Institutio Oratoria

Quintilian

Quintilian. Institutio Oratoria, Volume 1-4. Butler, Harold Edgeworth, translator. Cambridge, Mass; London: Harvard University Press, William Heinemann Ltd., 1920-1922.

So far we have been dealing entirely with

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admitted facts. Let us now return to the claimant. Unless he is hopelessly unintelligent, surely the following argument will suggest itself:—
If the law bars the way, there is no ground for action and the trial becomes a farce. But it is beyond question that the law exists and that the uneducated son did commit the offence for which it enacts a punishment.
What then shall we say?
I had no education.

But if the law applies to all men, it will be of no avail to plead lack of education. We must therefore try to discover whether there be not some point on which the law can be invalidated. We turn for guidance to nature (a point on which I cannot insist too often); what does she suggest save that when the letter of the law is against us, we should discuss its intention? This introduces the general question whether we are to stand by the letter or the spirit. But if we argue this question on general grounds with reference to law in the abstract, we shall go on for ever; it is a question that has never been decided. We must therefore restrict our enquiry to the particular law on which our case turns and try to find some argument against adhesion to the strict letter.

Well, then, is everyone who fails to appear in defence of his father to be disinherited? Are there no exceptions to the rule? At this point the following arguments will spontaneously suggest themselves.

Is an infant liable to the law?
For we may imagine a case where the son is an infant and has failed to appear in his father's support. Again
does the law apply to a man who was away from home or absent on military service or on an embassy?
We have gained a considerable amount of ground; for we
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have established the fact that a man may fail to appear for his father and still inherit.

Our declaimer, who has thought out this line of argument, must now pass over like a Latin flute-player, as Cicero says, [*](Pro Mur. xii. 26. The flute-player went from one actor to another, according as each required accompaniment. ) to the side of the eloquent son and reply,

Granted, but you are not an infant, you were not away from home nor absent on military service.
Is there any answer to this except the previous reply,
I am an uneducated man
?

But to this there is the obvious retort,

Even if you could not actually plead, you might have supported him by your presence,
which is no more than the simple truth. The uneducated son must therefore return to the intention of the legislator.
He wished to punish unfilial conduct, but I am not unfilial.

To this the eloquent son will reply,

The action whereby you deserved disinheritance was unfilial, although penitence or desire for display may have subsequently led you to choose this as your reward. Further, it was owing to you that our father was condemned, since by absenting yourself you appeared to imply that you thought him guilty.
The uneducated son replies,
Nay, you contributed to his condemnation, for you had given offence to many and made our family unpopular.
These arguments are based on conjecture, as also will be the excuse put forward by the uneducated son to the effect that his father advised his absence, as he did not wish to emperil his whole family. All these arguments are involved in the preliminary question as to the letter and the intention of the law.