The six books of a common-weale

SEeing that the Magistrat next unto the Soueraigne Prince, is the principall person in the Commonweale, & upon whom they which have the soueraigntie discharge themselves, communicating unto him the authoritie, force, and power to commaund: it is good reason before we passe further, briefly to touch what obedience he oweth unto his Soueraigne Prince; which is the chiefe part of his dutie. Now in this the Prince and Magistrat, and both of them do most differ from a priuat[*](How much a prince differeth from a magistrat, and both of them from a priuat an.) man: for that the Prince seeth no man in the state or Commonweal, whome he may compare or preferre before himselfe; but as one placed in a most high degree, and next unto the immortall God, beholdeth all his subiects set a great way beneath him: wheras the priuat man cannot by any publike right commaund over any other subiect, although that he by priuat and domesticall commaunds rule and gouerne his owne familie. As for the Magistrat, for that he is to regard many persons, hee must oftentimes change his port, his gesture, his speech and countenance, for the good performance of his dutie towards all: which no man can well discharge, except he first know his duty towards his Soueraigne prince, as also how to submit himselfe unto the other Magistrats his superiours, how to respect his equals, and how to commaund his inferiours, how to defend the weake, to withstand the great, and to doe iustice to all. And that is it, for which the auntients commonly said, Magistracie or authoritie to declare what was in a man, hauing as it were upon the stage in the Theatre, and in the sight of all men, to performe the parts of many persons. And so also may we say, A man to show what his office is: For if he be such an one as he ought to be, hee graceth his place: whereas if he bee otherwise, hee debaseth not only the authoritie of his place and office; but euen of the maiestie of the state and Commonweale. So Liuie speaking of Quintus Flaminius, a man vnworthy his high place, saith of him, Non qui sibi honorem adiecisset, sed indignitate sua vim ac ius Magistratui quem gerebat dempsisset, That hee had not (by

his office) encreased his honour; but by the vnworthinesse of himselfe, impaired the force and power of the office which he bare.

Now the better to know what obedience the Magistrat oweth unto his Soueraign, it is needfull first to vnderstand, what it is that a Soueraigne Prince may of right commaund[*](The lawful commaunds of soueraigne princes right diuers.) every Magistrat to doe. For why, the lawfull commands of Soueraigne Princes are right diuers, and vnlike themselves. Some of them seruing for perpetuall edicts or lawes concerning all persons, of what condition or qualitie soeuer they bee; or but for certaine persons, and for a certaine time, by way of prouision: othersome containe some priuilege or exemption contrarie to the edicts or lawes, for some one onely, or for some few of the subiects: or some graunt not contrarie unto the law, or some reward for the good, or punishment for the euill, or some office or commission; or else serue for the expounding of some edict or priuilege, or for the denouncing of warre, or the making of peace, or for raising of souldiours, or for the erecting of Faires or Markets, or for the leuying of taxes, subsidies, fifteenes, new impositions, or loanes: or for the sending of ambassadours to congratulat the good haps of other princes; or to mone their misfortunes, or to entreat of marriages, and alliances, or other such like things; or for the building or fortifying of places to be fortified, for the repairing of bridges, hie wayes, ports or passages, or for to iudge of certaine suits and proceedings in the law, or for the execution of some commaunds, or for the maintenance of letters of iustice, or for the restoring of such as be under age, or of full age, or of such as be condemned, or for some particularitie, or for some remission, or pardon, which may bee of diuers sorts. Of which commaunds so before declared, some containe diuers kinds, as do priuileges and graunts, whether it be for some gift giuen, or for exemption and immunitie from all charges, or from some one: or letters of discharge, or of estate, or to have the freedome of a citisen, or for to be made legitimat, or for nobilitie, or knighthood, or for the erecting of corporations or colleges, or other such like things. All which letters may be divided into two sorts, that is to say, into letters of iurisdiction or commaund, or letters of iustice or state. Albeit that the word Iubemus, or we commaund, be as well in the letters of iustice, as in the letters of grace and favour, as is to bee seene in the lawes and letters pattents of the Greeke emperours. Yet the letters of grace, or which proceed from the onely power and authoritie of the prince, are properly in Fraunce called Mandements, or Commands; and the secretaries which dispatch them are also called the Secretaries of the Commaunds: whereas the letters of iustice are most commonly dispatched by the other secretaries; beside the difference of the great and little seale, and for the most part the diuersitie of the waxe: or the single or double labell, or the seale hanging in silke of diuers colours, making the difference of the letters to be knowne. The auntient Latines called such instructions as were by princes giuen to their ambassadours, or gouernours of countries, or generals of their armies, Mandata Principum, or Princes Commands, which we do call by the name of of instructions: For so the word Mandat--- is taken in the law, where Iustinian the emperour saith, That hee had made a booke of Mandats or Commaundements for the gouernours of prouinces.

But leauing the subtilitie of words, let vs go unto the matter, and examine the force[*](The power and force of certaine clauses commonly set down in the letters patents, and princes Mandats expounded.) of the clauses commonly set downe in the letters patents and mandates of princes. And first these wordes, Vniuersis praesentibus & futuris (To all men present and to come) are ioyned onely unto such letters patents as are to endure for euer: (howbeit that no worldly thing can so for euer continue) but not unto temporarie edicts made by way of prouision, nor to commissions, nor to any other letters of prouision. But this clause, Quantum satis est &c. (so much as shall suffice) is of much greater importance,

& ordinarily ioyned unto letters which they call letters of iurisdiction or iustice, whereby the prince leaueth unto the discretion of him to whom such his letters are addressed, to allow of them, or to refuse them, as his conscience, and the equitie of the cause shall require: which is not in letters of commaundement which leaue nothing unto him to whom they are directed, except happily sometimes the examination of the fact onely: as in these words, Si paret &c. (If it shall appeare vnto you &c.) In such[*](The princes charters or letters of iustice no commaunde unto the magistrat to whom they are directed) sort that one may say of all sorts of charters or letters of iustice, albeit that they be granted by the prince, that they import not any commaund or constraint whatsoeuer unto the magistrat to whom they are directed: But to the contrarie, that by our lawes and customes it is most religiously prouided, that the magistrats or judges should unto such charters or letters have no further respect, than in that they were agreeable with equitie and trueth. And although that the same forme of letters of justice, be graunted in England, as also in Spayne, and other kingdomes; yet so it is neuerthelesse, that it is done rather for the particular profit of some one, than for the greatnes or increasing of the maiestie of the king, (who graunted them by way of benefit unto the partie) or for any necessitie there is thereof: seeing that the whole is remitted unto the power of the magistrat, after the graunting of such letters, which was not before the graunt thereof. Which was the cause that the people in the assemblie of the Estates in parliament at Orleans, presented a request unto the king for the cutting off of this formalitie of letters: as seruing not but to the oppressing of the people, without any profit therout of to be drawne unto the king or Commonweale. The auntient Greeks and Latins also neuer knew this forme of letters of iustice: but the magistrats upon the request of the parties did as much as do our judges upon the graunt of such letters of iustice. And the clause, Quantum satis erit quod liqueat (so much as may suffice for the manifesting of the matter) is the same which was conteined in the Praetors edicts, in this forme, Si qua mihi iusta causa videbitur, (if any iust cause shall seeme unto me.) True it is that the power to correct, supply, and expound the lawes, concerning the civill iurisdiction, together with the restitution & relieuing of them which had beene circumuented, or deceiued by the formalities of the lawes, (a power before giuen unto the Praetors by the vertue of their office) resteth now (I know not how) amongst the marks of soueraigne maiestie; and for this cause the Praetors authoritie and lawes were called honorable; which the interpretors of the law call Nobile officium. Wherefore as offices are confounded, when as the prince conuerteth unto himselfe such things as belong unto the magistrat▪ euen so also are the rights of soueraigntie impaired, when as they are by the magistrats vsurped. Now as for the declaration, and correcting of the edicts and lawes, we have before said that it appettaineth and belongeth unto them which have the soueraigntie: But as for restitutions against the extremitie of the law, and all that concerneth letters of justice, it greatly appeareth not that the soueraigne princes have much troubled themselves therewith, but have left them to the magistrats to be in their name decided. I except only certain letters of iustice, which passe under the great Scale, and whereunto the aforesaid clause, If it shall be iust, If it shall be agreeable unto equitie and truth, is inserted: which clause so much displeased a certaine great personage, holding one of the highest places of honour in this Realme, (who vnderstood not the force thereof) as that he would have raced out the same; saying the maiestie of the king to be thereby impaired▪ howbeit that he was therein to be excused, as being a straunger, and not well seene in the lawes and customes of a straunge countrey. But how could the maiestie of kings be in this respect empaired or diminished? seeing that the auntient kings of Aegipt caused their magistrats solemnely to sweare,[*](A notable ) neuer to obey their commaundements, in case they commaunded them any thing that was vniust: as we read in the sayings of the Aegiptian kings reported by Plutarch. Seeing therefore that the allowance or reiecting of letters of iustice directed in the kings name unto the magistrats, dependeth of the equitie and discretion of the magistrats themselves, it needeth not vs to speake any more thereof. Wherefore let vs now proceed to those rescripts or letters of commaund, which for that they concerne the state of the Commonweale, and publique and not priuat causes, are called rescripts of State; or letters of commaund or state. Concerning which, a double question may be made: One whether such Rescripts or letters of the prince, containing onely the simple examination of the fact, without giuing any further hearing of the matter unto the magistrat, according to the desert thereof; whether (I say) the magistrat fully informed of the truth of the fact according to the tenour of his letters, ought to proceed to the further execution thereof being vniust, or to hearken unto the vniust commaunds of his prince? The other, whether the magistrat hauing neither power to examine the[*](Whether the magistrat be bound to obey his princes vniust commaunds or not?) equitie nor truth of a matter, may refuse the vniust commaunds of his prince: the doubt therein being the greater, if they shall be thereunto by the prince more straitly vrged, or expresly commaunded: For sometime princes by their particular and secret letters, vse to request the magistrats; so with couert requests accompanying their vniust commaunds: yea oftentimes in their letters patents their requests are ioyned with their commaunds, because they would not seeme to wrest all things from them against their wils; but to request many things of them: as when they say, We pray and commaund you, wherein the prince seemeth as in nothing more to derogate from his soueraigne maiestie: for if the thing be iust and honest which hee commaundeth, what needeth requests? if vniust or dishonest, why doth he commaund it? Now the magistrat is neuer to be requested to doe his dutie, or intreated not to doe wrong, or that which is vniust or dishonest, as Cato the Censor saith. Besides that, to commaund is a thing incompatible with request. It is wisely said, ---,[*](Princes requests to have the power of the most strait cōmaund.) Tyrants requestes to bee commaunds: wherefore let vs suppose nothing to be more straitly commaunded, than that which the prince seemeth by fyled speech or intreatie to persuade. Wherefore to resolue this point, if the princes letters giue unto the magistrat neither the examination nor the hearing or disciding of the fact, or of the right and truth of the cause, but that onely the execution of the princes commaund be unto him committed: the magistrat in this case may not in any sort take upon him the examination or hearing of the matter; except the letters of commaund be notoriously false, faultie, or absurd, and contrarie to the lawes of God and nature (as we read of the commaunds of Pharao and Agrippa:) or else to robbe and spoile the poore people; as in our time Albert Marques of Brandeburg, who amongst other his notable cruelties, set up sundrie gibbets in all such townes and cities as he had taken in, threatning his souldiours to hang them thereupon, if that contrarie to his commaund they should spare to robbe and spoile the poore inhabitants: albeit that he had neither true, nor yet any colourable cause, for his taking up of armes against his countrey. Now if a man subiect unto a particular Lord or Iustice, be not in law or right bound to obey him passing the bounds of his territorie, or the power to him giuen, (albeit that the thing which hee commaundeth be both iust and honest) but may well refuse his commaund: how should the magistrat then be bound to obey or to put into execution the princes commaunds in things vniust and dishonest, the prince in this case transgressing and breaking the sacred bounds of the lawes both of God and nature? But some will say, no prince to be found so euill aduised, nor that it is to be supposed that he would commaund any thing contrarie unto the lawes of God and nature: and true it is; for why he worthily loseth the title and honour of a Prince, which departing from reason, and forgetting the dutie of a prince, breaketh the lawes of God and nature.

We have before (as we suppose) sufficiently enough declared, what and how much[*](What commands of the prince, and how far the magistrat eught to execute the same.) a prince may doe by the right of his soueraigntie, from whence many things may be deriued pertinent unto this question here in hand: for why it is not well to be vnderstood what obedience is by the magistrat due unto the soueraigne maiestie, except the rights of Soueraigntie be before well vnderstood and fully knowne. But here the question is, what commaunds of the prince, and how farre the magistrat ought to execute the same? for sometime dishonest and vniust thinges are by princes commaunded, which the euill magistrats themselves do more willingly, and shamefully put in execution, than they were by the princes commaunded. As not long agoe in the time of the civill warres, (wherewith all Fraunce was on a light fyer) the president of the court of Normandie (whose name deserueth to be buried in perpetuall obliuion) beeing commaunded extraordinarily to leuie thirtie thousand crownes of them which professed the reformed religion, extorted from them three hundred thousand; and for so doing (the calamitie of the time considered) receiued a great reward. Howbeit that Tiberius the emperour (a man of incredible crueltie) sharply reproued the gouernour of Aegypt for exacting more of the subiects than he was commaunded: saying, Tonderioues meas non cutem detrahi volo, I would have my sheepe shorne, but not flaine. If therefore the commaundement of the prince be not contrarie unto the lawes of God and nature, the magistrat is to put it in execution, although it seeme to differ from the lawes of other nations: which lawes it is not against nature for the princes to chaunge, for the profit or disprofit of their Commonweales. For albeit that the princes (as wee have said) ought to keepe the oath by him made unto his people, if hee have so bound himselfe by oath; and although hee were not by oath so bound, yet neuerthelesse of duetie ought to keepe the lawes and customes of the estate and Commonweal whereof hee is soueraigne: yet for all that wee must not thereof conclude or gather, That if the prince doe in that case commaund any thing contrarie unto his oath or the duetie of a Prince, that the Magistrat is therefore to refuse to obey his commaund. Forasmuch as it belongeth not unto the Magistrat to examine or censure the doings[*](The is noto censure his princes cōmand, beeing not contrari unto the lawes of God & nature.) of his prince, or to crosse his proceedings concerning mans lawes, from which the prince may as he seeth cause derogat. Yet if the Magistrat bee commaunded by the Prince to abrogat an auntient law, being more upright and profitable to giue way unto another lesse iust, and lesse profitable for the Commonweale; he may stay the execution of such a law or commaundement in suspense, vntill he have shewed his reasons therefore unto the prince, which he is in dutie bound to do, not once, but euen twice or thrice: and then if the prince notwithstanding his remonstrances, will not by him be aduised, but refuse his wholsome and profitable admonition, and will needes have the law to passe further; then the Magistrat (as hauing alreadie done his dutie) shall put it in execution: which he may also at the first commaund of his prince doe, if the delaying thereof be daungerous. And to that end and purpose tendeth that which is by Innocentius the fourth written, before he was Pope, That Magistrats ought to put in execution the princes commaunds, albeit that they be vniust: which is to bee vnderstood of civill iustice and vtilitie: but not if such commaunds bee contrarie to the lawes of nature. Which interpretation may serue also for the right understanding of that which the lawyers say, That the prince may derogat euen from the law of nature. VVherin[*](How it is to be vnderstood that a prince may derogate from the law of nature.) their meaning is, from the law of nations, and common constitutions of other people: least any deceiued by the obscuritie of the words, or equiuocation of the law of nature, should thereby rashly presume to breake the sacred lawes of God and nature.

Now if any man shall obiect and say, That the emperour Anastasius expresly commaunded, That the judges and Magistrats should not so much as suffer men to produce the princes rescripts or letters graunted unto particular persons, contrarie to the generall edicts or lawes: Mine aunswere is, that that is to be vnderstood, if in such the princes rescripts or letters no speciall clause be comprehended, derogating from the generall lawes: notwithstanding which derogation, yet the Magistrat ought neuerthelesse to aduertise the prince thereof, and to put him in mind of his dutie: who if he be not by the Magistrats reasons to be remoued from his former opinion, but command the same the second time, the Magistrat is then to obey his commaund, although the thing so commaunded be not agreeing with the common profit, and contrarie unto the lawes. For why, the Magistrat hauing so done his dutie, is not to expect but the second commaund; as is by the law prouided. To the example whereof the edict of Charles the ninth was made, concerning the magistrats admonitions unto their prince. So long before this Theodosius the Great, at the request of Saint Ambrose the good bishop of Milan, made a law, whereby he willed, That the execution of his letters pattents and commaunds, should be holden in suspense thirtie dayes after the signification thereof, when he had commaunded any to be more rigorously punished than the vsual manner and custome was. The occasion of the making of which law was, the execution of seuen thousand Thessalians, put to death by the commaundement of this Theodosius, for that they had murthered and slaine certaine of his Receiuers and Magistrats. For which cause Saint Ambrose excommunicated the emperour, neither would suffer him to be reconciled, vntill he had made the aforesaid law. And hereof (as I suppose) proceed those rescripts, which are yet used by the bishops of Rome: the first called Monitorie, the second Iussorie, and the third Executorie; or as we say in English, Edicts of admonition, of Commaund, and of Execution.

The same opinion we are to haue, if the prince by his letters patents command the[*](How the Magistrat commaunded by his prince to put in execution old penall lawes, now of themselves or through the negligence of the magistrats forgotten, is to proceed in the execution thereof.) Magistrat to proceed to the execution of the penaltie uppon them that haue offended against such his edicts and lawes, as by the antiquitie of themselves, or by the negligence of the Magistrats seeme to have bene quite forgotten and abrogated. For why, the long sufferance of the prince, and conniuence of the magistrats, in the sight and knowledge of whome the lawes are so broken, remitteth the penaltie due by the law: which could not otherwise have bene infringed, by the abuse of them which transgressed the same, had it by the prince or magistrat bene still looked vnto. And therefore the magistrat ought not rashly to proceed to the execution of the penaltie of such forgotten or neglected lawes, before he have caused the same to be againe republished, being by his default before neglected. Yea the prince ought rather to proceed against his magistrats, who through their remisse negligence have suffered his edicts and lawes to be contemned. For otherwise it should be a thing verie vniust and sauouring of tyrannie, to make edicts and lawes, and after long neglecting of them, upon a sodaine to proceed against them, who by the example of others, had transgressed against them, seeing others before them to have escaped vnpunished. Which was one of the tyrannicall slights of the most cruell emperour Nero, as of other auntient tyrants also. Wheras the good emperour Traian to the contrarie commaunded Plinie gouernour of the lesser Asia, of new to publish such edicts and lawes as were any wise before buried in obliuion, by the disobedience or errour of his subiects, or the sufferance of the magistrats: for that a common errour is reputed for a law, if the errour bee not against the law of nature, against which no errour can probably be pretended.

But some man may aske, Whether the magistrat owe obedience unto such his princes commaunds, as shall unto him seeme contrarie unto the law of nature, albeit

that indeed they be not contrarie thereunto? For the equitie and reason which we call [*](The -ture not cleare and fest.) naturall, is not alwaies so cleere and manifest, but that it findeth impugners. Yea oftentimes the greatest lawyers and philosophers are therein intangled, and of quite contrarie opinions, and the lawes of people are therein sometime so repugnant, as that some of them appoint reward, and some others punishment for the selfe same fact, whereof bookes, lawes, and histories are ful, all which to prosecute were a matter infinit. Wherunto I aunswere, that if that which the auntients say may take place, a man neuer ought to doe that whereof he doubteth, whether it be iust or not; and much lesse ought hee so to doe, if he be thereof certainly persuaded that the thing which the prince commaundeth, is of it selfe by nature vniust. But if question be of civill iustice onely, the[*](The magistrate bound in ciuil causes to put his princes commaunds in execution, although they seeme unto himselfe vniust or contrarie unto lawe.) magistrat ought in such case to verifie and put in execution his princes commaunds, although he thinke them to be in civill equitie or law vniust. And therfore the magstrats in euerie Commonweale were compelled to sweare to obserue the lawes and ordinances; to the end they should not call into dispute or question, that which they ought to hold, as before resolued upon. And this was the manner and custome of the Romans when the old magistrats receiued the oath of the new, before they entred into their charge: which was commonly done upon the calends of Ianuarie, in the capitoll, after solemne sacrifices there made: for otherwise the magistrat lost his place of estate, if hee tooke not his oath within five daies after. Yea sometimes the Tribunes which held the estate of the people constrained them in particular which had withstood the publishing of a law, to sweare to obserue the same, after that it was once published, and that upon the paine of banishment. So L. Metellus Numidicus was by a decree of the people banished, for refusing to sweare unto the lawes published at the instance of the factious Tribune Saturninus. So also after that the lawes of Lewes the twelfth were published in the high court of the parliament of Paris: for that many disliked of the same, the kings atturney generall there made a request, That they might be duely obserued, and prohibition giuen for any man to call them in doubt, and that upon paine of high treason; as is to be seene in the records of the court. For why, it is lawfull for[*](Lawes once established ought not by prinat persons to be againe called into dispute or question.) euerie man before the publishing of the law, to despute and reason of the equitie thereof: which to doe after the publication thereof, is not lawfull. And so, before that, when as king Lewes the eleuenth had commaunded certaine vniust decrees of his to be published in the court of the parliament at Paris: the court refused to yeeld thereunto, for that they seemed unto euerie man vniust: but the king neuerthelesse still vrging his former requests, ioyned thereunto grieuous threats also; as that they should loose their heads that would not yeeld thereunto. Which thing Lauacr---e, president of the parliament[*](A notable example.) understanding, accompanied with the rest of the judges of that honourable court in their red robes, came unto the king, not to excuse the fault by him and the rest committed, in refusing the kings vniust decrees, but to show the reasons of their such refusall, and to request, That he with the rest might rather bee put to death, than enforced to giue their consent to the publishing of the propounded lawes. The king beholding the grauitie, the port, and dignitie of these persons, and almost abashed with the so constant resolution of such his great magistrats, and withall doubting the power and authoritie of the parliament, caused those his decrees so much misliked, to bee abrogated, and in their presence torne in peeces, requesting them to continue so still to maintaine iustice; solemnly protesting neuer more to send unto them any edict which should not be both iust and reasonable. It is a wonderfull thing to say of what power and moment this thing was to keepe the king within the bounds of reason, who otherwise had alwayes used his absolute power and commaund. As before hee came unto the kingdome, being as yet Dauphin, he caused the presidents of the court of Paris to bee called before him▪ to rase out the clause, De expresso mandato (by expresse commaundement) which the court had caused to be put unto the confirmation of the priuileges graunted unto the countie of Maine, protesting, That he would neuer goe out of the citie, vntill it were done, or yet take uppon him the charge by the king committed unto him. Whereupon the court indeed commaunded those words to bee cancelled: but yet that the cancelling might appeare, commaunded the acts to be kept, which are[*](How the wordes de expresso or expresissimo mandato are in princes graunts, edicts or decrees to be vnderstood,) yet preserued vndefaced. Now these words, De expresso mandato, and De expressissimo mandato, whereunto these words are also sometimes annexed, Multis vicibus iterato (or oftentimes repeated) which are many times to be found in the records of soueraign courts ioyned vnto the publication of the princes edicts and decrees, have this illation or meaning, that such edicts and priuileges (graunted by the princes expresse commandement) should not be so precisely kept, but that shortly after they might by the sufferance of the magistrats be againe forgotten and neglected, as not much regarded. And by this secret of the courts, hath the state of this kingdome bene preserued in the greatnesse thereof: which otherwise would have bene ruinated by the flatterers of princes, who by such extorted priuileges scrape unto themselves whatsoeuer they desire: and the good kings not stil able to satisfie the hungry courtiers, sometimes wel eased, which have used these restrictions, being so of their subiects well beloued, the confirmation of such edicts and priuileges not carrying with them any effect unto the subiect, or disobedience unto the king to giue good words, or charge of conscience unto the magistrat in not performing it.

But yet farther question might be made, VVhether a magistrat may bee suffered to[*](Whether a magistrate be to be suffered to giue up his place, rather than to allow an edict or commaund of his prince which he for certaine thinketh to be vniust, and contrarie unto reason) giue up his place, rather than he will allow an edict, a commission, or commandement from his prince, which he for certaine thinketh to be vniust and contrarie vnto naturall reason, when as the equitie of it is called in question, & especially if the other magistrats and multitude of the people shall hold it to be iust, contrarie to the others. For the force of iustice, and power of upright reason, is not perceiued but of the fewer and wiser sort: and a wise man being as it were the rule of reason, is of all others the greatest enemie unto the multitude. VVhich if it be so, why should a wise man bee enforced to giue his consent unto the multitude of mad magistrats. In which case I say, that the magistrat is not to be suffered to giue up his place, if it please not his soueraign prince he should so do, but ought rather to bee constrained to obey his princes commaunds, if the equitie thereof being called in doubt, be approued by the greater part of the magistrats, which have charge to confirme such edicts: For otherwise if they should be permitted to giue up their places, rather than to passe an edict approued by others, it would open a perilous gap to all the subiects, by their example to refuse and reiect the edicts and commaunds of their prince: and so euerie one in his charge might leaue the Commonweale unto danger, and expose it unto the tempest, as a ship without a Rudder, and that under the shadow of an opinion of iustice▪ which may haply be but a deuise of a subtill braine, to no other purpose than to contradict the more common opinion. And therefore among the most lawdable laws made by Lewes the xij, there is one which importeth, That if the judges be of three or moe opinions, those which were the fewer in number should be constrained to conforme and ioyne themselves unto one of the greater parties, for the concluding of the decrees. VVhereupon the court of Paris of long time doubted, whether this law should be published or not: for that it seemed a very hard and a most strange thing unto many, to force the conscience of the judges contrarie to their owne opinions, and so enforce them to iudge contrarie to that they ought, and that especially in such things as were committed unto the wisedome and deuotion of the judges, as are almost all both publike and priuat

iudgements. Yet neuerthelesse after the court had considered of inconueniences which it saw ordinarily to arise upon the varietie of opinions, and that the course of iustice, and the concluding of many good decrees, was thereby also often letted, the court confirmed the aforesaid law, which by processe of time hath bin found to be most iust & profitable. Hereunto also agreeth the maner and custome of the antient Romans: for their judges oftentimes to change their opinions, and to ioine themselves unto the greater part, albeit that they were not thereunto constrained. As is to bee seene in Plinie, of a iudgement wherin one part of the iudges had condēned the guiltie person unto death, another part had cleerely and fully acquited him, and the third part had for a time banished him: in this diuersitie of opinions, as well they which had before acquited him, as they which had condemned him to death, consented both to them which would have him banished. But our law is in that point better, which compelleth the fewer to ioyne themselves unto the more. For in all corporations & colledges reason would, that that which pleaseth the greater part should take place and preuaile, as strengthened with the most voices. Howbeit that in all such consultations and actions the rule of the auntient wise neuer faileth; which willeth, That of many honest and profitable things propounded unto vs, we should chuse those which be most honest, and most profitable: and so of many inconueniences and daungers, to make choice of the least: for otherwise mens actions should neuer sort to good end. And a man may also say, That the equitie of a law is not properly naturall, if it bee obscure or doubtfull; for that true naturall iustice is more cleere and resplendent than the brightnesse of the sunne, as not wrapped up in obscuritie, nor depending of the erroneous opinions of men, but of the most cleere and immutable wisedome of the euerlasting.

And yet neuerthelesse since the law of Lewes the xij. I find not that any magistrat hath giuen up his place, as fearing to be inforced to maintaine or yeeld to any opinion contrarie unto his conscience: and especially since the places of justice were giuen unto men for vertue, and not for reward and favour. Neither hath the law of Lewes the xij. at any time constrayned the judges to iudge contrarie unto their conscience, but hath rather silently giuen them leaue to giue up their places; howbeit that it were more equitie so to constraine them, than to leaue it vnto their will and pleasure. For which cause the kings Attourneyes general haue oftentimes constrained the Iudges to iudge according unto Lawes and customes of the land, albeit that all the Iudges were of contrarie opinion. As I remember that whilest I was at Tholouse, one Bartholomew President of one of the Chambers of Inquirie, seeing all the counsellours of his court of one and the same opinion in a suit, and directly against the law: after he had assembled all the rest of the courts upon the matter, he constrayned them to change their opinions, and to iudge according to the law; And that iustly also: for who enforced thee to seeke for thine office? or to accept of it being offered thee? and hauing taken it upon thee, (being happily got either by suspending of voices, or by sure, or briberie,) and being sworne, wilt thou now forsweare the lawes, which thou mightest before have red, or at least wise oughtest to have red? wilt thou by thy false opinion of the law and iustice, wrong the place thou bearest? delude the lawes? or forsake thy prince and Commonweale.

Yet sometime it happeneth that such lawes as of themselves seeme unto every man[*](Wh the magistrate is to d in case the law otherwise▪ iust, now upon som soden occutrents to be har and vniust.) most iust, may upon some suddein occurent appeare and proue to be most vniust. In which case, whereas the wrong is in the fact presented plaine and euident, wise magistrats vse to certifie the king thereof, (as I remember it to have most oftentimes bene done in the parliament at Paris,) who imparting the matter unto his Counsell, doth as he seeth cause derogate from the positiue law; or adde some thing unto the same:

(which our men call the exposition or declaration of the law) a thing properly belonging unto the soueraigntie of a Prince, as we have before declared. So that in this case, it is not lawfull for the magistrat to iudge against the law, although he may suspend his sentence vntill that the Princes pleasure be further knowne. But otherwise the law being cleare and without difficultie, the magistrat is to iudge according thereunto without disputing of the equitie thereof: for otherwise if the judge shall wittingly and wilfully iudge contrarie unto the law, he is by the lawes themselves noted of infamie: but if he shall so iudge of ignorance, or supposing himselfe to iudge according unto the law; he is not therefore to be accounted infamous: howbeit that such his iudgement is of it selfe void, as if it had not beene giuen at all, in such sort as that a man by the auntient Roman law need not at all to appeale therefrom.

Now there is great difference whether question be of the lawes alreadie established, or of those which yet are by the magistrat to be published. For why, such as be alreadie established, every man is bound to keepe, and especially the magistrats, who if they wittingly swarue therefrom, (beside the penaltie appointed by the law) are subiect also unto the note of infamie, as periurours and forsworne men. But as for such Edicts and[*](Great care to be had by the greater magistrats in the publication of lawes.) lawes as are not yet published, but are but as yet presented unto the magistrats to be confirmed and published, of them it behoueth the greater magistrats (to whom the publication of lawes especially appertaineth) well to consider, and to show the reasons if they shall dislike of them vnto the prince, albeit that it concerne but the particular interest of some one priuat person; but much more, in case it concerne the great harme or good of the Commonweale: which good if it be verie great, may in some sort cover the iniustice of the law; (as the auntient states-men say.) Yet must we not proceed so farre in respecting of the publike profit be it neuer so great, as therefore to forget reason, and to be caried headlong with wrong and iniustice: as were in auntient time the Lacedemonians, who measured all iustice by the common profit, whereunto they directed all their lawes, all their iudgements, and counsels; so that if that were once in question, neither oath, nor reason, nor iustice, nor yet the law of nature was by them[*](Better it is for the magistrat of himselfe to giue way unto the law contrarie unto the lawes of God and nature.) once respected. But much better it were for the Commonweale, and more beseeming the dignitie of the magistrat, of himselfe to giue up his office (as did the Chauncelour of Philip the second, duke of Burgundie) than to giue way unto a law that is contrarie unto the lawes of God and nature, or that in every mans iudgement seemeth to be dishonest or vniust; howbeit the Duke seeing the irremoueable constancie of his Chauncelour, readie to giue up his office, thought it better to reuoke such his commaunds, than to want so stout & wise a man. Which so constant resolutions of the magistrats, hath oftentimes preserued Princes from infamie, lawes from decay, and Commonweales[*](That a princes faults which cannot be amended ought by all meanes to be of the magistrate coured.) from destruction. But when such constancie cannot heale the diseases of the Commonweale, or faults of soueraigne princes; and that the prince commaundeth the magistrats, to have his actions excused unto his subiects; it is much better for the magistrat to obey his commaund, and in so doing to cover and burie the memorie of a wicked fact alreadie done, than in refusing so to do, to irritate the prince to the doing of worse; and so (as they say) to cast the helue after the hatchet. As did Papinian the great Gouernour of the empire, (and by Seuerus the Emperour in his will appointed Tutor unto the yong emperours Anthonius Caracalla, and Geta his sonnes) who by Caracalla commaunded to excuse unto the Senat the murder by him committed upon the person of his brother Geta, would therein do nothing, but cut him off with this sharpe and short answere, saying, That murthers were more hardlie excused, than committed: which was of him more stoutly then wisely said. For Caracalla with this aunswere enraged, and yet not satisfied with his brothers blood, in his rage commaunded

Papinian also to be slaine: and after the death of him so great a man, (as who alone might haue gouerned the furious yong prince, and repressed his rage) neuer ceased without any contradiction or controulment to kill, murther, and tyrannize, vntill such time as he had brought himselfe together with the Empire unto destruction. Which I would not have to bee so vnderstood, as spoken of vs in any respect to impaire the worthie praises of so notable a man, (for that can in no wise be done) but that magistrats may hereby vnderstand, how farre they are to beare with the saults of princes, which once done, cannot by them be amended. For had Papinian couered that he could not now amend, he had saued his owne life, and counterpeased the tyrannies and cruelties of the Emperour, who alwaies before had him in greatest honour and regard. Which fault in Papinian I have thought good to note, for that many have right highly commended him for the same▪ without respecting, that such his resistance auailed nothing, but brought an irrepairable losse unto the affaires of the empire, being so depriued of so great a personage, as might therein doe more than any other; for that he was a prince of the blood, and the greatest magistrat in the state. But had the matter then stood whole and entier, and that the Emperour had commaunded him to put his brother Geta to death, he had then done both stoutly and wisely in refusing so to doe, and had had iust cause rather to die than to consent to that vnnaturall fact, for one brother to murther another. But Seneca and his companion Burra (the gouernors of Nero) shall be for euer blamed, as hauing no excuse to pretend for their most wicked counsell, persuading Nero to kill his mother, who by chaunce had escaped drowning: which most cruell counsell, commaund, or fact, shall together with the authors thereof be for euer crowned with eternall infamie and shame.

But what if the prince shall command any thing to be done, and that the same thing[*](A princes commaund being begun to bee put in execution, whether it b by the princes contrary commaund to giuen ouer.) being begun to be put in execution, he changing his mind shall reuoke his former commaund; shall the magistrat in this case stay from proceeding any further, or go on with that he hath begun? Whereunto a man at the first sight would say, That he ought to stay and to proceed no farther: following therein the maximes of the law. Howbeit to aunswere rightly thereunto, the matter is by distinction to be opened; that is to wit, that if the thing so begun may be left off without the publike harme, it is then so to bee left off according to the last commaund: but if it be so begun, as that it cannot bee left off, whithout the manifest hurt of the state and Commonweale; the magistrat in this case is to proceed on with that he hath so begun, notwithstanding the latter countermaund, and that especially in matters of warre; as wee have before said. And to this[*](Great things by great men vndertaken, ought also to be by them performed, or else neuer taken in hand.) purpose Marcellus the Consull saith, Multa magnis ducibus sicut non aggredienda, ita semel aggressis non dimittenda. As many things are not of great captaines to be at all taken in hand: so being once by them vndertaken, are not by them to bee againe giuen ouer. And this in time of warre. But if at home the magistrat following the commandement to him giuen, hath begun to execute the condemned, or them that the prince hath commaunded to be put to death, he ought forthwith to surcease from any further execution, if the commaundement be reuoked: and not to do, as did the Consull Fuluius, who hauing taken the citie of Capua, as he was punishing the authors of the rebellion, and had now caused the greater part of the Senators of that citie to bee beheaded, receiuing letters from the Senat of Rome, willing him to stay and cease the execution, put those letters in his bosome, without reading of them, & doubting of the contents thereof, proceeded to the execution of the rest, vntill he had put to death fourescore of them. True it is, that the Senat had no power in any thing to commaund the Consuls (as we have before said) yet for all that, the gouernours of prouinces, and the generals of the Roman armies, yea a---d the Consuls also, used most commonly to be obedient

vnto the Senate, and to yeelde unto the decrees thereof, as unto lawes. And truely the principall cause why they of Gaunt put to death sixe and thirty of their lawyers, after the death of Charles Duke of Burgundy, was for nothing else, but for that they had condemned a citisen to death, after the death of the Duke; before they were againe confirmed in their authoritie and office, although it was not a thing altogether necessarie; as with like examples wee have declared. Yea it is almost a perpetuall thing, for them which are in authoritie and have power to commaund, to bee able of their owne right to execute that was commanded them, yea after that the time of their authoritie is expired, if he that gaue them the authoritie and charge knowing and wittingly shall dissemble the fact, or not forbid it when he might.

Now all that we have hitherto said, is to be vnderstood onely of such letters or rescripts of commaund, as yet carrie with them no power for the magistrat to examine the fact or matter they concerne. But then what shall wee say, if such rescripts or commaunds report such things as certainely knowne and true, which yet are neither publikely, nor unto the magistrat so knowne to be. Heere we must againe consider, whether[*](Whether the magistrate b to examine the trueth of that he is by the prince commaunded, before he proceede to the examination thereof?) the examination of the matter, be by speciall commaund expresly taken from the magistrat, or else left unto him: if it be left unto him, there is then no doubt, but that the magistrat may and ought to enquire of the truth of such things, as are reported in the princes rescripts or letters: but if al examination of the matter be taken from the magistrat, then some doubt, whether he may inquire of the truth thereof or not; and especially if it be expressed in the rescript or mandate, that the prince being well enformed of the truth, commaundeth the magistrat to proceede to the execution of his letters or commaunds: howbeit the best opinion is, that the magistrat both in the one case and the other, ought to examine the truth of the matter. For when to inquire of the truth of the cause, is neither forbidden nor commaunded, although it bee expressed in the princes rescripts or letters, to proceede to execution, yet ought the magistrat neuerthelesse to examine the truth of the mater. And to the intent, that the magistrats should not pretend to excuse themselves by ignorance, the emperour Constantine, prouided by an expresse law, that the magistrats should inquire, whether these things were true or not, which were set downe in his rescripts or letters of commaund, whether it were so in them expressed, or left out. And as for the other point, if in the rescripts or letters, it be expresly set downe to proceede to execution, for that the prince is well enformed of the truth of the matter; yet neuerthelesse ought the magistrat to examine the truth thereof: notwithstanding the clause which I have said, which ought not to hinder the examination of the matter, nor to be preiudiciall to any other mans right; and so much lesse unto the publike, and least of all unto the truth: and so generally, all such narratiue clauses as are but reported in rescripts, mandates, commissions, lawes, priviledges, testaments, and sentences, cannot be any thing preiudiciall unto the truth. And albeit, that during the tyranny of the Sforces, they made a law, that all faith and credence should be giuen unto the princes commaunds and letters; yet was the same law againe disanulled, after that they were by the French, driuen out of the estate of Milan. And if the faith and credite must needes bee giuen unto the narratiue clauses of princes rescripts and letters of commaund, that is to bee vnderstood, onely of such clauses, as whereby the obscure places of their edicts, and lawes, commissions, mandates, or iudgements are expounded, which none can better declare, then they themselves that made them; howbeit, that such their declarations ought rather to be called decrees, then expositions or declarations. But if the prince shall in the bestowing of offices, places of charge, or other his grants in his rescripts or letters, testifie for the fidelity, integrity, wisedome, or religion of any man, it is so farre from, that the magistrat should rest contented

with that testification, as that hee ought therefore with greater diligence to inquire [*](Whether the ma gistrate ought to enquire of the sufficiesie of him of whose wisdom and the prince shal himselfe by his rescripts or letters testifie; in the bestowing of any office or other charge upon him) of him, for that the prince supposed him to be indeede such, and would not have such benefits or preferments bestowed upon an ignorant or vnwise man. But contrary wise, if the prince shall simply giue unto any man an office or place of commaund, he is no farther by the magistrat to bee inquired of, for that the prince in his wisedome hath thought him worthy such honour and place; if the prince first giue him not leaue so to doe, or that the custome of the country so require: as in the latter times they did in Rome; but afterwards, almost ---ery where: but especially in the appointing of iudges. So also in antient time, in the raigne of the Gothes, triall was made of the Senators, before they were to bee admitted into the Senate. For Theodoric, king of the Gothes, writing unto the Roman Senate, for the receiuing of a new Senator, saieth, Admittendos in Senatum examinare cogit sollicitus honor Senatus▪ the care (we haue) of the honour of the Senate, causeth vs to examine such as are to be admitted into the Senate.

But if any man under a false pretensed colour shall encroach uppon the prince the profits and commodities unto him graunted, being in the princes rescript expressed, yet is he thereof by the magistrat to be embarred; and the rather, if the common treasure be with immoderat gifts exhausted: unto which disease euerie where spreading, remedie might be giuen, if the law of Valois concerning gifts might take place. For Philip Valois the French king, commaunded those gifts and graunts to bee reuoked from them, who in the letters of such gifts or graunts, had not expressed what they or any other for them, had for the same cause in the letters of their graunts, before obtained; which yet also is in vse in Millan. For seeing that it much concerneth the Commonweale what money and profit, what rewards, and priuileges, every man obtaine---h, the magistrats[*](It much conneth the Commonweale what gifts or priuileges be graunted unto particular men.) must thereunto have a most vigilant eye, and especially in popular estates, wherin as all publike things lie open unto the spoyle of all men; so for the same cause occasion is ministred vnto the seditious, to the trouble and oftentimes to the ruine of the Commonweale. And for this cause it was most straitly prouided by a law in the twelue tables, that no priuilege or dispensation might in any wise be graunted, and that upon paine of death, but onely in the great assembly of the whole estate of the people: the words of the law being these, Priuilegia nisi Commitijs Centuriatis ne irroganto, qui secus faxit Capital esto, ---et no priuilege be graunted, but in the great and general assembly of the people: and he that shall otherwise doe, let him die the death. And after that Constantine the emperour writing unto the people, saith, Nec d---mnosa fi---co, nec legibus contraria impetrari oportet, ---t is not fit, things hurtfull unto the common treasure, or[*](Priuileg things odious and unto the law, how they are to be interpreted.) contrarie unto the laws, to be obtained▪ howbeit that all priuileges are directly contrarie unto the law; for otherwise they should not be priuileges. And i--- it bee so, that they must needs passe after the second commaund (as we have before said) yet beseemeth it the magistrat to cut them short, and to interpret them in strictest maner that he can, and to the least hurt of the Commonweale, as things odious, and contrarie unto the law; and not by favourable interpretations to encrease their strength, or to draw them into consequence, as heretofore haue the judges and the clergie, which by their faire gloses, have drawne the profit and priuileges graunted onely unto souldiors, unto themselves also; vsing these faire gloasing words, of worldly Souldiours and heauenly Souldiours: so laying all the burthen upon the poore countrey man, unto whom the same priuileges ought of better right to be communicated than to them.

But for that our purpose is not here to enter into the disputing of priuileges, which[*](Priuileges to be most straitly examined.) were a thing infinit, sufficeth it in passing by, in generall to aduertise the magistrat to have speciall regard unto the priuileges by princes graunted, and most straitly to examine

them, what good report soeuer the prince therin make of him that hath obtained such priuilege: For that every man well knoweth, that the prince oftentimes knoweth not them to whome such priuileges are graunted; vnworthy men still not so much obtaining them, as indeed wresting them from princes, euen as it were against their wils: no craft or subtiltie in this case left vnsought out, to defraud the lawes, and abuse the prince and magistrats, and that with so many shifts and quirkes of words, and so much deceit, as that they seeme hardly to be by the magistrat to be met withal, but by plaine force. Such is that clause, De motu proprio (of our owne meere motion) which inuented at Rome, hath from thence crept abroad into all Europe. For why, there is almost neither king nor kesar, which when question is for the breaking of a law, or repealing an edict, or for giuing way unto dispensations and priuileges, ioyneth not thereunto this clause, De motu nostro proprio (Of our owne proper motion) howbeit that the same princes have bene importuned, and as it were enforced to graunt that euen unto vnknowne and most vnworthy men, for whome they have bene so importunatly requested. There is at Rome a field called Flory, or Flourishing, not so much for the plentie of flowers, as of witnesses that are therein; out of which euerie man may take testimonies, for the bestowing of benefices upon them which dwell euen in the remotest places of Asia and Affrica, and that with these words, De motu proprio. By which onely clause, all the fraud and deceit of them that sued for preferment, be they neuer so bad or vniust, are easily excused: and by vertue of which words the examination of all slye incommings or craftie intrusions, cease, if wee will receiue the opinion of some most pernitious and daungerous unto the state: but such sleights and deceits wee have long since bid farewell out of our Commonweale. And for that princes and magistrats circumuented with the wiles of deceitfull men, could hardly, or not at all escape the same, it was wisely decreed, That the princes rescripts, nor letters pattents, should be of none effect, except they were presented unto the magistrat the same yere that they were obtained; neither should be of any force, before they were by the magistrat approued. And yet it seemeth unto me, that the law of Milan is better, that is to wit, that the princes mandats and letters pattents directed unto the Senat, were not to be receiued after the yeare expired: neither those that were directed unto the magistrat after a moneth were past: and that not onely the yeare and day, but euen the verie howre also, should be therein set downe, as the manner is almost throughout all Germanie; following therein the opinion of many great lawyers, to stop the suits and controuersies which oft times arise for gifts, offices, and benefices graunted unto diuers in one day, as it was decreed by the parliament at Blois, at the request there made by Bodin deputie of Vermandois.

But what if the prince by his rescript or letters pattents, shall expresly forbid the magistrat[*](Whether the magistrat expressely forbidden to examin the trueth of things contained in the princes grants or letters, may yet passe beyond such his soueraignes prohibition.) to examine the truth of such things as are contained in them, albeit that they be false or doubtfull; ought the magistrat in this case to examine the matter? And it seemeth that he ought so to doe: For we have before said, that hee may, and ought to examine the cause, and enquire of the truth of things expressed in the princes rescripts and letters, albeit that the prince therein declare himselfe to know the truth thereof. Yet for all that, I say, that it belongeth not unto the magistrat in this case to passe beyond the prohibition of his soueraigne prince: For there is great difference when the prince declareth, That he knoweth the truth; and when he forbiddeth to enquire therof: For in him it is to be presumed, that he hath bene circumuented, and so mistaking things false for true, and things vnknowne for knowne, to haue commaunded them so to be put into his rescript, which he would not have done, had hee beene truely thereof enformed: As if hee should giue a judges place unto a souldior, or a captaines place

unto a lawyer, neither the one nor the other ought by the magistrat to be admitted or receiued, although the souldiour were commonly called a lawier, and the lawier a souldiour, such pretended qualitie hauing happely giuen occasion unto the prince to be so in his graunt deceiued. But when the prince shall expresly forbid the magistrat to examine the fact or matter, it is to be presumed, that he well knoweth that which he doth, and that he would not that the magistrat should farther enquire thereof. Yet may the magistrat well vse the remedie by vs before spoken of, and show the prince the truth, and the importance of his commaund, with the inconueniences and harmes ensuing thereof, and so in what he may to draw him from his former purpose: and hauing so discharged his duetie, yet neuerthelesse then to yeeld his obedience, if he shall be againe so commaunded: for otherwise the maiestie of a prince or Commonweal should be but a mockerie, as still subiect unto the controlement of the magistrates. Besides that, it is much more also to be feared, least that the other magistrates, by the example of one or two, and after them other priuat men also, should presume to contemne the princes commaund, to the great endangering and ruine of the Commonweale.

Now if a man should say that a Prince ought not to commaund any thing that is dishonest or vniust, he therein sayth well: neither ought the prince (if it were possible) to commaund any thing not beseeming his honour, or that were so much as subiect unto reprehension or slaunder, or knowing the magistrates to be of contrarie opinion unto his, to constraine them thereunto: for that the ignorant and common people is no way more moued unto disloyaltie, and contempt of their princes edicts and lawes, then to see the magistrates hardly delt withall, and the lawes by them contrarie to their[*](Whether the magistrat commaunded by his prince any thing contrarie to the common profit, or course of civill iustice, ought to obey such his princes commaund, or to giue up his place.) good liking published and forced. But now here the question is, what the magistrat ought to doe, in case the prince forgetting his duetie, commaund any thing contrarie to the common profit and civill iustice; yet prouided still that it be not against the law of God and nature: whether the magistrat ought to obey such his princes commaund, or to giue up his place? And if so it be, that the worldly magistrat ought to be obeyed, albeit that he commaund such things as are vniust: Ne Praetoris matestas contempta videatur, Lest the maiestie of the Praetor should seeme to be contemned (as saith the law) how much more then ought men to obey their soueraigne Prince, of the maiestie of whom all magistrates depend? Now it is in many lawes repeated that we must obey the magistrat, whether the thing that he commaundeth be iust or not, following the counsell of all the wise which have hereof written. And to this purpose saith Cicero (albeit that he was a mortall enemie unto the Tribunes of the people) that men were to obey euen the vniust oppositions of the Tribunes, in these words: Parere iube--- lex intercessori, quo nihil praestantius: impediri enim bonam rem melius est, quàm concedi malè, The law (saith he) commaundeth vs to obey the magistrat that opposeth himselfe, then which nothing is better: for better it is a good thing to be crossed then euill graunted. And before he had said: Nihil exitiosius ciuitatibus, nihil tam contrarium iuri ac legibus, nihil minùs ciuile & humanum, quàm composita & constituta republica quicquam agi per vim, Nothing is more dangerous unto cities, nothing more contrarie unto right and law, nothing more vncivill or inhumaine, then in a well ordered[*](Dangerous unto Commonweales for the the magistrates to refuse to put in execution their princes Edicts or commaunds.) and setled Commonweale to have any thing done by force. We oft times see the subiects to take up armes against their prince, the lawes violated, and iustice go to wracke, and all for the false opinion that the people have of the equitie and integritie of the judges, refusing to verifie and put in execution the Edicts and commaunds of their prince. O but say they it is an vniust Edict or law, neither can we, nor ought we, to obey the same: an honest speech, if indeed thou canst not; but where learnedst thou that thou oughtest not? from whence haddest thou that doctrine? wilt thou (being a

magistrat) with stripes, imprisoment, fines, yea, and with death it selfe enforce priuat men to obey, yea euen thine vniust commaunds, and yet thy selfe not obey the commaundement of thy Prince? But thou wilt denie thine owne commaunds to be vniust: so doth the prince also denie that which he commaundeth to be so: shalt thou now be iudge herein, or he? or if thou wilt needs be iudge, why shouldst thou not thinke to suffer the same in thine owne decrees concerning priuat men. Besides that, as no man enforced thee to take upon thee thine office, so no man forbiddeth thee to giue up the same, if the law thou likest not seeme to thee so vniust: it is therefore the desire of bearing rule, that maketh thee that thou wouldest beare rule over priuat men, and yet not obey thy prince thy selfe. Wherefore let vs upon this conclude, it to be much better in all obedience to stoupe unto the soueraigne maiestie, than in refusing of his soueraigne commaunds to giue example and occasion of rebellion unto the subiects; yet still keeping the respects that we have before set downe, and especially when it concerneth the honour of God, which is and ought to bee unto all subiects greater, and more precious than the wealth, the life, the honour of all the princes of the world. And to know how a man should beare himselfe herein, amongst many examples we will vse but one or two. Saul commaunded all the priests of God without iust cause in his presence to be slaine, yet was there no man which refused not his vngodly commaund, except Doeg, who himselfe alone performed that so cruell an execution. An other notable example there is of one Petronius gouernour of Syria, who receiued[*](A notable example of a wise gouernour or magistrat.) commaundement to place the image of Caligula the emperour, in the fairest place of the Temple of Hierusalem, as it had beene in all other Temples of the empire: howbeit that the Iewes had neuer suffered those images to stand in their Temples, but had still cast them downe, and broken and beaten them all to peeces, euen to the verie shieldes of the emperours, which they had there placed. Whereof Petronius aduertised the Emperour, and that it could not be done without great trouble and slaughter of the people: wherewith Caligula more incensed, sent more expresse and strait commaund unto Petronius, to assemble all the old bands of his garison souldiours in those quarters, and so with a puissant armie to put his commission in execution. Of whose comming the Iewes hearing, left their Townes, and the tillage of their grounds, and so in great companies all vnarmed, went to meet him, if happily they so might by their humble prayers intreat him; telling him withall, that they ought not so much to feare any mortall man, as to commit so abhominable a sinne against the maiestie of the immortall God: and therfore most humbly requested him to take in good part such their constant resolution, which was rather to die, than to see so great an abhomination, as the most sacred Temple of God to be so polluted with the images of men. Neuerthelesse Petronius told them that it concerned his life, to performe his commission: and so to terrifie them the more, marched with his armie unto Tiberias, (as supposing himselfe to doe nothing contrarie to his owne religion, or to the lawes of God or man) but there the people came running unto him from all parts, disarmed, and resolued all to die, rather than to see the image set up in the Temple, humbling themselves, and bowing their heads before the armie wherewith Petronius had beset them round: who seeing the great constancie of the people, and their exceeding zeale towards the honour of their God, as to chuse rather to die, than so much as to see the image of 2 man in the Temple of God; wonderfully moued therewith, and with their pitifull complaint and teares, (and being himselfe also a man of a courteous and milde nature, and farre from that crueltie, which the Iewes feared not whatsoeuer it had beene) he commaunded them all to returne home; promising againe to write in their behalfe unto the Emperour, and rather himselfe to die than to execute his commission, accounting his life a worthie ransome for the sauing of the guiltles blood of so many innocent people. Neuerthelesse Caligula therewith the more enraged, sent unto him a new commaund, with grieuous threats to put him unto the most grieuous torture that he could possibly deuise, if he forthwith put not his commission in execution, according to his commaund. But the ship, together with them that brought the commission, was by force of tempest caried an other way, and newes brought into Iurie of the death of the tyrant, before that the cruell commission could come thither. And so Petronius hauing discharged his conscience towards God, his duetie towards his prince, and well showed his great loue toward the subiects, and discharged all the parts of a most wise Gouernour: was himselfe by the diuine prouidence wonderfully preserued from the cruelties unto him by the tyrant threatned. But yet this is especially to be considered, that we [*](That the Magistrat ought not upō a vaine show of religion, or conscience euill grounded, to refuse to execute his princes commaunds.) pretend not the vaine show of religion, or rather of superstition, against our princes commaunds, and so upon a conscience euill grounded open a way unto rebellion: for when the magistrat maketh conscience, and a matter of religion, about the executing of his princes commaunds, he seemeth himselfe (and giueth occasion unto others also) to suspect euill both of the religion and conscience of his prince. Wherefore he ought to be well assured of the true knowledge of the eternall God, and of the true worship and seruice unto him due: which consisteth not in vaine and counterfeit showes of religion or conscience. Diuers other examples I could to the same purpose produce, were I not afraid lest those whom we call Pagans should therein ashame vs, with whom the feruent zeale unto the honour of God is so abated, and by processe of time cooled, as that it is to be feared lest at length it be altogether frosen. And thus much for the obedience of the Magistrat unto his Soueraigne Prince. Let vs now also speake of his power and authoritie over particular and priuat men, and what a manner of man we wish him for to to be towards them.