & neuer afterwards willingly endured their princes commands. Whereby it was then perceiued, No more cruell enemies to be found against the prince, than his desperat subiects, Nor any war to be more iust, than that which is by necessitie imposed; as said an auntient Roman Senator. But that the aforesaid warre was such, it is euident & plaine, seeing that together with their most shamefull yeelding, most cruell death did hang over all their heads, and a reproach heauier than death it selfe; reproach and disgrace being alwayes more dreadfull unto men of honourable minds, than most cruell death. But in that time it should seeme, that princes tooke pleasure to encrease their crueltie with reproach and despight against their disobedient and disloyall subiects. For so [*](This Frederike hauing sharply chastised the rebellions Millanotes his subiects, afterwards in dispite caused such of them as would have their lives spared with their teeth to drawe a figue out of a mules taile: whereof grewe the dispite ful mocke yet used by the Italians, by showing the thombe betwixt two fingars, with these words: Eco, la . ) Frederike the second, the German emperour, to revenge the miurie done unto his wife, with great disgrace at Milan, hauing besieged and taken the citie, after he had put to death the chiefest of the citisens, and rifled and rased the citie, used a contumelie and despight towards the rest that had escaped the souldiours furie, as was unto them more despightful than cruel; & yet worse than death. So Dagobert king of France, not cōtented to have slaine the inhabitants of Poitiers, for ayding his enemie against him, caused also the towne to be rased, and the ground to be plowed with an eternall curse, and salt to be sowne upon it to make it barren: whereof they are yet called Salted men of Poitiers. But as princes which with sufferance passe over the seditions & rebellions of the corporation or communitie of any towne or prouince, giue example to others to doe the like: so those princes also which without measure exercise crueltie upon their vanquished [*](Seueritie in punishing of rebellion ought stil to be tempered with gitie.) subiects, get vnto themselves not onely the title of most barbarous and cruell tyrants, but in so doing sometimes also hazard their whole estates. But hee shall deserue the prayse and commendation of a iust prince, and preserue also his estate, which shall keepe the meane in punishing the authors and ringleaders of rebellions, tempering seueritie with lenitie. As did Charles of Fraunce king Lewes the ninth his brother: (afterwards king of Naples) who hauing commission from the king, to chastice the inhabitants of Mont Pelier, who had slaine certaine of the kings receiuers & officers: tooke from them all their liberties and priuileges, appointed the walles of their citie to be rased, their steeples pulled downe, and a fine of six score thousand crownes to be set upon them: or as some write, caused halfe the goods of the citisens to bee confiscated, and of six hundred of them one part to be drowned, another part to bee hanged, and the third part burnt. And so indeed the iudgement was to the terrour of them giuen, and the decree set downe: how bei--- that it was afterwards by the good prince moderated, in such sort, as that none but the offendors themselves were executed: for that the kings officers and magistrats had bene so murthered by no publike councel, or assembly of the citisens orderly called, but by the insolencie of the rash tumultuous people onely. With like lenitie Charles the sixt the French king disarmed the Parisians risen up in rebellion against him, and executing the authors thereof, restrayned the rest of the whole bodie of the citisens, by imposing upon them a great fine. And admit all the citisens of a citie, by their common consent, and the matter being before well debated, to have all together with one mind rebelled, and chosen unto themselves a new prince: Yea and to have augmented their wickednesse with contumelie and despight against their soueraigne: yet were it not the part (I will nor say) of a good prince, but euen of a wise prince, to take revenge of all of them of whome he might, for blemishing thereby for euer of his fame and reputation; than which nothing ought to bee unto a prince more deere: albeit that he might so doe (which yet were a most hard thing) the state of the Commonweale reserued whole. Wherefore T. Quintius the Consul[*](The wisdom of T. Quintus and▪ Scipio Affricanus in chastising of their mutinous souldiours.) did wisely, who when he could not with the safetie of the Commonweale chastice the armie which he then had under his conduct and leading, for their rebellious mutinie, after he had appeased all matters, and yet thought it not safe for the souldiours so in danger of the law to returne into the citie, he himselfe came first to Rome, and there by consent of the Senat presented a request unto the people, Ne cui militum fraudi esset secessio, That the mutinous reuolt might not be daungerous to any of the souldiours: which he with the great good liking both of the Senat and of the people obtained. With like wisdome Scipio Affricanus the father, repressed the mutinie of his army at Seuerone, with the execution of thirtie five of the souldiours onely: Certabatur vtrum in authores tantum seditionis xxxv animaduerteretur, an plurium supplicio vindicanda defectio magis esset quam seditio: vicit sententia lenior, vt vnde culpa orta esset, ibi poena consisteret, ad multitudinis castigationem satis esse, Question was (saith Liuie) whether execution were to be done onely upon thirtie siue, the authors of the sedition: or that so great a reuolt rather than a sedition, were to be revenged with the execution of moe: wherein the milder opinion preuailed, That from whence the offence was begun, there should the punishment rest: and that to suffice for the chastising of the whole multitude. And shortly after in the oration which Scipio made unto the armie, he vseth these words, Se non secus quàm viscera secantem sua cum gemitu & lachrimis xxx hominum capitibus, expiasse octo millium noxam, Him no otherwise but as a man cutting his owne entrels, with sighes and teares to have made satisfaction for the offence of eight thousand men, with the heads of thirtie. So when Appius the Consull (with great rashnesse should I say, or pride) would by strong hand have restrained and corrected his armie, then all in a mutinie, he was by the Colonels and captaines staied from so doing: who all with one voice told him, Nothing to be more daungerous, than to seeke by force to chastice them, in whose loialtie and fide litie the whole force of the empire consisted. And albeit that nothing were to bee feared in the punishing of an whole armie, or[*](A notable regard to be had in al general and popular punishments.) of a citie, yet such generall and popular punishments are not to be vsed: but in chastising of such offences, an especiall regard is to be had, Vt poena ad paucos, metus ad omnes perueniat, That the punishment it selfe should touch but few, but that the feare thereof should come unto all; [*](Tullie. That it beseemeth not a soueraign prince to be the executor or to behold the general execution of his rebellions subiects.) as an auntient orator no lesse eloquently than wisely said.

Yea moreover it beseemeth not a soueraigne prince to be the executor or beholder of the execution of such generall punishments; (if otherwise it may bee in his absence done) to the intent his subiects minds should not so be alienated from him: but to the contrarie it is needfull for him with a convenient lenitie to moderat euen the iust and necessarie seueritie of his deputies and magistrats, to the imitation of Antiochus the[*](The wise moderation of some great princes in chastising of their rebellions subiects.) great king of Asia, who hauing giuen commission to Hermeas his constable, to punish the rebellion of them of Seleucia: and he condemning the corporation of the citie in a fine of six hundred thousand crownes, and banishing also a great number of the citisens, and taking away the liberties and priuileges of the citie: Anoiochus called home againe the banished; and contenting himselfe almost with the tenth part of the fine, restored againe unto the citie the auntient liberties and priuilegs thereof. But not to goe further, Henrie the second the French king, hauing giuen commission to the duke Mont-morencie constable of Fraunce, to chastise the rebellion of the countrey of Guyenne, and especially of the inhabitants of Bourdeaux, graunted them afterward a generall patdon, and forgaue them the rasing of their towne hall, wherein they had made their assemblies, with the fine of two hundred thousand pound, and the charges of the armie brought against him: in all which the inhabitants of Bourdeaux were by the duke condemned; restoring unto them also the right and freedome of the corporation of the towne, excepting them only who had laid hands upon his officers, and some few priuileges and demaines of the towne, which were then abridged and cut off. But the emperour Charles the fift, not so cruelly as wisely, by one and the selfe same iudgement,[*](The wisdome of Charls the fift in the seueritie by him used in chastising the rebellious Gaunties: and in the lenitie to the contrarie by him used towards the Spaniards rebelling against him in Spaine.) revenged the often rebellions and iniuries which they of Gaunt had of old used to doe against his auncestors, and which till then remained vnpunished: partly by the sufferance, and partly through the weakenesse of the earles of Flaunders. For when the citisens of Gaunt had now compelled the Bourgamaster openly to teare in peeces the emperours edicts, and had sent ambassadours unto Frauncis the French king to receiue them with their citie into his protection: and he refusing them, had solicited his other subiects, their neighbours to rebellion: the councell of Spaine decreed, That the citie should be rased and laid euen with the ground, and all the goods of the citisens confiscated. Howbeit the emperour hauing it in his power, spared the countrey and citie wherein he was borne and brought up: but executed thirtie of the chiefe authors of the rebellion, tooke away all their corporations and colledges, depriued the citie of part of the publike lands thereunto belonging, as also of all the priuileges; and caused a most strong castle to be there built, and a garrison therein to be kept and maintained, and all at the citisens charge. This the emperours sentence I receiued of them of Gaunt, at such time as I was of councell to Frauncis duke of Aniou, and of the Low countries. And not long after king Frauncis, who had refused to protect the Gantoies going in person himselfe to represse the rebellion at Rochell, raised for the custome of salt, with the maiestie of his speech terrified them of Rochell, and fined them, but yet put no man to death: yea he left unto the citie the liberties and societies thereof whole,

yet protesting himselfe to have had no lesse occasion to revenge himselfe than had Charles the fift, but that he had rather to encrease his commendation, by sauing, than by spilling of his subiects, and by gentlenesse rather than by crueltie. By these examples before set downe it is well to be vnderstood, what is to bee determined for the punishment of Communities, Corporations, and Colledges: wherein they which affect lenitie, do giue occasion unto the same citisens oftentimes to rebell: which in a Commonweale is of a prince especially to be taken heed of. In which thing no man seemeth to have behaued himselfe more wisely than Charles the fift. Yet he that seemed to have bene so seuere against the Gauntois, used the greatest lenitie that might bee towards the Spaniards of all sorts, at such time as they had not only rebelled against him, (when he went to take possession of the empire) but also chosen the duke of Calabria for their king, who refused that so daungerous a preferment. Of which so great a multitude Charles thought it not good to punish one, and that right wisely: for that in so doing he should haue launced all the members of the Commonweale. For albeit that it is an wholesome thing to cauterise or cut off a mortified member for the preseruation of the whole bodie; must we therefore if all the members of the bodie bee in a consumption, or taken with a Gangrena vse sections or cauterisations? Hypocrates the great physitian saith no, forbidding vs to apply remedies to desperat diseases, and so much the lesse, if a consumption shall take hold of the chiefe and principall members of the bodie.[*](How a communitie or corporation offending is to be punished.) Wherefore to conclude this question, if the offence be committed by the councell or deceit of a communitie or corporation, that which belongeth unto such a communitie or corporation so offending, is therefore to be confiscated or forfeited: but if there be no such thing thereto belonging that may so be forfeited, then a fine in money is to be set thereupon, but yet to be exacted onely of them which gaue counsell or aid to the committing of the offence: for as much as it could not bee committed by the whole communitie or corporation it selfe: but if the guiltie parties be not to be known from the guiltles, then are they altogether to be fined: but as for any corporall punishment, it is not to be inflicted, except that euerie one of them, and all of them together, have most grieuously offended. Neither yet are they to be thought all to offend, although they follow the ensignes displaied, except that they altogether and euerie one of them apart gaue their councell or consent thereunto before: but the communitie or corporation being punished, doth not therefore exempt them that are guiltie of the offence committed, from their due deserued punishment.[*](Whether a commonweale can be without communities, corporations, or colleges.)

But these things being thus declared, concerning the punishments of Communities aud corporations: it remaineth for vs to see, whether that a Commonweale can bee without such Communities, Corporations, and Colledges. Wee said at first, men every where to be, and alwaies to have bene desirous of the societie and companie of men: and so out of a familiar and naturall societie by little and little to have growne into a colledge, into a corporation, into a communitie, and so at length into a citie: and so to have made these empires and kingdomes, which we here in the world see, hauing no surer foundation wherupon to rest (next unto God) than the loue and amitie of one of them towards another: which can in no wise be maintained, but by alliances, societies, estates, communities, fraternities, corporations, and colledges. So that to demand, whether communities and colledges be necessarie in a Commonweale? is as much, as to demaund, Whether that a Commonweale can be maintained and upholden without loue and amitie? without which the world it selfe cannot long stand. Which I have said, for that there have bene, and yet are some of opinion, That all corporations and colleges are out of a Commonweale to bee excluded and banished; not considering that a familie, and the verie Commonweale it selfe, are nothing else but communities.

Which is an errour whereat the greatest spirits have oft times stumbled; for one absurditie or incommoditie which ensueth of one good custome or ordinance, willing to have the same custome or ordinance abolished and quite taken away, without[*](Great harms ensuing of corporations or communities euil gouerned.) regard of the great good which otherwise ensueth thereof unto the Commonweale. I confesse that colledges and communities euill gouerned, draw after them many factions, seditions, part-takings, monopolies, yea and sometime the ruine of the whole Commonweale also: and that in stead of sacred loue and amitie, there ariseth of them coniurations, and conspiracies of one of them against another. And that more is, it hath bene seene, that under the shadow of religion diuers colledges have couered some most detestable and execrable impietie. Whereof no better example can bee giuen, than of the fraternitie of the Bacchanals in Rome, which deuised under the colour of religion, so long couered the most execrable and detestabble filthinesse of both sexes, vntill that the secrets thereof opened, polluted the citie then mirrour of the world, and all Italie with the loathsome sauour thereof, aboue seuen thousand persons beeing partly accused, attainted, conuinced, and many of them execured and banished,[*](Religion the fairest cullour for a foule matter.) for the abhominable villanies by them committed vnder the colour of that religion, which hath alwaies the fairest and most glorious show that can bee deuised, to bee set uppon a fowle matter; as said Flaminius the Consull speaking unto the people of Rome, concerning the impieties by him found out, Nihil in speciem fallacius praua religione; vbi Deorum numen praetenditur sceleribus, subit animum timor, Nothing is in show more deceitfull than corrupt religion: For where the maiestie of the gods is pretended for the cloaking of villanies, there feare pierceth the mind. Which was the cause that the fraternities of the Bacchanals was by a decree of the Senat put downe through all Italie: VVhich decree of the Senat confirmed by the people, passed into the force of a law, That from that time forward no moe sacrifices should bee made by night, but alwayes done in publike. VVhich thing Damonax a wise Grecian had long time before attempted to persuade the Athenians of, saying, Those[*](Nightly conuenticles under the cullour of religion suspitious and in euerie Commonweale daungerous.) night-sacrifices to have alwaies seemed vnto him verie suspitious. And better it is in euerie Commonweale openly to suffer whatsoeuer assemblies or sacrifices to bee done by day, in the sight of all the people, then nightly assemblies to bee made under the colour of religion▪ VVhereof Cato the Censor most grieuously said, Ab nullo genere non summum periculum est, sicaetus, & consilia, & secretas consultationes esse sinas, There is no sort of men from whom the greatest daunger is not to bee feared, if you shall suffer conuenticles, and secret councels and consultations to be kept amongst them: VVhich can so much the lesse be auoided, when as the false opinion of religion is pretended for to colour villanies. For that there is no conspiracie, which may not be contriued and made in such secret assemblies: which growing by little and little, and not perceiued vntill they bee growne great, at length bursting like to a rotten impostume, infecteth the whole bodie of the Commonweale. As for proofe thereof in our remembrance, whereas there have alwaies beene many conuenticles and meetings of seditious persons, under the pretensed show of religion, so a more daungerous companie of filthie fellowes neuer more sodenly in any place brake out, than did that of the Anabaptists in Munster, the chiefe citie of VVestphalia, who there secretly multiplying, uppon the sodaine tooke up armes, and by the leading of a Taylour draue out the bishop and magistrats, and so possessed the citie wholly to themselves, which could not bee againe recouered from them, not those phantasticall seditions repressed, but by a strong armie of the whole German empire. The Colledges and Fraternities of the Pythagorians dealt more moderatly in Italie, who professing the studie of wisedome, and hauing drawne unto them so many disciples, as that many the greatest lords & princes, both of Italie and Greece, moued with the admiration of their doctrine, were now become both their auditors and followers: they bearing themselves thereupon, went about to have euerie where ouerthrowne the popular estates, and tyrannicall governments, and for them to have established Aristocraties, and the governments of wise men. But that their so good a purpose was ouerthrowne by certaine ambitious and popular men, who setting the people in an uprore with fire and sword, destroyed all the Pythagorians. Which (as saith Polibius) troubled almost all the estates both of Italie and of Greece. And for this cause the emperours, and almost all other princes, popes, and councels, giuing the Iews leaue to have their meetings & synagogues (which Tyberius, Claudius, & Domitian) the emperours, had of antient time taken from them) commaunded yet, That they should alwaies do their sacrifices, and have their prayers openly, and in publike. Which libertie Pharao king of Aegypt (terrified with the iudgements of God) would have also graunted them, but was by Moyses refused, alleaging, That it was to be feared least the Aegyptians should ouerwhelme with stones the Iewes, vsing a strange religion, and by the lawes of the countrey forbidden. And to say the truth, it is a thing most hard and[*](The common people hardly to endure any religion contrarie or repugnant to their owne.) difficult to maintaine colledges or corporations in a Commonweale of what religion soeuer, either publikely or priuatly, being contrarie to the religion of the people, or of the greater part of them: For that the people every where most iealous of their religion, cannot but most hardly endure any rites and ceremonies, differing from the religion by themselves generally receiued: neither are by the lawes, or by the magistrats commaund, or bands of men so to be restrained and kept in, but that their rage will ofttimes most furiously breake out, not against the weaker sort onely, but euen against the most mightie ones also. For so Thomas emperour of Constantinople, pulling downe the altars and images of the saints, was by the angrie people most cruelly slaine in the verie temple of saint Sophia. We have also seene in the citie of Franckford foure corporations[*](The Iewes, and Catholiques by the protest nts borue within Franckford, and they of the confession of Geneua forbidden.) and colledges of diuers religions, to have bene publikely allowed and exerci sed, namely those of the Iewes, of the Catholikes, of the Protestants, and of the Confes▪ sion of Geneua: But it so fell out in the yeare 1562, in the moneth of May, that the Protestants assuring themselves of the strength of their partakers, fell upon them of the Confession of Geneua, (who in their profession came neerest unto them) and bearing with the other which more differed from them, cáused that of the Confession to bee there vtterly forbidden. Which is lesse to be feared in such religions and sects as have bene of auntient time receiued, and which as it were in their owne right defend their profession: such as is the religion of the Iewes, from which all other religions, except ---, seeme to haue taken their beginning: which Chrysostome therefore calleth The mother of the Gentiles: the princes of Europe and of Barbarie hauing alwaies granted unto the Iews, their antient priuileges, corporations, & colledges, for the exercising of their religion, in paying unto them certaine tribute, as they did unto the Roman emperors, which was called Aurum Coronarium; which the German emperours ordinarily giue unto the emprises, for the confirmation of the Iewes priuileges, which are yet greatet in Polonia and Lituania than in any other place of the world, since they were by Cazimir the great king of Polonia graunted unto them, at the request of a Iewish ladie, called Hester; such as had of antient time by a Persian king bene unto this nation giuen, at the instance of another Iewish ladie of the same name. Where they so mightily encreased, as that there was no prince in the greater Asia, which had not in it one or other Collonie of the Iewes; as we read in Iosephus, and Philo. Wherefore the most auntient antiquitie of that the Iewish religion, together with the great pouertie of the Iewes themselves, who in no place of the world may possesse any lands, maketh that they need the lesse, and are indeed the lesse able to sight for their religion and libertie.

But it may be, that the consent and agreement of the nobilitie and people in a new religion or sect, may be so puissant & strong, as that to represse or alter the same, should[*](That a sect or religion grown so strong, as that it cannot without the extreame perill of the state and commonweale be altered, is of a wise prince to be suffered.) be a thing impossible, or at leastwise maruelous difficult, without the extreame perill and daunger of the whole estate. In which case the best aduised princes and gouernours of Commonweales do imitat the wise pilots, who when they cannot attaine unto the port by them desired, direct their course to such port as they may: Yea and oft times quite chaunging their course, giue way unto the stormes and tempests, least in seeking too much to put into the desired hauen, they suffer shipwracke. Wherefore that religion or sect is to be suffered, which without the hazard and destruction of the state cannot be taken away: The health and welfare of the Commonweale being the chiefe thing the law respecteth. Wherefore Constans the emperour suffered the companies and colledges of the Arrians, not so much for the loue and affection he bare towards them, as diuers have written but so in quiet to preserue his subiects, and estate. And Theodosius the Great being himselfe a Catholike, and alwaies contrarie to the Arria---s opinion, yet bare with their religion, which hee could by no meanes suppresse, maintaining both the one sort and the other in peace and obedience. And after him Zeno the emperour, to reconcile the companies of all sorts of religions among themselves, and together with the Commonweale, commaunded an edict, which they called ---, which is to say, of vnion and tranquilitie or quietnesse to be published. After whose example Anastasius caused the law of forgetfulnesse to bee set forth, cherishing the graue and modest preachers, and remouing such as were of vehement and turbulent spirits.

And yet no doubt, but that a prince favouring one sect or religion, and disliking another,[*](How a prince favouring one sect or religion and disciding an other, may without force or fur suppresse that religion he disliketh, and aduaunce the other which hee better liketh of.) may if he will without force or constraint, or any violence at all, suppresse that which he liketh not (except it be by the hand and power of the almightie supported) & that by keeping the maintainers thereof from all preferments and places of command; and by shewing himselfe in deeds rather than in words, to abhorre that religion which he desireth to have extinguished, For the maner of men is, to loue such things as their princes embrace: and minds resolued, the more they are crossed, the stiffer they are, which otherwise of themselves grow weake and feeble, if they be not at all resisted. Besides that, there can be nothing more daungerous unto a prince, than to make proofe of his forces against his subiects, except he be wel assured to preuaile against them: which otherwise were but to arme a lion, and to show him his clawes wherewith to teare his master. But if the wiser sort of princes do in the varietie of religions right, hardly keepe the concord and unitie of their subiects: what then is to be hoped for of such princes, as have no experience of gouerning of the state, on euerie side beset with their flatterers? pressed by their false enformers, thrust forward by their furious followers: aiming only at this, how to fill themselves with other mens wealth and blood. So in the beginning [*](A daungerous practise of such as are neere unto great princes: to deuise false calumnies against the professors of any religion, so to bring them into hatred, and to enrich themselves with their wealth.) of the Primitiue Church, under the first emperours, so many grosse and impudent calumnies, and slaunderous reports, were deuised and put in writing against the Christians, for the taking away of their assemblies and meetings, as the like whereof were neuer before deuised, and would indeed seeme incredible, were they not yet in writing extant. As witnesseth Anaxagoras the orator, in his apologie to Antoninus: Tertullian in his apologie for the Christians: and Origen against Celsus, certaine of whose writings are yet extant. Whereby it is to be vnderstood, that it was commonly obiected unto the Christians, that they were Atheists, irreligious contemners of all gods, incestuous murtherers: and such as in their secret assemblies and meetings used

to kill yong infants conceiued of their mutuall incests, and after that they had so killed them, to eate them. Which thing indeed Epiphanius reporteth of the heretiques called Gnostic---: as that they should in their meetings beat in a morter their new borne children, begotten in incest,, with the yeolkes of egges, flower, honie, and certeine spices mingled together, and so to make cakes of them, and to bake them, and eate them: and that to haue beene with them accounted a sacrament of the bodie and blood. Which slaunders so falsely obiected against the Christians, might seeme altogether incredible, if in the time of our auncestours the like accusation had not beene commenced against the Templers, viz. under the raigne of Philip the faire; for which the[*](The Templers falsely accused, and for their great wealth wrongfully suppressed.) Colledges in Fraunce before graunted unto the Templers, at last by a decree of pope Boniface the viij were taken from them, the master with a great number of his fellowes most cruelly burnt, and the order quite suppressed. All which for all that, the Germans by their writings have since showed to haue beene but a malitious false accusation, inuented for the taking away of their great lands and wealth from them. The like practise was also used against the Corporations and societies of the Iewes, aswell in[*](The Iewes in like manner wronged.) Fraunce under Dagobert, Philip Augustus, and Philip the long: as afterward in Spaine under Ferdinand king of Aragon and Castile, who of a mercilesse deuotion driue them quite out of their countries, and enriched themselves with their goods, it being giuen out, that they had crucified boyes, and poysoned wels with the blood of their leprous persons.

Wherefore, to discide the question before propounded, as whether Communities, [*](Communities, Corporations, and Colledges, necessarie in every Commonweale, but especially in a popular estate.) Corporations, Societies, and Colledges be good in a Commonweale, or no? or that the Commonweale may well be without them? Truely in mine opinion nothing could euer have beene deuised more effectuall or better for the keeping & mainteining of popular estates, or for the ouerthrow of tyrannicall gouernements, than corporations and societies: For why, the Commonweales and estates being one unto an other contrarie, doe by quite contrarie meanes both mainteine and ruinate themselves. And therefore the people and popular estates, accept and embrace all manner of communities, corporations, and colledges; as we said that Solon did, in establishing the popular estate of Athens. All which tyrants in their tyrannicall governments seeke vtterle to ouerthrow, as well knowing, the unitie and amitie of subiects among themselves, to be the tyrants ineuitable ruine and destruction: the iust royall, and Aristocraticall estates, euen for the same reasons still holding the meane betwixt both, neither accepting nor reiecting of all communities and colledges, but admitting onely such as they see needfull for the state and Commonweale; which with good lawes and orders they still keepe within the compasse of duetie and obedience. The good king Numa was the first that ordained Societies and Fraternities of artificers and men of occupation; and so Tarquin the proud was the first that tooke them away, and that forbid the assemblies of the people, and that had in himselfe a purpose also to haue suppressed the bodie of the Senat, by the death of the Senatours, not suffering any new to be chosen in the roomes of them that died But he was no sooner by his subiects driuen out, but that the popular estate was established, the number of the three hundred Senatours supplied, and the colledges and companies before abolished againe restored. But when the people by the helpe of their Tribunes began more insolently to rule, and that in the bodie of the Senat were almost six hundred of the nobilitie and chiefe men of the citie, who had almost drawne unto themselves the soueraigntie, the colleges, and companies of the citisens, were by a decree of the Senate, for the most part suppressed and put downe: Howbeit shortly after Clodius the Tribune to be the more gracious with the people, and to maintaine them in iarre and discord with the nobilitie

(which he had renounced, causing himselfe to be adopted by a base fellow, so to become Tribune) not onely restored all the Colleges and companies by the Senat before suppressed, but ordained and erected a great number moe: which Caesar being got to be Dictator, to maintaine his owne power and weaken the peoples, put downe; but were afterwards by Augustus hauing assured his estate, by an expresse edict againe restored. All which Nero the the tyrant againe suppressed. Whereby it appeareth, Tyrants alwaies to haue hated the corporations and communities of the people, and[*](Communities, Corporations, and Colleges, alwaies hatefull vnto Tyrants.) by all meanes endeuored to have them vtterly extinguished: Insomuch that Dionysius the tyrant of Sicilie would not that euen neere kinsfolks should so much as visit one an other, but as they came late from supper from their friends, caused them to be robbed and spoiled. As in like manner did Nero, who oft times by night walking the streats, spoiled and slew such as he met, which returned late from supper with their friends; so much he feared the assemblies of his subiects, for the conspiracies they might so make against the tyrannie of him so wicked a prince. And yet for all that the iust Monarchie,[*](The great benefit and vse of Communities, corporations, and colleges, in a iust Monarchie or royall estat.) hath not any more assured foundation or stay, than the Estates of the people, Communities, Corporations, and Colleges: For if need be for the king to leuie money, to raise forces, to maintaine the Estate against the enemie, it cannot be better done, than by the estates of the people, and of every Prouince, Towne, and Commutie. Yea we see that they themselves which would have these estates of the communities and societies of the people suppressed and abolished, have in time of their necessitie no other refuge or stay to flie vnto, but euen to these estates and communities of the people: which being together vnited, strengthen themselves for the defence and protection, not of their Prince onely, but euen of themselves also, and of the whole estate and subiects in generall, especially the Prince himselfe there being in person present. For where can things for the curing of the diseases of the sicke Commonweale, or for the amendment of the people, or for the establishing of lawes, or for the reforming of the Estate, be better debated or handled, than before the prince in his Senat before the people? There they conferre of the affaires concerning the whole bodie of the Commonweale, and of the members thereof; there are heard and vnderstood the iust complaints & greeuances of the poore subiects, which neuer otherwise come unto the princes eares; there are discouered and laid open the robberies and extortions committed in the princes name; whereof he knoweth nothing, there the requests of all degrees of men are heard. Besides that, it is almost a thing incredible to say, how much the subiects are eased, and how well they are also pleased, to see their king to sit as chiefe in the assemblie of the estates, and to heare him discoursing; how every man desireth to be seene of him, and if it please him to heare their complaints, and to receiue their requests, albeit that they be often times denied the same; yet O how it pleaseth them to have had accesse unto their Prince, yea sometime they goe away better pleased with such a deniall, than if they had had that they requested, being by their prince altogether contemned. All which is better obserued and kept in Spayne, than in any place of the world, where the assemblies of the estates heretofore have beene holden every two or three yeares one. And in England also, for that the people graunt no payments, if the Estates be not assembled: as I remember was done, when as I passed over into England embassadour from Frauncis duke of Aniou. Our kings do not so often call together the assemblies of their estates, as doe the kings of England. But whereas there are accounted sixteene Prouinces in this kingdome, whereof six have their particular assemblies among themselves, (namely Bretagne, Normandie, Bourgundie, Languedoc, Dauphine, and Prouence) some there were, who for feare their villanies and extortions should in those assemblies have beene found out, laboured to the vttermost of their power to have had the same assemblies and meetings of the Estates of the aforesaid prouinces, in any wise taken away and changed into elections. As also in the beginning of the raigne of Charles the eight, at such time as it was with one generall voice called upon, that a generall assemblie of all the Prouinces might be had; there wanted not some who threatned it to be Treason to such as in the counsell should consent with the people for the calling of such an assembly: whose opinion Philip de Commines (a most worthy counsellour and a man of great experience) most earnestly withstood. But how necessarie the assemblies & meeting of the whole people for to consult[*](The generall assemblies & meetings of the people to consule of matters, necessarie for the good of the Common weals.) of matters, are, is hereby perceiued; in that the people which may so call together such their counsels, with them all things go well: wheras others which may not so do, are oppressed with tributes & seruitude. For as the shot of many pieces of artillerie delivered one after another, is not of so great force and power for the battering of a fort, as when the whole tyre of the great ordinance is together discharged, so the particular requests of men often times vanish but into smoake. But when whole Colleges or Communities, or the estates of a prouince, or of a people, or of a realme, shall make their requests unto their king; the voice is so loude, and the requests so effectuall, as that it is hard for him to refuse it. Howbeit that there is a thousand other commodities & vses of the generall assemblies of the Estates in every prouince and countrie, for the common good therof. As if question be for the leuying of forces, or of money to withstand the enemie, or for the building of fortresses, for the mending of high waies, repairing of bridges, or for the scouring of the countrie of theeves, or withstanding of the great; all these things which can in no wise be done by particular men, are best of all performed by them all in their generall assemblies. As to passe over the rest, all these things have beene better done in the prouince of Languedoc by their assembled Estates, than in any other prouince of this Realme. They within a few yeares erected a Schole, and appointed twelue hundred pounds yearely pension for the instruction of all the youth of the countrie. In the Towne of Nismes, beside the other particular Colleges, they built the fairest fortresses of this realme; and caused Buzac to be executed, the most notable[*](Buzac a notable theefe and robber.) robber that euer was in our remembrance, of whom neither judge, nor magistrate, no nor yet the parliament of Thoulouse it selfe, could take punishment, he being growne so strong as to doe his robberies in forme of iustice, and yet no man so hardie as to dare to lay hands upon him: of whose execution I was a beholder, & saw the people wonderfully reioycing to see themselves delivered of a theefe and robber, of all others the greatest: albeit that I remember ten thousand crownes to have bene before laide out about the same matter. And to keepe that prouince the safer from theeves & robbers, they appointed farre greater rewards for the Prouost Marshal than did any other prouince, as twelue hundred pound for his maintenance, and xxv pound for every processe he should bring of the execution by him done. I have bene willing in passing by, thus the rather to note these particularities, to show the great good which ariseth unto Cōmonweals by the assemblies of their Estats: which are yet better ordered in the Commonweals of the Swissers, & the Germaine empire, than in other the Commonweals of Europe. For the Swissers beside the assemblies of Estate, in every Towne and Canton, have their generall assemblies of their Estates also; and the ten Circles or Circuits of the Empire have their assemblies of their Estates separate, unto whom the particular estates of the Imperiall Townes & Countries referre themselves: and so likewise the estates of the circuits refer themselves and their decrees unto the assemblie of the estates[*](A measure to be had for the number of Corporations and Colleges in a Commonweale.) of the Empire, which without this pollicie had long ago bene ruinated & fallen.

We said that the meane and measure which is in all things commendable, ought also to be kept in all iust Monarchies and Aristrocraties, in regard of the number of

Corporations and Colleges to be had in their kingdomes and Commonweales: For as quite to take away all Corporations and Communities were to weaken or ruinate the estate, and to establish a barbarous tyrannie, or tirannicall government; so likewise to permit and suffer all assemblies, and all fraternities, is not also without danger, as not easely to be ruled by the princes power, or nobilities commaund. In them also oft times are couered conspiracies, and secret Monopolies, whereof we have many examples, which hath bene the cause often times by expresse Edict in this Realme to take away these fraternities; which for all that could neuer yet be put into execution. Howbeit much better it were to take away the abuse, than the thing it selfe that is abused, and to[*](That it is better or the Commonweale, that men of one trade or occupation should be divided into diuers streets, and quarters of the citie, the to dwell all in one street together.) pluck up the weeds alone, rather then both the good and bad together. And to auoid Monopolies amongst artificers and trades men, it is good to diuide them into diuers streets and quarters of the citie, and not to seat them in one street or quarter together, (as they do in Affricke, and also in many townes and cities of Europe) except th--- place for the hauing of water, or some other such common respect so require: For besides the incōmoditie that it is in great cities not to have artificers which are ordinarily required in every quarter thereof, there must needs either be secret monopolies amongst them so to sell their marchandize and wa---es the dearer, or else iealousies and quarels, if one of them shall sell better cheap than another, before his face that hath refused to take the money. I said artificers ordinarily required, for that it is not fit in their dwellings to mingle men giuen unto their studie and quiet, together with Fishmongers, or Armorers, or Curriors with Schollers: for as for such as are lesse requisite as hammermen, they may well enough be raunged in the same street or quarter of a citie together, and that better than to trouble the quiet of others. But as there is nothing better for the maintenance of the strength and unitie of the subiects, than Corporations & Communities: so is there nothing which can so much weaken & keepe vnderfoot a Commonweale, as by the vtter taking away of Communities, Corporations, and Colleges, or Societies: Which the Romans well knowing, wisely put in practise, who after they had vanquished the kings of Macedonia, and conquered the countrie, vtterly forbid all assemblies and meetings together of the people there to consult of matters. And so afterwards also the Achaeans being ouer come, the consul Mummius as saith Liuie: Concilia omnia singularū Achaiae nationum, & Phocensium, & Baeotorum, aut in alia parte Graeciae deleuit, Suppressed all the councels of all the particular nations of Achaia, and of the Phocensians, and of the Baeotians, or in what soeuer other part of Graecia else: But after that they were once become good and obedient subiects unto the Romans: Antiqu--- concilia genti cuique restituta, The auntient councels were unto every nation againe restored, as saith Strabo.