Noctes Atticae

Plutarch's account of the method of comparison and the calculations which the philosopher Pythagoras used in determining the great height of Hercules, while the hero was living among men.

In the treatise [*](This work, probably entitled bi/os )Hrakle/ous, has not survived.) which he wrote on the mental and physical endowment and achievements of Hercules while he was among men, Plutarch says that the philosopher Pythagoras reasoned sagaciously and acutely in determining and measuring the hero's superiority in size and stature. For since it was generally agreed that Hercules paced off the racecourse of the stadium at Pisae, near the temple of Olympian Zeus, and made it six hundred feet long, and since the other courses in the land of Greece, constructed later by other men, were indeed six hundred feet in length, but yet were somewhat shorter than that at Olympia, he readily concluded by a process of comparison that the measured length of Hercules' foot was greater than that of other men in the same proportion as the course at Olympia was longer than the other stadia. Then, having ascertained the size

The apt use made by Herodes Atticus, the ex-consul, in reply to an arrogant and boastful young fellow, a student of philosophy in appearance only, of the passage in which Epictetus the Stoic humorously set apart the true Stoic from the mob of prating triflers who called themselves Stoics.

While we were students at Athens, Herodes Atticus, a man of consular rank and of true Grecian eloquence, often invited me to his country houses near that city, in company with the honourable [*](Clarisximus became a standing title of men of high rank, especially of the senatorial order.) Servilianus and several others of our countrymen who had withdrawn from Rome to Greece in quest of culture. And there at that time, while we were with him at the villa called Cephisia, both in the heat of summer and under the burning autumnal sun, we protected ourselves against the trying temperature by the shade of its spacious groves, its long, soft [*](Cf. Plin. Epist. ii. xvii. 15, vinea . . . ndis etiam pedibus mollis et cedens.) promenades, the cool location of the house, its elegant baths with their abundance of sparkling water, and the charm of the villa as a whole, which was everywhere melodious with plashing waters and tuneful birds.

There was with us there at the time a young student of philosophy, of the Stoic school according to his own account, but intolerably loquacious and presuming. In the course of the conversations which are commonly carried on at table after dinner, this fellow often used to prattle unseasonably, absurdly, and at immoderate length, on the principles of philosophy, maintaining that compared with himself all the Greek-speaking authorities, all wearers of the toga, and the Latin race in general were ignorant boors. As he spoke, he rattled off unfamiliar terms, the catchwords of syllogisms and dialectic tricks, declaring that no one but he could unravel the

master,

resting,

heap

Once when he was puffing out these empty boasts, and already all, weary of his prating, were thoroughly disgusted and longing for an end, Herodes, speaking in Greek as was his general custom, said:

Allow me, mightiest of philosophers, since we, whom you call laymen, cannot answer you, to read from a book of Epictetus, greatest of Stoics, what he thought and said about such big talk as that of yours.

Then, when the book was brought, there was read the passage which I have appended, in which Epictetus with equal severity and humour set apart and separated from the true and genuine Stoic, who was beyond question without restraint or constraint, unembarrassed, free, prosperous and happy, that other mob of triflers who styled themselves Stoics, and casting the black soot of their verbiage before the eves of their hearers, laid false claim to the name of the holiest of sects:

1. "'Speak to me of good and evil.'—Listen:
2. The wind, bearing me from Ilium, drove me to the Cicones. [*](Ei)pe/ . . . is the request of the pseudo-philosopher, )/Akoue the answer of Epictetus, who quotes a line of Homer (Odyss. ix. 39) which is here meaningless, implying that the pretended Stoics quote both poetry and ethics glibly, but without understanding.)

Of all existing things some are good, some evil, and some indifferent. Now the good things are virtues and what partakes of them, the evil are vice and what partakes of vice, and the indifferent lie

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between these: wealth, health, life, death, pleasure, pain. [*](Some assign this speech— Of all existing things . . . pain to Epictetus, quoting the pseudo-Stoic jargon; others to the pseudo-philosopher. The former seems to fit best with what follows.) —'How do you know this?'—Hellanicus says so in his Egyptian Histoy. For what difference does it make whether you say that, or that it was Diogenes in his Ethics or Chrysippus or Cleanthes? Have you then investigated any of these matters and formed an opinion of your own? Let me see how you are accustomed to act in a storm at sea. Do you recall this classification when the sail cracks and you cry aloud? If some idle fellow should stand beside you and say: 'Tell me, for Heaven's sake, what you told me before. It isn't a vice to suffer shipwreck, is it? It doesn't partake of vice, does it?' Would you not hurl a stick of wood at him and cry: 'What have we to do with you, fellow? We perish and you come and crack jokes.' But if Caesar should summon you to answer an accusation. . .

On hearing these words, that most arrogant of youths was mute, just as if the whole diatribe had been pronounced, not by Epictetus against others, but against himself by Herodes.

The difficult decision which the Lacedaemonian Chilo made to save a friend; and that one should consider scrupulously and anxiously whether one ought ever to do wrong in the interest of friends, with notes and quotations on that subject from the writings of Theophrastus and Marcus Cicero.

OF Chilo the Lacedaemonian, one of that famous group of sages, [*](The names of these are variously given. They generally include, in addition to Chilo: Cleobulus of Lindus in Rhodes, Periander of Corinth, Pittacus of Mitylene, Bias of Priene, Thales of Miletus, and Solon of Athens. Plato, Protag. p. 343 A, gives Myson of Chen in place of Periander.) it is written in the books of those

"That very little of what I have said and done in the course of a long life calls for repentance, you yourselves may perhaps know. I, at any rate, at such a time as this do not deceive myself in believing that I have done nothing that it troubles me to remember, except for just one thing; and as to that it is not even now perfectly clear to me whether I did right or wrong.

I was judge with two others, and a friend's life was at stake. The law was such that the man must be found guilty. Therefore, either my friend must suffer capital punishment or violence must be done to the law. I considered for a long time how to remedy so difficult a situation. The course which I adopted seemed, in comparison with the alternative, the less objectionable; I myself secretly voted for conviction, but I persuaded my fellow judges to vote for acquittal. Thus I myself in a matter of such moment did my duty both as a judge and as a friend. But my action torments me with the fear that there may be something of treachery and guilt in having recommended to others, in the same case, at the same time, and in a common duty, a course for them contrary to what I thought best for myself.

This Chilo, then, though a man of surpassing wisdom, was in doubt how far he ought to have gone counter to law and counter to equity for the sake of a friend, and that question distressed him even at the very end of his life. So too many subsequent students of philosophy, as appears in their works,

whether one may sometimes act contrary to law or contrary to precedent in a friend's behalf, and under what circumstances and to what extent.

This problem has been discussed, as I have said, not only by many others, but also with extreme thoroughness by Theophrastus, the most conscientious and learned of the Peripatetic school; the discussion is found, if I remember correctly, in the first book of his treatise On Friendship. That work Cicero evidently read when he too was composing a work On Friendship. Now, the other material that Cicero thought proper to borrow from Theophrastus his talent and command of language enabled him to take and to translate with great taste and pertinence; but this particular topic which, as I have said, has been the object of much inquiry, and is the most difficult one of all, he passed over briefly and hurriedly, not reproducing the thoughtful and detailed argument of Theophrastus, but omitting his involved and as it were over-scrupulous discussion and merely calling attention in a few words to the nature of the problem. I have added Cicero's words, in case anyone should wish to verify my statement: [*](De Amicitia, 61.)

Therefore these are the limits which I think ought to be observed, namely: when the characters of friends are blameless, then there should be complete harmony of opinions and inclinations in everything without any exception;

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and, even if by some chance the wishes of a friend are not altogether honourable and require to be forwarded in matters which involve his life or reputation, we should turn aside from the straight path, provided, however, utter disgrace does not follow. For there are limits to the indulgence which can be allowed to friendship.

When it is a question,

either of a friend's life or good name, we must turn aside from the straight path, to further even his dis-honourable desire.

For,

there are limits to the indulgence which can be allowed to friendship.

Against one's fatherland,

one must not take up arms for a friend.

before The ognis was born,

One ought to aid one's friends, but only so far as the gods allow.

Theophrastus, however, in the book that I have mentioned, discusses this very question more exhaustively and with more care and precision than Cicero. But even he in his exposition does not express an opinion about separate and individual action, nor with the corroborative evidence of examples, but treats classes of actions briefly and generally, in about the following terms:

A small and trifling amount of disgrace or infamy,

to be influenced by mere terms, because my fair fame and the advantage of a friend under accusation are not of the same class. For such things must be estimated by their immediate weight and importance, not by verbal terms and the merits of the classes to which they belong. For when the interests of a friend are put into the balance with our own honour in matters of equal importance, or nearly so, our own honour unquestionably turns the scale; but when the advantage of a friend is far greater, but our sacrifice of reputation in a matter of no great moment is insignificant, then what is advantageous to a friend gains in importance in comparison with what is honourable for us, exactly as a great weight of bronze is more valuable than a tiny shred of gold.

On this point I append Theophrastus' own words: [*](Fr. 81, Wimmer.)

If such and such a thing belongs to a more valuable class, yet it is not true that some part of it, compared with a corresponding part of something else, will be preferable. This is not the case, for example, if gold is more valuable than bronze, and a portion of gold, compared with a portion of bronze of corresponding size, is obviously of more worth; but the number and size of the portions will have some influence on our decision.

The philosopher Favorinus too, somewhat loosening and inclining the delicate balance of justice to suit the occasion, thus defined such an indulgence in favour: [*](Fr. 102, Marres.)

That which among men is called favour is the relaxing of strictness in time of need.

Later on Theophrastus again expressed himself to about this effect:

The relative importance and insignificance of things, and all these considerations

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of duty, are sometimes directed, controlled, and as it were steered by other external influences and other additional factors, so to say, arising from individuals, conditions and exigencies, as well as by the requirements of existing circumstances; and these influences, which it is difficult to reduce to rules, make them appear now justifiable and now unjustifiable.

On these and similar topics Theophrastus wrote very discreetly, scrupulously and conscientiously, yet with more attention to analysis and discussion than with the intention or hope of arriving at a decision, since undoubtedly the variations in circumstances and exigencies, and the minute distinctions and differences, do not admit of a definite and universal rule that can be applied to individual cases; and it is such a rule, as I said at the beginning of this essay, of which we are in search.

Now this Chilo, with whom I began this little discussion, is the author not only of some other wise and salutary precepts, but also of the following, which has been found particularly helpful, since it confines within due limits those two most ungovernable passions, love and hatred.

So love,

as if you were possibly destined to hate; and in the same way, hate as if you might perhaps afterwards love.

Of this same Chilo the philosopher Plutarch, in the first book of his treatise On the Soul, wrote as follows: [*](vii, p. 19, Bern.)

Chilo of old, having heard a man say that he had no enemy, asked him if he had no friend, believing that enmities necessarily followed and were involved in friendships.

The care and fine taste with which Antonius Julianus examined the artful substitution of one word for another by Marcus Cicero in one of his orations.

THE rhetorician Antonius Julianus had an exceedingly noble and winning personality. He also possessed learning of a delightful and helpful sort, devoting great attention to the refinements of the writers of old and readily recalling them. Moreover, he inspected all the earlier literature with such care, weighing its merits and ferreting out its defects, that you might say that his judgment was perfect. [*](Lit., according to a rule or level.)

This Julianus expressed the following opinion of the syllogism which is found in the speech of Marcus Tullius spoken In Defence of Gnaeus Plancius [*](§68.) —but first I will quote the exact words on which he passed judgment: "And yet, a debt of money is a different thing from a debt of gratitude. For he who discharges a debt in money ceases forthwith to have that which he has paid, while one who continues in debt keeps what belongs to another. But in the case of a debt of gratitude, he who returns it has it; and he who has it returns it by the mere fact of having it. [*](The point of this passage depends on the meaning of referre grafiam, requite (pay a debt of gratitude), and habere gratiam, feel gratitude. I have followed to some extent the rendering of Watts (L.C.L.), but with some changes.) In the present instance I shall not cease to be Plancius' debtor if I pay this debt, nor should I be paying him any the less simply by feeling goodwill, if the present unfortunate situation had not occurred" [*](That is, the prosecution of Plancius, which enabled Cicero to pay his debt by defending his friend.)

Here,

is to be sure a fine artistry in the way the words are marshalled, something well-rounded that charms tile ear by its mere music; but it must be read with the privilege of a slight change in the meaning of one word in order to

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preserve the truth of the proposition. Now the comparison of a debt of gratitude with a pecuniary debt demands the use of the word 'debt' in both instances. For a debt of money and a debt of gratitude will seem to be properly compared, if we may say that both money and gratitude are owed; but let us consider what happens in the owing or paying of money, and on the other hand in the owing and paying of a debt of gratitude, if we retain the word 'debt' in both instances. Now Cicero,

having said that a debt of money was a different thing from a debt of gratitude, in giving his reason for that statement applies the word 'owe' to money, but in the case of gratitude substitutes ' has' (i.e. 'feels') for ' owes'; for this is what he says: ' But in the case of a debt of gratitude, he who returns it has it; and he who has it returns it by the mere fact of having it.' But that word 'has' does not exactly fit the proposed comparison. For it is the owing, and not the having, of gratitude that is compared with money, and therefore it would have been more consistent to say: 'He who owes pays by the mere fact of owing.' But it would be absurd and quite too forced if a debt of gratitude that was not yet paid should be said to be paid by the mere fact that it was owed. Therefore,

Cicero made a change and substituted a similar word for one which he had dropped, in order to seem to have kept the idea of a comparison of debts, and at the same time retained the careful balance of his period.

That the orator Demosthenes was criticized because of his care for his person and attire, and taunted with foppishness; and that the orator Hortensius also, because of similar foppishness and the use of theatrical gestures when he spoke, was nicknamed Dionysia the dancing-girl.

IT is said that Demosthenes in his dress and other personal habits was excessively spruce, elegant and studied. It was for that reason that he was taunted by his rivals and opponents with his

exquisite, pretty mantles

soft, pretty tunics

In like manner Quintus Hortensius, quite the most renowned orator of his time with the exception of Marcus Tullius, because he dressed with extreme foppishness, arranged the folds of his toga with great care and exactness, and in speaking used his hands to excess in lively gestures, was assailed with gibes and shameful charges; and many taunts were hurled at him, even while he was pleading in court, for appearing like an actor. But when Sulla was on trial, and Lucius Torquatus, a man of somewhat boorish and uncouth nature, with great violence and bitterness did not stop with calling Hortensius an actor in the presence of the assembled jurors, but said that he was a posturer and a Dionysia—which was the name of a notorious dancing-girl—then Hortensius replied in a soft and gentle tone:

I would rather be a Dionysia, Torquatus, yes, a Dionysia, than like you, a stranger to the Muses, to Venus and to Dionysus.

An extract from the speech delivered to the people by Metellus Numidicus when he was censor, urging them to marry; why that speech has been criticized and how on the contrary it has been defended.

A number of learned men were listening to the reading of the speech which Metellus Numidicus, [*](Metellus Numidicus was censor in 102 B.C. Livy (Periocha 59) attributes a speech on this subject to Q. Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus, censor in 131 B.C., which he says was read to the people by Augustus; cf. Suet. Aug. lxxxix. Since Suetonius, who gives the name simply as Q. Metellus, cites the speech under the title De Prole Augenda and the Periocha says that it was delivered ut co g e re nt omnes ducere uxores liberorum creandorum causa, it seems probable that it was not identical with this address of Metellus Numidicus.) an earnest and eloquent man, delivered to the people when he was censor, On Marriage, urging them to be ready to undertake its obligations. In that speech these words were written:

If we could get on without a wife, Romans, we would all avoid that annoyance; but since nature has ordained that we can neither live very comfortably with them nor at all without them, we must take thought for our lasting well-being rather than for the pleasure of the moment.

It seemed to some of the company that Quintus Metellus, whose purpose as censor was to encourage the people to take wives, ought not to have admitted the annoyance and constant inconveniences of the married state; that to do this was not so much to encourage, as to dissuade and deter them. But they said that his speech ought rather to have taken just the opposite tone, insisting that as a rule there were no annoyances in matrimony, and if after all they seemed sometimes to arise, they were slight, insignificant and easily endured, and were completely forgotten in its greater pleasures and

A censor,

ought to speak in one way, an advocate in another. It is the orator's privilege to make statements that are untrue, daring, crafty, deceptive and sophistical, provided they have some semblance of truth and can by any artifice be made to insinuate themselves into the minds of the persons who are to be influenced. Furthermore,

it is disgraceful for an advocate, even though his case be a bad one, to leave anything unnoticed or undefended. But for a Metellus, a blameless man, with a reputation for dignity and sense of honour, addressing the Roman people with the prestige of such a life and course of honours, it was not becoming to say anything which was not accepted as true by himself and by all men, especially when speaking on a subject which was a matter of everyday knowledge and formed a part of the common and habitual experience of life. Accordingly, having admitted the existence of annoyances notorious with all men, and having thus established confidence in his sincerity and truthfulness, he then found it no difficult or uphill work to convince them of what was the soundest and truest of principles, that the State cannot survive without numerous marriages.

This other passage also from the same address of Metellus in my opinion deserves constant reading, not less by Heaven! than the writings of the

The immortal gods have mighty power, but they are not expected to be more indulgent to us than our parents. But parents, if their children persist in wrong-doing, disinherit them. What different application of justice then are we to look for from the immortal gods, unless we put an end to our evil ways? Those alone may fairly claim the favour of the gods who are not their own worst enemies. [*](Sibi is taken by some as referring to dii, but see Lane, Lat. Gr. 2343.) The immortal gods ought to support, not supply, virtue.

In these words of Cicero, from his fifth oration Against Verres, hanc sibi rem praesidio sperant futurum, there is no error in writing or grammar but those are wrong who do violence to good copies by writing futuram; and in that connection mention is also made of another word of Cicero's which, though correct, is wrongly changed; with a few incidental remarks on the melody and cadence of periods for which Cicero earnestly strove.

IN the fifth oration of Cicero Against Verres,[*](ii. 5. 167. ) in a copy of unimpeachable fidelity, since it was the result of Tiro's [*](Cicero's favourite freedman, who not only aided him in his literary work, but also, after the orator's death, collected, arranged, and published his patron's writings, in particular his correspondence.) careful scholarship, is this passage:

Men of low degree and humble birth sail the seas; they come to places which they had never before visited. They are neither known to those to whom they have come nor can they always find acquaintances to vouch for them, yet because of this mere faith in their citizenship they believe that they will be safe, not only before our magistrates, who are constrained by fear of the

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laws and public opinion, and not only among Roman citizens, who are united by the common bond of language, rights, and many interests, but wherever they may come, they hope that this possession will protect them.

It seemed to many that there was an error in the last word. For they thought that futuram should be written instead of futurum, and they were sure that the book ought to be corrected, lest like the adulterer in the comedy of Plautus [*](Bacch. 918.) —for so they jested about the error which they thought they had found—this solecism in an oration of Cicero's should be

caught in the act.

There chanced to be present there a friend of mine, who had become an expert from wide reading and to whom almost all the older literature had been the object of study, meditation and wakeful nights. He, on examining the book, declared that there was no mistake in writing or grammar in that word, but that Cicero had written correctly and in accordance with early usage.

For futurum is not,

While they were being cut to pieces, the forces of the enemy would be busy there (copias . . . futurum)

If you enjoy health proportionate to your own merit and our good-will, we have reason to hope that the gods will bless the good (deos . . . facturum)

If those religious rites should be performed, and the omens should be wholly favourable, the soothsayers declared that everything would proceed as they desired (omnia . . .processurum esse).

Plautus also in the Casina, [*](v. 691.) speaking of a girl, used occisurum, not occisuram in the following passage: Has Casina a sword?—Yes, two of them.— Why two?—With one she'd fain the bailiff slay, With t'other you. So too Laberius in The Twins wrote: [*](v. 51, Ribbeck.3) I thought not she would do (facturum) it. Now, all those men were not unaware of the nature of a solecism, but Gracchus used dicturum, Quadrigarius futurum and facturum, Antias processurum, Plautus occisurum and Laberius facturum, in the infinitive mood, a mood which is not inflected for mood or number or person or tense or gender,

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but expresses them all by one and the same form, just as Marcus Cicero did not use fiturum in the masculine or neuter gender—for that would clearly be a solecism—but employed a form which is independent of any influence of gender.

Furthermore, that same friend of mine used to say that in the oration of that same Marcus Tullius On Pompey's Military Command [*](§ 33.) Cicero wrote the following, and so my friend always read it:

Since you know that your harbours, and those harbours from which you draw the breath of life, were in tile power of the pirates.

1. Número mihi in mentém fuit,

But besides Plautus, whom my friend used as an example in this instance, I myself have come upon a great abundance of such expressions in the early writers, and I have jotted them down here and there in these notes of mine. But quite apart from that rule and those authorities, the very sound and order of the words make it quite clear that it is more in accordance with the careful attention to diction and the rhythmical style of Marcus Tullius that, either

These are his own words from the speech which he delivered On Pomnpey's Military Command: [*](§ 30.)

Sicily is a witness, which, begirt on all sides by many dangers, he freed (explicavit), not by the threat of war, but by his promptness in decision.

An anecdote found in the works of the philosopher Sotion about the courtesan Lais and the orator Demosthenes.

SOTION was a man of the Peripatetic school, far from unknown. He wrote a book filled with wide and varied information and called it Ke/ras )Amalqei/as,[*](The Horn of Amantheia; see Greek Index.) which is about equivalent to The Horn of Plenty.

In that book is found the following anecdote about the orator Demosthenes and the courtesan Lais:

Lais of Corinth,

used to gain a great deal of money by the grace and charm of her beauty, and was frequently visited by wealthy men from all over Greece; but no one was received who did not give what she demanded, and her

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demands were extravagant enough.

1. Not every man may fare to Corinth town, [*](Cf. Horace, Epist. i. 17. 36.)

The great Demosthenes approached her secretly and asked for her favours. But Lais demanded ten thousand drachmas

Amazed and shocked at the woman's great impudence and the vast sum of money demanded, Demosthenes turned away, remarking as he left her: 'I will not buy regret at such a price.'

What the method and what the order of the Pythagorean training was, and the amount of time which was prescribed and accepted as the period for learning and at the same time keeping silence.

IT is said that the order and method followed by Pythagoras, and afterwards by his school and his successors, in admitting and training their pupils were as follows: At the very outset he

physiognomized

auditors.

continence in words,

students of science,

sciences

natural philosophers.

Having thus expressed himself about Pythagoras, my friend Taurus continued: "But nowadays these fellows who turn to philosophy on a sudden with unwashed feet, [*](Proverbial for without preparation.) not content with being wholly 'without purpose, without learning, and without scientific training,' even lay down the law as to how they are to be taught philosophy. One says, 'first teach me this,' another chimes in,' I want to learn this, I don't want to learn that'; one is eager to begin with the Symposiumn of Plato because of the revel of Alcibiades, [*](Ch. 30.) another with the Phaedrus on account of the speech of Lysias. [*](Ch. 6.) By Jupiter!" said he,

one man actually asks to read Plato, not in order to better his life, but to deck out his diction and style, not to gain in discretion, but in prettiness.

But I must not omit this fact either—that all of them, as soon as they had been admitted by Pythagoras into that band of disciples, at once devoted to the common use whatever estate and property they had, and an inseparable fellowship was formed, like the old-time association which in Roman legal parlance was termed an

undivided inheritance.

In what terms the philosopher Favorinus rebuked a young man who used language that was too old-fashioned and archaic.

THE philosopher Favorinus thus addressed a young man who was very fond of old words and made a display in his ordinary, everyday conversation of many expressions that were quite too unfamiliar and archaic:

Curius,

and Fabricius and Coruncanius, men of the olden days, and of a still earlier time than these those famous triplets, the Horatii, talked clearly and intelligibly with their fellows, using the language of their own day, not that of the Aurunci, the Sicani, or the Pelasgi, who are said to have been the earliest inhabitants of Italy. You, on the contrary, just as if you were talking to-day with Evander's mother, [*](Evander, a Greek from Pallanteum in Arcadia, migrated to Italy and settled on the Palatine hill before the coming of Aeneas.) use words that have already been obsolete for many years, because you want no one to know and comprehend what you are saying. Why not accomplish your purpose more fully, foolish fellow, and say nothing at all? But you assert that you love the olden time, because it is honest, sterling, sober and temperate. Live by all means according to the manners of the past, but speak in the language of the present, and always remember and take to heart what Gaius Caesar, a man of surpassing talent and wisdom, wrote in the first book of his treatise On Analogy: [*](A work on grammar in two books, mentioned among the writings of Caesar by Suet. Jul. lvi. 5; Fronto, p. 221, Naber (L.C.L. ii, pp. 29 and 255 ff.); described by Cic. Brut. 253 as de ratione Latine loquendi.) 'Avoid, as you would a rock, a strange and unfamiliar word.'

The statement of the celebrated writer Thucydides, that the Lacedaemonians in battle used pipes and not trumpets, with a citation of his words on that subject; and the remark of Herodotus that king Alyattes had female lyre-players as part of his military equipment; and finally, some notes on the pipe used by Gracchus when addressing assemblies.

THUCYDIDES, the most authoritative of Greek historians, tells us [*](v. 70.) that the Lacedaemonians, greatest of warriors, made use in battle, not of signals by horns or trumpets, but of the music of pipes, certainly not in conformity with any religious usage or from any ceremonial reason, nor yet that their courage might be roused and stimulated, which is the purpose of horns and trumpets; but on the contrary that they might be calmer and advance in better order, because the effect of the flute-player's notes is to restrain impetuosity. So firmly were they convinced that in meeting the enemy and beginning battle nothing contributed more to valour and confidence than to be soothed by gentler sounds and keep their feelings under control. Accordingly, when the army was drawn up, and began to advance in battle-array against the foe, pipers stationed in the ranks began to play. Thereupon, by this quiet, pleasant, and even solemn prelude the fierce impetuosity of the soldiers was checked, in conformity with a kind of discipline of military music, so to speak, so that they might not rush forth in straggling disorder.

But I should like to quote the very words of that outstanding writer, which have greater distinction and credibility than my own:

And after this the

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attack began. The Argives and their allies rushed forward eagerly and in a rage, but the Lacedaemonians advanced slowly to the music of many flute-players stationed at regular intervals; this not for any religious reason, but in order that they might make the attack while marching together rhythmically, and that their ranks might not be broken, which commonly happens to great armies when they advance to the attack.

Tradition has it that the Cretans also commonly entered battle with the lyre playing before them and regulating their step. Futhermore, Alyattes, king of the land of Lydia, a man of barbaric manners and luxury, when he made war on the Milesians, as Herodotus tells us in his History, [*](i. 17.) had in his army and his battle-array orchestras of pipe and lyre-players, and even female flute-players, such as are the delight of wanton banqueters. Homer, however, says [*](Iliad, iii. 8.) that the Achaeans entered battle, relying, not on the music of lyres and pipes, but on silent harmony and unanimity of spirit:

1. In silence came the Achaeans, breathing rage,
2. Resolved in mind on one another's aid.

What then is the meaning of that soul-stirring shout of the Roman soldiers which, as the annalists have told us, was regularly raised when charging the foe? [*](This is approved by Julius Caesar, Bell. Civ. iii. 92. 5.) Was that done contrary to so generally accepted a rule of old-time discipline? Or are a quiet advance and silence needful when an army is marching against an enemy that is far off and visible from a distance, but when they have almost come to blows, then must the foe, already at close quarters, be driven back by a violent assault and terrified by shouting?

But, look you, the Laconian pipe-playing reminds me also of that oratorical pipe, which they say was played for Gaius Gracchus when he addressed the people, and gave him the proper pitch. But it is not at all true, as is commonly stated, that a musician always stood behind him as he spoke, playing the pipe, and by varying the pitch now restrained and now animated his feelings and his delivery. For what could be more absurd than that a piper should play measures, notes, and a kind of series of changing melodies for Gracchus when addressing an assembly, as if for a dancing mountebank? But more reliable authorities declare that the musician took his place unobserved in the audience and at intervals sounded on a short pipe a deeper note, to restrain and calm the exuberant energy of the orator's delivery. And that in my opinion is the correct view, for it is unthinkable that Gracchus' well-known natural vehemence needed any incitement or impulse from without. Yet Marcus Cicero thinks that the piper was employed by Gracchus for both purposes, in order that with notes now soft, now shrill, he might animate his oratory when it was becoming weak and feeble, or check it when too violent and passionate. I quote Cicero's own words: [*](De Orat. iii. 225.)

And so this same Gracchus, Catulus, as you may hear from your client Licinius, an educated man, who was at that time Gracchus' slave and amanuensis, [*](The more usual expression for amanuensis is (servus) a manu, but ad manum also occurs.) used to have a skilful musician stand behind him in concealment when he addressed an audience, who could quickly breathe a note to arouse the speaker if languid, or recall him from undue vehemence.

Finally, Aristotle wrote in his volume of Problems [*](The marching of the cowards, because of their fear, would not be in time with the music.) that the custom of the Lacedaemonians which I have mentioned, of entering battle to the music of pipers, was adopted in order to make the fearlessness and ardour of the soldiers more evident and indubitable.

For,

distrust and fear are not at all consistent with an advance of that kind, and such an intrepid and rhythmical advance cannot be made by the faint-hearted and despondent.

Why, when on the point of encountering danger, did they advance to music of the pipe? In order to detect the cowards by their failure to keep time.

AT what age, from what kind of family, by what rites, ceremonies and observances, and under what title a Vestal virgin is

taken

Those who have written about

taking

Now, as soon as the Vestal virgin is chosen, escorted to the House of Vesta and delivered to the pontiffs, she immediately passes from the control of her father without the ceremony of emancipation or loss of civil rights, and acquires the right to make a will.

But as to the method and ritual for choosing a Vestal, there are, it is true, no ancient written records,

taken

Now the Vestal is said to be

taken,

I take thee, Amata, as one who has fulfilled all the legal requirements, to be priestess of Vesta, to perform the rites which it is lawful for a Vestal to perform for the Roman people, the Quirites.

Now, many think that the term

taken

taken.

Publius Cornelius, the first to receive the surname Sulla, was taken to be flamen of Jupiter.

Yet they say that they wished to revolt. I myself at the present moment wish a thorough knowledge of the pontifical law; shall I therefore be taken as chief pontiff? If I wish to understand the science of augury thoroughly, shall anyone for that reason take me as augur?

Furthermore, in the Commentaries on the Twelve Tables compiled by Labeo [*](Fr. 24, Huschke; 2, Bremer. The comment quoted by Gellius is on Twelve Tables V. 1.) we find this passage:

A Vestal virgin is not heir to any intestate person, nor is anyone her heir, should she die without making a will, but her property, they say, reverts to the public treasury. The legal principle involved is an unsettled question.

The Vestal is called

Amata

On the philosophical question, what would be more proper on receipt of an order-to do scrupulously what was commanded, or sometimes even to disobey, in the hope that it would be more advantageous to the giver of the order; and an exposition of varying views on that subject.

IN interpreting, evaluating and weighing the obligations which the philosophers call kaqh/konta, or

duties,

I think that this question of obedience to commands of such a nature will be more clearly defined, if I add the example set by Publius Crassus Mucianus, a distinguished and eminent man. This Crassus is said by Sempronius Asellio [*](Fr. 8, Peter.) and several other writers of Roman history to have had the five greatest and chiefest of blessings; for he was very rich, of the highest birth, exceedingly eloquent, most learned in the law, and chief pontiff. When he, in his consulship, was in command in [*](In the year of his consulship (131 B.C.) he was sent with an army against Aristonicus, who laid claim to the kingdom of Pergamum, which Attalus III had bequeathed to the Romans.) the province of Asia, and was making preparations to beset and assault Leucae, he needed a long, stout beam from which to make a battering-ram, to breach the walls of that city. Accordingly, he wrote to the chief engineer of the people of Mylatta, [*](The text seems hopelessly corrupt. We perhaps have a fusion of e)pa/rxwn a)rxitekto/nwn (Dittenberger3, 804. 5) and its equivalent magister( == praefectus) fabrumt. With a)rxite/ktona (Hertz), the meaning would be 'builder. With matgistrumn (Hosius), the chief magistrate, or perhaps a ship-captain (sc. navis). For the town, Bergk proposed Mytilene; Hosius, Myrina. The MSS. suggest Mylasa (Mylassa, Mylatta).) allies and friends of the Romans, to have the larger of two masts which he had seen in their city sent him. Then the chief engineer on learning the purpose for which Crassus wanted the mast, did not send him the larger, as had been ordered, but the smaller, which he thought was more suitable, and better adapted for

What was said and done by Gaius Fabricius, a man of great renown and great deeds, but of simple establishment and little money, when the Samnites offered him a great amount of gold, in the belief that he was a poor man.

JULIUS HYGINUS, in the sixth book of his work On the Lizes and Deeds of Famous Men,[*](Fr. 3, Peter.) says that a deputation from the Samnites came to Gaius Fabricius, the Roman general, and after mentioning his many important acts of kindness and generosity to the Samnites since peace was restored, offered him a present of a large sum of money, begging that he would accept and use it. And they said that they did this because they saw that his house and mode of life were far from magnificent, and that he was not so well provided for as his high rank demanded. Thereupon Fabricius passed his open hands from his ears to his eyes, then down to his nose, his mouth, his throat, and finally to the lower part of his belly; then he replied to the envoys:

So long as I can restrain and control all those members which I have touched, I shall never lack

v1.p.73

anything; therefore I cannot accept money, for which I have no use, from those who, I am sure, do have use for it.

What a tiresome and utterly hateful fault is vain and empty loquacity, and how often it has been censured in deservedly strong language by the greatest Greek and Latin writers.

THE talk of empty-headed, vain and tiresome babblers, who with no foundation of solid matter let out a stream of tipsy, tottering words, has justly been thought to come from the lips and not from the heart. Moreover, men say that the tongue ought not to be unrestrained and rambling, but guided and, so to speak, steered by cords connected with the heart and inmost breast. Yet you may see some men spouting forth words with no exercise of judgment, but with such great and profound assurance that many of them in the very act of speaking are evidently unaware that they are talking. Ulysses, on the contrary, a man gifted with sagacious eloquence, spoke, not from his lips but from his heart, as Hommer says—a remark which applies less to the sound and quality of his utterance than to the depth of the thoughts inwardly conceived; and the poet went on to say, with great aptness, that the teeth form a rampart to check wanton words, in order that reckless speech may not only be restrained by that watchful sentry the heart, but also hedged in by a kind of outpost, so to speak, stationed at the lips.

The words of Homer which I mentioned above are these: [*](Iliad, iii. 221.)

1. When from his breast his mighty voice went forth

1. What a word has passed the barrier of your teeth.

Provided this fact be recognized, that neither should one commend the dumbness of a man who knows a subject, but is unable to give it expression in speech, nor the ignorance of one who lacks knowledge of his subject, but abounds in words; yet if one must choose one or the other alternative, I for my part would prefer tongue-tied knowledge to ignorant loquacity.

For what is so insane as the empty sound of words, however well-chosen and elegant, if there be no foundation of sense or sagacity?

That man is never silent who is afflicted with the disease of talking, as one in a lethargy is afflicted with that of drinking and sleeping. For if you should not come together when he calls an assembly, so eager is he to talk that he would hire someone to listen. And so you hear him, but you do not listen, just as if he were a quack. For a quack's words are heard, but no one trusts himself

v1.p.77

to him when he is sick.

For a crust of bread he can be hired either to keep silence or to speak.

of measureless speech,

a reckless babbler,

disordered,

he chattered

1. In chatter excellent, unable quite to speak,

Talkative rather than eloquent.

1. The greatest of man's treasures is the tongue,
2. Which wins most favour when it spares its words
3. And measured is of movement.

1. Thou art not skilled in speech, yet silence cannot keep,

Who, though he could not speak, could not be silent.

I once heard Favorinus say that the familiar lines of Euripides: [*](Bacch. 386.)

1. Of unrestrained mouth
2. And of lawless folly
3. Is disaster the end,

given to talk.

a certain amount of eloquence but little discretion,

abundant talkativeness, too little discretion,

Finally, loquacity of this kind and a disorderly mass of empty grandiloquence is scored with striking epithets by Aristophanes, wittiest of poets, in the following lines: [*](Frogs, 837 ff., Rogers (L. C. L.). The epithets are applied to Aeschylus!)

1. A stubborn-creating, stubborn-pulling fellow,
2. Uncurbed, unfettered, uncontrolled of speech,
3. Unperiphrastic, bombastiloquent.

That those words of Quadrigarius in the third book of his Annals,

there a thousand of men is killed,

QUADRIGARIUS in the third book of his Annals[*](Fr. 44, Peter.) wrote the following: "There a thousand of men is killed," using occiditur, not occiduntur. So too Lucilius in the third book of his Satires,

1. From gate to gate a thousand of paces is.
2. Thence to Salcrnum six, [*](v. 124, Marx, who has exinde for sex inde and supplies sumus, mus profecti.)

To the beginning of Romulus' reign is more than a thousand and one hundred years,

From there it is nearly a thousand of paces.

Is the middle Janus [*](The middle Janus was the seat of money-lenders and bankers. As a district it extended along the northern side of the Forum Romanum. The Janus itself was near the basilica Aemlia, perhaps at the entrance to the Argiletum.) so subject to the patronage of Lucius Antonius? Who has ever been found in that Janus who would lend Lucius Antonius a thousand of sesterces?

In these and many other passages mile is used in the singular number, and that is not, as some think, a concession to early usage or admitted as a neat figure of speech, but it is obviously demanded

thousand,

a thousand

There is a thousand of denarii in the chest,

There is a thousand of horsemen in the army.

1. This horse no jolting fine Campanian steed,
2. Though he has passed him by one thousand, aye
3. And twain, of paces, can in a longer course
4. Compete with, but he will in fact appear
5. To run the other way.

1. With sesterces a thousand you can gain
2. A hundred thousand.

Before the estate of Clodius, where fully a thousand of

v1.p.85

ablebodied men was employed on those crazy substructures,

were employed,

a thousand men,

a thousand of men.

The patience with which Socrates endured his wife's shrewish disposition; and in that connection what Marcus Varro says in one of his satires about the duty of a husband.

XANTHIPPE, the wife of the philosopher Socrates, is said to have been ill-tempered and quarrelsome to a degree, with a constant flood of feminine tantrums and annoyances day and night. Alcibiades, amazed at this outrageous conduct of hers towards her husband, asked Socrates what earthly reason he had for not showing so shrewish a woman the door.

Because,

it is by enduring such a person at home that I accustom and train myself to bear more easily away from home the impudence and injustice of other persons.

In the same vein Varro also said in the Menippean Satire [*](Varro's Menippean Satires, in 150 books, based to some extent on the Speudoge/loion of Menippus, a Cynic philosopher of the third century B.C., treated in a mixture of prose and verse a great variety of moral and serious topics in a playful and sometimes jocose manner. For other titles see Index under (M.) Terentius Varro, and for the fragments, Bücheler's Petronius, 3d. ed., Berlin, 1882, pp. 161 ff.) which he entitled On the Duty of a Husband: [*](Fr 83, Bücheler.)

A wife's faults must be either put down or put up with. He who puts down her faults, makes his wife more agreeable; he who puts up with them, improves himself.

correct.

How Marcus Varro, in the fourteenth book of his Antiquities of Man, [*](Fr. 99, Agahd. In the lemma, or chapter heading, Varro's statement is wrongly reffered to the Antiquities of Man, the other division of his great work Antiquitatum Libri XLI, treating the political and religious institutions of the Romans. Only scanty fragments have survived.) criticizes his master Lucius Aelius for a false etymology; and how Varro in his turn, in the same book, gives a false origin for fur.

IN the fourteenth book of his Divine Antiquities[*](Fr. 99, Agahd. In the lemma, or chapter heading, Varro's statement is wrongly referred to the Antiquities of Man, the other division of his great work Antiquitatum Libri XLI, treating the political and religious institutions of the Romans. Only scanty fragments have survived.) Marcus Varro shows that Lucius Aelius, the most learned Roman of his time, went astray and followed a false etymological principle in separating an old Greek word which had been taken over into the Roman language into two Latin words, just as if it were of Latin origin.

I quote Varro's own words on the subject:

In this regard our countryman Lucius Aelius, the most gifted man of letters within my memory, was sometimes misled. For he gave false derivations of several early Greek words, under the impression that they were native to our tongue. We do not use the word lepus ('hare') because the animal is levipes ('light-footed'), as he asserts, but because it is an old Greek word. Many of the early words of that people are unfamiliar, because to-day the Greeks use other words in their place; and it may not be generally known that among these are Graecus, for which they now use (/Ellhn, puteus ('well') which

v1.p.89

they call fre/ar, and lepus, which they call lagwo/s. But as to this, far from disparaging Aelius' ability, I commend his diligence; for it is good fortune that brings success, endeavour that deserves praise.

Tis is what Varro wrote in the first part of his book, with great skill in the explanation of words, with wide knowledge of the usage of both languages, and marked kindliness towards Aelius himself. But in the latter part of the same book he says that fur is so called because the early Romans used furvus for ater (

black

thief,

black,

The story of king Tarquin the Proud and the Sibylline Books.

IN ancient annals we find this tradition about the Sibylline Books. An old woman, a perfect stranger, came to king Tarquin the Proud, bringing nine books; she declared that they were oracles of the gods and that she wished to sell them. Tarquin inquired the price; the woman demanded an

Sibylline

On what the geometers call e)pi/pedos, stereo/s, ku/bos and grammh/, with the Latin equivalents for all these terms.

OF the figures which the geometers call sxh/mata there are two kinds,

plane

solid.

plane

solid

pyramids,

like the dice,

with which we play on a gaming-board, for which reason the dice themselves are called ku/boi

Pythagoras declared that the cube of the number three controls the course of the moon, since the moon passes through its orbit in twenty-seven days, and the ternio, or

triad,

Furthermore, our geometers apply the term linea, or

line,

A line,

is length without breadth or height.

height

A line is mh=kos a)plate/s, or 'breadthless length.'