Institutio Oratoria

Quintilian

Quintilian. Institutio Oratoria, Volume 1-4. Butler, Harold Edgeworth, translator. Cambridge, Mass; London: Harvard University Press, William Heinemann Ltd., 1920-1922.

Further there are cases where a senator sets forth to the senate the reasons which determine him to commit suicide, [*]( Based on a law of Massilia, where the state provided poison for the would-be suicide, provided he could justify himself before the senate. ) in which there is one legal question, namely, whether a man who desires to kill himself in order to escape the clutches of the law ought to be prevented from so doing, while the remaining questions are all concerned with quality. There are also fictitious cases concerned with wills, in which the only question raised is one of quality, as, for instance, in the controversial theme quoted above, [*](VII. i. 38.) where the philosopher, physician and orator all claim the fourth share which their father had left to the most worthy of his sons. The same is true of cases where suitors of equal rank claim the hand of an orphan and the question confronting her relatives is which is the most suitable.

I do not, however, intend to discuss every possible theme,

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since fresh ones can always be invented, nor yet to deal with all the questions to which they give rise, since these vary with circumstances. But I cannot help expressing my astonishment that Flavus, [*](i.e. Verginius mentioned in § 24. ) for whose authority I have the highest respect, restricted the range of quality to such an extent in the text-book which he composed for the special guidance of the schools.

Quantity also, as I have already stated, [*](§ 16.) falls as a rule, though not always, under the head of quality, whether it is concerned with measure or number. Measure, however, sometimes consists in the valuation of a deed with a view to determining the amount of guilt or the amount of benefit involved, while, on the other hand, it sometimes turns on a point of law, when the dispute is under what law a man is to be punished or rewarded.

For example is a ravisher to pay 10,000 sesterces [*](cp. IV. ii. 69. ) because that is the penalty appointed by law, or is he liable to capital punishment as a murderer because his victim hanged himself? In such cases those who plead as if there were a question between two laws, are wrong: for there is no dispute about the fine of 10,000, since it is not claimed by the prosecution.

The point on which judgment has to be delivered is whether the accused is guilty of causing his victim's death. The same type of case will also bring conjecture into play, when, for example, the question in dispute is whether the accused shall be punished with banishment for life or for five years. For the question then is whether he caused his death willingly or not.

Again, there are questions concerned with numerical quantity which turn on a point of law, such as the questions whether thirty

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rewards are due to Thrasybulus, [*](i.e. for his overthrow of the thirty tyrants; cp. II. vi. 26. ) or whether, when two thieves have stolen a sum of money, they are each to be required to refund fourfold or twofold. But in these cases, too, valuation of the act is necessary, and yet the point of law also turns on quality.