Institutio Oratoria

Quintilian

Quintilian. Institutio Oratoria, Volume 1-4. Butler, Harold Edgeworth, translator. Cambridge, Mass; London: Harvard University Press, William Heinemann Ltd., 1920-1922.

Again, what would eloquence do if deprived of the artifices of amplification and its opposite? of which the first requires the gift of signifying more than we say, that is emphasis, together with exaggeration and overstatement of the truth, while the latter requires the power to diminish and palliate. What scope is there for the stronger emotions if the orator is not allowed to give free rein

v7-9 p.377
to his speech, to flame out in anger, to reproach, to wish or execrate? Or for the milder emotions without the assistance of commendation, conciliation and humour?

What pleasure can an orator hope to produce, or what impression even of the most moderate learning, unless he knows how to fix one point in the minds of the audience by repetition, and another by dwelling on it, how to digress from and return to his theme, to divert the blame from himself and transfer it to another, or to decide what points to omit and what to ignore as negligible? It is qualities such as these that give life and vigour to oratory; without them it lies torpid like a body lacking the breath to stir its limbs.

But more than the mere possession of these qualities is required; they must be deployed, each in their proper place and with such variety that every sound may bewitch the hearer with all the charm of music. But these qualities are as a rule open and direct, manifesting themselves without disguise. They do, however, as I have said, admit of figures, as the instances to which I shall proceed will show.

What is more common than to ask or enquire? For both terms are used indifferently, although the one seems to imply a desire for knowledge, and the other a desire to prove something. But whichever term we use, the thing which they represent admits a variety of figures. We will begin with those which serve to increase the force and cogency of proof to which I assign the first place.

A simple question may be illustrated by the line: [*]( quanquam, Spalding: quam cum, A: cum, B. )

  1. But who are ye and from what shores are come?
On the other hand, a question involves a figure,
v7-9 p.379
whenever it is employed not to get information, but to emphasise our point, as in the following examples: [*](pro. Lig. iii. 9 and in Cat. i. 1. )
What was that sword of yours doing, Tubero, that was drawn on the field of Pharsalus?
and
How long, Catiline, will you abuse our patience?
and
Do you not see that your plots are all laid bare?
with the whole passage that follows.

How much greater is the fire of his words as they stand than if he had said,

You have abused our patience a long time,
and
Your plots are all laid bare.
We may also ask what cannot be denied, as
Was Gaius Fidiculanius Falcula, I ask you, brought to justice?
[*](pro Cluent. xxxvii. 103. ) Or we may put a question to which it is difficult to reply, as in the common forms,
How is it possible?
How can that be?

Or we may ask a question with a view to throw odium on the person to whom it is addressed, as in the words placed by Seneca in the mouth of Medea: [*](Med. 451. )

  1. What lands dost bid me seek?
Or our aim may be to excite pity, as is the case with the question asked by Sinon in Virgil: [*](Aen. ii. 69. )
  1. Alas, what lands, lie cried,
  2. What seas can now receive me?
Or to embarrass our opponent and to deprive him of the power to feign ignorance of our meaning, as Asinius does in the following sentence:
Do you hear? The will which we impugn is the work of a madman, not of one who lacked natural affection.
In fact questions admit of infinite variety.