Institutio Oratoria
Quintilian
Quintilian. Institutio Oratoria, Volume 1-4. Butler, Harold Edgeworth, translator. Cambridge, Mass; London: Harvard University Press, William Heinemann Ltd., 1920-1922.
We praise Demosthenes [*](Phil. i. 2. ) for his sagacity because when he urged a policy of war upon the Athenians after they had met with a series of reverses, he
since he feared to give offence if he taxed the people with lack of energy in defending the liberties of their country, he preferred to praise their ancestors for their courageous policy. Thus lie gained a ready hearing, with the natural result that the pride which they felt in the heroic past made them repent of their own degenerate behaviour.
If we turn to Cicero, we shall find that one speech alone, the pro Cluenltio, will suffice to provide a number of examples. The difficulty is to know what special exhibition of sagacity to admire most in this speech. His opening statement of the case, by which he discredited the mother whose authority pressed so hardly on her son? [*](vi. 17.) The fact that he preferred to throw the charge of having bribed the jury back upon his opponents rather than deny it on account of what he calls the notorious infamy of the verdict? [*](i 4.) Or his recourse, last of all, to the support of the law in spite of the odious nature of the affair, a method by which lie would have set the judges against him but for the fact that he had already softened their feelings towards him? [*]( lii. 143 sqq. ) Or the skill which lie shows in stating that he has adopted this course in spite of the protests of his client? [*](lii. 114, 148, 149.)
What again am I to select as an outstanding instance of his sagacity in the pro Milone? The fact that he refrains from proceeding to his statement of facts until he has cleared the ground by disposing of the previous verdicts against the accused? [*](cp. Quint. III. vi. 93. ) The manner in which he turns the
to say that there is nothing not merely in oratory, but in all the tasks of life that is more important than sagacity and that without it all formal instruction is given in vain, while prudence unsupported by learning will accomplish more than learning unsupported by prudence. It is sagacity again that teaches us to adapt our speech to circumstances of time and place and to the persons with whom we are concerned. But since this topic covers a wide field and is intimately connected with eloquence itself, I shall reserve my treatment of it till I come to give instructions on the subject of appropriateness in speaking. [*]( In XI. i. cp. I. v. 1. )
I think that enough has been said on the subject of invention. For I have dealt not merely with the methods by which we may instruct the judge, but also with the means of appealing to his emotions. But just as it is not sufficient for those who are erecting a building merely to collect stone and timber and other building materials, but skilled masons are required to arrange and place them, so in speaking, however abundant the matter may be, it will merely form a confused heap unless arrangement be employed to reduce it to order and to give it connexion and firmness of structure.